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
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



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








JAMES OUTRAM





Faithfully yours
W. W. W.

Portrait by Louis Brown, from a Daguerotype by Claudet

JAMES OUTRAM

A BIOGRAPHY

BY

MAJOR-GEN. SIR F. J. GOLDSMID, C.B., K.C.S.I.

'Whose spirit lent a fire
Even to the dullest peasant in his camp'

SHAKESPEARE, *Henry IV.* Pt. II. Act. I, Sc. I

WITH ILLUSTRATIONS AND MAPS

IN TWO VOLUMES


VOL. I.

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1880


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TO
THE DOWAGER
LADY OUTRAM

These Volumes are respectfully Dedicated

WITH THE ASSURANCE THAT
HAD WILL BEEN POWER
THEY WOULD NOT HAVE ILLUSTRATED
DEFECTIVE WORKMANSHIP
IN THE TREATMENT OF AMPLE MATERIALS
AND
AN INSPIRING SUBJECT



PREFACE.

SEVENTEEN years ago, in accordance with the expressed desire of Sir James himself, the late Sir John Kaye had agreed to write the 'Life of Outram.' What ability and power this brilliant writer would have brought to bear upon his task, the many readers of his 'War in Afghanistan' and other books will readily understand. But ill-health and press of official and literary work interfered to prevent progress; and eventually Sir John Kaye died without carrying out his intention. When in Paris during the winter of 1877-78, the question was referred to me whether I would assume this unfulfilled responsibility. Engaged at the time in the completion of an official report connected with a mission to the French island of Réunion, from which I had but just returned, the prospect of continued employment was agreeable to me. Though recently out of State harness, I had not been so chafed by the yoke of Fixed Occupation as to seek to throw it off altogether: nor was I ambitious of a Leisure for which I did not possess the conventional qualifications.

In undertaking, then, more than two years ago, to write the biography of one whose name is a household word, not only in England and British India, but throughout the civilised world, I perhaps laid myself open to a charge of imprudence, if not actual presumption. But the subject

presented was of so great attraction, and the proposal made was of so flattering a kind, that, in the weakness of human nature, I succumbed.

While prosecuting the task undertaken, however, I have found my labours considerably lightened, and in one sense my responsibilities materially lessened, by the cordial and continuous assistance received from a member of Sir James Outram's family. I was aware from the very first that my materials would be abundant; and a glance at those materials, when coming into my possession, convinced me that they had been arranged in the most careful and methodical manner: but I could not at the outset have anticipated how much I should have become indebted to any individual helper for the suggestions, paragraphs, and illustrative details of which I have availed myself freely in the course of the work. Had the biography been confined to certain chapters, such as those on the Mutiny campaign, I must have associated the name of my assistant with my own, as that of a distinct *collaborateur*.

My own personal knowledge of Sir James Outram was but slight. I was a fellow-passenger with him for a short voyage in 1849: and some three years later was privileged to meet him at a dinner in Bombay, when, to the best of my recollection, there were no other guests. But I had naturally heard and learnt much of his character and career, and had had especially good opportunities of studying and appreciating a section of his work; for it fell to my lot to investigate the claims of the Ex-Amirs of Haidarabad, Khairpur, and Mirpur—both as a Deputy, working under the Collector of Shikarpur, and as Assistant Commissioner for the settlement of alienations of land and revenue in the Province

of Sind. A long residence in those parts, and subsequent political employment in Baluchistan, Western Afghanistan, and Persia, have, moreover, given me some practical training in a field by no means the least important of those in which Outram passed some of the best years of his life.

It is like standing on the threshold of platitudes, to say that a published biography should have an object beyond the indulgence of family wishes, or compliance with friendly opinion. And to explain that object to be the instruction of the reader, or, more generally, the better being of the human species, may be to repeat a mere truism. But we may assert, in less hackneyed and equally relevant phraseology, that the lives of illustrious men are comparatively useless records to after generations, unless they contain plain lessons which those who run may read: and the one fact which should be apparent in all—namely, that no successful career is without its episodes of crosses and failures—may convey a trite moral, but is an ever fresh, wholesome, and practical text of sermons.

Many hundreds, it may be thousands, of those to whom the name of Sir James Outram has become familiar, irrespective of the multitude who contemplate his bust in Westminster Abbey, or sit under his statue on the Thames Embankment, picture to themselves the successful soldier-statesman, who has risen to eminence by the usual routine of conquering arms and well-applied diplomacy. Among them many will have heard that he had had differences with his Government, and differences with individuals; and that his professional labours led him, more than once, not only within the treacherous precincts of paper controversy, but to submit official appeals and protests against treatment which he him-

self had experienced at the hands of local authority. But few can realise the pain which this extra-professional work must have cost him, or how much valuable time, and moral and physical energy were thus expended without profit. Apart from the feelings of the individual sufferer, in respect of severed friendships and mistaken motives, who can say how much good service to the State has been impaired by the misapplication of State power towards an enthusiastically loyal servant? The great lesson to be learnt here is not, however, to be restricted in its meaning to young men whose conduct is moulded on illustrious exemplars. It is twofold : one for those in high places, if they will accept it ; the other for aspirants, who will be sure to search it out. For the former, if put into conventional shape, it would read much after the manner of one or more of the following propositions :—

‘Do not refuse to your official agents that consideration which you are ever ready to accord your friends, even when they are no longer fulfilling the particular duty for which you think them qualified. Do not assume that fitness for strange and rough work implies necessarily the absence of refined sentiment, or is incompatible with a keen sensitiveness. If it be the proper task of diplomatists to humour the weaknesses of those with whom they have to do, and generally to gather advantage from a knowledge of human character—so is it the duty of statesmen high in office, to study the dispositions of their confidential agents, and studiously avoid wounding them in tender points. The willing horse should never be allowed to get out of condition, or to have any real cause of complaint against his employers. If a servant of the State has earned his reward,

assuredly he has earned the right to receive and wear the honours conferred upon him.'

Outram eventually triumphed, and his triumph completes the moral lesson of his life in its fitness for the study of rising generations. But a less strong man than he might have sunk under like circumstances. Should this be?

In any case it is hoped that one old familiar Truth will be discerned between the lines of the Biography now submitted to the reader. It is that, independently of work which claims, and often obtains the recognition of the State, there is something also to be done which brings its own reward from the consciousness that it belongs to a higher cause than that of Governments; something which, if only part fulfilment of the great duty of man to his neighbour, is to human ken admirable in its very imperfection. Outram's friends and contemporaries have not been slow to appreciate in his character an overflowing benevolence void of all cant or pretension.

But let us glance for a moment on the more practical uses of a mind like his upon the questions of the present day. Does he not help us in any way to interpret the Afghan puzzle which English statesmen and soldiers are now seeking to understand; and which is after all, perhaps, as likely to be resolved by Chance or Circumstance, as by any fixed lines of policy? We say not this in any disparagement of authority, nor to lay a charge of unwisdom at the door of any of our rulers. Have not the last forty years' experience of the Afghan people taught us that Outram's first recorded estimate of them was a right one; and that the rules he laid down for our guidance in 1839 are, in 1880, equally applicable to our dealings with these faithless intriguers?

We believe that fair conclusions in this respect may be formed on the information contained in the following pages ; though we cannot but feel that, had our work been confined to one phase only of a busy life, very much more might with propriety have been quoted to enlighten the reader.

He admitted the impolicy of any interference on our part 'with the internal affairs of the Herátis, or generally of Afghanistan.' On this subject he thus wrote from Baghdad in May 1857, to the late Lord Lyveden :—'Nothing is more to be deprecated, in my opinion, than the most *distant* attempt on our part to side with this or that chieftain, much less to foster a policy for incorporating the whole of that country under one rule or ruler. Any such scheme, however cautiously pursued, would involve us in inextricable difficulties, and be followed with one only result—failure—as regards any solid advantage which our Indian Empire would reap therefrom. *The time is not come* for British intervention to effect any good among the Afghans themselves ; and the consolidation of an Afghan empire, under present circumstances, and *in view of the geographical position of that country*, might be attended with serious inconvenience, as well to our north-west frontier as to our political relations with Russia and Persia.' The italics are not in the original, but emphasise expressions to be borne in mind by those who consider them in 1880. I would solicit attention to the fact that neither in the above quotation, nor in any other of the writer's recorded opinions, is there anything like an assertion that British interference could *never* be judiciously exercised in Afghanistan ; nor that a consolidated Empire was a *sine quâ non* for the better government of three substantially separate States as Herat, Kabul, and Kandahar.

His views on the advisability of restricting our frontier to the Indus caused him to regret up to the closing years of his life, that we had ever shackled ourselves with the Pesháwar valley: but let no politicians urge this as a reason for making a retrograde movement towards the river line after the events which have transpired under the last three Viceroy's of India. For my own part—whatever judgment he might have formed on the 'Scientific Frontier' and our responsibilities along the Suliman range of mountains—I do not believe that Sir James Outram, had he been now living to give his counsel, would—with his knowledge of the Afghans and their Persian neighbours, and the exterior influences bearing upon both—have advised withdrawal from our position in Kandahar.

Independently of politics, Outram has done more to enlighten the world on the geography of Afghanistan and Baluchistan than has been hitherto placed to his credit. From Bamian to Sonmiani is a long stretch of country, in parts of which he was the first English explorer; the mountain track by which he hit the Kabul road leading to Bamian—the diversions made to attack the Ghilzai forts between Kabul and Kwatta—the alternative route to Pottinger's, by which Bala was reached from Kalát—all these may need something more of acknowledgment to him than has been yet accorded by books and maps. Scientific accuracy may be wanting in actual mapping; but where the information imparted has been turned to good account, should not the giver of it be recognised with all due honour?

With regard to the spelling of Oriental names, the principle which I have adopted is to transliterate *generally* on Dr. Hunter's system; substituting *u*, *i*, and *a* (ä) for the

old *oo*, *ee*, and *u* respectively—with an occasional accent ', where necessary, to guide the pronunciation of less practised readers. Where *kh* is used, it represents the corresponding letter in the Arabic word *khair*, or the two letters in the Sanskrit *dukh*. Unfortunately, the numerous extracts, with which these pages are necessarily studded, show a different orthography. It need scarcely be stated that quotations, to be genuine, or copies, to be correct, must be left as much as possible as found in the original. For, independently of this consideration, the mode of spelling affects, in some way, the personality of the speller. There are many civil and military officers of the Indian Government, at the present day, whom nothing but a radical change of nature would induce to write 'Kánhpur' for 'Cawnpore,' or 'Lakhnau' for 'Lucknow.' As a rule, then, there has been little or no interference with the spelling of proper names by Outram and his contemporaries. If, in one instance—the diary in Chapter X.—the treatment has been exceptional, it is because it is so woven with the narrative as to form almost part of the text. I may be told that a wholesale recurrence to the old system would have saved the apparent inconsistency now exhibited. This would have been, in my opinion, a retrograde step; and it would not have secured uniformity, for the quoted letters and papers illustrate a mode of transliteration as varied as it is unsystematic.

I have now to offer my sincere acknowledgments to the many kind friends who have aided the preparation of these volumes. Among the abundant family records and correspondence supplied to me unreservedly by Sir Francis Outram were letters and papers of great public interest and value. The original contributions of Sir Bartle Frere, Sir

Vincent Eyre, Sir Joseph Fayrer, and others whose names are noted in the last chapter, speak eloquently for themselves. So also do the passages scattered here and there from manuscript papers placed at my disposal by the Reverend Dr. Percy Badger, a gentleman always ready and able to respond to my solicitations for aid. The communications of Mr. Stuart Poole, General Olpherts, Captain Robertson, and others, rendered available to illustrate the narrative, will bear similar testimony on behalf of the writers. Sir George Clerk has evinced his interest in my work by the kind loan of letters, and in many other ways; and I would add a like remark with reference to Captain W. J. Eastwick. To Colonel Henry Yule, Sir William Merewether, Major-General George Hutchinson, Colonel McLeod Innes, and Colonel Malcolm Green, I am under very great obligation for looking over many proof-pages which must, in some cases, have taken up hours of valuable time. If I do not specify those other gentlemen to whom I have been, in a less degree, indebted for help or advice, they will still, I hope, accept my thanks, and not attribute the omission of their names to forgetfulness, or failure to appreciate their kindness.

F. J. GOLDSMID.

3 OBSERVATORY AVENUE, CAMPDEN HILL:

May 31, 1880.

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Erratum.

Page 180, line 3 : *for Captain Laurence read Captain (now General Sir George) Lawrence.*

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BOYHOOD—YOUTH—MANHOOD.

1803-1843.

VOL. I.

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CHAPTER I.

1803-1818.

The Outram Family—Mr. Outram, of Butterley Hall—Dr. James Anderson of Mounie, and Mrs. Outram—Sketch by Miss Catherine Sinclair—Francis Outram—James Outram : his boyhood and education—Receives an Indian cadetship.

WHEN James Outram, the subject of this biography, was born at Butterley Hall, Derbyshire, on January 29, 1803, his family had long been resident in that and the neighbouring counties. The race from which he sprang was apparently one of honest yeomen or small landowners and farmers, little known beyond the limits of their own parishes, with now and then a representative in the Church. But undistinguished in history as the family may have been, it happens that the soldier-statesman is not the first member of it whose remains have been honoured by a resting-place in Westminster Abbey. In Poet's Corner may be observed a monument recording the peaceful virtues of William Outram, D.D.,¹ Archdeacon of Leicester, and Prebendary of Westminster, who, though a Court chaplain in the evil days of Charles II., was acknowledged to be, as Pepys describes him, 'one of the ablest and best of the conformists, eminent for his piety and charity, and an excellent preacher.' He was moreover a sound and learned Protestant divine, as his work '*De Sacrificiis*,' on the expiatory and vicarious sacrifice of Christ, which still holds a place among standard works of divinity, best testifies.

¹ *Biographical Encyclopædia*, abridged from *Biographia Britannica*.

Passing over the other numerous entries of the name, variously spelt, to be found in the Bishop's Registry at Lichfield, through which the family is traced up to Thomas Outram, Rector of Durton, near Gainsborough, in 1435, we come to Joseph Outram, of Alfreton, Derbyshire, a well-to-do surveyor and manager of estates, and himself possessor of some property in land and collieries, in whose marked vigour of character, shrewd sense, and kind heart, we begin to discern qualities which his sons and grandsons were destined to develop in a wider sphere.

His eldest son, Benjamin,¹ born in 1764, was so named after Benjamin Franklin, a friend of his father's. He did no discredit to the sponsorship of that eminent philosopher and politician, and as a young civil engineer, gave evidence of talent and energy which raised him to distinction in a very few years. Of special professional achievements attributed to him there is no very distinct record; but his name is associated with that of more than one of the heralds of railway construction whose voice

¹ The second of his numerous family, Edmund, earned for himself in the Church a high reputation for learning and worth. He became D.D., Public Orator at Cambridge, Prebendary of Lichfield, Archdeacon of Derby, Chancellor of the Lichfield Diocese, and holder of more than one substantial preferment. Named by Chancery co-guardian of his elder brother's orphans with Mr. Seton of Mounie, he ever proved himself a kind and generous friend to his bereaved sister-in-law and her family, until his death in 1821, at the comparatively early age of fifty-five. The third son, Joseph, also a civil engineer, was for some time associated with Mr. Benjamin Outram in the management of the Butterley Works, but migrated to the neighbourhood of Glasgow, where his representatives remain still. His youngest daughter, now Lady Deas, first married, as his second wife, a kinsman of whom we must record a few words. Sir Benjamin Fonseca Outram, C.B., Inspector of Hospitals and Fleets, saw much sharp service afloat in the medical department of the navy, from 1794 till 1803, from which time till the end of the war he served principally on board the Royal yachts. He lived to refute the mis-statements in Thiers' *History* regarding one of the actions in which he took part, viz., the remarkable exploit of the 'Superb' (Captain Keats), when she destroyed two Spanish three-deckers, the 'Carlos' and 'Hermengildo,' and captured a French seventy-four, the 'St. Antoine,' during the night of July 12, 1801. His presence of mind in extinguishing a fire at

was heard during the past and at the dawn of the present century. At first he appears to have been employed chiefly in the construction of canals, but after a while turned his attention more especially to supplementing or superseding water traffic by iron railways in suitable localities. His energy and success in the introduction of such lines, notwithstanding much prejudice and opposition, not only in the neighbourhood of Derby, but also in the Forest of Dean, in Wales, and elsewhere, appear to have suggested the generally received idea that the word 'tram' had its origin from the second syllable of his name. That such a notion prevails, and that even so high an authority as Mr. Smiles entertained and recorded it in the first edition of his '*Life of George Stephenson*,' though he subsequently found the word to be of much older application, is strong presumptive proof of Mr. Outram's great reputation on the practical side of the profession.¹

But the undertaking which latterly monopolised his energies was the foundation and organisation of the Butterley Ironworks in Derbyshire. About three years before their establishment he had become purchaser of the Butterley Hall estate, jointly with Francis Beresford, Esq., and here it was that he fixed his residence, forming, in association with Messrs. John Wright, of Nottingham, and William Jessop, the civil engineer, the company which, having acquired Codnor Park, an adjacent property rich in coal, iron, and other minerals, carried on business until his death as '*Benjamin Outram & Co.*' and after that, under the now well-known designation of '*The Butterley Company.*' His career was, however, cut short when apparently on the verge of the door of the magazine is said to have saved the '*Superb*' from sharing the fate of her blown-up antagonists.

¹ See notes by George Stephenson, in reference to the '*Spayson Railways*,' Smiles's *Life of George Stephenson*, p. 59; and Wood's *Practical Treatise on Railways* (1838).

success. Shortly before his marriage in 1800, he withdrew almost entirely from the practice of his profession, then yielding him from 2,000*l.* to 3,000*l.* per annum, in order to devote himself without hindrance to his ironworks. Endowed with genius, judgment, and a spirit of enterprise potent in overcoming every difficulty, it was considered by those able to form an opinion that, had life been spared to him he would have become a millionaire. It was otherwise ordained: he died in 1805, having barely attained middle age, and at a critical time of the work he had taken in hand; a work in which more than half his capital and the half share of Butterley Hall had been sunk—and only just beginning to make a return. The result of his death was a complete wreck of his fortunes, and both anxiety and poverty to his family. He is described as a tall fine-looking man, very determined and high-spirited, acutely sensitive of honour, with a hasty and impetuous but generous temper, and a restless energy which could ill brook either stupidity or opposition—characteristics of disposition inherited by both his sons.

Fortunately for the present biography, the influence of the mother upon the son is one generally acknowledged; so that it is now as much to the purpose to lay before the reader some account of Mrs. Benjamin Outram as of her husband and his family. Her father, James Anderson, LL.D., was 'unquestionably a man of an ability and mental power far beyond the average.'¹ Having added the study of chemistry and other sciences to the thorough agricultural training he had received at Hermiston, near Edinburgh, he became distinguished as an experimental agriculturist and weighty author. For many years he conducted a periodical called the 'Bee,' remarkable for the practical tone of its contents, he himself writing much in its pages as elsewhere on agriculture, and especially gardening. At the instance of Lord

¹ Chambers' *Encyclopædia*: 'Dr. Anderson.'

Melville he undertook a circuit of the north-western islands and coasts of Scotland, which, in respect to any useful results then obtained, appear to have been virtually a *terra incognita*. He made an elaborate report of their capabilities of improvement, accompanied by charts, statements, and miscellaneous details. His information and recommendations were deemed valuable, and led to many improvements, as well as anticipated schemes which have since been independently carried out. A ship was placed at his disposal, but he received no remuneration beyond thanks for his useful labours. We are told that he was too proud to ask, or to explain the cost to himself, and the value of the time expended under his by no means affluent circumstances; and those were not days when governments volunteered substantial rewards for services thus incidentally given. Intimate with most of the literary men of his day in Scotland, he corresponded with many celebrities abroad, and among others, George Washington; but by some mischance the valuable series of letters which he possessed from that great man disappeared at his death and were lost to his family. He married the heiress of Mounie in Aberdeenshire, and his eldest son consequently assumed the maternal name of Seton,¹ honoured in Scottish annals.

Dr. Anderson's only daughter who survived childhood, Margaret, was born in 1780. The loss of her mother when she was only six or seven years old, and the preoccupation of her father in literary and other pursuits explain the reason that she received but a poor education. Dr. Anderson had a

¹ One of Dr. Anderson's grandsons was the gallant Colonel Alexander Seton, of the 78th Regiment, who commanded the detachment which went down so heroically on the deck of the 'Birkenhead.' His nephew, Admiral Henderson, was one of Nelson's band of officers, said to have received the same number of wounds as his illustrious chief. Of his sons who went to India, one, Major Henry Anderson, of the Engineers, shared in the misery of Monson's retreat and died from exposure at the siege of Deig. One letter of General Washington is given in Appendix A.

horror of ladies' schools, and the curriculum of 'modern accomplishments' for girls; and he does not seem to have given that attention to providing something better in their place which might have been expected from the judicious arrangements made for his eight sons. The possession of remarkable talents, however, soon enabled his daughter to recover lost ground when brought into contact with society. By personal application and observation, and a readiness to turn to account all such chance instruction and training as were offered her, she acquired a knowledge which, if not so comprehensive and methodical as that of schools, was quite as real, and possibly more to the purpose. She was married to Mr. Benjamin Outram in June 1800, and in May 1805 was left a widow with five young children: Francis, born in 1801; Anna, afterwards Mrs. Sligo, in 1802; James, the subject of our biography, in 1803; Margaret, afterwards Mrs. Farquharson, in 1804; and Eliza, in 1805. Her wedded life, passed at Butterley Hall, though brief, had been apparently a prosperous and happy one; but her widowhood was beset with trials. As above shown, Mr. Outram's investments and purchases at the period of his decease had not yet yielded fruit; the balance sheet exhibited entries almost wholly on the side of debit and outlay: and to make matters worse, trade was depressed. The casualty had been so sudden, that there had been no time or opportunity for the arrangement of his affairs; and his estate was burdened with a debt involving endless anxiety on his representative. Finally, affairs were thrown into Chancery, to await a tardy and unprofitable compromise. Mrs. Outram faced her cheerless prospects with characteristic spirit and independence. Compelled to accept 200*l.* a year from relatives, she determined to make that allowance, combined with the little she could realise from the wreck of her husband's personal property, suffice for her wants. At first she remained in

the neighbourhood of Butterley Hall, three years at Worksop, and two more at Barnby Moor. The circumstance that at the latter place she occupied a house which, on account of its lonely situation and reputation for being haunted, was let at a cheap rate, is of itself a strong proof of courage. Not many women would care to reside under one and the same roof with the ghost of a proprietor who had cut his throat on the premises! In 1810 she removed to Aberdeen, where schooling was good and of moderate cost, and the receipt, at this time, of a small annuity from Government as the daughter of Dr. James Anderson, obtained on her own personal representation of her father's eminent services, enabled her to provide all the better for the maintenance and education of her children. The story of her visit to Lord Melville in London, which resulted in the grant of this pension, is eminently characteristic. This is her own account of the interview, given twenty years after its occurrence :—

‘My spirit rose, and in place of meanly supplicating his favour like a pauper soliciting charity, I addressed him like a responsible being, who had misused the power placed in his hands by employing my father's time and talents for the good of the country, and to meet his own wishes and ends, then leaving him ignobly to suffer losses he could not sustain, but which his high-toned mind would not stoop to ward off by solicitations to those who had used him so unjustly. I then stated my own situation, my dependence and involved affairs, and concluded by saying that I could not brook dependence upon friends when I had claims on my country by right of my father, adding, “to you, my lord, I look for the payment of these claims. If you are an honest or honourable man, you will see that they are liquidated; *you* were the means of their being incurred, and *you* ought to be answerable for them. In making this application I feel that I am

doing your lordship as great a favour as myself, by giving you an opportunity of redeeming your character from the stigma of holding out promises and not fulfilling them." All this I stated and much more in as strong language, which was so different from anything his lordship expected, or was used to meet with, that he afterwards told me he never was so taken by surprise or got such a lecture in his life.'

For some years she lived in a small cottage in the outskirts of Aberdeen called 'Berryden.' When her daughters grew older she moved to an upper flat in Castle Street, in order that the best tuition available for them might be within their reach. The shortcomings in her own training made her painfully anxious to complete, so far as practicable within her limited means, the education of those for whom she was herself responsible. Possessing a hasty and somewhat imperious temper—like that of her husband, impatient of misapprehension as of opposition—she had nevertheless taken occasion of adverse fortune to practise self-denial, and accept with resignation a position of comparative poverty and seclusion. If, in her lighter social moments, inborn wit and vivacity led her at times to say things it had been better to have left unsaid, or to exact more than was right, she was ready to acknowledge and recall the error; and all the more earnestly if a harsh or injurious word had been spoken of an absent person. While she abhorred, it was her constant custom to avoid debt and dependence; and her children were brought up to follow this salutary example.

After the departure for India of her sons, the marriage of her eldest daughter in 1822 to George Sligo, Esq., of Seacliff, Haddingtonshire, and the keenly felt loss of her youngest child, Eliza, in 1824, Mrs. Outram indulged her taste for travel, and wandered much in France, Switzerland, and Great Britain. Her brilliant talents and conversational

powers enabled her to shine wherever she went, and these gifts, combined with a faculty of keen appreciation, enabled her to enjoy the best society afforded by the place in which she happened to be. Her reminiscences of the many people of mark whom she had encountered in her sojourns at home and abroad, were varied and amusing. In later years she made Edinburgh or its neighbourhood her head-quarters. Always dignified, she was far too sensible to run into the common error of strong-minded and unfettered old ladies, and allow herself to be *outrée*, or remarkable from any peculiarity. She was simply natural and in accordance with her age and position. To the last she resisted the oft-repeated solicitations of her son that she would indulge herself in maintaining a house and carriage of her own. Ever simple and abstemious in her personal tastes, energetic, industrious, and untrammelled by fashionable innovations, she saw no reason for dissatisfaction with her neat and comfortable suite of three rooms in a good Edinburgh house, with her maid as her 'establishment' and her dog as her 'companion.' Her strength of constitution was exceptional, and until she became a little lame a few years before her death, health never interfered with her plans, a little congenial excitement proving the best restorative from passing ailments. She wrote fugitive pieces of clever poetry, but never came forward as an authoress. One of the points in which she proved herself an exception to most feminine characters was punctuality. She boasted, and it is believed with accuracy, that she had never of her own fault kept a person waiting five minutes in her life. With a strict and high sense of honour, she abhorred meanness and appreciated excellence in any walk of life. Like her son, she possessed in a singular degree the power of attracting strangers of worth, and of retaining their regard ever afterwards. Few of the numerous visitors who were daily to be met in her drawing-room but

carried away with them a kindly and lasting interest in the talented and most *uncommonplace* old lady.

To these reminiscences of Mrs. Outram, given as recorded in family memoranda,¹ we may add the words of one who is writing of a most intimate friend; of one whose reputation has been long since recognised in the world of letters as in the more private sphere of social virtues and accomplishments. No apology indeed will be required for quoting from a manuscript by Miss Catherine Sinclair.

‘Her intimate friends, knowing that her income was straitened, made frequent offers of assistance, but all in vain. Her independent Scottish spirit recoiled from receiving an obligation, and she struggled successfully on through every difficulty or privation. . . . Mrs. Outram was formed by nature to be the mother of a hero, and those among her friends who knew the gallant and chivalrous son, might see that he had inherited his noble and generous sentiments, his bright talents, his inflexible integrity, and his indomitable energy from a parent of the old Scottish stamp, who has since her recent decease left few equals behind her. Even after the age of eighty, Mrs. Outram’s conversation continued to be so original, so sprightly, so full of wisdom and excellence, that every day there gathered around her a circle. . . . With the most cordial kindness there was an intellectual dignity in her manner that commanded respect. Mrs. Outram occasionally received her friends in the evening, and on her eighty-second birthday she had about twenty ladies at tea, to each of whom she presented a beautiful shawl of her own work. . . . Lord Dalhousie, while Governor-General in India, fully appreciated the noble character of Sir James Outram, and on his lordship’s return, he became so partial to the society of the hero’s

¹ In 1844, unfortunately, Mrs. Outram’s heavy boxes were burned at Brechin, and in them all her accumulated family relics, correspondence, and miscellaneous papers.

mother, that he visited her very frequently, and when on his deathbed he said, "If I ever reach Edinburgh again, my first visit shall be to Mrs. Outram." . . . She had a peculiar talent for letters, writing the most graphic description of passing scenes and of daily events, with a sparkle of vivacity and a glow of kindness never to be imitated. As years advanced, her style became more thoughtful, and she read for hours at a time with those large bright eyes which served her for above eighty-three years without becoming dim. Many a sorrowing friend and relative must daily miss the cordial sympathy, the sound advice, and the abounding anecdotes of gaiety and gravity of one so endeared to all who knew her.'

Francis, the elder of Benjamin Outram's two sons, received his early training at Christ's Hospital. After a long elementary course of seven years' duration, from which, agreeably to the wishes of his maternal uncle, classics had been carefully excluded, he was sent to continue his studies at Aberdeen. Here his natural ability had fuller scope, and he soon found opportunity of gaining much lost ground. At Marischal College, where he attended one session, he must have made a singularly favourable impression, for the opinion of him entertained by a contemporary junior student is now found recorded in the following terms: 'He appeared to my youthful imagination the *beau idéal* of all that is elegant and refined; but having been brought up in England, I think he did not take kindly to Aberdeen.' But his Scotch schooling was cut short by the grant of an Indian cadetship; and a nomination to Addiscombe, obtained from Mr. Elphinstone through the Duke of Gordon, opened a new field for the exercise of his powers. At the East India Company's Military College—now, like the great corporation whose authority it acknowledged, a tradition of the past—his work was brilliant and

full of promise. Ere long he became a distinguished scholar and superior draughtsman, while three, instead of the usual four terms, sufficed to place him at the head of his fellow-students—enabled to enter Chatham an officer of Engineers with a reputation for talent and attainments of rare order. To his brief Indian career allusion will hereafter be made.

Perhaps, as a rule, the nursery and school days of a man who has left his mark on the passing age show no more of incident and adventure than those of an undistinguished unit in the immense sum of living humanity. Nor is there any reason why any such distinction as that alluded to should be apparent in the two conditions. But it is very certain that while, in the latter case, few readers would be found for the story of an ordinary man's boyhood, it is always a matter of general interest to trace the rise and progress of a mind which has exercised an exceptional and acknowledged influence over other minds. We may therefore be excused for dwelling somewhat lengthily upon James Outram's boyhood, of which a fair account is rendered by contemporaries from his twelfth year. He was but a child of less than three years old when his father died, and had probably reached the age of eleven when sent to Udney School, near Aberdeen. It has been already stated that Mrs. Outram remained in the neighbourhood of her former home at Butterley Hall for the first years of her widowhood, and removed to Scotland in 1810. We find it was in the autumn of 1814, when residing at Berryden, that she arranged with Dr. Bisset, the master, for admission of her second son to Udney. The boy is described at that period as somewhat pale, but quite healthy, and of prepossessing countenance. He had his mother's black glossy hair; 'his dark hazel eye kept time, as it were, with whatever was going on, and marked his quick apprehension of, and sympathy with, every scintillation of wit, drollery, or humour,'

yet 'his usual manner was quiet and sedate.' This is his teacher's picture, and we may believe in its fidelity. According to the same authority, the pupil made creditable progress in classics and other studies, but showed especial taste and energy in acquiring a knowledge of mathematics and the exact sciences. As an instance of his powers in the latter respect, it is stated that Mr. Forbes Irvine of Drum, an accomplished votary of literature and the fine arts, lighting by chance upon one of James Outram's original demonstrations left on the dining-room table, was greatly struck by the accuracy and ingenuity, as well as the draughtsman's neatness which it displayed; and afterwards made habitual inquiry as to the young mathematician's 'fresh discoveries.' One of his favourite occupations in play-hours, when bad weather or other cause kept him from out-door sports, was carving figures with a knife out of such materials as were more readily available; and in the exercise of this bent he seems to have been both skilful and artistic. 'The figure of an elephant continued for many years to adorn the mantelpiece of the Udney drawing-room, and never failed to be spoken of, by those who could appreciate perfect truthfulness of expression, as a *chef-d'œuvre* in its kind.' But in out-door pursuits he gave unmistakable evidence of exceptional mettle; here he was *in limine* the hardy soldier, the untiring traveller, and the bold sportsman. 'Whether at football, shindy, bowls, or cricket, he was equally ardent, speedily rose to the front rank as a player, and before he was fourteen was the recognised leader of the school. When parties were formed, those who had Outram on their side felt pretty sure of victory.' Renowned, moreover, as a wrestler, he was as generous as valiant; and it is related of him that on one occasion, when a front tooth had been broken and his mouth otherwise damaged in a contest with a schoolfellow, he was most persistent in exonerating his

antagonist from all blame, and in proving the injury to be accidental. 'In the swimming ground' we learn that 'there was a pond, some fifteen or twenty feet deep, which was generally shunned, but the few who essayed it gained much in reputation among their fellows. Of this number was Outram, soon after joining the school.' He used to return from his watery exploration with a 'gratified air,' 'bearing generally some trophy in his hand—pebble, sand, or mud—in proof of his having reached the bottom.' In climbing trees again, he obtained honours not easily won amid a host of enterprising boys, to whom the prospect of rooks' eggs was much as a decoration or a step in rank to the subaltern officer only a few years their senior. But his comrades promoted him at once beyond the subaltern ranks: in their estimation he deserved higher position, and he was generally known to them as 'Captain Outram.'

From the master's recollection of his pupil we now pass to the testimony of a younger schoolfellow at Udney, who writes:

'He was always kind to me, protecting me from the bullying of older boys; and I believe he was equally generous and just to the others. He drilled us regularly. . . . In winter he had forts of snow built, in the attack and defence of which there was many a severe contest. In every adventure of daring he was the leader, and frequently he exposed himself to great danger. There was a tradition in the school that he let himself down from the top of Udney Castle by using an umbrella for a parachute. But I can hardly suppose that anything so fearfully dangerous was attempted. The very fact, however, of the boys believing it, shows their estimation of him.'

Apart from the school contributions, there are further authentic and interesting data of James Outram's early

life, which the reader will doubtless prefer to have in the very words of the recorder. Mrs. Sligo thus alludes to her brother's boyhood:—

‘He was the reverse of studious, but equally the reverse of indolent. His play-time was spent in active exercise, gardening, mechanics, and every athletic sport. His great enjoyment, however, was to associate with the soldiers at the barracks, or the sailors at the docks—we, in the meantime, never knowing where our missing brother had gone. I recollect our surprise one evening when, on returning from our walk and glancing at the soldiers going through their exercises, we saw our own little Jemmy at their head, as perfect in all the manœuvres as any among them. He was the delight of the regiment, but even still more, if possible, the sailors’ pet. There was a mutiny among the latter—I can’t remember the date, but I think he must then have been about twelve or thirteen years of age. All Aberdeen was uneasy; my brother, of course, not at home. The sailors were drawn up in a dense body on the pier. The magistrates went down to them, backed by the soldiers, whose muskets were loaded; and they were held in readiness to fire on the mutineers, if necessary. Between the latter and their opponents, Jemmy Outram was to be seen, with his hands in his trouser-pockets, stumping about from one side to the other, like a tiger in his den, protecting his sailor friends from the threatening muskets; resolved to receive the fire first, if firing was to be.

‘All ended peacefully, however; much to the general satisfaction, and to our particular thankfulness, when we were told how our brother had exposed himself. He had the courage and fortitude of a giant, with the body of a pigmy (being very small for his age). I never remember his evincing the slightest sign of bodily pain. When very young, we all crossed over to the other side of the Dee to

enjoy a sunny holiday in scrambling on the rocks, picking up shells and seaweed, and dining in very simple mode in one of the fisher-huts. There we saw several large crabs lying on their backs, and we thought that they were dead; we soon, however, found that this was not the case, when one of them caught hold of little Jemmy's forefinger. He calmly held it up, the blood streaming down on the creature, which thus hung, until of its own accord relaxing its hold, it fell to the ground. Not a cry had been heard from the sufferer, nor even a wry face made. He wrapt his handkerchief round the wounded finger, coolly saying, "I thought he'd get tired at last."

His talent for carving little figures, particularly of animals, is thus described by the same hand:—"He liked much to be at the menageries which occasionally visited the town, the better to represent the creatures they contained. These he carved out of anything which he could obtain as yielding to the penknife. Date-stones, fixed together by a cement made from their own pulverised substance, he particularly liked for this purpose; and in the attitudes of the monkey race he was especially successful. My mother thought that perhaps he would do well as a sculptor, but having no friends in that line, she did not make any endeavour to follow up this view.' An anecdote related by a friend of the family, illustrates in a remarkable manner his mechanical taste when a boy of thirteen or fourteen at Aberdeen. The lady referred to remembers her mother's astonishment on coming home one day after a short absence, and finding the entire works of a large eight-day clock which stood on the stairs, all laid out on the school-room table, as well as the locks of all the doors. Objects of this kind it was the enquiring youth's delight to take to pieces, and restore to their respective places."

After about four years at Udney, James Outram was

removed to a school then supposed to be the best in Aberdeen, kept by the Rev. Mr. Esson. Here he distinguished himself rather by the exuberance of his boyish spirits than close application to study, and on one occasion a practical joke played upon the principal usher, resulted in a severe castigation, the boy's manful endurance of which was worthy of a nobler cause. His diary—a record, by the way, kept under school direction and supervision—contained an entry of the occurrence in the following form, with date and hour duly inserted. 'From ——— till ——— flogged by Mr. ——— for making him an April fool.' At the same time his pluck had occasionally a better field for display; and we learn of one particular case in point, when he appeared at home with face so bruised and features so changed that he was hardly to be recognised by his relatives. On this occasion he had upheld the weak against the strong, and to the anxious questions put to him by his sister with a view to eliciting an explanation of his condition, he was able to reply triumphantly: 'Never mind, Anna, I've licked the biggest boy in the school in such a manner that he'll not ill-treat any of the little boys again, I'll be bound.' Courage was one of his many characteristics in early boyhood. A playmate much of his own age—both being about thirteen—was walking with him in the neighbourhood of Aberdeen, when they were attacked by a large farm mastiff. His comrade's natural alarm was not in the least degree shared by James Outram. Without a moment's hesitation, and without any kind of weapon, he faced the furious brute, ran at him, struck him with fists and feet, and drove him off in dismay. The narrator, in recalling this incident in after years, speaks of the strong impression which it made on him at the time, and expresses the belief that few boys or men would have undertaken such a feat; and fewer still would have thought or said so little of it after it was over.

His removal to Mr. Esson's was really, however, an important step on the educational ladder; for it introduced him to Marischal College, where he attended the second mathematical class, and Professor Copland's course of natural and experimental philosophy, for the session 1818-19. The college reports represent him to be uniformly an attentive and well-behaved student, evincing good abilities and an amiable disposition, and making satisfactory progress in his studies.

This higher-class education was, however, but a temporary measure. The year 1819 brought him an Indian cadetship.

Mrs. Outram had applied to her cousin, Colonel Henderson, a Peninsula officer, for assistance in getting her son James into the army; but his reply was unfavourable. Any profession was, he thought, preferable to one in which there was nothing but pay to depend on; for, owing to the seeming certainty of peace, there could be no opportunity of advancement. Another cousin, brother to the last-named, a captain (afterwards an admiral) in the navy, made answer much to the same effect when addressed in respect of his own calling. The anxious lady then bethought her of the Church, and had recourse to Archdeacon Outram, her husband's younger brother, of whom we have before spoken, and who had been a kind friend to her. He also represented the little likelihood of success in his own profession, even were the candidate's habits more studious than reported. Dr. Outram was, moreover, educating two of his own sons to take holy orders. Still, he consented to do what he could in furtherance of his relative's wishes; and the intention might have been fulfilled had it not been for objections raised by the boy himself, who, hearing of his mother's action in the matter, lost no time in giving expression to his feelings in a quarter where there was a good chance of meeting sympathy. 'They mean to make me a parson,' he

said to his sister. 'You see that window; rather than be a parson, I'm out of it; and I'll 'list for a common soldier!' This repugnance to undertake a duty for which he clearly did not consider himself qualified, having been communicated to Mrs. Outram, she was perplexed how further to pursue the quest for her son's provision in life. It so happened that Captain Gordon, member for Aberdeenshire, called upon her in the midst of her troubles, and to him she detailed the circumstances of the case. He readily came to the rescue, and soon succeeded in obtaining for her the offer of a direct Indian cadetship. A still better offer, a nomination to Addiscombe, forwarded about the same time by the Duke of Gordon, decided her to let the boy follow the profession of a soldier. He was allowed to choose a starting-point—a direct commission or college preparation, and the first presented the greater attraction to his young ambition. 'Frank,' he argued, referring to his elder brother, 'when only half the allotted time at Addiscombe, gained all the highest prizes there, and got into the Engineers. If I remain the whole three years, I shall at the best come out only as cadet for the infantry. It's much better, therefore, that I should at once go out as a cadet; I choose Captain Gordon's appointment.'

Mrs. Outram thought he had done wisely; for she did not expect that he would have distinguished himself as his brother had done. And she was justified in the judgment which she had formed of her sons. Whatever might have been the result of his military instruction, it would have been difficult, within the confined limits of Addiscombe, to measure the full value of James Outram, who had a part to play among people and nations of the outer world.

CHAPTER II.

1819-1824.

Early military tastes—Arrival in Bombay—Comparatively peaceful state of India—Joins regiment—Experience of an Adjutant's duties—Sick-leave to Presidency—Accidental explosion—Home letters—Lieutenant Ord's stories of *Shikár*—Outram's 'first spears'—Sent in command of wing to Malegão—The Commander-in-Chief—Second sick-leave to Presidency—Kittur—Malair—Appointed to command a Bhíl corps.

WE have already shown that James Outram's tastes were not of a kind to lead parent or guardian to choose for him one of the learned professions. It may further be affirmed that the bent of his mind was essentially that of a soldier. His yearning for things military did not confine itself to mimic troops, martial toys, or those counterfeit instruments and implements of war by which childhood is often attracted without more serious cause than the love of display and glitter. In his case the young heart was touched, imagination was at work, and arrested development might have been attended with results as pernicious as the too sudden check of certain physical complaints under mistaken medical treatment. Instinctively drawn as he had been to the companionship of soldiers and sailors, his boyish ambition was, moreover, stirred by sights calculated to endear that companionship and graft it into the custom of his after-life. In 1815, he watched with eager eye the march of a regiment or detachment, largely composed of mere boys; and he saw some of these return again in a few months, if not weeks, in the full glory of Waterloo. That spectacle, according to his own recollection, was the incident which fixed unalterably

his resolution to be a soldier and nothing else but a soldier—a private if he could not be an officer. Though scarcely able to comprehend the anxious aspirations, the tears and prayers, which had accompanied the body of warriors as it sped gallantly forth to a field of world-wide renown, he could heartily participate in the burst of exhilaration, congratulation, and rapturous welcome with which it was received on return to its native shores. An incident such as this might easily make indelible impression on the mind of an ordinary boy of twelve. On one of sensitive and sympathetic nature, and of generous and enthusiastic temperament, the impression would be as effectual as indelible. We are not surprised to learn that in the present instance it actually determined the after-professional career.

His school contests had been rather in the cause of the weak and oppressed than from any desire of personal distinction. At college, however, he appears to have been somewhat more strictly pugnacious. For we learn that he was the leader in many a 'town and gown' row, and consequently all but 'came to grief' on several occasions. Once, it is said, a kind lady friend paid a considerable fine imposed by the authorities, and so prevented the report of delinquency from reaching the ears of his mother, of whom he stood in great awe. His own account of himself at that period, according to a confession volunteered in later years, was ingenuous and condemnatory. And he would laughingly cap the reminiscence by affirming that he dared not yet return to Aberdeen, because a reward of 5*l.* hung over his head, as the undetected leader in a disturbance which had proved more than usually destructive to the windows of the college and its neighbourhood.

Mrs. Outram accompanied her son to London, whither he proceeded on receipt of his cadetship; for there were several forms and ceremonies to be attended to in Leaden-

hall Street, beside the demands of an outfit. Their voyage in the smack was a sufficiently miserable one, but it was accomplished without mishap. They stayed with Mr. James Anderson till the sailing of the good ship 'York' on May 2, 1819.¹

Of the passage out we have no details. To Ensign Outram it was probably monotonous and uneventful; for all that he has told us on the subject is that, after recovery from the almost inevitable visitation of sea-sickness, he acquired the faculty, or it may be, the accomplishment, of smoking. He appears at this period to have brooded over his *physique*; for he refers to being only five feet one inch in height, and looks upon himself as a 'puny' lad. Subsequent growth to five feet eight inches he attributed to fever and sickness generally; but even when he had entered his twentieth year, we find him described by his brother Francis as the 'smallest staff officer in the army.' The vessel in which he was a passenger reached Bombay on August 15; the 4th of that month is, however, the date given by the Army List of the year to his lieutenant's commission in the 1st Grenadier Native Infantry.

On arrival the young officer was kindly received by his cousin, Dr. Ogilvie, in whose house he remained while not required for duty, or until fairly posted to a regiment. His impressions on first joining his comrades in arms are not to be traced in the correspondence now extant. But we may conclude that he soon found attraction in his surroundings. His *shikár* book affords positive evidence that he was not long in becoming initiated in hog-hunting; for it is there recorded that he fleshed his maiden spear at Goolygaun,

¹ She left the Downs on May 5; as did also the 'Barossa' with the Bombay Commander-in-Chief, Sir Charles Colville, on board; and the 'Marquis of Hastings,' in which the only cadet passenger was the present General Sir William Wyllie, G.C.B. The late General Stalker was a fellow cadet and passenger of James Outram in the 'York.'

near Sirúr, in November. He saw much sport with the Sirúr and Púna hunts during the remainder of the season, but at that time kept no regular diary or memoranda of his exploits in the saddle, as later experience led him to do.

The period to which we refer was an eventful one for our Eastern Empire. The deposed Peshwa had reached his appointed residence at Bithúr—a place destined to attain, some forty years later, a cruel celebrity in the annals of British India. The ‘reformed’ Pindaris had been disposed of in two peaceable colonies, strictly according to the dictates of philanthropy and rules of civilisation. The strong fortress of Asirgarh had surrendered to a British general. Quiet had been restored to Sawant Wari and Berár; and Bhúj, with its barbarous Rajah, had easily passed into the hands of our troops. More, much more, had been done; but we refer to the latest achievements only. The situation in August 1818 had been well explained by the Governor-General himself in answer to an address of congratulation from the inhabitants of Calcutta; and a popular chronicle of the day sums up, with all semblance of authority, subsequent events up to the middle of 1819, in the following terms:—

‘From the mouths of the Indus, north-east to the Sutlej, from the Sutlej south-east to Chittagong, from thence to Cape Comorin and Ceylon, an area containing thousands of miles, and embracing twenty-five degrees of latitude and twenty-two degrees of longitude—all is now at peace—we have no public enemy to oppose. It is little more than twelve months since we were threatened by a confederacy of the native powers which had for its aim the renewal of every sort of plunder and devastation, and the reduction of British authority where it had long been paramount. The whole is now dissolved. The turbulent spirits which broke forth, boasting of their strength and power, have shrunk into

nothing. The hosts that assembled tumultuously to support their pretensions are overthrown and dispersed.’¹

This was the state of things proclaimed about the time that James Outram landed at Bombay, and in the ninth year of Francis, Marquis of Hastings, one of the most distinguished of Governors-General. It was natural that a young and ardent soldier should, under the circumstances, turn his attention to the dangers and excitement of the hunting-field.

But peace in India during these years of consolidation was neither complete nor permanent. A Governor-General’s proclamation, like a royal message, has no time or space for details; and it would be impolitic and inexpedient to depart from generalities except as regards matters better understood by the masses than are Indian or Asiatic politics. If little or nothing was said of external relations to the Calcutta residents, it was, perhaps, because they did not interest themselves greatly about them; and that they more immediately concerned Western than Eastern India. Not that all was quite satisfactory to the Indian Foreign Office. Among other ‘outer barbarians’ who gave trouble, the Joasmi pirates in the Persian Gulf were conspicuous. An attempt had been made to coerce them in 1809, but no stop was put to their misdoings; they frightened the port of Bú-shahr, threatened Basrah, and, moreover, plundered ships and butchered crews from British India. Major-General Sir William Kier Grant, who had just done good service in Sawant Wari and Bhúj, was sent in command of troops against them. These operations lasted from October 1819 till April 1820; but when the expedition returned to Bombay, it was judged necessary to leave a detachment or small corps of observation in the island of Kishm.

¹ ‘History of Europe’ in *Annual Register* for 1819.

Although the name of Lieutenant James Outram is found in the Army List of 1819 among the officers of the 1st Grenadier Native Infantry, he was first appointed to the 1st Battalion of the 4th Native Infantry, at an up-country station, and proceeded to join about three weeks after disembarkation from Europe. His departure for Satára is at that time recorded in the Gazette; but he appears actually to have joined his battalion at Púna, marched with it to Savandrúg, and returned to the Presidency by October 1. In Government General Orders of November 1 his name is shown as twenty-fifth in a long list of officers recently arrived, and he is then posted to the 1st Grenadier Native Infantry, his departure to join the 2nd battalion of which regiment at Púna¹ is notified in the Gazette as on December 2. Shortly afterwards he was transferred to the 1st battalion of the 12th Regiment, on its embodiment, at the same station, and he became its acting adjutant about the beginning of July 1820. The choice of so young an officer for this post gives good evidence of the estimation in which he was held by his seniors.

On October 5, 1820, he wrote to his mother from Púna, with reference to the regimental appointment :—

‘ I have now acted upwards of three months, and expect to act one month longer, as I believe the adjutant will not join till that time. It is of no immediate advantage to me, otherwise than that it teaches me my duty, but my having acted as adjutant four months will give me strong claims for that appointment when it becomes vacant. Though an adjutancy is thought by the generality of people to be a very arduous and responsible situation, yet it really is not much so, as it is a mere rotation of the same duties monthly, and should a vacancy

¹ His own notes say that he joined at Sirúr.

happen to-morrow, I would not hesitate a moment about applying for the situation, as I would feel confident (without flattery to myself) that I would be equal to the task, with a little application and trouble on my part.'

This was the natural view of a true soldier, who, like the poet, *nascitur non fit*; and who, in his teens as in after years, ignored difficulty in every professional shape. But the opinions were hardly sound, and the writer, soon after expressing them, admitted that he had misapprehended the full scope of his work. The appointment had a deeper importance than he at first supposed. A young Indian officer, competent to excel, and laudably ambitious of excellence in the little restricted arena which lay open to him half a century ago, could scarcely find a better training-school than in the adjutancy of a native regiment. Intimate acquaintance with *sipahis*, from the drill-ground to the commissioned ranks, and with European officers, especially commanding officers, both on parade and in quarters, was one of the great advantages thus obtained, by a sure process to which the mere company captain or subaltern was a comparative stranger. More than this, the special gain to the intelligent novice was the experience of power and self-discipline. He attained the knowledge how to work under a commandant, whether smart and strict, or smart and easy; ignorant and testy, or ignorant and lax; in fine, whatever the type presented, good, bad, or indifferent. The tact was thus acquired of exercising delegated authority over equals, superiors, and inferiors in rank and position, in a manner calculated to ensure subordination and efficiency. He was not, however, relieved of his acting appointment so soon as expected. Between six and seven months after date of the last quoted letter James Outram again addressed his mother. On this occasion he wrote from Baroda, whither he had marched with his

regiment from Púna,¹ making excuses for a long silence, not to be attributed, as he himself explained, to forgetfulness. He had had so 'much to do lately in the adjutancy,' and had found it 'a much more difficult situation to fill' than he had before contemplated. Thus he expressed himself:—

'Many difficulties were thrown in my way, which I had not foreseen. Several officers who were removed from the corps had charge of a company each, all of which were thrown upon my hands, and I had to make out the papers of almost all the companies, besides all the battalion ones. Almost all adjutants have two writers, one which Government allows—a sergeant—and one which he keeps at his own expense. Now I have been altogether, I daresay, five months without one at all, and have never had more than one at any time. At first a sergeant was not procured (as it is a new corps) till about seven months after I had begun to act. I had, now and then, a writer for a few days, but I daresay I was five months without one altogether; and when I got the sergeant I found him more a burden than a help to me, as he had everything to learn. . . . I have also been latterly acting quartermaster. I am to be relieved by the regular adjutant, I suppose, on the 1st of next month (May), as he has been relieved from the corps which he has been obliged to remain with till this time. I shall then have done the duties of adjutant exactly ten months.'

We doubt not that many Indian officers have been in like case; and such as these would readily admit that the little

¹ This march is alluded to in a brief entry for the year 1820-21, made in his *shikár* book:—'Had little sport on the road, and nothing but coursing at Baroda.' In the *Bombay Gazette* of November 22, 1820, it is noted as a movement 'now taking place;' but the corps did not leave till February 10, 1821, arriving at its destination, *viâ* Bombay, Surat, and Broach, on March 29. The 2nd Battalion was ordered at the same time to Kishm, in the Persian Gulf.

early and extra responsibilities thus thrust upon them have had their value. They do more than many books and instructions to explain the actual routine of duty, and their lessons, once acquired, are seldom, if ever, forgotten. Though times have certainly changed, and the adjutant of a native regiment has neither the same inducements nor the same opportunities of equipping himself for the battle of life that he had in former years, the school he represents may still be found a good one, and those who profit by its teaching should not be in too great haste to abandon it for a wider and more ambitious field. Patience is a more practical virtue than ever in these days of railways, speed, and restlessness.

In the following year (1822) another letter to his mother, dated Ahmadabad, April 28, a full twelvemonth later than the last quoted one, affords a singular contrast between locomotion in India experienced in 1878-79, and the slow movements of olden times. The writer had been sent, on account of sickness, to Bombay, and would have left the Presidency to rejoin his corps in February, but that an 'unfortunate accident,' just after embarkation, had compelled him to put back and lay up for a month. On March 9, he had re-embarked with two companions, and after tossing about at sea for two days, disembarked on the north side of the island of Bombay, proceeding thence by land. He had been about six weeks on the road to Ahmadabad, a journey now accomplished in, perhaps, twice that number of hours; and his corps was moving about somewhere to the north-east of that station. The full (or, according to Indian parlance, *paka*) adjutancy had been conferred upon him on January 15, but absence from the regiment had prevented his receipt of any emoluments accruing from the appointment.

He is not explicit as to the sickness which had driven him to Bombay, but we gather, incidentally, that it was a fever which had prostrated many of the residents at Baroda after

the rains of 1821. His own allusions to it are with reference to the drain thereby caused upon his scanty income. The regiment had been ordered on field service to the Máhi Kánta, a province in the east of Gujrát (and the littoral of the river Máhi), of which we shall have to say much in a subsequent chapter; and he had made preparations to accompany it as adjutant. Of these preparations the important items of tents and camels will give some support to the idea that they were on a large scale, when considered in respect of a single subaltern. Owing to the nature and severity of his attack, he had had to proceed suddenly from Baroda to Cambay, and thence to take boat to Bombay, the cost of which unexpected journey had to be met by the sale of his camels at a disadvantage. The expenses of the return journey and purchase of a horse at the Presidency had contributed to swell the demands upon a not over-stocked purse, and he had found himself with no remedy but, much against his will, to borrow money.

As regards the 'unfortunate accident' above noted, and hardly explained by a statement that his enforced detention was 'owing to the burn,' we find tolerably detailed accounts among the family papers. It appears that the medical men at Bombay were of opinion that he should return home to recruit strength after his attack of *jangal* fever. This arrangement, however, did not suit his own plans; and feeling sufficiently recovered for the work before him, he started to rejoin his regiment in Káthiawár, embarking on board a native boat, with horses and kit, to get over the first part of the way by sea. From some cause unknown, the evening was a gala one, and fireworks were to be let off in the harbour. The convalescent resolved to share in the fun and signalise his own departure at the same time. So, in addition to the necessary *impedimenta* of ordinary travelling baggage, he laid in a superfluous stock of combustibles, and

had them carefully brought on board his unpretending craft. The story continues that he blew up his boat, that its contents were showered into the water around, that the horses were killed or drowned, and that he himself was picked up floating, a 'hardly animate mass of blackened humanity.' Not even recognised as a European, he was left uncared for when first deposited on the shore; but in course of time a charitable Parsi, whose name has never transpired, had him placed in a palanquin and conveyed to his own house, whence, his identity discovered, he was removed to Mr. Willoughby's. It is added that the skin of his face peeled off, and was replaced by a second skin coarser than the first: but that the explosion, however injurious to his personal appearance, was attended on the other hand with one good result. All traces of *jungal* fever had been as effectually blown out of its victim as they could have been eradicated by a voyage to Europe and transfer to his native atmosphere. As no account is rendered of servants or followers, let us hope that any such may have escaped without serious injury. Two months after the occurrence, Francis Outram, then still 2nd Lieutenant of Engineers at Bombay, adverting to it in a letter to his mother, says that results might have been much worse, but that James luckily escaped with a good scorching, and that 'he will be more careful with gunpowder for the future.'

His own home letters at this period, as indeed for the first few years of his Indian career, are mainly taken up with matters of domestic interest. These belong essentially to his biography, inasmuch as they exhibit the working of inner life and reveal the secrets of individual character. But for obvious reasons we shall be sparing in extracts, merely selecting those passages which may better serve to illustrate the whole correspondence. The reader may rest assured that if he were to read over from first to last every line of the

four or five original letters now before us, which come within the chronological scope of the present chapter, he would see no cause to consider the selections exceptional. The tone is one of genuine and honest affection; the spirit breathed is that which fathers and mothers would rejoice to acknowledge in the writings of their own sons; and if the language be not remarkable for high educational polish, it has the more sterling merit of straightforward expression and simplicity. That he was not trained when a boy in the art of polite correspondence may be taken for granted. Mrs. Outram could tell the story of a certain epistle he had to prepare, in which the mere formula of commencing and ending was not accomplished without assistance; and she seemed to think this the only piece of letter-composition that could be credited to him prior to departure for India.¹ She marvelled how he wrote so well when fairly launched on his Indian career.

We have quoted his views regarding employment on the regimental staff. Let us turn from self to his care for the happiness of others, especially of her whom he addressed as the presiding genius of his home. Assuredly it is manhood and not childhood, nor even youth, which realises the poetry as well as essential charm of the relationship between mother and son.

‘You used to say you were badly off,’ he wrote in an undated letter, bearing the postmark of November 1822, ‘but as I had been used to poor Udney, I thought we were

¹ The real story is thus told:—‘During the holidays, a schoolfellow (one of the Gordons of Manar) sent him a letter by a servant. His mother said he must in civility answer it, so he retired to do so. After a while he came back, saying, “How am I to begin?” “Why, ‘My dear Gordon,’ of course.” Thus prompted, he again disappeared for a considerable time. He then came and asked how he was to end, and being told, “Yours sincerely, James Outram,” soon brought his letter. His mother had the curiosity to look at what he had said. The contents were simply, “My dear Gordon—Yours sincerely James Outram.”’

very comfortable at our humble home. Now, when I see how many privations you had to put up with, I think you made wonderful sacrifices for your children, whose duty it is to make you as comfortable as they possibly can. I, for one, am certainly sorry that I have not been more prudent, for I certainly ought by this time to have been able to send you, at least, something; for I got the allowances of the acting adjutancy for eight months out of the ten in which I acted, after a reference to Government. . . . When I rejoin my corps I shall be in the receipt of 600 rs. per mensem, as the corps is at present in the field; out of which I shall at least be able to save 300 rs. a month, which is about 350*l.* a year. I am obliged to keep an additional horse and office establishment and field-carriage, but 300 rs. a month will certainly cover all expenses in the field, and 250 in garrison. The above 600 rs. per mensem is the field-pay and allowances, the garrison is about 400 rs. per month; so that in the field I shall save about 350*l.*, and in garrison about 150 rs. a month, which makes about 180*l.* a year; all of which is, of course, dedicated to you; and much greater pleasure will spending it in this manner afford me than if I was amassing riches upon riches on my own account.'

A little later in the year (though the letter bears the postmark of October), he continues in the same strain, entering freely into details of money liabilities, and adding:—

'I was at first undetermined whether to let you know how I am circumstanced, . . . but then I recollected that honesty is the best policy, and that being candid with you would please you more than if I were perhaps not exactly to fulfil what I promised. I therefore have told you everything, and always shall.'

It is but fair to remark that Francis Outram shared the same filial sentiments, and could equally appreciate the in-

estimable value of a mother's attachment. His letters are conclusive testimony on this point.

We have already said that when James Outram went up to rejoin his battalion in 1822, it was somewhere north-east of Ahmadabad. He fell in with it at the village of Morassa, where it formed part of a field force assembled with a view to the suppression of local disturbances which had become aggravated by long continuance. Lieutenant Richard Ord, of the same regiment, but of the 2nd battalion, then at Kishm, was acting adjutant, and from him he received charge of his substantive appointment. This officer had spent eighteen months in the Persian Gulf, but ill-health having prevented his return thither, he had been directed to attach himself to the 1st battalion of his regiment in the Máhi Kánta. The campaign being brought to a close by the capture of the rebel chief Konkaji, the battalion was ordered to Rajkot for the rains. A march in Káthiawár during the prevalence of the hot winds is not pleasant, but the weather does not appear to have abated the energy of the young men thus incidentally thrown together. They were much of the same standing, for Ord was only two senior to Outram in the regimental list of lieutenants. The latter had not enjoyed much sport on his upward journey. His journal shows he had had a little hunting at Surat, and had been unfortunate in breaking down a colt brought from Bombay; also that he found some hog at Ahmadabad, where he had experienced two severe falls. But of the 'little sport on the road' through Káthiawár to Rajkot, to which he refers, Lieutenant Ord gives the following account:—

‘A few days after he (Outram) had joined, he and I were riding in rear of the column, and as day broke we espied hog at a little distance. Immediately we started in chase, not anticipating much result from our hunt, as we had no

spears, merely our swords. After a short run we detached a fine large fellow from the herd, who, after a sharp burst of about a mile, took refuge in a large patch of cactus bushes, out of which we found it impossible to dislodge him, though Outram in his eagerness dismounted, and did his best to make him bolt. From what I afterwards saw of hog-hunting I think it was as well . . . that he did not succeed. Foiled in our attempt, we galloped back to the regiment, and were just in time to rejoin it before it arrived at the encamping ground.'

Again, a little later, a regular hog-hunt was organised. Owing to the hot weather, however, there was but one hunter to the fore, besides the same two named; Ord *loquitur*:—

'Off we started, and after riding about three miles, admiring the mirage, the solemn stillness, and the various villages flashing on the horizon, we came to a large level plain covered with grass and stunted trees. Our guides stopped, and upon our asking them where the hogs were, waved their arms in a circle and said "There!" We all looked rather blank, for having no beaters with us, we might as well have searched for a needle in a haystack as a hog on that wide plain. Suddenly we caught sight of a little flag waving from a solitary tree in the distance, and, putting our horses' heads in that direction, soon started a huge boar. Away we went as hard as we could lay legs to the ground, my horse leading—and Outram just behind, calling out to me to turn him. On, on we rode, but just when I came within nearly a spear's length of him, instead of turning from me, he charged furiously at me, and had not my gallant steed bounded in the air and leaped over him, we should have been rolled upon the plain. Before I had recovered the suddenness of the attack, Outram rushed to the rescue; the

hog charged him furiously, but being a practised hand, he received the charge on his spear. In the concussion the spear was broken in half, one part remaining fast in the animal's head. Our enemy was now brought to bay but, sitting on his haunches with the spear in his head, he had such a strange appearance and charged so furiously when we approached, that our horses would not go near enough to him to allow of his getting his *coup-de-grâce*. We had, at this time, but one spear, I having dropped mine, and Outram's being broken—but after a while our horse-keepers came up with other spears, and the boar was soon despatched. My companions were much amused at my discomfiture, but gave me great credit for my first attempt.'

Outram had purchased a house at Rajkot, and into this he moved shortly after reaching the station. The other officers who could not find *bangla* accommodation went into tents. Ord took up his quarters with a friend in the 1st Cavalry, joining the mess of that regiment; but Outram, not thinking this arrangement compatible with a proper *esprit de corps*, eventually persuaded him to share his own house and become a member of his own mess.

Colonel Ord, at a comparatively recent date, in reviewing the weekly hog-hunting picnics of Rajkot held at this particular period, gives a stirring account of an adventure at a place called 'Kerisera,' prefacing it with the remark that 'in India sporting is much encouraged by the higher authorities, it being the general opinion that these hardy exercises conduce much to the military training and formation of a soldier.' 'He had heard both Sir John Malcolm and Sir Lionel Smith'—and few men could be trusted for sounder opinions on military training—'observe that they never knew a good sportsman who was not a good soldier.' We quote the original narrative:—

‘ Outram, Liddle, and myself were together ; we started a sounder. Outram looking after one hog, and L. and myself after another, Outram soon lost sight of his in the thick jungle, but L. and I pursued our course. Soon we heard O. galloping up behind us ; we pushed on, hoping to get the spear before he came up. Most unfortunately there was a deep jungly ravine before us ; into that the hog dashed, and while we stopped on the brink, Outram rushed by us, and after floundering and rolling over several times reached the bottom—a dry *nullah*. We thought that he must have been severely hurt, but not a bit—soon he was on his horse’s back again, and after a long run he killed the boar, although he had only half a spear, the shaft having been broken in his descent down the ravine. When Outram had left us, L. and I went into the jungle, hoping to finish another hog. We had not ridden far when we heard a rustle, and saw the grass moving at a little distance in front of us ; we immediately set off in pursuit, but on coming to a more open space we found that it was not a hog that we were in chase of, but two lions. The lions, on getting a fair view of us, stopped and turned to look at us. We stopped also, feeling no inclination to encounter them. After gazing at each other for a while, the lions quietly walked away, and we followed their example. On regaining Outram, and telling him what we had seen, he was anxious that we should again go in pursuit, but we resolutely declined. These were the first lions, I believe, that were ever seen in Káthiawár ; since then I have heard that many have been met with, and some killed, but with the rifle, not the spear.’

Running a *nílgái* down without dogs, and following him into the middle of a river, is another story of those days told of his hero by the same authority. One morning, too, that they were out with the dogs in quest of foxes, they

slipped the whole pack at some wolves which appeared upon the ground. These fought fiercely, and seriously damaged their assailants. The result was that most of the dogs went mad.

For the year 1823 there is recorded in James Outram's *shikár* book, that he had 'good hog-hunting in the neighbourhood of Rajkot.' A list of eighty-three first spears is given, of which fifty belong to the recorder himself, the rest being divided among twelve other competitors, the highest of whose individual scores is eight. Of course many of the party were oftener out than others; Outram always. The rule of the hunt was that all should go after the same hog, selecting the largest. For the year 1824 the *shikár* register in Káthiawár is roughly continued until March 4 only, at which date thirty-nine hog and one *chítá* (leopard) had been killed. Of the first spears Outram carried off twenty-four, inclusive of the *chítá*; the remainder being divided among three comrades, one of whom scored eight. He also killed in Káthiawár four *nílgái*, two hyenas, and two wolves; the *nílgái* having been obtained in seven runs, at the cost of four horses! ¹

¹ A detail of winners of these 'first spears' is given in the *shikár* book. Adding the two years together, we obtain a total of 123 (83 + 40), in the following order:—

Outram	74
Morris	10
Watkins	8
Wight	6
Scott	6
Rowland	6
Poole	5
Slight	3
Sparrow	1
Wilkes	1
Barlow	1
Stevenson	1
Jám Rája of Naunagar	1

But the years 1823 and 1824 were not wholly taken up with the chase. The account just given of trophies in the hunting-field begins really in the last week of July and ends on March 4, thus exhibiting a detail of consecutive sport for little more than seven months. During this period Outram, a young man of but one-and-twenty, up to January 29 took three-fifths of the 'first spears,' it is true; but he was winning his professional spears also by energy on the regimental parade. Independently of the duties of his own corps, he had already been adjutant of a detachment on service in Káthiawár under Captain Morris. In January 1823, he commanded the 1st battalion of the 12th N. I. on its annual review, and was highly complimented by Colonel Turner, the reviewing officer, in Station Orders of the day; and in March 1824 he commanded a wing of his corps on the occasion of its review by Sir Charles Colville at Junagarh. The state of the battalion generally may be inferred from the Commander-in-Chief's order, dated February 29, the day on which he had reviewed its headquarters for the first time since 'incorporation into the Line.' His Excellency expressed to the officers and men how much gratification he had experienced 'in witnessing that their good composition as a body' was 'equalled by their smart and soldier-like performance under arms, and the report of their orderly and correct conduct in cantonment.' No slight praise is hereby implied to an adjutant who, however able his commandant, must, if he be of the proper stamp, exercise a strong direct personal influence upon both officers and *sipahis* in a native regiment. And he had then only just entered his two-and-twentieth year. The good opinion of the higher authorities on his soldierly qualities was, however, not evinced by mere compliment. In April 1824, when his regiment moved in wings to relieve the 19th Native Infantry at Malegáon, in Khandesh, he was

placed in command of the wing reviewed by the chief at Junagarh, resuming, at the end of the march, his duties of adjutant. Selection of a junior lieutenant for such responsible work was no poor evidence of efficiency. Dr. Johnston, of the Bombay army, accompanied in medical charge. His recorded reminiscence of this chapter of Indian life is of sufficient interest to be utilised for the benefit of the reader. The march is described as 'a distance of 250 miles, through a fine country, not wanting in game.' The strict discipline maintained by the young commanding officer did not admit of '*shikaring*' while the men were in movement. 'But,' writes the doctor, 'after reaching our ground, encamping the men, and discussing a good breakfast in the mess tent, we generally sallied out in quest of game, and many a wild boar bit the dust on these occasions. Outram was always ready to join those under his command in the field sports, of which indeed he was the great promoter, and in which he took more first spears than any other man. But this, so far from leading them to be lax in their duties, made every man try to do his best. Duty was always a labour of love with those under him, for he inspired all who were capable of any elevation of feeling with some portion of his own ardour, and made all such willing assistants rather than mere perfunctory subordinates. Thus early did he show that wonderful tact of commanding which few have possessed in such a high degree.'

In October 1824 he proceeded on medical certificate to Bombay. Some four or five months before, his battalion had been converted into a regiment,¹ under the designation

¹ The order of the Governor-General in Council for the reorganisation of the armies of the three Presidencies is dated May 6. Twelve regiments of Native Infantry, consisting of 2 battalions each, were given to Bombay; 25 to Madras, and 34 to Bengal. The separation into regiments accordingly was notified in Bombay Government Orders of June 7, when James Outram appeared as fourth Lieutenant in the 24th N.I. Francis Outram was at the same time shown as sixth among the Lieutenants of Engineers. On July 29, James

of 23rd. He himself had been posted next to Lieutenant Ord in the 2nd battalion or 24th, and appointed adjutant; but he had been permitted at his own request to return to his original battalion and his original adjutancy.¹

His Khandesh experiences of *shikár* had not been as full as those of Káthiawár, nor were his results so successful. For a party of four there is only shown a list of ten first spears; but then seven of these belonged to James Outram. One of the seven was exceptional, in that it was not taken upon a hog. The young Nimrod had again run down a *nílgaí*, and the exploit had once more cost him 'a valuable horse.'

Many old officers of the Bombay army will doubtless remember a story which obtained credit in those days, to the effect that Lieutenant Outram volunteered for employment in the Birmese campaign, and that the Commander-in-Chief, who had a real appreciation of the volunteer's soldierly qualities, but may not have cared to move him from the scene of present usefulness, replied through his secretary that he would not accede to the application, as, after giving the matter every consideration, he had come to the conclusion that the war might be successfully accomplished without him! The sequel was said to have been a challenge, to which the good humour and good sense of the old General replied by a friendly admonition conveyed through a third party. We think it probable that the following is the more correct account. It claims to be that

Outram is gazetted Adjutant of the 24th Regiment N.I. from August 1, 'vice Allen, who resigns.'

¹ The following is the text of the Government Order, dated September 3, 1824:—

'23rd Regiment N.I.—Lieutenant J. Outram, having exchanged from the 24th to this Regiment N.I. (in order to remain in a corps in which he has long done duty), to be continued in the discharge of the duties of Adjutant without alteration of original date of appointment, and his appointment of Adjutant to the 24th Regiment of N.I., by the General Order of July 29 last, is cancelled.'

related by Sir James himself in after years :—He used to be nicknamed ‘the little general,’ and when he asked the chief to be allowed to go to Birmah, verbally, the reply of ‘Oh, no, little general, I think we can manage it without you,’ so enraged him that he rushed out bent upon the *duello*, and eager to find a sympathising second. Of course no one would act in that capacity; and the General, on hearing of the matter, said to him, ‘It’s lucky you did not find one, for I’d have shot you.’ In any case Sir Charles Colville must have been the chief referred to, and it is not unlikely that the occurrence took place about the period of his inspection of the 23rd Regiment in March 1824; for it was in that very month that Sir Archibald Campbell was appointed to command the expeditionary force in Birmah. It may be here mentioned that Lord Amherst had arrived as Governor-General in Bengal, in succession to the Marquis of Hastings, in the middle of the previous year.

While Outram was at Bombay, towards the end of the year 1824, one of those miniature wars occurred, which, trifling as they are in respect of numbers and area, afford lessons to young soldiers more practical in their way than the sand-modelling experience of our military colleges. The story is instructive because it illustrates an incident of British rule in India which may have been repeated more or less often, with variations in detail but like general results; because it shows the delicate ground on which we tread in enforcing our morals as well as laws upon a people unwilling to accept either where they clash with ancient custom or prejudice; and because it establishes the fact that a rebellion against authority may be carried on, even by the more uncivilised of our Indian subjects, in a strange spirit of chivalry, devoid of personal rancour or animosity.

The Deshai, or hereditary native governor of Kittúr, died in September 1824 without heirs; and his *jágír*, or alien-

ated lands, lapsed to the paramount power. Mr. Thackeray, British Resident in the native state, consequently assumed control of the property, pending receipt of the further orders of Government. But some members of the native household sought both to conceal the death of the chief, and to palm off a successor, falsely represented to have been adopted. It became, therefore, necessary to take measures for securing the treasure and jewels, valued at about 15 lacs of rupees; and a guard, sufficient to supply the requisite sentries, was ordered to move into the fort on October 22. The day following the spirit of resistance was clearly manifested, and admittance refused to a relief of soldiers. Strong measures were necessary; so the Collector gave orders that Captain Black should proceed with two guns to the gateway and demand surrender of the place, with one hour to consider. This done, without answer returned, and a further half-hour having been accorded with similar result, the gates were blown open. A heavy fire was then opened upon our troops from within the fort; Mr. Thackeray, Captain Black, and Lieutenant Dighton were killed, and Lieutenant Sewell was badly wounded. Messrs. Stevenson and Elliott, of the Madras Civil Service, the Collector's Assistants, who had been taken prisoners, were brought in front of the *sipahis* to induce them to cease firing. The device was successful, and the rebels carried their point.

No time was lost in repairing the mischief done to the prestige of our authority. There were no railways or telegraphs in those days, but fortunately Kittúr was not a very remote locality. On November 7 the 1st European regiment and a detachment of artillery embarked from Bombay for Vingorla, to proceed to Dharwar; and soon afterwards a combined force of Madras and Bombay troops, which had been directed to assemble in the Southern Marhatta country, entered the refractory State under command of Lieutenant-Colonel Deacon, C.B., of the Madras establish-

ment. On December 10 the Governor of Bombay in Council published the despatches reporting the reduction of the fortress, and expressing his entire approbation of the measures adopted to achieve success, as well as of the conduct of officers and men engaged. Government viewed 'with particular satisfaction the exertions of the several corps to reach their destination from distant points, under circumstances of great difficulty attendant on the late unusual season and the great want of carriage in the country through which they had to pass.' The affair had been smart and well-managed, with a total loss on our side of three killed and twenty-five wounded. It is worthy of remark that Messrs. Stevenson and Elliott were well treated throughout this short period of captivity. According to the portion of the local press then considered the more authoritative, they were desired by the Marhattas to look upon the fort as their own, and their keepers, not themselves, as prisoners!

Now it so happened that both Francis and James Outram were present at the siege of Kittur: the former in the course of duty, the latter as a volunteer on leave at the Presidency. For the parts they respectively played we must refer to the despatches of the officer commanding the field detachment, although the Engineer only is mentioned in them by name. Colonel Deacon says: 'In reconnoitring . . . I was ably assisted by the abilities of Captain Pouget, of the Bombay Engineers; and his decided exertions and operations, as well as those of Lieutenants Lawe and Outram, of the same branch, were of the greatest use to me.' He added, however, that a demur on the side of the besieged to fulfil the terms of capitulation, which had been intimated by prearranged signal, had caused him to move forward 'H.M.'s 46th Regiment under Lieutenant-Colonel Willshire,¹ and the 3rd Bombay Native Infantry under Lieutenant-

¹ Afterwards General Sir Thomas Willshire, Bart. K.C.B.

Colonel Seely.' Suspicion of treacherous dealing had been so far aroused, that 'the batteries were several times about to re-open:' but all ended well, for after a little delay in negotiation 'the prisoners were . . . brought out and the forts surrendered, about 8 o'clock on the morning of December 5.' By the light of these passages in the despatch, we understand the personal notes which inform us that James Outram, after successfully volunteering for the Kittúr expédition, was 'attached to the 3rd Regiment in command of the Light Company,' and that he had further 'volunteered to lead the storming-party,' a contingency contemplated, but rendered unnecessary owing to the submission of the insurgents.

As their arrival at Bombay is notified in the same day's Gazette, we may conclude that the two brothers returned thither from Kittúr together on January 19. The younger did not tarry many days at the Presidency, and in February had joined his regiment at Malegáon. One month later, an insurrection which, unchecked, might have proved of a serious character, broke out in the western districts of Khandedh, in the suppression of which he was called upon to take a prominent part. The leading rebel, with 800 men, attacked and plundered Antapúr, and carried his spoil to the hill-fortress of Malair, a village between Surat and Malegáon. There, having established his head-quarters, he raised the banner of the recently conquered Peshwa, and proclaimed his intention of reviving the glories of the Marhatta confederacy. Convenient military stations, such as Surat, Jálnah, and Ahmadnagar, were warned to hold soldiers in readiness for service; while the more immediately available force was concentrated for protective purposes upon Zai Kaira, the chief town of the Malair district, and seat of the treasury; that place being only twelve miles distant from the stronghold of the insurgents.

On the morning of April 5 a requisition for troops reached Malegão: and a detachment of 200 men of the 11th and 23rd Regiments was paraded and marched off at 5 o'clock in the evening. Lieutenant Outram, who was to command, and his friend, Mr. Graham the assistant-collector, followed at 11 P.M. on an elephant. They reached Zai Kaira at sunrise on April 6—37 miles in seven hours. On the way they had seen the fires in Malair; and the surrounding country had appeared to them in a blaze. For the last five miles into the town the road had been strewn with *sipahis*, completely knocked up. In the course of the day Outram received information which led him to believe that, despite of numbers, the fortress of Malair might be successfully escaladed on the further side. But this day's proceedings, and those of April 7, will be retold in the words of one who may be trusted for a knowledge of his subject: 'He therefore proposed to carry the place by a *coup-de-main*, to rout the insurgents under the panic of a sudden surprise and, by thus destroying the prestige they had already acquired, to dishearten the allies that were flocking to their standard. This proposition was enthusiastically received by his companions, Ensigns Whitmore and Paul, of the 11th Regiment; but it so far exceeded the discretionary powers which their written instructions vested either in Graham or Outram, that it was a matter of serious deliberation with the former whether he was justified in giving his consent. The result of his enquiries, however, satisfied him that a rapid and alarming extension of the insurrection could only be prevented by offering a prompt check to the rebels. He accordingly sanctioned the proposed measures; and soon after nightfall Outram marched forth to carry them into execution.

'As he neared the hill on which the fortress was situated, he sent Ensigns Whitmore and Paul, with 150 men, to make a false attack in front, while he himself, with the remaining

fifty sepoy of his detachment, turning off to the left, proceeded to assail the rear.

‘The operation was completely successful. Both parties effected the ascent before daybreak, and while the rebels had their attention drawn to their front by the assault of an enemy whose strength it was impossible to ascertain in the dark, Outram dashed in upon them from behind. The panic-stricken garrison fled with scarcely an attempt at resistance, and at the head of his reunited detachment, and some horsemen whom Mr. Graham had in the meantime collected, Outram followed them up so closely that they could neither rally nor discover the weakness of their assailants. Their leader was cut down; many of his adherents shared his fate, and the rest made for the neighbouring hills in a state of complete disorganisation.

‘As the infantry had now marched upwards of fifty miles in little more than thirty-six hours, Outram found it necessary to halt them soon after dawn. But the horsemen continued the pursuit so far as the nature of the ground permitted; scouts were despatched to ascertain the point of rendezvous selected by the scattered foe, and, at night, the chase was resumed. The insurgents were a second time surprised; many were slain, numbers were taken prisoners, and the rest, throwing down their arms, fled to their respective villages. A rebellion which had caused much anxiety to the authorities was thus crushed ere the troops intended for its suppression had been put in motion, and the plunder of Untapoor was restored to its lawful owners.’¹

These services, for which the acknowledgments of Government, the Commander-in-Chief, and the Division General, were received by the smart young adjutant and his supporters, were the last rendered by Lieutenant Outram in his capacity

¹ *Memoir*, printed for private circulation in 1853.

of regimental officer. He had been marked by the authorities for special employ, and his energy and abilities were to be displayed in a new and higher sphere. By Bombay General Orders of April 22, he was placed at the disposal of the collector and political agent in Khandesh for the purpose of commanding a Bhil corps to be raised in that province for police duties. A fortnight afterwards appeared in the Government Gazette the appointment of an officer to be adjutant of the 23rd Regiment N.I. '*vice* Outram, appointed to command a Bhil corps.' We are not surprised to learn that when he thus officially, as it were, parted from his old companions, his commanding officer, Major Deschamps, recorded a warm eulogium on his services, attributing in a great measure to his individual merits and exertions, the good reputation obtained by the newly-formed regiment.

Having now traced the strictly regimental career of the subject of our biography, it will not be out of place, before commencing a new chapter, to glance at the result of this incipient work upon physical powers which an Indian climate and much out-door work had put to a tolerably severe test.

He was not one to dwell upon bodily ailments, but he was not free from those to which flesh is heir; nor was India more kind to him during the first five years of his residence than to the generality of his companions. It has been shown that sickness had compelled him to leave Baroda in 1821 and Rajkot in 1824, proceeding on each occasion to Bombay. It has not, however, been stated that just before the march from Púna in the former year he had been attacked by a bilious fever which, to use his own words, though 'got over in three days,' was 'succeeded by a very curious disease, something between small-pox and chicken-pox.' He had managed to accompany his regiment out from Púna in that kind of second-class palanquin called a *doolee*;

and after four days' rest at his cousin's quarters in Bombay, whither he had gone by water from Panwell, he had felt well enough to decline his commanding officer's offer to precede the corps by sea-passage to Cambay. That this attack, however, had been of a decided character, may be inferred from his report of himself when it had fairly passed away: *i.e.* that he was 'a greater scare than ever,' and 'a little marked' by the disease. Moreover, Mr. Elphinstone had not at first recognised him at Baroda, because he 'had grown so much,' and his 'face was greatly altered;' which latter result he attributed to the same circumstance.

For some years he continued the 'puny lad' of his self-retrospect, liable to every prevailing sickness, and easily knocked up by exposure. But we learn that even in his early days he formed the resolution to fight it out with the climate or die: to acclimatise himself by surmounting all the illnesses of Anglo-Indian existence, or succumb to one of them altogether. If he was not to conquer such contingencies, he did not care to live in the atmosphere to which they belonged. And he *did* fight it out and, strange to say, illness after illness left him none the worse permanently; while the result of an unusually varied series of approaches to death's door was the establishment of a constitution of iron, proof against all influences, and proverbial in its marvellous capacity for endurance of deadly trials; nerves of steel—shoulders and muscles worthy of a six-foot Highlander. He was given over in cholera more than once, and experienced fevers and other diseases or complaints which, humanly speaking, would have killed most men: but excitement and work soon became, and long remained, his best restoratives and tonics.

Of his 'moving accidents by flood and field' and 'hairbreadth scapes,' we shall have to tell hereafter. Our immediate business is with the Bhils of Khandesh.

CHAPTER III.

1825-1828.

Khandesh and the Bhils—Outram's Bhil Corps.

THE province of Khandesh, situated to the north-north-east of the port of Bombay, from which its principal town, Dhulia, is distant 181 miles, became incorporated in British Indian territory in 1818, after the Peshwa's downfall. For a time it formed part of the district of Ahmadnagar; but was separated in 1849. It is now known as a collectorate, of which the greatest length is, from east to west, 175 miles, and breadth, from north to south, 128 miles.¹

Thirty-seven years ago, Captain Douglas Graham described the tract as contained between the Satpura hills on the north, and that branch of the *gháts* which passes under the names of Chandar, Satmála, and Ajanta, to the south. So far the description holds good at the present day. Let us add that, beyond the Satpuras, are the Akráni *parganna* and the native state of Barwáni. These comprise lands south of the Narbada, flanked by the territory of Holkar and the Gáikwár, the last extending also along the Sukhain hills, or western limits of Khandesh. East and south-east are Berar and the country of the Nizam. The tabular trap hills on the north are, according to Captain Graham, 'separated from each other by ravines of vast magnitude, and are covered with splendid forests which afford, amidst the most romantic scenery, unbounded shelter to the outlaw.' The Sukhain

¹ See also Appendix B, as regards Khandesh and the Bhils generally.

range is steep and stony, but the *gháts* on that side are broken: they sustain 'tangled masses of bamboo found nowhere else in greater luxury or more difficult of access.' A thick *babul jangal* clothes the hilly country on the south.

What with bad roads, sparse hamlets, rugged impracticable mountain passes, and the spread of *jangal* over the cultivable tracts, the aspect of the province, on being brought under British occupation, was far from inviting. Its decline is dated at a period within the present century, when Holkar's ravages were followed by famine, and famine was followed by misgovernment and official plunder. Irrespective of these visitations, though in some degree consequent upon them, lawless men moved, and savage beasts prowled over the face of the land in quest of mischief. Foremost among marauding tribes, one, the Bhíl, is especially connected with the work which we have in hand.

Colonel Briggs, political agent in 1818, estimated the Bhíls in Khandesh to form an eighth part of the whole population. Fifteen years later, Mr. W. S. Boyd, an experienced collector, adopting the same basis of calculation, fixed the number at 55,000. The former believed them to be a distinct people; and assigned them a habitat in the mountainous tract lying between Dharanpur in the Konkan (20'-23' north lat.) and Meywar, belonging to the Rána of Udaipur. Sir John Malcolm saw in them a distinctiveness of race and class-separation dating from the most remote ages. Captain Douglas Graham placed on record that, on being driven out of Meywar and Jodhpur by other tribes, they had located themselves among the rocky ranges of the Satpura, Vindhya and Satmála, and amidst the woody banks of the Máhi, Narbada, and Tapti, 'where, protected by the strong nature of the country, they have since dwelt, subsisting partly on their own industry, but more generally on the plunder of the rich landholders in their vicinity, considering

depredation on the inhabitants of the plain as a sort of privilege, and a tax upon all persons passing through the country of their occupation as a national right.' He believed the bulk of the Khandesh Bhils to have settled in Baglan (or Baglana), and to the north and north-west, as peaceable cultivators, proprietors, and village officials—respectable probably as their fellows, because having the same interest in the preservation of their rights and property. But there must have been many exceptions to this hopeful majority in the indolent, improvident lot whom he found scattered in numbers throughout the province, refusing intimacy with, or to acknowledge as kith or kin, those who had become 'degraded' by trade or labour, and had abandoned the normal ways and habits of the tribe. The most restless and troublesome he stated to be 'those dwelling immediately at the foot, and amidst the recesses of the surrounding ranges, who at different periods have either usurped, or have been entrusted with all the passes leading into the country, and till lately have held charge of many of the most important fortresses in the plains. Their hive-like habitations formerly crested the top of each isolated hill, where approach from every side was easily defended or immediately discovered; and these hovels, not reared for permanent occupation but hastily put together to be crept into for a few months or weeks, were without regret abandoned on any occasion that induced the occupants to shift their quarters. Roving and restless by disposition, and skilful hunters by necessity, the woods and jungles supplied them with roots, berries, and game; a successful foray filled their stores to overflowing, and as every man's hand was lifted against them, so the measure of wrath was fully returned by the tribe, whose powers of mischief far exceeded those of their numerous oppressors, and whose habits and locations enabled

them to bid such a lengthy defiance to so many Governments.'¹

The term, like that of 'Kurd' in Asiatic Turkey, has been long traditionally associated with robbery and violence, but circumstances may have had something to do with turning the hand of the Bhil against his neighbour, equally with inborn combativeness and natural predilections. In village communities the Bhil of Khandesh was described to be usually the recognised watchman, who received a certain amount of rent-free land and grain for the ordinary fulfilment of duty, and special rewards for special services. We speak of the system in its condition under native states unaffected by the changes of European civilisation. It was observed however that, in the interior, that is, at some distance from the mountain ranges, the village Bhil seldom admitted the authority of an official or hereditary chief, or acknowledged any superior but one who had acquired the greatest reputation as a leader of banditti—failing whom, his choice fell on the oldest and wisest of his fellows. There is therefore good reason to infer that the settlement in the plains of certain of the tribe as peaceable members of an agricultural family, was brought about by compulsion or strong persuasion on the part of the Muhammadan rulers.² Moreover, on the occurrence of famine and invasion, it appears that the Bhil watchmen and cultivators generally broke away from their more domestic ties, and took refuge in the surrounding hills.

Apart from village organisation and the milder morality of the plain country, there were the fierce, intractable Bhil robbers of the mountain: men of strong animal passions and instincts, who had no sympathy or part with the tiller of the soil,

¹ *A Brief Historical Sketch of the Bhil Tribes inhabiting the Province of Khandesh.* Bombay, 1843.

² Report by Lientenant-Colonel Robertson, of March 18, 1825.

and knew nothing of honest livelihoods or the uses of industry; who prided themselves in a profession of plunder invested with the character of sanctity, and whose religion was allegiance to the powers of evil, illustrated by propitiatory sacrifices of a sanguinary type. No wonder that these, and such as had not been grafted into a more civilised state than these, isolated themselves from, and were readily isolated by their neighbours, whose bitter and hereditary enemies they naturally became. Suspicious, cunning, and more ready to prey on the weak than test the prowess of the strong, their bravery was perhaps in most cases that of desperation and recklessness of life, but has also been held to partake of 'manly fortitude' and 'heroic devotion.'

One authority, admitting two sides to the picture, speaks of them in the following terms: 'Small in stature, lean and wiry, these Bhils are capable of great endurance, and from constant exercise their senses of sight and hearing are wonderfully acute. They seem, in their natural state, like the Bushmen of Africa, scarcely men, but rather a link between the human species and the wild creatures among whom they live. Robbers and marauders by natural descent, for long their hand was against every man and every man's hand against them. Hunting, varied by plundering and cattle-lifting, was their normal trade. There was something noble in them too; they were in fact the Rob Roys of India and, like our Rob Roy, they for a long time actually levied black mail from the inhabitants of the open country. Proscribed by Government and hunted down, they were killed by hundreds, but never subdued.'¹ Of those who were essentially hill-men, it may be said that, prior to the formation of the British collectorate of Khandesh, no coercion or persuasion had, from time immemorial or according to any

¹ Lecture delivered in Edinburgh to H.M.'s 78th Highlanders, by Colonel Davidson, late of the Bombay Army.

tradition extant, succeeded in drawing them from their mountain abodes and fastnesses.

But we must not now confine ourselves, either ethnologically or geographically, to any one particular division of the race, though the strict range of biographical narrative be limited to the inhabitants of one British Indian collectorate and its immediate neighbourhood. We have to do with all to whom a particular designation applies, whether dweller in the hills or plains, or ignorant of one or the other, or an occasional visitor or frequenter of both; only, be it premised, our subject is rather warrior than cultivator, and more commonly a disturber than a preserver of the peace.

The Bhils had taken advantage of the war between Muhammadans and Marhattas to give vent to their tastes and powers of misdoing: but on the cessation of that struggle, a new period of anarchy and confusion arose which must have been at its height when Khandesh came into our hands in 1818.

At that time we are told:—

‘Murder and rapine stalked openly and unrestrainedly through the land. Fifty notorious leaders infested this once flourishing “garden of the west,” and their every command was implicitly obeyed by upwards of five thousand ruthless followers, whose sole occupation was pillage and robbery, whose delight alone consisted in the murderous foray, and whose subsistence depended entirely on the fruits of their unlawful spoil. Smarting also under the repeatedly broken pledges of the former Native Government, and rendered savage from the wholesale slaughter of their families and relations, the Bhils were more than usually suspicious of a new government of foreigners, and less than ever inclined to submit to the bonds of order and restraint.’¹

The Satpura and Satmála, or northern and southern

¹ Captain Douglas Graham's *Memoir*.

hills, as well as western *ghâts*, were alive with large bodies of warlike and disaffected men, ever ready, more or less, to ruffle the tranquillity of the plain country beneath. So insecure was the condition of the cultivator, that he was constrained to refuse the *takâwi*, or money advanced for seed, an act in many cases significant of a coming season of destitution. War between British and Bhîls became therefore a stern necessity; and it was further necessary at once to stop the forcible seizing of grain in the lowlands.

For seven years every effort was made to bring about a better order of things. Colonel Briggs, the political agent, tried conciliatory, as well as repressive measures. Some of the delinquents were enlisted in the Government service, some were pensioned, and with others an attempt was made to organise a local police; but notwithstanding the loss by death or confinement of many of the more prominent insurgents, and that great and reasonable inducement to accept terms had been held out, little sensible progress was attained. It was not until the new policy inaugurated by Colonel Archibald Robertson had been rendered intelligible to the mass, and names such as Ovans and Outram had become familiar to the Bhîl, that a marked change ensued for the better. This change is dated from the year 1825, when the Bhîl agency was established and effect given to the orders specially communicated by the Court of Directors. The three agents were Captain Rigby in the north-west, having under his charge the *ta'lukas* of Nandurbar, Sultanpur and Pimpalnair, with all the independent and tributary chieftains, those of the Dâng inclusive; Captain Ovans in the south, in charge of Jamnair, Burgâon, and Châlisgâon, inclusive of the districts below and adjoining the Ajanta and Satmala range; and Lieutenant James Outram in the north-east, superintending the line of the Satpuras, with the districts of Chopra, Yâwal, and Sauda, to which were after-

wards added Erindol, Amalnair, and Nasarábád. To the latter officer was moreover entrusted the duty of raising a Bhíl Light Infantry corps under native commissioned and non-commissioned officers of Line regiments.

The agents were certainly instructed how to carry on generally the important work committed to them, and made acquainted with the results which it was desirable they should achieve. But it is manifest that much must have been left to their discrimination and judgment, and that individual character would go far to solve the problem of success or failure in an undertaking of the kind. They had to combine administrative with executive functions: to be magistrates, judges, arbitrators, advisers, police superintendents, and military commanders: to conciliate as well as repress, to attract as well as awe, and to inculcate honesty and fair dealing by example as well as by precept. Outram had, in addition, to instil discipline and obedience into the minds of those whom he was to rear as a local force.

To render acceptable the humane and enlightened policy about to be initiated, military operations were reduced to a minimum. To stop them entirely would have been unwise, impolitic, and unfair to the peaceable inhabitants of Khandedh: but a general amnesty was offered to all Bhíls but the more heinous offenders, for whose apprehension large rewards had been proclaimed; and indeed, a free pardon for past crimes was granted to those who surrendered at discretion.

Although the order to organise a Bhíl corps under a European officer was long delayed, and the incident of the Malair rebellion, in which Outram bore so conspicuous a part, doubtless hastened its issue and execution, credit may not be withheld from the local Government for the measures eventually taken. Mountstuart Elphinstone, Governor of Bombay from 1819 to 1827, had had a long experience of Western India. Great natural ability, combined with a keen

insight into the native mind, and that cool courage which had caused Colonel Arthur Wellesley to hold him 'certainly born a soldier,' soon gave him a high local reputation, which was afterwards not diminished by his tenure of the Presidential dignity. In the matter of the Bhils he leaned to the milder policy of conciliation, and looked hopefully to the possibility of ameliorating the condition of these proscribed brigands and outcasts. He would reclaim rather than exterminate; and happily the Home Government, despite of objections put forward, eventually supported his proposals. The selection of so junior an officer as James Outram for the double work of morally civilising and physically disciplining the rough and ignorant Bhil of Khandesh, was not more creditable to the nominee's character than to the judgment of the Governor. In at once throwing up his regimental position and accepting the appointment offered, the young adjutant acted against the advice of friends, who expatiated on the poor prospect of a successful result to his labours. But he was wise in his generation.

A severe illness detained Lieutenant Outram until the beginning of May in Malegão, where his regiment was stationed. Here also were the head-quarters of a field force designed to keep in check the Bhils of the Ajanta or Satmala range, who, under the guidance of one Pandu and other leaders of local celebrity, had long ravaged the plains below the mountains with impunity, setting at nought all attempts to dislodge them from their fastnesses. As it was not practicable to open communications from this place, Outram proceeded up to Kanúr, a small station in the Nizam's country above the *gháts*, but with no practical result. Hence he returned to Malegão in the hope of persuading the local authorities to consent to active operations; for he was convinced that his mission would be vain so long as the spirit of rebellion was fostered by the belief that our troops

could not attack the evil at its source, by penetrating the mountain retreats. Again disappointed, he made his way to a native officer's post at Jatigáon, some thirty miles distant, also above the *gháts*, whither the men were detached from his own regiment. The commandant, recognising one whom he had long been accustomed to obey, and ignorant that a General Order, placing the English adjutant of the 23rd N.I. on separate staff employ, had virtually cancelled his immediate authority over the *sipahis*, even though drilled and disciplined by himself, at once complied with Outram's requisition to hold in readiness all his disposable men for a march after nightfall. Thus provided, he set off under guidance of a native spy, marched upon a strong position where he had heard the Bhils were then concentrated, and came upon his quasi-enemy by daybreak. His detachment consisted of only thirty bayonets, but the surprise had its anticipated effect. On the first alarm that the red-coats were upon them, given by the scouts when the distance was too great for actual assault, the whole body of rebels fled in every direction panic-stricken, leaving their women, children, and scant property at the mercy of the soldiers. Separating then his small party into threes and fours, Outram directed the *sipahis* to pursue the Bhils so long as any came in sight, and to rendezvous at a particular spot, searching the ravines closely on their way thither. The sight of the scarlet uniform and the sound of musketry in many different quarters confirmed the fugitives in the idea that the whole British force was upon them, and prevented all attempts at rallying; in fine, the dispersion for the time was complete. On this occasion two Bhils were killed and many supposed to be wounded, while most of the families remained in the power of the assailants. But the matter did not end here. It was determined to prevent, as much as possible, renewal of mischief. Information of the proposed *coup de main* had

been sent to Major Deschamps, commanding at Malegáon, and his co-operation invited and accorded. Reinforcements consequently appeared, and a pursuit of the Bhils, carried out on a more extensive scale than before, ended in the occupation of their haunts by regular troops, and the destruction of their power to such an extent that a way was opened for the introduction of restorative and remedial measures.

Outram then commenced his work of organisation and, as he himself expresses it, laid the foundation of the corps through the medium of his captives, 'some of whom were released to bring in the relatives of the rest, on the pledge that they all should be set at liberty.' He has further non-officially recorded the particulars of this interesting and remarkable inauguration of a great philanthropic as well as political movement:—

'I thus effected an intercourse with some of the leading Naicks, went alone with them into their jungles, gained their hearts by copious libations of brandy, and their confidence by living unguarded among them, until at last I persuaded five of the most adventurous to risk their fortunes with me, which small beginning I considered ensured ultimate success.'

Outram's first report bears date July 1, and is addressed from Dharangáon to Colonel Robertson, collector of Khandedh. It relates that on May 8 the writer, agreeably to his instructions, proceeded to Chálisgáon in search of recruits. At this place he received all necessary aid from Mr. Graham, the assistant collector, who explained personally to the superior native officials, and caused them to explain to those under their orders (as well as to the Bhils themselves, when forthcoming), the nature and advantages of enlistment in the service of the British Government. Pending

the result of such appeal, he went to a station above the *gháts* privately, to secure the support of Captain Kelly, of the Nizam's army, an officer generally credited with influence among the people with whom negotiations were to be opened. The gentleman thus addressed was not slow to act upon his young friend's requisition; but his efforts were unavailing and, as he declared it to be his decided opinion that the prejudices and fears of the Bhils in the matter were not to be overcome, the applicant returned to Cháligáon on May 20. Here, too, during the few days of his absence, no candidates for service had been induced to offer themselves; but Outram thought too well of this particular part of Khandesh, in its relation to his main object, to abandon it in a hurry, so he continued in the district, visiting and residing at neighbouring Bhil villages until June 15.

In the official report of these proceedings there is no mention of the affair in which the *sipahis* of the Jatigáon detachment were engaged; but it must have occurred at the period we have reached, and it was not improbably the result of the visit to Captain Kelly and failure to obtain recruits at Cháligáon. The unsuccessful application to Malegáon for armed men was doubtless as private in its way as the promptly met requisition on the native officer; and consequently neither circumstance appears on the record in official foolscap. It is not hard to understand the shyness of the Bhils to enter upon a new line of life on the representation of comparative strangers. They had had ample cause to mistrust authority under Native Governments, and insufficient experience of the British rule to accept it in a thoroughly trusting spirit. The fears of the men at some supposed lurking mischief were among the main obstacles to enlistment; and three or four of the first comers were frightened away by a report that they had been enticed with a view to eventual transportation beyond the seas. At length,

as already shown, five of the bolder, it may be the more intelligent of the number, were persuaded to take the shilling in earnest, and, though not a man seems to have been actually enrolled until late in June, Outram had, on July 1, as many as 25 recruits. On September 1 he again wrote to Colonel Robertson from Dharangáon which, on hygienic reasons, he had constituted for the time his head-quarters, and where he had commenced butting his recruits for the monsoon. From 25, the number of enlistments had increased on August 1 to 62, and on the date of writing to 92, but it will be seen that the progress was held insufficient. The report is explicit:—

‘You will be sorry to observe that they have not, during the last month, increased in number in the ratio that might have been expected from the former. Several are the causes of this; partly from the Mohurram festival having intervened, during which I kept all my men together to make them pass a happy holiday; partly because I find it prudent at present not to appear to press the rapid assembly of a large number whilst yet unarmed; but chiefly, I am sorry to say, because the suspicions of our motives gain ground daily. Alarming reports are doubtless kept alive by those who are interested in frustrating this measure, in the success of which they foresee the deathblow to plundering with impunity.’

The necessity for keeping the recruits unarmed gave a colour of truth to the mischievous stories circulated, and an unfortunate coincidence, arising from the locality selected, rendered the recruiting officer’s position more delicate still:—

‘The town of Dharangáon, and the very cutcherry in which I am residing, having been the scene of the massacre

of a number of Bhils (enticed on a very similar plan about eleven years ago, during the Peshwa's government), the butcheries of that period are fresh in their memory, and a repetition is dreaded by all but those who are now with me. I have spared no endeavour to remove their fears by constant intercourse with them; by talking of the cruelty above alluded to with marks of detestation and without reserve; by explaining the advantages we expect from their services (for they could not understand, and would suspect any *other* motive for the liberality of the Government); by listening to their complaints, enquiring into, and obtaining redress for oppression, to which the families of many were subjected when unable to complain; by interceding for those who, though proscribed, have sought my intercession, and by taking every opportunity of displaying a perfect confidence in them, and exacting little services from them.

‘By these means I have succeeded in inspiring almost all who are in the corps with a feeling of security, and a confidence in me, of which I have had ample proof. Had this not fortunately been the case, the undertaking must have been ruined on the 26th instant, when, by some means or other, a report was spread among them that, in the great concourse of people assembled in the town on that day (being the last of the festival), were concealed the agents by whom they were to be slaughtered in the evening. Well calculated to strike terror in the minds of people most of whom had had relations or friends cut off by similar treachery during the Peshwa's reign, the story was only credited by about fifteen of the newest and most timorous of the recruits, who fled on the first alarm.

‘The moment I heard of the rumour I ordered the Bhils to assemble, and was promptly obeyed. I explained to them how much disappointed I had reason to be in men who,

notwithstanding the confidence I placed in them, sleeping under their swords every night (having none but a Bhil guard at my residence), still continued to harbour suspicions of me. The feeling with which they answered me was so gratifying that I do not regret the cause which brought it forth. They immediately went after the fugitives, and returned with eight in the evening. The others, whose fears had carried them out of reach, are still absent, but I have not struck them off the strength of the corps, their friends having gone to recall them, and I have no doubt they will be happy to return when they find their fears were groundless.

‘Others have given early proof of their fidelity. In the beginning of August I despatched two parties to recruit, the one of a *havildar* and 20 Bhils to the Cháligáon, the other of a *naick* and 10 Bhils to the Londir *talukas*. Most of them were inhabitants of the countries to which they were sent, and on their arrival at their homes, they found that report had been busy with their fate during their absence. So terrified were their relations from what they had heard of our intentions, that they endeavoured by every means to persuade my men to desert, but notwithstanding such solicitations they all returned, though they could only prevail on nine men to accompany them. . . .

‘Agreeably to your permission I purchased twenty swords, which I have distributed among the Bhils, but they are not calculated to give the appearance of security I am anxious to display.

‘I have shown that those now with me are free from fear, but if kept without arms, I could not answer for their long remaining so. . . .

‘Having previously received your assent, on July 1, I promoted three Bhils to *naicks*,¹ and on August 1, one of the *naicks* to *havildar*.² My motives for making such early

¹ *Náyak*, a corporal.

² *Havildár*, a sergeant.

promotions were to excite a spirit of emulation by showing what they had to look up to as a reward of good behaviour, and to teach obedience to non-commissioned officers of my creation, in opposition to what they had only been accustomed to pay to their hereditary *naicks*. My wishes have been completely answered; the non-commissioned officers are aware of their responsibility, and the privates look up to them as they ought.

‘The great bar to order at first was their frequent indulgence in intoxication: this I have put out of their power by the mode of payment, which provides them daily with merely the necessaries of life; except on the last day of the month, when the surplus of their pay is given, which I am happy to find they are beginning to expend in articles of finery in preference to spirituous liquors, and I have not observed a single instance of excess in this respect during the past month. . . .

‘To terrify the Bhils into taking timely refuge in the corps, I also employed my men on one or two occasions to apprehend offenders. You have already been informed that a detachment from the Bhil corps was anticipated in the seizure of the notorious Heeria Naick, by one day. They also apprehended a gang of thirteen which had just committed a highway robbery; but the stolen articles not being found upon them, the prisoners were released—though there was no doubt they were the perpetrators, the information against them having been given by an accomplice whose evidence I did not think it prudent to bring forward.

‘The alacrity they evince in the performance of these services convinces me they will soon have no scruple to bring about their nearest relations to justice when required to do so. That these exertions have terrified the Bhils who continue to oppose the laws, is fully proved by the circumstance of two of the most notorious *naicks*, Lallia and

Saibia, who have for years eluded all attempts to apprehend them, having voluntarily tendered their submission to me. Although they are proscribed, taking advantage of their being thus in my hands would have been very detrimental to establishing the character of the friend of the Bhils, on which the success of my undertaking so much depends. I therefore promised my intercession with you in their behalf, on which subject I had the honour to address you on the 22nd ultimo.

‘I may also mention in proof of this position, the circumstance of the country for fifteen miles round my headquarters, which had hitherto been most particularly a prey to the rapacity of the Bhils, having been perfectly free from their depredations since the establishment of the Bhil corps at this place: not a single robbery having taken place, though formerly of daily occurrence, while travellers, who once never ventured out without the protection of horsemen and *sebundies*,¹ now proceed alone and unarmed. Should the Bhils in the corps prove faithful and efficient servants—which the little experience I have now had in them leads me confidently to hope I shall render them—the rest of that class will be compelled to have recourse to peaceable occupations for a livelihood, when it is not unreasonable to hope that this hitherto degraded race, finding protection under our mild rule, may become gradually habituated and attached to the change. Such is what I foresee will be the reward of this humane measure; and though I am aware it will at present be treated as a vague speculation, I do not hesitate thus early to express my confidence of the result.

‘In consideration of the irregular class of people I have to deal with, I entreat that the few propositions I may submit in the first stages of this undertaking may be treated with more indulgence than, as coming from so young and

¹ *Sibandi*, a kind of militia for revenue and police duties.

inexperienced a man, they might otherwise be entitled to. I may possibly in some instances be unable to abide by former custom or rule in my attempts to reform the Bhils, wherein I must be guided chiefly by circumstances as they occur. Placing early trust in them, for instance, will naturally be regarded as imprudent, and as placing temptation in their way—yet I am persuaded that this is the only way to make them trustworthy. Delay in the sanction of any measures is what I dread, and to show the necessity of avoiding this is my reason for making these remarks, and humbly requesting that you will consider the expediency of sanctioning or rejecting my propositions—while this undertaking is still in its infancy—without the delay of reference.’

Long extracts have been purposely made from this early report of progress, because it affords a very practical illustration of the difficulties arising at the outset of a great work—difficulties apt to be overlooked or underrated by those who have had no experience of similar ventures. Among other annoyances with which the writer had to contend, was the want of a long-expected detachment of regular *sipahis* which Government had placed at his disposal. These men were to constitute the nucleus of the new levy, and Outram had, with instinctive sagacity, given out from the first that they were coming. Only it was feared that their appearance at a late hour might rather impede than assist the growth of the corps, by encouraging the notion that they were intended as a check upon the Bhils already recruited. As it happened, when the *sipahis* did arrive in November, it was necessary to disarm them temporarily, so as to put them on a like footing with the recruits who had not yet been provided with weapons. In October, however, the newly enlisted men had commenced to show signs of usefulness, and to convince their young commander that

they were unwilling to eat the Government salt, without making return of some kind for benefits received. One Jambú Náyak, leader of a large body of marauders, who had slain a horseman in the Potran district, was brought in a prisoner to camp, and handed over to the civil authorities. His capture had been effected by a Bhil like himself, one of Outram's recruits, who, by direction of his British leader, had joined the lawless gang a few days before, without exciting suspicion that he was a mere detective. The man having accompanied Jambú—at a time that he was separated from the main body, and attended only by a few of his followers—to the locality of a tribe whose leader was in British pay, had there found means to secure and carry him off. This act was soon succeeded by other proofs of individual or collective zeal and devotion; and on November 1, when the total number of Bhil recruits had exceeded a hundred, and the whole scheme looked more than ever promising, and likely to bear fruit in accordance with the more sanguine expectations of its promoters, the periodical report to Colonel Robertson showed that the exertions of the men on police duty had on several occasions merited the collector's approbation, and that three privates had been made corporals for specially good service.

On the other hand the following passage in the report would infer that all was not *couleur de rose* at this period:—‘As was to be expected from suddenly raising the hitherto lawless Bhil to be the instrument of power, my parties were in one or two instances at first guilty of making petty exactions, which, though given as presents, were of course only granted from the idea of the donors that more would otherwise be extorted.’ But Outram checked the system by timely punishment; and the reduction to the ranks of a *návak* thus offending, brought the more intelligent of his men to a correct appreciation of their duties and responsibilities.

After little more than four months' experience of the work, he trusted to render his Bhils fully efficient for the outpost duties of Khandesh, and contemplated relieving all or most of the Line detachments then employed upon them.

The corps marched in December, and, passing through the *parganas* of Burgáon, Cháligáon, and Nandigáon, encamped within a short distance of Malegáon. Nothing could well be more satisfactory than the behaviour of the young Bhil soldiers, to whom the change of scene and camp-shifting on this occasion afforded a pleasurable novelty. Some hundred miles were thus traversed with excellent effect. On January 1, 1826, according to the provincial report, the levy had increased to 134 men. There had been 36 enlistments since November 1, but 7 desertions and 4 rejections had reduced the number to 25, to be added to 109 previously borne on the rolls. The new year's report is the more interesting because it refers to the introduction of drill and discipline in a less indirect way than before attempted; and chronicles the admirable behaviour of the older *sipahis* towards their low-caste brethren. We gather that the 'regulars obtained the entire confidence of the Bhils by their conciliatory conduct;' that the ready association of the regular troops with the irregular recruits had the happiest effect, for these last 'began to rise in self-esteem, and feel proud of the service,' which placed them 'on an equality with the highest classes.' The behaviour of Outram's own regiment (the 23rd N.I.) in this respect, when the men of the Bhil corps were sent bodily into the Malegáon cantonment, is told in a manner so characteristic of the honest heart of the narrator, that we make no apology for a full quotation:—'Not only were the Bhils received by the men without insulting scoffs, but they were even received as friends, and with the greatest kindness invited to sit down among them, fed by them, and talked to by high and low—

as on an equality from being brother soldiers. This accidental circumstance will produce more beneficial effects than the most studied measures of conciliation; and Bhil reformation will owe much to it. The Bhils returned quite delighted and flattered by their reception, and entreated me to allow them no rest from drill until they became equal to their brother-soldiers! Thus happily has another obstacle been removed.' This obstacle—a purely moral one—he explains to have been caused by the impression that his men would be unfavourably disposed towards the regular army; whereas, instead of any such result accruing from the contact, a feeling of regard for the red-coats arose in the minds of the Bhils, which would assuredly, in his opinion, be communicated to future recruits. A postscript dated January 4 reports the arrival and distribution of arms and accoutrements. The men seemed highly pleased with, and proud of the former, notwithstanding that a very few months before they had expressed themselves strongly against receiving them.

Early in 1826, Outram had returned to Dharangáo, which place he then determined to make his permanent head-quarters. On May 1 of that year, he states that it is his intention to discontinue for a time recruiting; and on July 1 he reports that he has 'now in the service 308 Bhils, of whom 258 attend drill.' During the two previous months the men had been much engaged in the construction of barracks. Their conduct continued to be satisfactory; there had not been a single complaint against them from villagers throughout June, and none that could be remembered in May. They abstained from spirituous liquors, except on certain special occasions, when the use was authorised; they exerted themselves with zeal and success to suppress robbery and violence; and they loyally responded to the call of their commandant to set an example of

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soldierly obedience and good behaviour, whether on duty or parade, or in quarters with their families.

In December the Bhils were inspected by Mr. Bax, of the Bombay Civil Service, who had succeeded Colonel Robertson as collector of Khandesh. The corps was reported competent to take part in the charge and escort of treasure ; to keep the peace in case of plundering or disturbance ; to act in a body, or detachments, against outlaws or rebels ; to assist regular troops in the event of serious field operations ; and to supply ordinary guards and escorts to the local authorities. Outram concludes an official report, dated December 13, with the expression of his intention to recommence recruiting so soon as the arrival of his expected adjutant would enable him to move about the country. 'I shall endeavour,' he says, 'to draw off recruits from all parts of the Satpura range, and make myself perfectly acquainted with every stronghold and place of refuge in these mountains ; so that, on the occurrence of any disturbances similar to those of last rains, and every former year, I may be able to circumvent all such gangs by my Bhils, and at once.'

In April 1827 an affair took place which enabled the authorities to judge more fairly of the temper and quality of the Bhil corps. A gang of marauding Bhils had been assembled for mischief in the hills beyond Sirpur. It had been just strengthened by the accession of two notorious characters, Mahdeo Singh and Govinda Náyaks, bringing more than twenty followers, and one Lahnu who had been expelled from Outram's levies ; and rumours were current to the effect that emissaries from these men were busily engaged in endeavouring to draw together the disaffected, and seduce the loyal inhabitants and Government servants throughout the province. Their numbers were said to be increasing daily, and it was generally believed that they would attack the village of Bonwári, which from its strong

position had already resisted one attempt made by them upon it.

Outram was moving with a detachment of his men in search of recruits when he learnt the state of affairs, and his first impulse was to solicit the orders of the collector. But the news reaching him that six carts and twenty-four bullocks had been just seized by the gang, he took the responsibility of action on his own shoulders. Marching his recruiting party to a village at ten miles' distance, he selected a detachment of one *jama'dâr*, one *havildar*, and twenty-five rank and file disciplined Bhils. And this is his account of the sequel :—

‘The whole body eagerly pressed to go, but being desirous to prove the power of discipline, I informed them that a larger force would detract from their merit, as I believed the enemy were not above double the number of those I had selected.

‘With the detachment above mentioned, I marched at nightfall on Boorwarry (twenty miles) at which place we arrived at about three A.M. The jungle around the village was all on fire, and fearing that it had fallen into the hands of the rebels I proceeded to reconnoitre. Being perceived by the villagers, who in the obscurity took me for an enemy, I was fired upon, but upon giving them to understand who I was, the gates were opened, and the detachment received as deliverers, the villagers having been in momentary expectation of attack.

‘I caused Callian Chowdry, and Dhen Sing, and Anchit Naicks immediately to assemble their followers, and under their guidance proceeded to attack the rebels, whose haunt was represented to be about six miles further in the hills. We reached a rugged ravine in which it was situated at sunrise, but I was surprised and disappointed to find they had been warned of our movements, and were nowhere to be seen. On dispersing some of my men to look for their traces, they

attacked me very spiritedly from ambush, and before a shot was fired by our party, had wounded my *jemadar*. This, together with their terrific shouts, and showers of arrows and stones from a height commanding us, at first startled my Bhils, but they were speedily rallied, and maintained the skirmish very steadily. The enemy having the advantage of the height and the cover of trees and rocks, it was necessary to draw them from their position. To this end I feigned a retreat which brought them down from the heights; my detachment then turned, charged very gallantly, and put them to flight. There being no prospect of ever taking a nimble and hardy Bhil on such precipitous ground, with men burdened with arms and accoutrements, and who had marched upwards of thirty-six miles, I again drew my detachment off, and induced the enemy to follow, when another charge totally dispersed them, leaving two killed behind them, besides several wounded, whom they carried off. Our loss was great in proportion to my small party; the Bhil *jemadar* severely wounded by two arrows, three sepoy with arrows, and about a fifth of the whole bruised by stones. . . .

‘Having returned to Boorwarry, where we were joined by the remainder of my detachment (which I had directed to follow in the morning from Tekwarry), at midnight I again marched into the hills with a detachment of twenty men and an officer, in the hope of securing the families of the enemy; but they were secreted, or sent off to other haunts. After searching till midday yesterday to no purpose (only five Bhil scouts having been seen, who fled at our approach), I returned to Boorwarry, and having left a detachment at that place sufficient to overawe the dispersed Bhils from re-assembling, and to assist the *mamlutdar*¹ (whom I have sent

¹ *Mamlat-dār*: doubtless from the Perso-Arabic *Mu‘āmalat-dār*; a native revenue official.

with his police to that place to endeavour to apprehend some of the fugitives), I marched this day with the remainder of my detachment to Talnair.

‘The conduct of the Bhil detachment on this occasion is highly satisfactory, being the first opportunity I have had of proving my men when opposed to their own tribe. They have freely risked their blood in our cause, and fought boldly.

‘The quickness with which they rallied, and the boldness with which they charged, together with the fatigue which they had undergone and the eagerness they showed to accompany me on the second night, entitle them to the approbation of Government; especially considering that they were unsupported by regulars (whom I purposely left with the remainder of the detachment), and that, of the whole party engaged, only four were above eighteen years of age, and that the enemy they had to encounter had obtained considerable celebrity by the success with which nearly the same number of Bhils, with the same leaders, and nearly on the same ground, had repulsed a detachment last year, consisting of an officer and seventy-five regular troops.’

The above is extracted from a report dated Camp, Talnair, April 22, 1827. Fifteen days later a further report, dated from ‘Ajunda,’ shows that Outram had since pushed on to this latter village, with as many ‘horse and foot’ as he could collect together, and dispersed a gang under one Seepria Náyak, which had been hovering around the scene of a recent disturbance with the manifest object of joining the rebels under Mahdeo. ‘All the Bheels in this neighbourhood,’ he writes, ‘had been more or less concerned, though few had joined in arms. All had connived at the assembly of the gang, and maintained correspondence with it. I deemed it prudent therefore to secure in the first place as many of their persons as possible, both to obtain information, and to

prevent their absconding from fear of their connection with the rebels becoming known—in which case it would have been difficult to settle the country, whilst they would be driven to plunder for a livelihood. Accordingly, at midnight, my parties apprehended simultaneously eighteen Bheels, of several villages, and having these in my hands, I secured the attendance of all with whom they are connected. From them I learnt that the gang had been formed here, but was chiefly composed of Bheels from a distance; that having assembled they proceeded to join the rebels in the hills, but returned and dispersed; and that only two or three were now in this *pergunnah*, the rest having separated and found safety individually. . . .

‘Having now satisfactorily ascertained that no more of the gang are left in this country, and having no fear that any of the rebels will dare to return and unite to disturb it, I took upon me such measures as I deemed immediately necessary to restore confidence and preserve tranquillity. . . .

‘I released all prisoners excepting the two who had belonged to the gang, after giving them and the Bheels of the surrounding villages written protections from any further molestation on account of the late rising, giving them to understand that this clemency is owing to the speedy dispersion of the rebels before the commission of any violence, and that all who are still absent (except the five leaders) who return to their villages within ten days shall not be molested. . . .

‘I am happy to state that these measures have had the desired effect; the peace of the country is entirely restored. . . . Of the leaders not one is left in the country. . . .

‘I have explained to the Bheels of the country that they will not be treated so leniently: that the mere circumstance of their concealing their knowledge of a rebellion being meditated or proposed, will subject them to severe punish-

ment ; and that in future Government will not merely make examples of the principal leaders as heretofore, but that all concerned in such risings shall equally suffer. They are now so fully convinced of the utter uselessness of such attempts, and of my ability and determination to carry my threats into execution, that I can confidently answer for their remaining quiet.'

In a history of local progress, there is little more to be added for the year 1827, beyond the fact of reduction of establishment in the northern agency and successful colonisation in the south of Khandesh. A new agency on the principle of the other three was at the same time created in the Nizam's territory. As for the Bhil corps, it grew gradually stronger and more efficient, and, on the occasion of a review by the brigadier commanding the province, numbered as many as 600 men. It was now enabled to relieve the regulars wholly from outpost duty. In 1828, the collector reported that, for the first time in twenty years, the country had enjoyed six months of uninterrupted repose.

Fairly to judge of the services thus rendered, the reader must not lose sight of the material of which the new levies were composed. An amusing illustration of the Bhil recruit in 1827 occurs in a note of introduction from Captain Ovans, thus describing its bearer :—'He is a restless and dangerous character, who will not settle at the plough, and who must not be left without a subsistence. But he will make a famous grenadier when you form your flank companies.' On December 18 in the same year, Mr. Giberne, the collector of Khandesh, referring to Captain Ovans's views, in which he agrees, writes :—'You should never consider looks or *character* in taking recruits : yours is a peculiar duty.'

From Outram's private correspondence during the last-named year, we gather that his mother had been under

grave apprehension on the score of his personal exposure to danger in the hunting-field. He had sought to reassure her in the following terms :—‘ It is not dangerous hunting tigers on an elephant as I do ; it is as safe as firing at the monsters from the top of a tower. If I have been carried away by enthusiasm occasionally to expose myself unnecessarily, believe me, I shall bear your advice and admonitions in mind, and abstain for the future. In my situation a little daring was necessary to obtain the requisite influence over the minds of the raw, irregular people I command ; and if ever you hear of any act of temerity I may have hitherto been guilty of, do not condemn me as unmindful of what I owe to you and our family, but attribute it to having been a part of my peculiar duty. . . . The necessity for a recurrence of such duties is now at an end.’ Boar-hunting was not to be had in Khandesh, and he had not experienced its pleasures and excitement for three years. The rapid diminution in the number of tigers was, moreover, even rendering that sport a comparatively rare one. As regards his bodily health, never had he felt better or stronger. He spoke of going home, but thought it well to await the termination of his brother Frank’s proposed furlough, so that the younger son’s visit might succeed the elder’s, and the absence of one would in some way be compensated by the presence of the other. We shall see with how little of the foresight displayed in his professional career he was reckoning up the concerns of his family and home.

To Mr. Giberne, the collector, he expressed himself contented to remain as long as possible in Khandesh. Púna and Nagar—the two favourite stations, cited as typical of convivial gatherings—had no special attraction for him. ‘ I care not for their society,’ he wrote, ‘ not being calculated to shine out of the range of my own forests.’

CHAPTER IV.

1829-35.

Bhils at school—Francis Outram—Dáng Expedition of 1830—Summary of Remaining Service with the Bhils till 1835—Shikar Experiences.

EARLY in the new year Outram had reported to the collector of Khandesh that the time had arrived when the experiment might be made of opening a school for the children of his Bhil soldiers. Heretofore the scheme had been judged impracticable; because that, in the eyes of these men, to educate was to degrade, and no Bhil had been known, on the testimony of an existing generation, to be capable of either writing or reading. A change had, however, been effected, which, without directly affecting the Bhil estimate of education, greatly facilitated the introduction of a healthier state of things. The discovery had been made that an Englishman could use the rod with impartiality, even though it were one of iron. If other Englishmen were of the stamp of those sent to govern Khandesh, within the limits of the agencies, then, it might reasonably be argued, must their words and wisdom be trustworthy; and if *they* said that education was essential to those under their charge, it was more than probable that they were right. It was not to be expected that so little advanced a thinker as the Bhil would stop to inquire whether all Englishmen were alike. And of course he knew nothing whatever of policies, or of the views of particular Governments, and particular Vice-

roys. A school was accordingly established at Bhil headquarters, to teach the *sipahis* themselves and their children.

One event in the year 1829 would have, doubtless, cast a deeper gloom over the routine life of the Bhil commandant, had his mind not been so healthily and usefully engaged in the service of the State. As it was, he felt the blow severely. The death of his Engineer brother, at the early age of 28, occurred on September 18, under painful circumstances.

We have before stated that Francis Outram was a man of no ordinary abilities. That he was also generous and unselfish above the average of his fellows, is demonstrated in a little incident which occurred on the occasion of his leaving England for India. He was then, like other cadets of his stamp, supplied with a first-class passage; but, without informing others of his intention, he exchanged his passage-ticket for one of the second-class, so as to be enabled to make parting presents to his sisters and friends out of the money saved. The discomfort and indignities to which he voluntarily subjected himself by the arrangement, in a long voyage round the Cape, were as nothing in the scale to the satisfaction he derived from the knowledge that the tokens of affection provided would be received after his departure, and that he had not become indebted for them to any resources but his own. Many may consider the story insignificant in its simplicity; others may agree with ourselves that it illustrates the morality of a whole life, in which it would be the key to many apparent anomalies.

In India he soon established a character for talent, energy, and professional zeal. His standard of honour was high and well maintained; but his independent spirit involved him sometimes in trouble. On one occasion, when he came in contact with a superior whom he could not

respect, he laid himself open to a charge of insubordination, and the result was a court-martial, which sentenced him to the loss of six steps. Opinion was divided on the justice of the finding, but the severity of the sentence was generally admitted, and there is every reason to suppose that, had the sufferer proceeded home as intended, a reversal would have been obtained. He did not, however, await the result of his appeal to this effect, for, in a fit of delirium, caused by *jungle* fever, he put an end to his life. Feeble in health, and keenly sensitive, he was morbidly jealous of character, and a year had scarcely elapsed since the fiat of the court had gone forth, when some misdoings on the part of a native subordinate led him to imagine a defalcation in his cash-sheet for which he would be held morally, if not legally, responsible. That his apprehensions were in point of fact unfounded, and the nature of his personal responsibility in the matter exaggerated, became clear upon after-investigation. Individual statements of men of position and honour, added to the proceedings of the court of inquiry, and the Government letter—which in exonerating his memory from reproach added a high tribute to his worth—give ample proof that the self-accusation which preceded self-destruction was nothing else but the delusion of a fevered brain. Among other testimonies to his character, those of Sir John Malcolm and Mr. Elphinstone, both Governors of Bombay, might be cited. The latter, when in England, had written to Mrs. Outram in eulogistic terms of her elder son. The former, when in the discharge of his pro-consular duties in India, expressed a strong opinion of the harshness of the sentence of the court-martial, so soon to be followed by a yet more serious calamity; and in after years, spoke of the young officer in terms indicating peculiar esteem.

For a Native Infantry subaltern, however intelligent, and even on staff employ, to address the Governor of the Presi-

dency in which his corps is serving, on his personal affairs, is a bold and unusual step. But the object of his appeal being to seek vindication of the character of a deceased brother, James Outram felt satisfied that he need make 'no further apology for the liberty' taken 'to Sir John Malcolm.' After this preface he wrote :—

'The knowledge I have of my late brother's honourable sentiments, and implicit confidence in his integrity, impel me to solicit the influence of your authority to cause the strictest inquiry into the accounts of the office which was under his charge, in order that his innocence may be established of any knowledge of the defalcations (if such there were) in his treasury, and that the guilty authors, who in that case were the murderers of my poor brother, may be brought to justice. The only information I have received of such deficiency in the treasury lately under my brother's charge, is contained in the subjoined copy of a memorandum¹ found on his death-bed. No communication from himself, or other circumstances have led me to believe that such is the case. I presume the first knowledge my brother had of the circumstance must have been obtained when on the point of leaving his station for the sea-coast on account of dangerous illness.

'Though he could have had little anxiety on account of the deficient sums, which he must have known he had friends able and willing to assist him to replace, yet the idea, perhaps, that the uncharitable world might be too apt to impute dishonourable motives to him—together with the disgrace he had been subjected to by a late court-martial (which had ever since preyed much upon his mind)—have driven him, weakened in mind and body from disease, into a state of temporary madness, during

¹ This paper is not forthcoming, but its nature is evident.

which he committed the dreadful act which terminated his life. I am confident the only guilt that can be laid to my brother's charge is neglect. For this there is no excuse; but to account for it, I have to state that the unfortunate result of the trial at Poonah must have greatly tended to lessen his zeal, to the over-exertion of which he attributed that misfortune; and though he was assured of reinstatement to former rank by your exertions in his favour, for the kind tender of which he ever entertained the most lively gratitude (and latterly, by the promise of assistance from his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief), yet the impression that he had been disgraced could not be removed from his highly honourable mind, and drove him into that state of carelessness to which he alludes.'

He adds an impression of certainty that his brother would not have allowed the loss of a single rupee to accrue to Government through his neglect; and that he holds it a 'sacred duty' to that brother's memory to fulfil his wishes in this respect, by personally making good 'the deficiency he appears to allude to, should any be really found to exist.' He leaves to the Governor, on becoming officially assured of the innocence of the deceased officer, to give the same publicity to such assurance as already obtained for the self-accusing memorandum above mentioned.

'Should the style of this letter be faulty,' is the concluding passage, 'I beg you will pardon it, in consideration of the state of feeling and of excitement under which I write, for nothing but the highest respect can be intended.'

To this appeal Sir John replied:—

'I have received your letter, and can fully understand, and as fully approve, the motives which have led you to write to me upon the melancholy subject of your late brother's

death. You may depend upon every effort in my power to do justice to his memory. He had his errors and failings—and who is without them? but all, I believe, are impressed with the same conviction that I have, that he was as distinguished for zeal and integrity as he was for professional talent. I assure you, I consider his death a serious loss to the public service.'

When writing to his sister, Mrs. Farquharson, on the subject of an epitaph to be inscribed on their brother's tomb, Outram thus expressed himself: 'It is my wish that nothing in the usual strain should be written. The feelings of friends, or the worth of the deceased, cannot be described by words. The most unworthy and commonplace characters have fulsome eulogiums written on their tombs by those who despised the person when living. No estimation of the character is formed from these memorials. Poor Frank's memory is esteemed by all: his worth and talents are known by all our army. The simple inscription I propose is

THE REMAINS OF
LIEUTENANT FRANCIS OUTRAM,
BOMBAY ENGINEERS.
A MOST TALENTED AND HONOURABLE MAN.
DIED IN THE TWENTY-SEVENTH YEAR OF HIS AGE.

Pray let me know your opinion, and that of Colonel Farquharson.'

Some relics of Francis Outram's inventive genius and scientific attainments are to be found in practical designs for the economy of manual labour by the use of self-acting machinery; but they would hardly convey a true notion of the intrinsic power which his contemporaries considered him to possess. So marked, indeed, were his artistic tastes and capabilities, that he seriously entertained the idea of

resigning the service and adopting the profession of an artist, in the event of his appeal against the sentence of the court-martial proving unsuccessful.

In the year 1830 occurred the invasion of the Dáng country and capture of its chiefs. This tract of tangled forest, situated on the west of Khandesh, and on the further side of the Sukhain Hills, had never been penetrated by troops. Its Bhil inhabitants, as little used to subjection as the Arab of the desert, had long been in the habit of seeking prey and plunder beyond their lawful limits, and of encroaching upon the lands of their neighbours. From time immemorial retaliatory measures having been found as difficult as actual suppression, a legacy of disorder had been left to the successors of native rulers, to deal successfully with which would have sorely taxed the powers of a Government less chary of oppression and generally scrupulous than our own. Captain Douglas Graham looked upon the Dángchis as the most uncivilised of all the wild tribes he had come across in Western India; deficient in intellect of the most ordinary description; physically stunted by hardships of living, climate, and poverty; extremely superstitious; addicted to intoxication, and careless of any fixed home. He thought it no matter of surprise that among a set of such degraded beings the principle of right and wrong was entirely lost, or the fear of consequences overwhelmed in a blind reliance on fortune; that the dread of treachery was the predominant idea, and that the animal instinct alone remained in full force to urge the supply of daily necessities.

Outram was convinced that by the medium of his own Bhils he could effect a settlement of the Dáng, the unruly occupants of which could easily be turned one against the other, and thus prevented concentrating against the sovereign authority represented by British officers. Accordingly he undertook to march a body of troops into the heart of their

country, consisting of 250 of the newly raised Bhil corps, four companies of native infantry from Surat and Khandesh, 120 auxiliary horse, and 1,100 auxiliary Bhils under their own chiefs or Rajahs.

Entering himself from the eastward,¹ with two companies of native regular *sipahis*, his own Bhils, 50 of the Púna auxiliary horse, and some Bhil auxiliaries, and awaiting simultaneous advances of detachments from four separate stations on the opposite frontier, he had contemplated a partial junction of his forces in the centre of the Dáng, but could give no fixed points of meeting, as his actual routes were unknown. When he had descended from the Gháts to the village of Gabrái, after a march of eighteen miles effected on the first day, the *jangal* was found so thick on all sides that, even had he known the localities reached, it would have been no easy task to open communications with his detached officers. As for the inhabitants of the country, his party had not fallen in with even one; they had passed sites of destroyed huts, and had arrived at the residence of a petty Rajah, where the dwelling-places were entire but utterly deserted. On the day following he heard of the arrival of one detachment of his force at Garvi. Two days afterwards he visited that village, which eventually became a connecting post, with forty horse and fifty Bhil auxiliaries. Two days later still he was able with three detachments to effect a thorough scour of a *jangal* twenty miles in circumference. The Dángchi leaders soon became fugitives and disheartened, and the 'Silput,' their chief authority, was openly deserted

¹ One of the great approaches to Gujrat from the eastward was through the Sindwa Ghat. It appears that the pass in this direction was formerly paved by the Muhammadan conquerors, and that after consolidation of their powers they constructed a line of as many as eighty-four forts in a convenient position west of the Sindwa, to keep the turbulent tribes in subjection. The few of these that remained on the British occupation were distinguished by the names of the respective commanders under whose auspices they were erected.

by his more prominent followers. On April 18, or not a fortnight after commencement of active proceedings, four local Rajahs had personally presented themselves with offers of assistance, and two others had expressed a wish to be received in the British camp; while 500 head of cattle with many prisoners were in British hands. Outram promised to restore the former and release the latter on the apprehension of the 'Silput.'

On May 22, the British force returned, as its leader himself expresses it, 'with the principal chiefs our prisoners, and all the others in alliance, after having subdued and surveyed the whole country.' In the morning of that day, the Silput himself had surrendered, conditionally that his life be spared. The followers of the captives had been dispersed; and an opposing force, said to consist of some 10,000 bows, had vanished into thin air. When it is borne in mind that the country was unexplored, and had been reported impregnable because impracticable,¹ and that the end was attained with scarce a shot fired, and the loss of one life only; the feat will doubtless appear eminently satisfactory. This is one of those expeditions, the importance of which must not be measured by the casualty list. It is to be judged by a knowledge of the difficulties of country traversed, and rapid movements of the lawless enemy, as well as by the results obtained, and their bearing on the pacification and well-being of the peoples concerned, whose habitat may be defined as situated between the Nizam's and Holkar's territories and the sea. Another element of anxiety not to be forgotten is to be traced in the connivance of the officers of a neighbouring native state, Baroda, with the movement we sought to suppress. The Gáikwar was apparently ever willing to lend

¹ The description of the Dáng in the Collector's Revenue Report, dated August 1, 1828, was rather an account, and a brief one, by Mr. Bax, of the chiefs and their resources than of the features of the country.

assistance to the robbers of the Dáng in their opposition to British supremacy.¹

Of Outram's share in the miniature campaign we should give but a faint idea did we restrict it to field operations, or even to the exact fulfilment of the orders and wishes of the civil authorities. We have the best authority for stating that Sir John Malcolm, governor of Bombay, had expressed his opinion in council that a strong brigade of regular troops would be insufficient to attempt invasion of the Dáng country ; and it was his confidence alone in the foresight of his Bhil agent and commandant that led him to sanction the project so satisfactorily put into practice. On Outram's shoulders rested the whole responsibility, and to him was naturally due the main credit accruing from the expedition.

But though there was barely any loss of life on either side occasioned in actual warfare, much sickness prevailed among the troops at the close of the campaign and on their return from the Dáng. The several detachments had been scarcely broken up when nearly half the men and officers were seized with fever, caused, it may be presumed, from the fatigues, exposure, and privations undergone during the two months of their employment in an unhealthy climate. Eventually, it would appear that more harm still resulted from this expedition, for of the thirteen officers engaged, not one was exempt from *jungle* fever ; three or four died, and the rest were compelled to leave Khandesh for change of climate. Outram alone, of all the Europeans, escaped, and his immunity he attributed to 'covering his head and face with fine gauze' when sleeping in feverish tracts, a habit which his comrades in the Dáng could not be induced to adopt.

On May 20, 1830, the magistrate of Khandesh conveyed to Lieutenant Outram, and the officers and men under his

¹ Captain Douglas Graham: *Synopsis of Bhil Settlement in Khandesh*. See also *Public Reports and Despatches of Captain Outram*.

command, the thanks of the Bombay Government 'for the highly meritorious service of the detachment in the Dáng; and four days later, in acknowledging the report of the Silput Rajah's surrender, the same functionary added: 'Nothing can exceed the indefatigable exertions made by yourself and the officers and troops under your command, in bringing this most harassing duty to a conclusion . . . which has now been most happily effected through the unyielding perseverance maintained, and the judicious measures you have pursued throughout.' On June 7, Government endorsed the magistrate's personal opinion by a renewal of thanks to Lieutenant Outram 'for the zeal, activity, and judgment he has displayed on this occasion, to which is to be attributed the fortunate conclusion of the harassing service he has had to conduct.' It will not do to dwell further on this brief passage of an illustrious career; but, as the necessity for economising space and the reader's attention forbids the indiscriminate recourse to extract, we take the opportunity of remarking that Outram's final report to Mr. Collector Boyd (the state of whose health would not admit of his meeting the Dáng chiefs near their own country), shows, on the part of the writer, a knowledge of his subject, and of his men, as well as an administrative ability and a rare energy of character deserving of appreciation and study. Not the least noteworthy feature in his recommendations is the care with which cause is shown for grants of money and other presents to particular chiefs and native officials who had rendered good service to the British Government.

In 1831, the collector of Khandesh deputed Lieutenant Outram to inquire into certain daring outrages committed in the districts of Yáwal and Sauda, in the north-eastern Bhil agency; also to determine and apprehend the offenders. Accompanied by some of his own Bhils and a few auxiliaries, not fifty in all, he captured 469 suspected persons, and in-

vestigated the charges against them, selecting for trial such as appeared to be actually guilty. Of 158 so committed, 114 were Bhils, accused for the most part of gang robbery. Attacks had been, moreover, made on the Dhúlia treasury, and on the houses of bankers, showing an inclination to serious mischief which called for immediate check and punishment. The official reports on these proceedings show that, owing to the measures taken, the spirit to break out had not only been subdued, but the apprehension of all offenders had been effected without the offer of a single reward, or any expense to Government further than the maintenance of the prisoners. The native Mamlutdar of Yáwal and his Sarishtadar were considered to merit especial notice for services rendered. Of the first, named Ram Chandar Bálaji, Outram wrote, with characteristic warmth, that he had 'throughout exerted himself in a manner' he had 'never found equalled in an officer in his situation.

In March 1831, he learnt the death, in India, of his sister Margaret, wife of Colonel Farquharson, one whom he describes, in replying to her husband's letter conveying the sad intelligence, as 'the warmest and most excellent friend' he possessed on earth, and the most affectionate of sisters. About three months later, addressing the same correspondent, he mentioned also having heard from Glasgow of the death of his uncle Joseph Outram, and adds: 'All, all are falling; I shall have no relations left to welcome me home, if I ever can return.'

With a short notice of one more minor campaign which occurred in the spring of the year 1833, we shall bring to a close the historical portion of ten busy and useful years among the Bhils, passing on to consider the less palpable and direct, but not less efficacious, means employed to effect the reformation and discipline of this rough and turbulent people. Let us premise that Outram was no longer

a subaltern: his Captain's commission dated from October 7, 1832.

The Bhils of the Barwáni territory, in the Satpura mountains, north of Khandesh, and of the neighbouring petty states on the Narbada in Nimár, having risen in rebellion, became so formidable that their Rajahs were unable to control or face them, and parties of the rebels having entered the British collectorate of Khandesh under Hatnia and Esnia Náyaks, sacking several villages, killing a *patell*,¹ and wounding others of our subjects, it was found necessary to send against them such force as could be hastily collected.

On April 24 Captain Outram took 25 men of the Bhil corps, and 20 horse, strengthened by some hundred auxiliary Bhils, with the intention of cutting off communication between the gangs of the two leading insurgents, and also of attacking Náyak Esnia when joined by a coming detachment of 50 men of the 18th Regiment. After a fatiguing march of two days through difficult *jungle* and over strong passes, and in a country uninhabited and destitute of supplies, his party arrived in the centre of the Satpura hills. The immediate result of this movement was the capture of Esnia, who was betrayed into the hands of the British officers by his uncle. On April 26 Outram was joined by the men expected from the 18th Regiment N.I., and marched the day following to a place called Mangwára, where he had appointed a meeting with the Barwáni Rajah. This chief, however, failing to appear, though a special escort had been sent to attend him, it was resolved, after three days' waiting, to push on at once against Hatnia, who, it was affirmed, had been joined by a large number of attendant rebels. The small force, marching 24 miles during the night, came upon his encampment at daylight of May 1. It was deserted; but the signals heard among the surrounding heights showed the enemy to

¹ Village head man, or local authority.

be on the alert. Thither, then, did the detachment move. Hatnia—observed ascending a hill with two or three followers, to join his companions assembled on the summit—was captured by Lieutenant Hart's horsemen, who intercepted his retreat. The rest fled on the loss of their leader, with the exception of one small body of bowmen, who stood their ground for a time and fired many arrows, but finally decamped on seeing mounted assailants in their rear. One hundred and seventy head of cattle were recovered on the pursuit of the fugitives.

This blow, however decisive, was not considered sufficient to check the misdoing of the Barwáni Bhils and their accomplices. Outram accordingly proceeded to the village of Auli, whither the Rajah came to meet him, bringing the before-mentioned escort, and about 50 horse and followers of his own. Having ascertained there that two *náyaks* and a *patell*, suspected of active participation or indirect complicity in the recently reported outrages in British territory, were in the camp of his native ally, he obtained the consent of the latter to arrest and forward them to Khandesh; and it is worthy of remark that these men, together with the captive chief Hatnia, were handed over, for this purpose, to the charge of auxiliary Bhils under native officers. The next step was to cross the Narbada and move against one Rajia, *Náyak* of Dassowa, said to have harboured the scattered rebels of the Satpura, to have long committed depredations in the territories of Holkar and the Barwáni Rajah, and to have become strong enough to defy the whole body of neighbouring chiefs in Nimár.

It was at the solicitation of his native friends and our allies that Outram had come to the resolution to assist in this matter until the strength of the insurgents had been so far broken as to enable the more powerful State officials to act unsupported against their common foe. And he called

upon the Barwáni Rajah, and a certain Mamlutdar of Chikaldi, to join him with such troops as they could get together. But when arrived on the northern side of the Narbada, the news that Rajia had vacated his stronghold, followed by that of the dispersion of his followers, caused him to change his plans; and he judged it prudent to leave the pursuit of a scattered gang to the chiefs themselves, simply furthering and facilitating the object in view by the nearness to the scene of his own detachment. The repugnance of the Mamlutdar to act on this proposal was, however, so evident that he was allowed to return to his home, and Outram himself had eventually to scour the tract in which were situated Rajia's principal posts. Led by a friendly Rajah, Durjan Singh of Dhir, he pressed on during the night to one of these; but on reaching the place at daybreak he found that the usual occupants had decamped. After a march of more than 30 miles, with little intermission, he encamped at Piplod, a deserted village in the Dhir district, and in the heart of Rajia's retreats. Here he stayed for two full days in the hope of securing some of the leading offenders; but the threatening weather operated against him. He was compelled to recross the Narbada and seek shelter for his men, who were totally unprovided with tents or extra clothing, or indeed any necessaries for a prolonged absence on active service. Arriving at Barwáni on May 13, he addressed the collector on that date, signifying his intention to halt there in completion of his arrangements on behalf of the Rajah, and then to return to Khandesh *viâ* the Sindwah, doing such further service with his detachment as he might 'find necessary to insure tranquillity after its departure.'

On June 2, a full report of these proceedings was made from Dhúlia, satisfactory and to the point. Already, some three weeks before this date, the collector had addressed Government on the subject as follows:—'The capture of the

Hatnia naïck (the rebel chief), previous to the monsoon, was what I could not, I confess, feel sanguine enough to expect; and as he is in reality a person of greater weight and importance in the country than his hereditary chief and superior, the raja of Barwáni (an independent prince, whose country is situated between the Satpura hills and the Narbada), his having escaped for the present must in probability have called for the employment of a regular expedition the ensuing season, till which period our whole northern frontier would have been a prey to the numerous gangs which would have risen at the instigation of Hatnia and his adherents.

‘I cannot sufficiently commend the prompt and judicious manner in which Captain Outram proceeded against and captured Hatnia, who in considerable force occupied a position in a tract of country the nature of which can only be known to those who have entered the Satpura range of mountains, and considered by themselves as totally impracticable.

‘The effects of this decisive and successful measure will be experienced not only at present, but for years to come; it will now check the rising inclinations of our own Bhils on the immediate frontier, who showed signs of beginning to join in the robberies perpetrated in the vicinity, and for the future it will prove a lasting warning to the foreign chiefs and Bhils, that, however little we know of their country and its strength, no outrages committed upon our territories can remain unnoticed, or the culprits undiscovered.’

On June 27, Government expressed to the Magistrate of Khandesh their great satisfaction at the successful termination of the expedition, and requested him to communicate to Captain Outram the high sense which they entertained ‘of his ability and judgment in concerting, and zeal and activity in executing those measures by which the insurrec-

tion had been suppressed, and the neighbouring parts of the province of Khandesh preserved from plunder.' The thanks of Government were also conveyed to Lieutenants Hart and Partridge, Ensigns Morris and Renny, and Jemadar Allahyar Khan, who co-operated with Captain Outram on the occasion, with an intimation that their deserving conduct would be brought to the notice of the Commander-in-Chief.

Prior to this expedition of 1833, Outram had begun to feel that he should like a wider field for the exercise of his powers; and now that it was brought to a happy conclusion his mind not unnaturally reverted to the prospect of a new appointment. He had written to his mother in April 1832, to use her home interest to get him employed in the political department, 'the only line in the Indian services which allows a military officer to display his talents, both civil and military.' His great wish was to be appointed an Assistant to the British Resident at Holkar's Court, or Indor, where he thought that his services might be useful, and an anticipated vacancy would give reasonable ground for the application. In November 1833, when there was question of the formation of a separate Agra Government, we find him writing home in the following strain: 'I am most anxious to leave the Bombay Presidency for the new one in Central India, for there is no further honour and advancement to be obtained for me here in this confined sphere. . . . In India I believe I can ensure success, having gained some little distinction, and many friends in power; therefore, get me home patronage, and strong recommendations to the new Governor; I will do the rest. Mr. Elphinstone, I think, would espouse my cause, as *he* was my *first* and best friend.'

To Mrs. Outram's letter in accordance with, and quoting the above request, Mr. Elphinstone replied:—

Albany, May 5, 1834.

‘Having the highest opinion of Mr. Outram, both for his enterprise and gallantry, and for his power of conciliating and gaining the confidence of the natives, I should be most happy to forward his views, if it were in my power; but I have not seen Sir Charles Metcalfe for these five-and-twenty years, and I do not feel myself entitled to address such a recommendation to him as Mr. Outram desires, or indeed to make any such application as would be effectual in a case like the present. This being the case, it is with much satisfaction that I perceive the date of Mr. Outram’s letter, from which I conclude that he had not then heard who was to be the new Governor, and supposed that it would be some stranger from this country, on whom Indian reputation would have no effect. The Governor who has been named, however (Sir Charles Metcalfe), spent all his life in India, and probably is more difficult to approach from this quarter than from others more within Mr. Outram’s reach. I make no doubt that he is already well acquainted with Mr. Outram’s merits, and he is a great deal more likely to employ him from his own impression of his fitness, than in consequence of any recommendation that could be sent from England.’

The Bombay Government, however, were not going to part with so valuable a public servant without further putting to the test and reaping the advantages from his capabilities within the limits of their own control. His work with the Bhils was not yet over; nor, when over, was it to be exchanged without a second and equally hard apprenticeship before he would be permitted to acknowledge other immediate superiors.

But we have now to illustrate Outram’s ‘non-official’ dealings with the Bhils; that is to say, his off-parade behaviour to his men, at times when he might have kept aloof

from them altogether without prejudice to the strict letter of his duty to the State. Should it have been no infrequent practice with young officers of the native Indian army to avail themselves of leisure hours rather for the indulgence of their own particular tastes than the indirect advantage of their profession, they have only done what their fellows have done in other walks of life. Time and example often work, in these cases, a wholesome and effectual change. The real evil is, to ignore, or to forget that the *sipahi*, whom they are accustomed to meet at drill or in orderly room, is a human being like themselves, and susceptible of heart influences as much as professional instruction. Those who do this, and consequently touch no chord of personal sympathy in their relations with the Indian soldier, are assuredly not acting in the true spirit of the covenant under which they serve. To use a hackneyed, but appropriate term, they are to all intents and purposes 'hard bargains.'

Had James Outram followed such impulses, the Bhil corps would never have been raised by him, and never would he have become a power for good throughout these uncivilised regions. The secret of his success lay in the unselfish and unwearied pursuance of principles exactly the opposite. He spared no pains to establish over his outlawed friends the power which springs from tested sympathy—not that inspired by awe alone. They found, not only that he surpassed them in all they most admired, viz., in all that was most manly, but that he thoroughly understood them and their ways; that he loved them; that he could and did enter thoroughly into their fears and their difficulties, their joys and their sorrows. Such a bond, all-powerful in its action, could be established and maintained only by the genial intercourse of daily life. Though his wild subjects saw their *sahib* exercising the open-handed hospitality of Anglo-Indian bachelor life in his costly residence at Dharangaon—a

palace in their eyes—yet they felt that he essentially belonged to themselves; while his active habits brought him into constant contact with the minute interests of their every-day existence.

No wonder that we hear of his memory still lingering in Khandesh, shrouded by a semi-divine halo. We are told that, a few years ago, some of his old *sipahis* happened to light upon an ugly little image. Tracing in it a fancied resemblance to their old commandant, they forthwith set it up and worshipped it as 'Outram Sahib.'

Reminiscences of Khandesh life must now be brought to a close by extracting a few of the many anecdotes still extant regarding those exploits in the *jangal* which formed an effective link in the chain of influence the young soldier made it the business of life to draw around his Bhils. He loved *dangerous* sport for its own sake, but rightly considered it a duty, though it happened to be a congenial one, to follow his own instincts in outdaring the brave little hunters whose hearts he sought to win. It must be confessed that his assurances to his mother were more honoured in the breach than the observance. For James Outram to eschew 'acts of temerity' within his reach, when duty did not absolutely forbid, seemed a physical impossibility.

The following are among the many gleanings of Captain Stanley Scott from the recollections of old Bhil native officers. They will serve to illustrate, in some degree, the kind of impression made on the minds of the narrators themselves by the deeds of prowess recorded :—

In April or May, 1825, news having been brought in by his *shikari*, Chima, that a tiger had been seen on the side of the hill under the Mussulman temple, among some prickly pear shrubs, Lieutenant Outram and another sportsman proceeded to the spot. Outram went on foot, and his companion on horseback. Searching through the bushes, when close on

the animal, Outram's friend fired and missed, on which the tiger sprang forward roaring, seized Outram, and they rolled down the side of the hill together. Being released from the claws of the ferocious beast for a moment, Outram with great presence of mind drew a pistol he had with him and shot the tiger dead. The Bhils, on seeing that he had been injured, were one and all loud in their grief and expressions of regret; but Outram quieted them with the remark, 'What do I care for the clawing of a cat!' This speech was rife among the Bhils for many years afterwards, and may be so until this day.

In 1827, it was reported to Outram that a tiger was lurking in the densely wooded ravine of 'Mahi Burda' in the Saigaon *jangal*. He proceeded thither, with his rifle, on foot. When near the spot indicated, it suddenly occurred to him that, by commanding the narrow end of the ravine, and placing the beaters at the other, the tiger must make his exit through the gorge, and he would get the opportunity of a close shot; but to find on the bank a place from which to fire was impossible, as the *jangal* grew close up to the sides, and the bottom of the ravine was not visible from the top. Outram's mind was not one to be baffled by trifles. He and some followers climbed a tree, a branch of which overhung the ravine. Securely posted on that branch, the Bhils tied their *pagris* (turbands) and waistbands together, passed a band round their commandant's chest and under his arms, and let him down dangling in the air. He now saw clearly all that was taking place beneath. The tiger, driven down by the shouts of the beaters, came within easy range of his rifle, and from his wonderful position he got the desired shot and killed the animal dead. Instantly drawn up into the tree again, he turned round laughingly to the Bhils, and said, 'You have suspended me like a thief from a tree, but I killed the tiger.'

In 1832, the inhabitants of Virgáon, in the Taluka of Pimpalnair, brought information to Outram that there was a tiger in their *jangal*. He immediately caused search to be made, and it was discovered that the animal had taken up his abode in a dark cave. Outram went to the mouth with three or four native followers and, placing them outside, he entered. On hearing a low growl immediately in front of him, he fired; the tiger not coming out, he fired again, when to his delight he found he had killed him.

In 1833, in the month of April, when encamped at Sirpúr, the villagers gave Outram information of a tiger that had been marked down in the thorny *jangal* to the north of the village. This part of the country was plain, and there was no hill or ravine near. Outram started on foot, spear in hand, a follower carrying a rifle, and some six others bows and arrows. The tiger broke ground on their approach; Outram followed him up on foot for three miles, and eventually speared him to death. This act, it is affirmed, has never been equalled, before or since, in Khandesh.

For the following spirited account of Outram and his Bhil trackers we are indebted to Colonel Davidson: 'Selecting a few of the most dashing and expert men (who could follow up the trail of man or animal for days together through those jungly wilds), he formed a band of scouts or trackers, with a famous little fellow named Khundoo at their head. In conducting a tiger-hunt on elephants, the first thing to be done is to disperse the Bheels over the country. They scatter, and yet act in concert; and when the "pug" (or print of the tiger's foot) is found, they collect, and follow up the marks. In this, their dexterity, to one who is not initiated in the art, surpasses credence. They seem to follow the game over places where no vestige of a mark could light. Sometimes they are at fault, at others the

scent (as it were) seems to run breast high, and on they go at a jog trot, marking as they run, with the point of a spear, the last decided print. Should they reach any thick jungle, covered with high grass and herbage, where no trace can possibly be found, they divide into two parties, right and left, and circle round the obstructive patch, till they meet on the opposite side, looking with lynx eyes at every inch of the line by which they circumscribe the spot. Finding no signs of egress, they conclude at once that the tiger is within the circle; so they divide again and circle back, dropping a man at intervals till they have formed a ring of sentinels round the patch. These sentinels get into trees, partly for safety, but chiefly to extend their range of vision. The tiger, perhaps not satisfied with his resting-place, or for reasons tigers can only know, is about to quit the spot. A Bheel sees him from aloft, and utters a low deep cough. The tiger, awed by the human voice, generally retires inwards, and tries another place. Again he encounters the same mysterious cough, till at last, from necessity, he becomes reconciled to his quarters, and the sun being hot, he lays himself down to rest. A messenger is then sent to tell the *sahib log*¹ that the tiger is marked down. Should the sportsmen be at a distance, or should any circumstance prevent their immediate attention to the call, these staunch pointers will keep their posts; and if the tiger break cover they track him up from place to place, even for days together, to his final halting place, when they again surround him with their guardian wing; and this faculty of tracking is not confined to the case of animals, for they follow up traces of men with the same facility. This makes them a valuable agency for the capture of marauders when they take to the jungles to escape detection. Outram's band rendered much

¹ For the benefit of the few to whom this Indian expression is strange, we may state that it means British officers or residents generally.

good service in this way when Khandesh was a sort of hiding place for outlawed men. . . .

‘Khundoo, the *naïck* or commander of this band of trackers, was the very *beau idéal* of a Bheel. Though a little fellow, he was a great man with his master, and it was one of the saddest days in Outram’s chequered life, when this faithful follower met his death. A man-eating tiger had killed a native, and Khundoo, with a few men, was hard upon his track. Just previous to this, Khundoo had disappointed his master of a tiger, and he laid it so much to heart that he secretly resolved never again to send in word unless he had actually seen the beast himself. Following out this resolution in the present instance, with nothing in his hand but a slight spear, Khundoo approached the bushes where he believed the tiger to be concealed. In a moment the beast sprang out, Khundoo’s spear glanced off his thick head, and in the next instant the tiger’s fangs had met in the upper part of the little fellow’s chest. The tiger slunk back to cover, where he was surrounded by a portion of the Bheels: the others took up their dying chief, carried him to Outram’s tent, and laid him at his master’s feet. Outram’s first impulse was to destroy the savage beast and, vowing he would neither eat nor drink till the tiger had bit the dust, he seized his rifle and rushed off.¹ A well-directed shot laid the man-eater low, and when Outram galloped back, he found poor Khundoo’s life was ebbing fast. It was a touching spectacle, as the brave Outram bent over the dying chief to catch his last farewell. Khundoo took the hand of his little son and, placing it in Outram’s, bid him supply a father’s place to him.’

Major C. Giberne, late of the Bombay Army, tells a story

¹ The Bheels firmly believed that a man killed by a tiger became subject to the beast in the next world, unless instantly avenged. Hence their commandant’s prompt pursuit, to ease Khundoo’s mind in his latest moments.

of these days of Indian *shikar* too good to be here omitted. His acquaintance with Outram dated from 1825, towards the close of which year he proceeded up country to do duty with the 23rd N.I. at Malegão:—

‘A party of us went out under Outram’s leadership. . . . Word was brought us that the Bheels had tracked a tiger into the dry bed of a river, where he had taken refuge among the tamarisk bushes on a small island in the centre. We were at once divided into three or four parties, and stationed on both banks of the *nulla*, while the Bheels were distributed on the rising ground a little farther off to watch our proceedings and prevent the tiger making his escape. Outram, followed by a few sepoys, then deliberately walked across to where the tiger was lying, fired at him and broke his fore leg. He immediately charged out of his lurking place and was received by us with a volley of balls, when . . . he rushed across and laid himself down in a bush on the opposite bank to where I was. Outram then advanced towards him, supported in rear by three sepoys with fixed bayonets, under which it was his intention to cast himself should his shot prove a failure and the tiger spring out upon him. Just as he arrived within three paces of the tiger, and he was on the point of springing upon him, he fired and the tiger fell down dead.’

The following is from Colonel Ord’s notes, but no date is assigned to the occurrence related:—‘One day when Outram was in our camp, some villagers came in from a village about eight or ten miles off, to pray that some of us would come out to kill a well-known man-eating tiger who had just killed a man not very far from the village. It was not long before Outram, myself, and one or two others, among whom was Ensign T. Parr, of the 23rd

Regiment N.I.¹ . . . mounted and were on the spot, guided by some of the villagers. There lay the body in a sequestered part of the jungle, with the fleshy part of the throat torn out, and the legs and arms eaten clean off to their junctop with the body. The trunk alone remained, and it was neatly covered with green grass, though still visible. The villagers not being of the hunter caste, knew not where the tiger was. But there was no lack of foot-marks, and we were soon in his trail, accompanied by a few of the Bheels, led by their determined chief, Outram; who, on all these occasions, was our chief also. After an intensely exciting hour or two, occupied in pugging him through the jungle, we came suddenly upon him, or rather he came upon us, or at least on Parr, for on looking to one side, we saw him standing on his hind legs with his jaws, as it seemed to us, about to close on our friend's head, who was instinctively pulling at the trigger of his gun. No explosion, however, followed, for he, like ourselves, not expecting the tiger at that precise moment, had not cocked his gun. Fortunately this was of little consequence, for the brute, scared either by our appearance or the click of our guns being put on full cock, turned away without having so much as touched Parr. He did not go far, however, for a well-directed shot from Outram's famous gun laid him low.'

By his fearless bearing in the presence of danger, and his general prowess in the chase, Outram attracted the affection and admiration of the wild men among whom his lot was cast for so many years. Willingly would they have followed him anywhere. He could excel in tiger-slaying—a feat in which was their own greatest pride. He could trust their rude honour—a result at which none of his

¹ Now General T. Chase Parr, of the Bombay Army.

predecessors could arrive, though officials of a native government. He was clearly their pattern of an authority which they could acknowledge without loss of self-esteem, or such equivalent for caste as they were contented to accept. That *caste*, in the Indian sense, is not a term applicable to themselves, is perhaps undisputed. Even the common village barber would not exercise his profession upon the Bhil otherwise than on compulsion; and one collector of Khandesh had to administer a fine before the razor was produced for shaving the men of his guard.

Lieutenant Douglas Graham, from whose writings we have already quoted, succeeded Lieutenant Beck as adjutant of the Bhil corps. Writing of his commanding officer in 1833, he designates him his own 'staunchest friend,' and the 'boldest and the best sportsman' in Western India. 'We have lived together,' he says, 'for seven long years now . . . without having had a difference. . . . He has saved my life; I have done the like good office to him; we have fought together, and *fed* together, been for months without any but our own sweet society; and, to sum up the story, I do not think friendship can go a step further than what exists between us two.'

If Douglas Graham's journals are known mainly by repute in Bombay, many of the exploits related in them should be familiar there as household words, especially among sportsmen, and have doubtless been circulated far beyond the limits of the Western Presidency. We shall, therefore, select for extract only three or four of the more striking narratives:—

'Before starting this morning (June 12, 1828) on very sure intelligence, I had been wondering why a certain long spear, one of your real Maratha lances, with a knob of rusty iron at one end, and a bayonet-like bit of steel at the other,

was undergoing the process of excessive filing and sharpening; when I recalled to my remembrance some expressions of my commandant, that tended to imply a determination of spearing a royal tiger. And as the exploit was said to have been once perpetrated on horseback on the Bangalore race-course, a sort of vow rose floating among the mazy recollections of the last evening's conversation, of his intention to perform it on foot. Fifty good reasons were adduced why the attempt was rash, nay, amounted to a sort of indifference to the least chance of existence in the struggle; but no, the word had gone forth, and he would peril to the uttermost to redeem the pledge.

'Fears were laughed at, and dissuasion entirely set at nought, so we had nothing for it but to see we had French caps in our pockets (H.B. never miss) and proceed, anxiously desirous that no opportunity would occur for our too adventurous friend. There was a fine thick cover down each side of the broad nullah that ran past the tents, and at intervals on either side two or three small topes, with abundance of under creepers well known to us as frequented haunts. There were only two elephants out that day, so, of course, each took his own side. We had beat through the first cover which was on our line, and had halted abreast of the second, to observe the operations of the other howdah, on the opposite bank, when a startling volley came provokingly across from the very centre of the thicket, and the loud and continued bursts of uproarious music, fully declared that there was more than one of the right sort on foot. Our position was by no means so commanding as our wishes. We were stuck on a bank which extended half a mile on each side of us, and presented, as far as I could see, a perpendicular fall of ten or twelve feet; but this was no time to stick at trifles, so we shoved old Hyder at the place, notwithstanding the remonstrances of the mahout, who declared the descent im-

practicable. But, making a virtue of necessity, for he saw the butt-end of a rifle coming in contact with his sconce, he began to manœuvre his "ankoos"¹ in style. Hyder got down on his belly in the most scientific manner, and stretched his fore legs to their full extent over the side, but finding no bottom, and not at all relishing a drop leap, withdrew speedily from this position. Thrice he was brought down, but to no avail; in the third attempt, luckily, the bank gave way, and down we came, elephant, howdah, and all, but landed in safety on the bed of the nullah. The firing still continued in the tope, and on our arrival, we found one tiger mortally wounded on the ground, and two others charging fiercely from below a thicket of creepers. A cast round the wood soon put us in possession of their mark. We had hardly proceeded a hundred yards when the track went right into a porcupine's earth, and I was indulging in the idea of enjoying a novel sort of sport, when I saw my friend's eye turn to the Maratha spear, with a meaning glance that could not be mistaken, and the condition of my nerves was by no means improved on seeing him alight from the howdah, and on his knees creep a little way into the hole, to look, as he said, for the glittering of the eyes. Having ascertained that there were only two entrances to the den, he blocked up one passage with thick bushes, placed the elephant about two yards in front, and my friend took up his station at the very mouth of the remaining hole.

'There he stood, spear in hand, like a gladiator in the arena of a Roman amphitheatre, ready for the throwing open of the wild beast's cage. The bushes were set fire to, and the tiger, by no means relishing the smoke, came

¹ As this word seems to call for explanation, the opportunity is taken to interpret with it four preceding words in the same letter, i.e.:—*Nullah*, strictly *nālā*, a river or river-bed; *tope* or *tōp*, a wood, tuft of trees; *howdah*, strictly *hauda*, an elephant's turret; *mahout*, strictly *mahawat*, the elephant keeper or driver; *ankoos* or *ānkus*, *ankus*, a goad.

puffing and blowing like a porpoise, every five or six seconds, to get a little fresh air ; but scenting the elephant, he was always fain to retreat again. This sort of work went on for some time, and bush after bush blazed away without producing the desired effect. I could not have stood the suspense, when life was at stake. At last there was a low angry growl, and a scuffling rustle in the passage. The tiger sprang out, and down descended the long lance into his neck, just behind the dexter ear. With one stroke of his powerful paw he smashed the spear close to the head. There was a pretty business. Mr. Tiger one step below, with the steel sticking in his neck, which by no means improved his temper, had gathered his huge hind quarters below him for a desperate spring ; and my friend, armed after the fashion of the South Sea Islanders, standing on a little mound, breathing defiance and brandishing his bamboo on high—odds by far too overpowering ; so, to bring things a little more to equality, I threw in a couple of balls from old Hyder, which turned the scale, as Brennus' sword did of old. The tiger was luckily stunned and floored by this salute, but shortly recovered, and finding too many enemies besetting him on the open ground, scampered away to the thicket. We found him again below an old bush, and very vicious he was, tearing through the jungle, and charging in mad fury whenever we came near his entrenchment. Three times he was on the elephant, roaring and screaming ; charge succeeded charge, ball after ball went into his inside, and at length he yielded up the ghost, under the very trunk of the elephant. Had the spear not been directed with the most cool self-possession, so as to arrest the progress of the tiger, and give me a slight chance of hitting, and had not old Hyder remained perfectly steady, without taking at all into consideration my fluttering nerves and state of anxiety, there would have been an end of one whose like we shall seldom see again ;

at best it was the happy accomplishment of a very rash vow.'

Undated, but headed 'Fragments, 1828 to 1832,' are two entries appropriate to these pages. It need scarcely be said that Outram is the 'commandant' whose directions are so implicitly obeyed in sporting attire as in uniform :—

'Moved to Pingulwara, where we killed a very splendid tiger after breakfast, and on our way home fell in with the marks of a tigress and cubs, which we followed for about two miles, when they went into an old tunnel that had been carried for eighty or ninety yards through a small hill. As the aperture was of just sufficient size to allow us to enter abreast, we put our rifles, double-barrelled two-ounce ones, all ready, and went in together, on the understanding that the moment we saw the glittering of the brute's eyes we were to fire sharp and fall flat on our faces. I have no hesitation in saying that it was with fear and trembling that I entered this ugly den; but as my commandant proposed the thing, I could not be off, so, making up my mind for a pretty scrimmage, away we went. The place was foul, dark, and damp; but, as good luck would have it, the tigress had made no stay in the place, but had gone right through. As there was no arguing about these things with my commandant, I always did as he did, and left the result, in this and a hundred other mad tricks, to the entire direction of the fates. The elephants were close at hand, and we bagged the tigress and cub among some very high reeds in the nullah, not a hundred yards from its mouth. She had no chance, as we saw her crouched for a spring, about twenty yards off, and took the liberty of checking her intentions by a couple of well-directed balls. A tiger is very difficult to twig just at the proper moment. His colour confounds him with the decayed leaves and wood, and were

it not for his strawberry-leaf shaped ears, which some way always catch a practised eye, the game would pass often unseen on very open ground.'

The next is entitled 'The First Accident : '—

'I remember well the occurrence, whilst on a hunting trip among the rocky mountain ranges that separate Khandesh from the Deccan. It was towards the close of a June day, when but little of vegetation and water remained; the leaves of the bushes were shrivelled up, the country parched and cracked, the very stones in a glow of white heat.

'We had been particularly successful during the trip, and had upwards of forty full-sized tigers on our list, owing to the research and sagacity of our Bheels, and the skill and perseverance of our chief; and flushed with the fulness of sport, and rendered careless, probably, from success, we all entertained rather too contemptible an opinion for the tyrant of the flock.

'The country was a difficult and dangerous one to hunt—the side of a long waving hill, intersected by numerous broad stony ravines, and covered with short, thick, thorny *babul* bush, whose yellow, discoloured leaves increased the difficulty tenfold of discovering our game. We beat up a nullah with three elephants, but an accidental shot had scared the monster. He had quitted his lair, which we found quite fresh, and sneaked off among the bushes. The party separated, and each elephant took his line about a quarter of a mile apart from the other. I had that day charge of old Hyder—that pink of elephants—and was leaning over the side of the howdah with my rifle in my hand, half a dozen Bheels close beside me, eagerly examining a patch of open ground which extended fifteen or twenty yards from the edge of the nullah where the jungle commenced, and

pressing forward, notwithstanding the strict injunctions they had received to keep well behind, when a roar loud and deep startled me from my position. All had either fallen to the ground or fled, except one, a fine, handsome, active young fellow, and a particular favourite with us all, named Gurwur. He stood riveted to the spot, fascinated by the tones of that awful roar. The huge yellow form came cleaving through the air with the rapidity of light; in one fell swoop he pounced on his prey, and in the same instant his paw rested deep in the shoulder and his ruthless teeth were crashing through the skull of the unfortunate one. I could see the fierce glare of his eye as he stood overtopping his victim, and holding him up in his terrible jaws. It was all the work of a second. I had scarce time to bring my gun to my shoulder, but I aimed high, and fired both barrels. The savage quitted his grasp and disappeared amongst the thicket. Poor Gurwur's sword was half drawn, but his fight was over !'

About a week afterwards, Lieutenant Graham was surprised at seeing his chief gallop up to camp with an enormous tiger strapped to his saddle-bow. It was the fierce destroyer of the foregoing story. After committing the act narrated, the beast, in accordance with invariable practice, fled across the hills to seek concealment in the thickest cover available. Outram had followed, with steady determination to avenge, if possible, his Bhil. For three days, we are told, the pursuit lasted, through rain and wind, over mountain and torrent, and across valley and forest. On the evening of the fourth day the tiger was brought up by a long shot, whilst skulking along the side of a palm *jungal*.

To give some imperfect notion of the continuous nature of this exciting sport, we might quote no less than twelve entries in fourteen days, or from May 7 to 20, 1829, inclusive, each day after bears or tigers, and usually with the

sought for result. In the previous year are two successive entries, very brief, and worthy of special extract. One of them has just been made familiar to us in the form of a detailed narrative.

‘June 9.—Went out after an immense tiger. Outram wounded him from horseback. He went into a small nullah, and when he advanced, he charged, and wounded one of the Bheels.’

‘June 12.—Killed two tigresses and one tiger. The tiger got into a hole, and we smoked him out. Outram stood above the hole, and speared him in the neck as he came out. He turned and broke the spear to pieces, and was just making a *daur* upon Outram, when Tapp and I fired from the howdah and knocked him over. The finest day’s sport I ever saw.’¹

In May 1828, there is a vivid account of an assault upon a herd of wild buffaloes in Meywar, ending in the death of a fine bull, who made a vigorous defence against the many spears and rifles brought against him. But we have no more space for extract from these journals of exceptional *shikár*. A summary from Outram’s personal record will aptly illustrate the case, in conclusion.

He has noted that, during ten years, or from 1825 to 1834 inclusive, he himself and associates in the chase, killed no fewer than 235 tigers, wounding 22 others; 25 bears, wounding 14; 12 buffaloes, wounding 5; and killed also 16 panthers or leopards. Of this grand total of 329 wild animals, 44 tigers and one panther or leopard were killed during his absence by gentlemen of the Khandesh hunt; but Outram was actually present at the death of 191 tigers, 15 panthers or leopards, 25 bears, and 12 buffaloes. It is to be regretted that, during the period specified five

¹ See ante, pp. 105–108. *Daur*—Anglicè—‘rush,’ ‘run,’ or ‘spring.’

natives, while assisting in the *shikár*, were killed, and four wounded; but it must be remembered that the Bhil is not a participator in such dangerous doings upon compulsion, but under pressure from his own restless nature. In 1825-26, of the five English gentlemen who composed the party, two died of *jungal* fever, and Outram, while on foot, was severely wounded by a *chita*. In 1827-28, he, though usually mounted on his elephant Haidar (who was twice wounded), killed and wounded two tigers off horseback, besides spearing one tiger on foot, as before mentioned. In 1831, the highest figure was attained in the account of spoil. Out of 65 animals then killed and wounded, 46 tigers were killed. Outram speared a bear during the same year. In 1830, however, with the exception of ten days passed with the Nagar hunt,¹ he had shared but little in the excitements of the chase, owing to the campaign in the Dáug; and he was again much occupied in the Satpura expedition of 1833.

The time has now come to take leave of Khandesh, and though the scene of action in the next chapter will not be very far away from that province, we shall have to treat of a comparatively new subject, and new characters.

¹ At which time he took 10 first spears—all but one contested—in a party of six, 55 hog being killed; broke the small bone of his right leg the first day, and was compelled to give up running altogether on the eighth, in consequence of bruises. He had before been with the Nagar hunt in 1829, when he managed to take 12 first spears—all contested.

CHAPTER V.

1835-1838.

Appointment to a Special Mission—Leave to Bombay—Marriage—Two years and three quarters in the Máhi Kánta.

EARLY in 1835 Captain Outram accompanied Mr. Bax, then Resident at Indor, through Malwa and Nimar. The scant supply of home letters received from him at this period finds ready explanation in his reports of constant marching and attendance on native *darbars* and festivals. Later on, the same deficiencies are accounted for by other and more pressing demands of the public service. After return from his annual Khandesh tour in June, he was confidentially addressed by Government, and his opinion invited on the affairs of the neighbouring province of Gujrat, which had long been in an unsettled state, and which, in the Máhi Kánta, had assumed a threatening aspect. This tract of territory, literally but incorrectly interpreted as the littoral of the river Máhi, comprised, in those days, all that portion of Gujrat proper yielding tribute to the Gáikawár on compulsion only, or realised at the point of the bayonet. It is situated far above Khandesh and the Narbada, and extends up towards Sirohi and Udaipur on its north, leaving Kaira on its south, Dungapur east, and Pálánpur west. From south-east to north-west its length is estimated at about 100 miles, and its breadth in the direction of the opposite angles at about 60; the area is given at 3,400 square miles.

The following descriptive account from the Rás Mála is

so clear and explicit that we make no apology for its insertion here :—

The level country (which, covered with noble groves of trees, 'may vie,' says Mr. Grant Duff, the historian of the Mahrattas, 'for hundreds of miles with the finest parks of the nobles of England,') was almost entirely reduced by the Mahrattas under direct government; though the jungles of the Choonwal and the banks of the Myhee, as far south as Baroda, still furnished shelter to independent tribes, and many villages, including those which belong to the Rajpoot landholders, in some of the richest districts, required an annual armament to enforce payment of their tribute. As the smallest streams branched off, many independent communities appeared among the ravines and jungle on their banks; as these rivulets increased in number, and the forest grew thicker and more continuous, the independent territories also became more frequent, and were found in more solid masses, until at length the still untamed principalities of Eedur and Loonawara were reached, amidst the mountains of the north-east. Many Koonbees, Waneas, and others of the peaceable classes, were included among the population of the Myhee Kanta; but the castes which bore arms, and in whom the whole authority of the country was vested, were Rajpoots, Kolees, or Muhammadans; of these the Kolees were by far the most numerous, though they were for the most part found under Rajpoot rule. All the Rajpoots used swords and shields, matchlocks and spears. They often wore defensive armour either of leather or chain, and placed it upon their horses. Their plan of warfare was to defend their villages; they seldom, except after an ineffectual defence, took to the woods like the Kolees, and were quite incapable of the desultory warfare so congenial to the latter tribe. The Kolees or Bheels (for, though the former would resent the classification, the distinctions between them need not here be noticed) were more diminutive than the other inhabitants, and their eyes wore an expression of liveliness and cunning, their turbans, if they used any, were small; their common head-dress was a cloth carelessly wrapped round the temples; their clothes were usually few and coarse; they were seldom seen without a quiver of arrows, and a long bamboo bow, which was instantly bent on any alarm, or even on the sudden approach of a stranger. The natives described them as wonderfully swift, active, and hardy;

incredibly patient of hunger, thirst, fatigue, and want of sleep; vigilant, enterprising, secret, fertile in expedients, and admirably calculated for night attacks, surprises, and ambuscades. Their arms and habits rendered them unfit to stand in the open field, and they were timid when attacked, but had, on several occasions, shown extraordinary boldness in assaults, even upon stations occupied by regular British troops. They were independent in spirit, and although professed robbers, were said to be remarkably faithful when trusted, and were certainly never sanguinary. They were averse to regular industry, exceedingly addicted to drunkenness, and very quarrelsome when intoxicated. Their delight was plunder, and nothing was so welcome to them as a general disturbance in the country. The numbers of the Kólees would have rendered them formidable had they been capable of union; but though they had a strong fellow-feeling for each other, they never regarded themselves as a nation, nor ever made cause against an external enemy.

The inhabitants of this country—and we do not confine the term to the ‘Kúlis,’ or supposed *aborigines*—had long been known as a warlike and rebellious people: and when the British Government was first brought into immediate contact with them in 1820, it soon became evident that without the application of stronger and fairer measures than had been attempted by the Gáikawár for the suppression and control of these his unruly tributaries, there could be no security to life and property in the villages and lands which they occupied. The establishment of a British agency was due to Mr. Elphinstone, who visited the Máhi Kánta in 1821; and who had hoped, by this means, to secure quiet to the country, and a peaceful realisation of his dues to the native ruler. Our local authorities, however, while using undoubted goodwill and good intentions to introduce order into chaos, were unfortunate in the choice of means. Whether right men were not consulted for right measures, or not put into right places, it matters little now to inquire. The result was signal failure to achieve the desired end. But in order

to make the situation intelligible, we must resort to a summary of the state of affairs in the Máhi Kánta, when Outram's services were to be put in-requisition there, practically much in the same way as for Khandesh.

In the year 1828, Gambhir Singh, Rajah of Edar, burnt the village of Kíri, which belonged to Fath Singh of Rupál. The latter complained to the British agent at Pálánpur, who then exercised a temporary superintendence of the Máhi Kánta. Gambhir Singh was directed to pay a heavy fine; but, as the decision remained a dead letter, Fath Singh took the law into his own hands, and imprisoned the brother of Khem Chand, a minister of the Edar Rajah, when a guest in his house. Such a hostage would, he thought, prove better security for damages due than less tangible professions and promises. Khem Chand, however, pleaded the attachment of the Edar State by the British Government as a cause for non-payment of fine; and his brother remained a prisoner. At this time, one Suráj Mall, the turbulent son of Jalum Singh, lowest in rank but greatest landholder of eight Rajput feudatories of Edar, was in banishment; and to him appeal was made for assistance against Fath Singh. He readily undertook the task assigned, and raising a body of 400 or 500 men, attacked and plundered Rupál. But as the unfortunate hostage was not to be found, Khem Chand refused to pay the promised reward; and Suráj Mall was left to his own devices. His ways were those of strong and unprincipled contemporaries: he supported himself and followers by a course of pillage and devastation among the villages of Edar. Seven years after the occurrence of the original cause of quarrel—and long after the death of Gambhir Singh, the main offender—the feud threatened to become a chronic infliction. A third disturber of the peace had, moreover, appeared on the scene, in the person of Pirthi Singh, son of the deceased Karn

Singh of Ahmadnagar, who, with his brother Hamir Singh and many adherents, caused three widows of the late Rajah to become *satis*,¹ in despite of the injunctions, and almost within sight of the British political agent. Military operations were rendered imperative, and a field force was called out against Suráj Mall and the Thákur of Rupál. By the middle of March 1835, the principal strongholds of both chiefs had been destroyed—and Ahmadnagar was in the possession of British soldiers. But in the former case, the offenders themselves, both outlaws, were still at large, while the occupation of a town, was, at best, but a superficial measure of success. A report, favourable to an approaching peaceful settlement of the Máhi Kánta, sent to the Court of Directors by the Bombay Government in September, was succeeded by one in October of a less cheering kind. It was to the effect that, notwithstanding the ‘severest suffering and privations on the part of the troops in toiling through a most difficult and rugged country’ with which the authorities were imperfectly acquainted, the chiefs had not been captured, and the causes of disaffection and disturbance had not been removed. What was required was a better knowledge of the place and people, and an influence over the popular leaders: something, in fine, which, in effecting the work of pacification, could be substituted for the too common remedy of overwhelming brute force.

In furtherance of its views of amelioration, the local Government proposed to make a survey of the tract under report, and to aim at the acquisition of moral control over its warlike inhabitants through the exercise of a conciliatory policy such as had been successfully adopted for Khandesh. Hence the consultations with Captain Outram to which we have referred, and which only took official shape after a frequent interchange of thought embodied in a confidential

¹ *Anglicè*, ‘Suttee.’

correspondence with Government officers. Among the last was the late Major Orlando Felix, so long on the personal staff of Indian governors, whose urbanity and tact in the fulfilment of social duties were on a par with a highly intelligent appreciation of the more strictly professional part he had to perform. One of the subjects discussed with this gentleman was Outram's own proposal to divide his Bhil corps and, instead of raising it, as contemplated, to a thousand strong, to break it into two regiments or battalions of five hundred men each. The palpable advantage recognised in the modification was that, in case of emergency, the force could be doubled in number without any fresh accession of officers. But another question arose from this discussion. Should there be occasion to form a brigade of Kúlis in Gujrat, who more fit than Outram to advise on, and, if practicable, take under his immediate charge the organisation of the scheme? His services would be invaluable for the purpose, and it was natural to try and secure them. A much wider responsibility, however, than involved in the drill and discipline of Kúlis, was to rest upon him in his new sphere of action.

About the middle of March 1835, Sir Robert Grant had succeeded Lord Clare as Governor of Bombay. In prompt obedience to the orders of Government, bearing date August 27 of the same year, Captain Outram quitted Khandesh on September 11 following, for Indor. His object in taking this circuitous road to the Máhi Kánta was to consult with Mr. Bax on some details of his mission; but more particularly to enter, if possible, the disturbed districts from the Malwa side, through a part of the country on which trustworthy information was urgently needed. At Indor he was destined to disappointment; for the route he had laid out for himself was reported impracticable, owing to the deep mud

which, impervious to cattle or carriage of any kind, had generally covered Malwa, during six weeks of continuous rain. He was, therefore, forced to make the best of his way to Baroda, nearer the northern bank of the Narbada, by Bhopáwar, and Chhotá Udaipur. Through the care of the British resident at Indor, the journey across Holkar's territory was uneventful and free from obstruction; but the passage across this section of the Vindhya mountains, and through the neighbouring *jungal*, in autumn, are acts always attended with serious risk to health for Europeans or natives, and it is not strange that fever and other sickness should have visited the camp. Out of Holkar's limits a certain annoyance was experienced in the behaviour of the Gáikawár's *employés*. These, it had been inferred, would have readily aided the progress of a duly accredited British officer traversing the tracts in which they exercised a little brief authority; and faith in their friendly disposition caused Outram, on entering Gujrat, to dismiss the horsemen who had been placed at his disposal by the Rajah of Udaipur. But the event proved he had made a mistake. On reaching, late at night, one of the Gáikawár's large towns, the servants of the mission were refused a guide to show them the public resting-place, and could not procure even a little milk on purchase. Outram himself was not more successful at the Police Thána, and though supperless, like the remainder of his party, was glad to accept the shelter offered him by a kindly Brahmin schoolmaster. From Baroda he proceeded to Ahmadabad, and thence to Ahmadnagar, Edar, and Disa, returning to Ahmadabad to draw up his report, in personal communication with the political commissioner, Mr. Williams, and with the advantage of access to the records of his office. This report, completed at Baroda, was prepared with much care and ability, and is an elaborate and comprehensive State paper. It set forth the measures necessary for dealing

with the insurgents at once, and under certain future contingencies; it detailed the cases of individual leaders; it investigated the elements of which the hostile forces were composed, and the sources and causes of hostility; it entered into the question of Police for preservation of the peace of the country present and future; it discussed the liabilities of the native ruling power; it showed the importance of survey, and the opportunities likely to offer for carrying out the measure; finally, it expressed the writer's conviction that the Máhi Kánta could not be tranquillised, nor could a system of active reform be successfully introduced among its inhabitants, until the unruly clans had been brought under subjection, and the chiefs punished for their opposition to British troops. Its date of November 14, little more than two months after departure from his old Bhíl head-quarters of Dharangáon, gave ample evidence that no time had been lost by Captain Outram in fulfilling a mission which, mentally and physically, was arduous, and of special kind.

Later in the same month of November, Outram was offered by the commander-in-chief, Sir John Keane, command of the troops then about to be assembled against the insurgents of the Máhi Kánta. In the spirit which actuated him throughout life, but which circumstances have rendered more conspicuous in his later years, he declined the honour in favour of a friend very much his senior. His letter to the chief's military secretary on this occasion is very characteristic. He declared himself sensible of the distinction conferred upon him by such mark of confidence, but felt it his duty to point out that the appointment of so junior an officer might give umbrage in quarters where unanimity was necessary. The senior officer on the spot was almost the senior captain in the army: none above him could be sent with the detached companies of which the force would be composed; whereas he himself, from his junior position in the army, would, if in

command, be the cause of separating captains from their companies, to the detriment of the service. He wrote, moreover: 'the qualifications of the officer now commanding the detachment in the disturbed districts are far superior to mine. I willingly stake my humble reputation on his conduct. Associated with him, as I presume I shall be in the duty, while his be the honour of success, mine be the blame of defeat, in measures of which I am the proposer.'

If the sentiment here exhibited appear to some in any way Quixotic, it was certainly genuine. Nor was it the expression of an unambitious soldier, or of an untried man, whose temper was unknown to his employers. Sir John Keane, while appreciating the objects of Captain Outram, and admitting the merits of the senior officer on whose behalf he had written, could not accept the change of arrangements submitted. 'His Excellency considers,' replied Major Macdonald, 'that the ultimate success of all the plans of Government will mainly depend upon your being left in the free exercise of your own good judgment without anybody being placed over you to control it. It is not alone the task of meeting the enemy in the field that devolves upon the person having the chief arrangement of affairs in these rebellious districts. . . . His Excellency highly approves of what he understands to be the intention of Government—namely, to invest you with civil and political powers, which will render you independent of the authority of senior officers; and the military, of whatever rank, must take their directions from you. This is according to precedent and Indian usage; and why should it not be acted on in your case, who possess the confidence of Government, and are looked up to, of all others, as the person best qualified to put their plans into execution?'

Seldom has a more complimentary letter than this been addressed to a junior captain under the circumstances. Mr.

Bax, the former collector in Khandesh, wrote privately to Outram on the subject of this correspondence, that he had 'acted judiciously and most considerately' in declining a command which must have annoyed many of his seniors in the service—a result which would have been 'overlooked by nineteen men out of twenty,' for the sake of the distinction to be conferred.

On completing his report Outram repaired to the Presidency. It was not alone on public grounds that the requisite leave to make this visit had been solicited, though a personal conference with the members of Government on the affairs of Gujrat seemed an indispensable sequel to the late inquiry and proceedings. Another urgent cause prompted the application. He was about to be married to his cousin Miss Margaret Anderson; and the bride was daily expected to arrive in Bombay. He had hoped to have welcomed her in the previous year: for the engagement had been of some standing; but passages to and from India were more serious affairs then than now considered, and not arranged as at present, irrespective of particular ships and particular seasons.

The settlement of the Máhi Kánta was a matter of so urgent a nature in the eyes of the local Government that no time was lost in issuing instructions for the more immediate guidance of the executive officers; but Outram's proposals were held to be too warlike, and conciliation was to be put in practice, and thoroughly tested, before recourse should be had to violence. Sir Robert Grant, the Governor, was essentially a man of peace and a philanthropist. He could not believe in the existence of disaffection among the chiefs without a cause, which, at least, demanded full and patient inquiry. He wished this inquiry, if possible, to precede any sterner measures: and no disarming, or tooth-drawing, would be sanctioned in the interim. In the words of the memoir already quoted: 'he had seen a purely conciliatory policy successful in

another province of Guzerat ; and, overlooking the difference in the condition of the two countries, he assumed that the measures which, under the masterly management of Major Walker, Captain Barnewell, and Mr. Willoughby, had given peace to Kattywar and Rajpeempla, must necessarily suffice for the tranquillisation of the Máhi Kánta. . . . So confident was this estimable and benevolent governor of the omnipotence of gentle speech and singleness of purpose, that he actually diminished the strength of the force which had already found itself inadequate to control the insurgents, though Captain Outram had recommended that it should be temporarily increased, not necessarily for employment, but for purposes of demonstration.' To what extent such views were concurred in by the Court of Directors will shortly become apparent.

Though we read of breakfasts and interviews at Government House at this period, there is no record of any conversations which transpired. The Governor invited ; Major Felix issued the invitations ; Outram and others attended : further particulars are wanting. But there is also no lack of official correspondence to throw a light on the course of events. Before referring to this, we have to note that, in December 1835, Outram's marriage was solemnised in Bombay, where his affianced bride was temporarily residing in the house of her brother-in-law, Mr. Morris, of the Civil Service. During the week or two of leave which preceded the wedding-day, his time was chiefly occupied at the Secretariat offices, reporting, or otherwise employed on public matters. A fortnight after his marriage, or in January 1836, he was forced to hurry off to his rough work in the Máhi Kánta, under injunctions to modify his original plans of settlement in accordance with the benevolent intentions of Government. He was now to all intents and purposes a political agent ; but notice of confirmation in the appoint-

ment was not received by him until the end of March, when his friend Douglas Graham succeeded him in the command of the Bhil corps.

A very few days subsequent to his departure from Bombay, he was again at Añmadabad, and there made acquainted by the assistant political commissioner, Mr. Arthur Malet, with the lines of policy laid down for his conduct of the agency, as defined in writing by Mr. Secretary Willoughby. The remarkable administrative faculty of the last-named gentleman, and his general aptitude of expression in communicating the instructions and meaning of his Government to the several officials it was his privilege to address, were almost universally admitted by those who were capable of forming an opinion on the subject, and Outram was not behind his fellows in respect for the Secretary's abilities. But in the matter of the Máhi Kánta troubles, the new political agent found it very difficult to believe that the Government programme was suited to the occasion. 'I will pay every attention to your remarks on the subjects you notice,' he writes on February 7, 'but while Government thus generously pardons the transgressions of these chiefs against us, no provision appears in my instructions for the satisfaction of the claims of others who have suffered at their hands. Such claims will, I fear, prove numerous and not easily answered, as, for instance, that of the Edar *soukar*,¹ Akka Chand, whose capture by Suráj Mall was reported by Mr. Erskine, and from whom a ransom of 10,000 rupees was extorted after a long exposure to dreadful tortures; also for the blood that has been spilt by them, and property destroyed in their attacks on the Edar village in Kuppura—in which, I hear, lives were lost, and a hundred buffaloes and other property taken; and the attack on Bottawur, another

¹ Now transliterated *sáhu-kár*, a merchant or banker.

Edar village, where one man was killed, and property destroyed, reported on the 5th instant. On these chiefs being taken under our protection, it will, I presume, be necessary to satisfy all well-founded claims against them, both in justice, and to prevent retaliation; and I beg to know how far I may hold out hopes of remuneration to the sufferers, either from the chiefs who plundered them—the pecuniary claims against the one being already so great, and the other having no means or estate whatsoever—or from the Edar Raja, or from the British Government, by whom their aggressors are protected?’

The language was strong; and it will surprise no one versed in the ways of official correspondence to learn that the writer was apprised how, in addressing his Government, he must find a second word for ‘spade,’ which was inadmissible at any cost. But the rebuke was administered in the mildest possible terms, and the Governor in Council highly approved of Captain Outram’s determination, distinctly expressed in his letter, impartially to follow the tenor of his instructions.

Conspicuous among the refractory chiefs with whom the political agent had to do were Fath Singh, Thákur of Rupál, Suráj Mall, the adventurer, Partáb Singh, of Aglor, and Karm Singh, Thákur of Gorwára. Of the two first we have already spoken; and we now refer to them, as to the whole four, in the light of illustrative cases. To understand the Government position with regard to these persons, it must be borne in mind that we were fighting the battle of a native power as much as on our own account. Indeed, one main cause of contention was the exaction of a tribute called the *Ghás dáná*, acknowledged by precedent and the custom of the country. This was the Gáikawár’s, and could not, therefore, be permanently reduced without that ruler’s consent; but

the Bombay Government reserved to itself the right to make temporary remissions when found expedient. Another payment exacted was the *Richri*, regarding which similar difficulties existed.

On first assuming charge of the political agency, Outram despatched letters, calling the outlawed chiefs to his camp. An amnesty was granted for all past offences under conditions which well-meaning men, however proud and independent, might easily have fulfilled; but which those who saw more personal gain in lawlessness and vagabondage would naturally disregard. Fath Singh, Thákur of Rupál, appeared with others, but soon absented himself, on the plea of seeking for securities. A long year was consumed in endeavouring to effect a settlement of his affairs. He shuffled and evaded, argued, objected, threatened, but did not proceed to violence. Eventually—in 1837—his case was settled in the spirit of leniency by which the Government was actuated, and which pervaded all its instructions, in respect of the disturbers of the peace in Máhi Kánta. The proceedings are not of sufficient public interest to be detailed; but there are passages in the recorded official correspondence regarding the Thákur of Rupál which we feel it a duty to reproduce, in proof of the loyalty and honourable action of the political agent.

There was a little cavilling at the departure of the Thákur in the present instance without furnishing securities, which, caused perhaps by suspicion of mismanagement, called for full explanation on Outram's part. Certainly there was something expressed or signified in the communications from Bombay which touched the sensitiveness of this honest servant of the State; for he had only been three months in the discharge of his new functions when he stated his apprehensions that he had lost the confidence of Government. A long despatch signed by the Chief Secretary thus

removes in a concluding paragraph all cause for such apprehension :—‘I am directed to request that you will assure Captain Outram that the confidence of Government, as it was not lightly given, will not be lightly withdrawn. The Right Honourable the Governor in Council trusts that he will go on cheerfully, under the conviction that though Government may dissent from his judgment on some points, it entertains the firmest general reliance on his zeal, enterprise, and sagacity, and confidently anticipates from his efforts—under Providence—the ultimate achievement of one of its most important and most favourite objects—the civilisation of the Máhi Kánta.’

At a later stage in the correspondence, ‘the Governor in Council very much commends the tone of Captain Outram’s communications to the Thákur, leaving, as it does, the door open for the extension of mercy, and the avoiding extremities.’ Later still, ‘the Governor in Council thinks that Captain Outram’s proceedings are entitled to the highest commendation of Government; for though his own opinions of the course of conduct to be pursued towards the Rupál Thákur varied in some respects from those entertained by Government, he has most faithfully adhered to the latter, without which they could not have been successful.’ But a higher compliment followed. Outram had recommended to the favourable consideration of Government the Thákur’s request to be permitted to pay the first instalment of the sum with which he was authoritatively debited one year later than the year fixed. To this Government objected on certain reasonable grounds; but the objection was followed by an unusual concession to the Government agent, thus expressed: ‘Should that officer, notwithstanding what has been stated above, still incline to think that the advantage of beginning a year earlier is not worth the difficulty or the risk which may be incurred by insisting on its being yielded, the

Governor in Council is willing to forego that advantage, and to abide by the terms Captain Outram proposed.'

The despatches quoted were written in 1836. In the subsequent year, the political agent forwarded the bonds required from the Thákur, and received the further approval of Government to his proceedings. But he himself was never satisfied that the settlement was real: for he saw mischief in the character of the man with whom he was dealing; and we find it on record that Fath Singh subsequently broke out when he saw his opportunity, and when there was no Outram in the Máhi Kánta to keep him to his better behaviour.

Suráj Mall had left the British agent's camp in search of securities, much in the same way as the Thákur, Fath Singh. During his absence, his case became further complicated by a charge brought against him, similar to that which first introduced him to the reader. Some three months before, he had seized and imprisoned a native merchant of Sidhpúr, a subject of the Gáikawár; and it was ascertained that he still retained the man in confinement, with the view of extorting a ransom of 2,000 rupees.¹ Outram, already believing that the treatment he had been instructed to pursue with the refractory chiefs was marked by unnecessary forbearance, could not but

¹ The details of Suráj Mall's offence, gathered from the *Rás Málá*, are illustrative of the state of affairs in the Máhi Kánta and neighbourhood at the time of commission, and also of the extraordinary audacity of the chief offender. It appears that on the death of the principal of a Hindu monastery at Sidhpúr, the succession to his authority was disputed by two disciples. One of these, named Raj Bharti, turned rebellious, donned Rajput attire, and enlisted Suráj Mall in his cause under promise of payment. The two together appeared one day with a party of horsemen at a town near Sidhpúr, and accounted for themselves to the satisfaction of inquirers by a made-up plausible story that they were peaceable travellers. In the evening they entered the market-place with the intention of seizing the person of the head merchant; but failing to find him, they went in search of a fitting substitute, one Lakhú Shet. This unfortunate individual they discovered at his dinner, forced him into the street, and carried him off on one of the horses of the party. The alarm was raised, and an attempt made to close the town gates against the marauders; but boldness and violence won the day, and they escaped.

feel highly indignant at this new proof of determined misdoing. And the circumstance that the evil-doer had quite recently been admitted to pardon, and publicly received by the political agent, greatly enhanced the seriousness of the offence. He therefore addressed a letter to Suráj Mall, informing him that he was again amenable to punishment for his conduct, and that if he did not accept certain conditions required of him to atone for his acts, he would be proclaimed and regarded as an enemy. As he was known to be close at hand, a period of three days was considered sufficient time to allow for acceptance or refusal of the terms offered. In reporting this matter to Government, Outram hoped for approval of his proceedings, but expressed his apprehension lest their tendency should be considered 'too lenient.' Government, however, did not approve, and there were no telegraphs in those days to supersede or supplement postal communication. The ball had been set rolling, and could not be stopped. Suráj Mall, declining to take advantage of the peaceable solution of the difficulty offered, was proclaimed an outlaw. Captain David Forbes, commandant of the Máhi Kánta field detachment, was called on to co-operate with the political agent, and a few troops were moved to take up here and there a position of precaution. The outlaw was followed up into his mountain fastnesses, and finally tendered his submission without striking a blow.

Mr. Willoughby's despatch, animadverting on the proceedings reported at the outset, was dated April 9. In the meanwhile, active measures had been taken with complete success, and the result submitted for the consideration of Government on the 29th of the same month. The despatch in acknowledgment of this subsequent report presents a curious contrast to the preceding one. We have no wish to criticise the writings of a secretariat so redolent of genuine philanthropy as that under the control of Sir Robert Grant ;

we are, moreover, willing to believe that this ruling spirit of benevolence was not only appreciated by Outram at the very time he was supposed to swerve from its teaching, but that its lessons greatly influenced his own after-career; nevertheless, we are bound to continue our extracts from official papers, which, if a controversy be admitted as between master and servant, give at least an apparent victory to the latter.

The Bombay Government, on April 9, 1836, expressing concern at what had occurred, directed that Captain Outram be called upon, *without a moment's delay*, to explain a proceeding which could not, *primâ facie*, be reconciled with his instructions; and they stated their strong apprehensions that the measures he had taken might precipitate the crisis which it was their wish to avert. On April 26, when all had ended satisfactorily, the Secretary acknowledged receipt of the intelligence that Suráj Mall had surrendered on the sole condition that his life be spared, and, expressing the gratification of the Governor in Council, requested that Captain Outram be congratulated 'on so fortunate a result of his spirited, though, in their opinion, somewhat rash proceedings.'

Then followed these four paragraphs:—

'The outlawing of Suráj Mall is conceived by the Governor in Council to have been harsh, and the consequent march of our forces unnecessary, but the plan has been executed with a skill and decision worthy of Captains Outram and Forbes, and which, no doubt, have contributed to the event.

'I am desired to observe that good may arise out of evil, and the Right Honourable the Governor in Council is perfectly willing that Captain Outram's success should be ascribed, not to his instructions, but to his departure from

them, provided only that the spirit of the instructions be henceforth carried into effect.

‘With the exception of the measure of outlawing Suráj Mall, the whole of Captain Outram’s proceedings, I am directed to state, reflect on him the highest credit, and entitle him to the warmest commendation of Government.

‘I am at the same time instructed to observe . . . that in calling Captain Outram’s march unnecessary, the Governor in Council considers it so only in this view, viz., that it was the consequence of an unnecessary proclamation of outlawry. Under the circumstances . . . it was an expedient and excellent measure.’

Not a fortnight after the date of this letter, Suráj Mall presented himself before the political agent, accompanied by the merchant of Sidhpúr; when Outram, acting in the spirit of his instructions, and not perhaps against his own good judgment, released the turbulent chief from arrest without infliction of fine. For this act of unexpected clemency we read that the latter appeared to be deeply grateful.

In the following year the same Suráj Mall had proved so good and loyal a subject to the paramount power, by active assistance afforded to British officers, that Outram was authorised to present him with a *pagri* and *selá*¹ in the name of his Government for the purpose of indicating the sense entertained of the service he had rendered. ‘We rejoice,’ said the Governor in Council, writing from Bombay to the Court of Directors, ‘in being able to report the continued good conduct of Suráj Mall since his admission to pardon, and we feel pleasure in having it also in our power to state to your Honourable Court that his exertions have been joined

¹ The *selá* is, according to Dr. Forbes, ‘a kind of sheet constituting a part of dress especially worn and given in presents in the Dakhin.’

with those of Captain Outram in re-establishing peace and good order in the Máhi Kánta.'

Partáb Singh, the third on the list of chiefs whose cases we have selected for notice, was one of the most dangerous of the Kúli insurgents in opposition to his liege lord the Gáikawár. Though his nominal range was the *pargana* of Bijapur, yet he possessed influence, and was likely to do mischief beyond such narrow limits. In March 1837, owing to a threatened insurrection at this man's instigation, Outram made requisition on the officer commanding at Hargol for a troop of cavalry and company of infantry to proceed to Parantej for the protection of the Ahmadábád territory, and to co-operate with detachments prepared to act from Ahmadnagar and Sadra, amounting in all to one company of infantry and some Gáikawár horse. The requisition was duly attended to, and the presence of the troops at Parantej, together with the arrest of four principal chiefs, must have had a good effect in checking the general progress of the outbreak. But some of the rebels, to the number of 500, took up a determined position in the strongly situated village of Ransipur, on the banks of the Sabar-Matri, whence they ravaged the surrounding districts, and openly defied the native authorities.

The Gáikawár's commander-in-chief appealed to Outram for aid, implying that we were bound to place our available soldiers at his disposal. The political agent would not for a moment admit the notion that the men should be transferred from his orders to those of a native state, but lent a ready ear to the alternative proposal of acting in concert with an ally. Accordingly, with no other warrant than that given by the political commissioner at Baroda, he resolved to become a party to the attack on Ransipur. A proclamation was issued in the name of the Gáikawár, allowing eight days'

reflection. If, within that period, the rebels did not come in and state their grievances, they were to be treated as 'thieves' and destroyed, wherever found, in the dominions of 'either Sirkar' (that is, the British Government, or that of the Gáikawár) by 'the troops of both Sirkars.'

The eight days having passed without advantage taken of the offer of peaceable adjustment, Outram proceeded to act in accordance with the plan of operations agreed upon with the native commander-in-chief. Colonel Troward commanded the British troops, consisting of one troop of cavalry and two companies of infantry. The Gáikawár's force was composed of 400 horse, and about an equal number of foot *sibandis*. The local field artillery was to have been strengthened by a horse artillery gun supplied from Disa; but this did not arrive until too late for use. From Colonel Troward's report we learn that the infantry and guns were in position early in the morning of May 2; that 'Captain Outram's endeavours to induce the enemy to lay down their arms having failed,' the batteries opened; and that after a few rounds of shell, the town was fired in several places.

'The Gáikawár's troops then attacked,' continues the Colonel, 'and, after some brisk skirmishing, entered the place, when the Kholis crossed the river, and endeavoured to break through the ravines of the eastern side (where part of my detachment was formed), but suffered most severely in the attempt, about 50 being killed and 47 taken prisoners. A very few succeeded in escaping through some very thick jungle, where horse could not act or follow them.

'Our loss in the affair was one sepoy of the 17th Regiment severely wounded, and one of the 9th Regiment slightly so, but I cannot ascertain correctly the loss of the Gáikawár's troops.

'When the enemy approached the ravines commanded by

our own troops, they were called on to surrender, and assured their lives would be spared, which they only answered by firing arrows, and rushing sword in hand upon us, when they were met by our fire, with the destructive effect above mentioned.

‘The slaughter in the town must have been very great, as His Highness’ troops were engaged for some time within it, and were opposed in a most determined manner.

‘The principal rebel chief, the Thákur of Paria, was wounded and taken prisoner; and the other, the Thákur of Ransipur, was slain by the Gáikawár’s troops, who displayed much gallantry in the attack.’

A subsequent report shows that on the British side there had been one man killed, and one wounded: 8 killed and 29 wounded of the Gáikawár’s troops; and that, while no true figure could be given for their killed and wounded, 77 bodies of the rebels had been actually found.

It has been stated, with a certain amount of authority, that Outram, when proposing to act in concert with the Gujrát executive against Ransipur, solicited the early instructions of Government; that, owing to some official accident, never satisfactorily explained, a delay occurred in placing his letter before Council; and that no answer to the reference was received in time to allow operations to be suspended.¹ At first sight such a statement is hardly to be reconciled with the assertion before made in these pages that the attack on Ransipur had been determined on in communication with the political commissioner at Baroda. But the question is one of mere routine and form: the latter functionary was the natural referee in such matters, and it was his particular duty, not that of the political agent of the Máhi Kánta, to address the Bombay Government. Outram reported fully to Mr. Williams all his proceedings, regarding his sanction or

¹ *Memoir of the Public Services of Colonel Outram*, p. 44.

disapproval as coming with the authority of the Governor in Council; and no affair of magnitude could be undertaken at all without his express concurrence. In the matter of Partáb Singh, the requisition for troops to protect the Ahmadabád territory was communicated to the commissioner on the day that it was made to the local military authorities concerned, and the subsequent arrangements for co-operation with the Gáikawár's officers were carefully and systematically detailed for his approval. Active interference, it was explained, was not so much desired from a conviction of justice in the original action of the Baroda *darbár*, as of necessity for securing the tranquillity of the Máhi Kánta, in which district the insurrection had spread, and was threatening to spread yet further. On the other hand, a combination of forces might give opportunity for beneficent interposition between the Gáikawár and the insurgents, both in the event of submission, and even if submission were delayed. Outram's last recorded despatch to Mr. Williams, prior to the assault on the town, is a statement of his 'cheerful compliance' with a proposal of Ganpat Rao, the Gujrát commander, for the temporary release of an imprisoned Rajah, on the ground that the act might indirectly tend to a prevention of hostilities.

Unfortunately, there *was* an element of injustice in the Gáikawár's dealings with Partáb Singh; and the rebellion of that chief against his sovereign had been in some measure instigated by the sovereign's disregard of the subject's personal grievances. The Government of Sir Robert Grant was more likely to keep this ill-treatment in view than to sympathise with their agent's anxiety for the maintenance of British prestige and power. Outram saw the mischief of leaving unpunished the lawless acts of a bold rebel, whose example had its immediate effect on the surrounding people, British subjects as well as others; while in the eyes of authority in Bom-

bay, the first duty was to ascertain and remove the cause of offence, so as to be in a position to mediate between our native ally and his dependent before taking the part of either against the other. Undoubtedly the aims of both were the same: but the process to be pursued was differently devised. In one case repression would precede inquiry; in the other, inquiry would lead the way, and might possibly obviate the necessity of repression.

But there were other signs which made him act with determination. During the first year of his work in the Máhi Kánta Outram had received a confidential communication from the Governor's private secretary, at Dapuri, to the effect that there were reasons for apprehending a combination of native powers against the British Government, and an attempt on their part, through secret agents, to seduce the *sipahis* from their allegiance. A Brahmin had introduced two *subadars* of a native infantry regiment to the son of the minister of the Satára Rajah, in whose presence they were informed of the names of many well-known princes and chiefs who had, it was alleged, united to subvert the British supremacy. The native officers had reported the circumstance, and were instructed to watch further proceedings; but although their good faith was held unimpeachable, and a commission had assembled to investigate the charges, the affair fell through without practical result, the Rajah stoutly denying his own complicity. Now, notwithstanding the failure to prove an accusation which, if established, would have implicated some of the most distinguished of our native allies and feudatories in the most barefaced sedition, there was at this time cause for especial vigilance on the part of British officers who, like Outram, had so much to do with internal politics. It was essential to show that British justice was not weak, nor British mercy a mere expediency; and acts were so much more intelligible to the mass than

words. At the same time, the omission of the Gáikawár's name from the list of compromised Indians of distinction seemed to afford a strong reason for favourable consideration, should this ruler ask or need our assistance.

When it did come, the censure of the Bombay Government was couched in strong language. Mr. Secretary Willoughby's despatch, expressing the sentiments of the Governor in Council on becoming first acquainted with the measures *proposed* to be taken by Captain Outram in conjunction with the Gáikawár's troops, was only dated May 6, whereas, three days before, Outram had officially reported to his immediate chief the success of his operations against Ransipur. The secretary had been instructed to inform the political commissioner that the proceedings he had submitted were the most extraordinary that had 'ever come under the observation of Government;' for, with a full acknowledgment that the Kúli insurrection in the Gáikawár's district of Bijapur had originated in wrong and injustice, Captain Outram had, upon his own responsibility,¹ consented to combine his forces with those of an officer of the Gáikawár, for the purpose of reducing the rebels. He went on to remark that whatever the result of these injudicious proceedings, 'even should Captain Outram succeed, by the skill and judgment which have heretofore invariably marked all his military operations, either in inducing the insurgents to submit, or in capturing them without bloodshed,' the Government could not but disapprove of the interference exercised. And he conveyed to both the political commissioner and political agent unqualified disapprobation at their omission to seek in the first instance the instructions of higher

¹ Mr. Williams, in acknowledging Captain Outram's notes of conference with Ganpat Rao Damderah, and plan of combined operations to be undertaken against the refractory Kúlis, added that he perfectly coincided in the opinions expressed, and requested that action be taken accordingly.

authority before adopting measures 'embracing such delicate and important matters.'

But nearly six months after this date, a despatch, dated October 19, was more severe upon the political commissioner in Baroda, who had brought to notice and defended the exercise of his own responsibility, in suppressing the insurrection according to the programme recommended and adopted by the political agent. 'It matters not to Government,' are the words of this communication, 'whether your consent was influenced by any strong opinion and plausible arguments which might have been expressed to you by Captain Outram in favour of the measure, since such an excuse, in the opinion of the Governor in Council, could in no way shift the responsibility from the superior to the subordinate officer. Whoever suggested the measures in question, you took it on yourself to order them, and for having done so, you, I am desired to state, and you alone, must be held the accountable person.'

As for Outram, he was relieved from the censure with which he had been visited for assuming an unjustifiable responsibility, his possible offence of persuasiveness being left to a tribunal of conscience, with which Government had nothing to do. The remarks passed upon his conduct in other respects were such as to leave it questionable whether the occasional disapproval of superiors might not be made in form more acceptable than their stereotyped satisfaction. In one paragraph the Governor in Council, lamenting 'the impolitic and mistaken proceedings' taken by both officers concerned, could not doubt that both 'acted from a sincere and honest conviction' that they were doing for the best; and they could 'not help taking into consideration the eminently able and highly valuable services performed by Captain Outram in the Máhi Kánta since his appointment to the agency of that province.' In the next, while rudely

contrasting, to the disparagement of the civilian, the respective merits of the two public servants addressed, the writer states that 'the terms in which Government have felt themselves compelled, on the present occasion, to speak of Captain Outram have been productive to them of indescribable pain.' The paragraph immediately succeeding we reproduce more *in extenso*: 'Captain Outram is regarded by Government as one of the finest military officers under this presidency, being full of courage, resource, activity, and intelligence . . . at those periods when the British power was struggling for existence or for empire he would have acted a brilliant part; but . . . his fault is that, though perfectly fitted for the performance of civil duties, he is essentially warlike. The capture of Ransipur was of easy accomplishment, yet, so far as was compatible with operations on so minute a scale, those of Captain Outram were, in the opinion of Government, perfect both in conception and execution, and deeply do they regret that his great military talents should have been exercised on such a field.'

Before reverting to the views expressed by the Court of Directors in England on these acts of their Bombay Government and its officers, we will glance at one more case illustrative of Outram's first Máhi Kánta career, that of the Thákur of Gorwára, one of the more notorious *bharwattis*, or outlaws of the day. The word *bharwattia* was expressive of a kind of self-imposed outlawry or vagabondism, which in French colonies is known as *marronage*; and when openly resorted to by a discontented chief, it was commonly accompanied by abduction, plunder, or some act of violence, which rendered unmistakable the offender's hostility to the State, and contempt of law and order. Karm Singh was a chief whose quarrels with other chiefs, and consequent resort to *bharwattia*, placed him for the better part of two years in constant opposition to the authorities. In the spirit of his

general instructions, and also in obedience to special orders bearing on the case in point, Outram tried to arrive at the root of this man's grievances; and called in the aid of a native court, known as a *panchaiyat*, in the hope of a successful result. The investigation was held, but the Thákur of Gorwára declined to abide by its decision. He would neither heed the political agent, nor the *panchaiyat*. Eventually Sir Robert Grant and his council acceded, though with great reluctance and regret, to the adoption of strong measures recommended in this case by the political agent. It was well they did so; for Karm Singh repented of his malpractices, and surrendered himself unconditionally to the latter officer—a result which caused great satisfaction in Bombay. We add an extract from the despatch communicating the intelligence, because it explains how success was obtained:—

‘This event will, I trust, justify in the eyes of the Right Honourable the Governor in Council the policy to which I expressed myself compelled to adhere, though at variance with the wishes expressed by Government, in Mr. Secretary Willoughby's letter.

‘Had any negotiations with the *bharwatti* been attempted, as therein suggested, I am convinced that the Thakur would have continued “out,” in the hope of ultimately gaining his ends; and had any modification in the terms finally decided on, and publicly promulgated by Government, been allowed, it would have encouraged a continuance of the system of *bahrwattia*-ism, which I am convinced it is in our power, as it is our duty, I conceive, to put an end to.

‘The Thakur sent to me last night to say he would abide by the decision of the *panchaiyat*, if he might now be admitted to pardon, and that he was ready to come in on that condition. I answered that, having committed a breach

of the peace in the face of the public proclamation of Government, by seizing a *banian*, I would give him no conditions; that if he came in, he would be placed in confinement to answer for his conduct, as might be directed by Government; at the same time, intimating to him that, as he had since released the *banian*, and committed no further excesses, his adopting the step of peaceably giving himself up would ensure my good offices with Government to obtain his pardon, on the full understanding, however, that he was to abide by the settlement of the *panchairyat*.

‘On this understanding, the Thakur surrendered himself this morning, and is now a prisoner in my camp.’

In October 1837, the Honourable Court of Directors wrote an important letter expressive of their sentiments on the affairs of the Máhi Kánta, and the arrangements then recently made by the Bombay Government for the political superintendence of Gujrát. It need scarcely be said that this, in common with many like manifestoes issued in the halcyon days of Leadenhall Street, was a State paper worthy of at least as much attention as the despatches of more exalted but not more qualified critics in ministerial offices. But the body corporate was just as jealous of its principles as any individual statesman could be of his, and no cabinet minister could take more pains to show that he had rightly forecast coming events than did the Court to prove infallibility in political prescience. Throughout the Bombay letter there was an evident tendency to impress upon the Governor’s mind that any success which had attended his benign policy in the Máhi Kánta was to be attributed to the attention he had given to fulfilling home instructions, contrary to the habit of his predecessors. Captain Outram’s report, on first proceeding to reconnoitre his new field of labour, had disappointed them; they would ‘not have expected that an officer who had assisted in reclaiming by mildness and con-

ciliation wild tribes which had been driven to desperation by a system of coercion, would have fallen into the common error of supposing that severity must precede indulgence:’ but that same officer must now, they felt assured, have become convinced that his recommendation at the outset had been rightly set aside. They would not refuse sanction to his nomination as political agent: and they saw no advantage in making the political commissioner at Baroda the organ for transmitting his correspondence.

A subsequent letter congratulated the Bombay Government on the complete success of their ‘just and generous policy’ in the Máhi Kánta, and on ‘the re-establishment of a tranquillity not previously enjoyed for many years,’ to be ascribed to the Governor’s ‘judicious instructions, and to the manner in which Captain Outram has carried those instructions into effect.’ And the Court immediately added:—

‘In bestowing this commendation upon Captain Outram we are not forgetful of the fact that on several occasions that officer has shown a disposition to act in a more peremptory manner towards refractory chiefs, and to resort sooner to measures of military coercion than your Government has approved. In all such cases which have been reported to us we agree in the main, or altogether, in the opinion of your Government.’

When the Court’s ruling was made known to Outram, he chafed under what he considered to be injustice or misconception. His impetuous and sensitive nature could not brook in silence remarks which he himself described as ‘very severe animadversions on the opinions’ expressed in his report of November 1835. The official communication to his address bears date June 7, 1838, but the letter to which it referred may have been six months or more on the road. On receipt he proceeded with characteristic fervour to reply

to the objectionable passages *seriatim*; but he prudently reserved completion and despatch for some weeks, and the consequence was that he sent in a fairly temperate and logical paper. We have no space to analyse, but may allude to the prominent points of his defence, as a demonstration that his policy with the Bhils, admitted to have been successful and therefore not quoted against him, had not always been conciliatory; a disavowal of entertaining warlike views in dealing with the rebellious Thákurs; a recapitulation of reasons for disposal of particular cases and assuming unsought responsibilities; and an appeal to practical and apparent results for a general confirmation of his zeal and devotion. The Bombay Government, in acknowledging the receipt of this reply for transmission, request the political commissioner in Gujrát to inform Captain Outram that 'while the Government are fully satisfied with the soundness of the principles which have governed the Honourable Court and themselves in the affairs of the Máhi Kánta, the spirited and energetic manner in which he has frequently acted on his own responsibility has, whenever the Governor in Council conceived that officer exercised a sound discretion, received the commendation of Government, and that whenever, as at Ransipur, approbation could not be awarded, it has been withheld under much regret.'

The next paragraph has a force which seems to disallow compression :—

'You are further requested to inform Captain Outram that on the occasions on which he acted on his own responsibility and received the commendation of Government, he has shown how judicious was the selection which placed him, from the experience of his most valuable services in Khandesh, in the office of political agent of the Máhi Kánta. But if his energy and prompt decision have been often

important in their consequences, not less have been his execution of instructions varying from his own impressions of what was best, and his scrupulous obedience when unexpected events did not call for his assuming the responsibility of action. The confidence of Government in the influence of this principle not unfrequently recorded will, I am directed to state, be particularly pointed out to the Honourable Court as showing the very high opinion entertained of Captain Outram's military and political character.'

After the extracts already given in this and the two preceding chapters, it would be superfluous to quote from public documents further testimony to the extraordinary estimation in which were held Outram's services in Khandesh and the Máhi Kánta. We should have been glad to have introduced here and there a sketch of the work performed by other of his fellow-labourers in the same field; but beyond casual mention of names it has been impossible to carry out any such intention. Colonel Ovans, for instance, will be long known in Indian local story as a great reclainer and benefactor of the Bhils; nor can his merit be classed as inferior to that of any officer associated with him in the same line of duty. He did not, however, transform the Bhil recruit into the Bhil soldier, nor make, out of the very materials of disorder and destruction, instruments of discipline and preservation. In saying this we are not seeking to draw invidious distinctions; only to explain that there are separate spheres of action and usefulness in India as elsewhere; and all workers do not attain the same degree of honour in one that they would in another.

To those unaccustomed to the ways of Indian public life, any description of the routine of a political agent in the Máhi Kánta would be barely intelligible. In his more strictly official capacity, Outram had to attend to the well-

being of his barons and minor feudatories: to make judicial investigations into their complaints, extricate them from financial embarrassment, and keep them, as much as practicable, in the paths of respectability. In other respects, he had to perform the general duties of a magistrate; to organise and keep in order a local police; to superintend the formation of a corps of Kúlís; to establish tribunals for the administration of justice; to render the roads secure to merchants and travellers, especially the main lines of traffic; and to give a stimulus to commerce by the institution of fairs and reduction of transit duties. In the last-named efforts he had the advantage of co-operating with Colonel Spiers, the political agent for Meywar and Malwa, an able and energetic officer.

He had also to contend with a system of bribery and corruption, on which we shall have so much to say by-and-by under its locally familiar name of *Khatpat*, that a detailed account of it may be deferred for the present.

Upon the whole, these two years and three-quarters in the Máhi Kánta were for him a great contrast to Khandesh existence. Though he and Douglas Graham had been accustomed to spend the rainy months almost alone in their 'palace' at Dharangáon, they were both good readers, and seemed never to have lacked occupation; while the open seasons brought them Nimrod guests in plenty, and Bhils, buffaloes, or tigers afforded ample scope for superfluous energies. But here, the free wild life in the *jangal*, the congenial duties and associations of the Bhil corps, had given place to the dull jog-trot of an isolated political agency. No sport attracted kindred spirits to the locality. The days of a 'hundred mad pranks,'¹ and of practical jokes, all well spiced with danger, were gone. Old Haidar's *harda* and the Maratha spear had degenerated into an office chair and an office quill. But James Outram threw himself into his new duties

¹ Douglas Graham's expression.

with the zest and absorption characteristic of Anglo-Indian soldier-statesmen. He had already learned to wield the pen of a ready writer; for without pretension to culture of style, he expressed himself on paper with a fluency and a force which often proved embarrassing to gentlemen of the Secretariat. Official platitudes were wasted upon him; 'how not to do it' he would not see; to the bottom of the matter both he and his Government must go; and he could never manage to sit still under what his too ready sensitiveness construed into a misrepresentation or an unjust rebuke, no matter by whom administered. It was well, both for the public service and for himself, that he served his 'political' apprenticeship under men who, like Sir Robert Grant and Mr. Willoughby, not only cherished warm feelings of personal regard for the young soldier, but could fully appreciate his real qualifications. Otherwise his outspoken energy would probably have soon dismissed him to his regiment a disappointed man—marked as one whose tendencies, both of sword and pen, were too essentially warlike for any but regimental duties. Mr. (afterwards Sir John Pollard) Willoughby used to speak of this as the most critical period of his friend's public life. Hard and uphill official battles we shall find him fighting in its after stages, but he had then established for himself a political reputation and a general sympathy which he lacked as a captain on special employ in the Máhi Kánta. Here and throughout his Presidency he was known as one of the most dashing soldiers and sportsmen in Western India; but his political spurs he had yet to win.

A despatch from the Court of Directors to the Governor in Council, Bombay, bearing date March 12, 1840, reviews the good work done by their officers in the district of which we have now been treating. Among its later paragraphs is an expression of regret at reading the earnest defence of his views, submitted to their consideration by Captain Outram;

an admission that no error had been observed in that officer's conduct since he had been made acquainted with the policy propounded by the Honourable Court ; an assurance that the pacification of the Máhi Kánta had never been supposed capable of accomplishment without some exhibition and occasional employment of force ; a high compliment paid to Captain Outram and his assistant, Lieutenant Wallace, for the removal from the popular mind of mistaken impressions of Government objects ; and, finally, acceptance of Captain Outram's own proposal to issue a proclamation declaring *Bharwattya* an offence not to be passed over with impunity.¹

At the date of this despatch, however, Outram was far away from the Máhi Kánta ; and by the time that it had reached its destination, his mind was full of cares and anxieties on behalf of a people situated beyond the limits of India Proper.

¹ Appendix C.

CHAPTER VI.

1838-1839.

Family affairs—Appointment to Sir John Keane's Staff—Arrival in Sind with the Bombay Division of the Army of the Indus—Missions to Cutch, Haidarabad, and Shikárpur—Accident—Accompanies General Willshire from Gandáva, but rejoins Commander-in-Chief on arrival at Kandahar—Opinions on Afghan War.

ALTHOUGH James Outram's career was essentially that of a public servant, we may not altogether lose sight of his domestic life, nor of those home associations which naturally influenced his character. In writing to his mother from Sadra in August 1838, he expresses a determination to remain in the Máhi Kánta no later than the following December, and, unless war should break out, to visit England in February 1840. He deplores the uncertainty and irregularity of homeward and outward bound mails, and encloses the triplicate of a bill, lest the original and duplicate, both before despatched, should never reach their destination. 'Some of our packets,' he says, 'have been plundered by the Arabs, and some have returned from being unable to face the monsoon.' Altogether, the picture is such as to reconcile Anglo-Indians to any defects in home communications apparent in 1880.

But the writer had unusual reasons for depression. His wife had left India in the previous year from ill-health. She had joined him at Ahmadabad in May 1836, shortly after their early separation consequent on his sudden and forced departure from Bombay. A son had been born at Harsol in September of that year. Danger to life had ensued on the

event, and Mrs. Outram had been conveyed to the residency at Sadra, so soon as pronounced able to bear the fatigue of moving. Hence she was ordered to the hills for the hot weather of 1837. Not being free to accompany her, Outram followed at a convenient opportunity, and they passed the rains at Púna. But he had to wend his way back to Sadra alone: the doctors would not hear of the lady's return thither: change to England was imperative.

Sadra had now few attractions for the political agent. The residency *bangla*, or 'mansion,' as he designated it, on which he had spent time and money, had suffered during the latest rains; and its leaking rooms had brought on serious damage. Renovation of carpets and matting would entail a tiled roof for protective purposes. All this expense was annoying at any time; for a *quasi* bachelor in straitened circumstances it was most unsatisfactory. He had, moreover, changed in ways and habits since his marriage. Physical exertion was in a great measure abandoned. He detested 'constitutionals' in any shape, and soon fell into the mistake of avoiding exercise if he could possibly manage it. The early morning, like every period of the day, was devoted to desk work. At Harsol he would walk beside his wife's *tonjon* in the evening; but at Sadra he often passed the walking hour in inspecting the workmen carrying out proposed improvements in the house, an expensive amusement to which he was everywhere prone. He had begun to grow quite stout before leaving the Máhi Kánta. Shikar expeditions did not engage his attention as before, with their dash and excitement. At Harsol he sometimes went after hog. At Sadra there was no sport to tempt him. It is supposed that he killed his last tiger in the *jangal* near Kaira, when in company with a friend during the hot weather of 1837—the beast had been reported a man-eater, and was giving trouble. The pursuit of small game he never cared for: indeed he

made a vow as a youngster never to fire anything but ball, and kept it. Outram's intention to return to England in February 1840 had, we have stated, been saddled with a condition. The outbreak of war was the contingency which might materially affect his plans. Now it so happened that, throughout the early part of the year 1838, movements had been going on in India which looked decidedly warlike : and on October 1 was issued the manifesto directing the 'assembly of a British force for service across the Indus.' There was to be no advance on Herat as once contemplated, but there was to be an occupation of Kandahar and other parts of Afghanistan, in favour of Shah Shuja, the sovereign of our choice. This, then, was a realisation of a state of things which had been dimly portended. Outram's regiment was ordered on service, and Outram naturally volunteered to join. Lord Auckland had, it seems, heard of him, and had suggested to the Bombay Government, through the channel of private secretaries, that it might be desirable to attach him in some capacity to the army ; so that his offer was at once accepted. One recommendation on his behalf was, that he should command the Shah's contingent ; but he disclaimed all hopes of so great honour or distinction. Eventually Sir John Keane, commanding the Bombay column, appointed him an Extra Aide-de-Camp on his staff. To judge from his own account, he did not at this time aspire to any high military post : his object was rather recreation than hard work ; but he was evidently amused at the unexpected manner in which they had provided for his employment. 'Neither you nor I,' he writes to his wife, 'ever could have thought I should be an A.D.C. : but recollect, this is not to flutter about in a ball-room, but to attend the General on service.' Then, as if apprehensive that he had foreshadowed a position of too much danger, he immediately changes his note, and explains how pleasant will be the discharge of duties

enabling him to see everything as an amateur; adding that, since the enemy never came near enough to the chief of the forces to endanger his life, the aide-de-camp ran no risk whatever!

His correspondence with friends in India, during the months of August, September, and October 1838, show how keen was the interest with which he regarded the approach of the then impending Afghan campaign. To Colonel Sutherland he proposed to raise, on the Shah's account, a small body of select horse in Gujrat, to be placed under the command of Mir Sarfaráz Ali, a nobleman whose good service to the British Government during the Pindári war had elicited the warm commendation of Sir John Malcolm. He also suggested the enrolment of a larger number of men from the same quarter, under English officers. The same subject was resumed in September in a letter to Major Felix. 'One month's notice,' he said, 'would suffice to complete a thousand *sowárs*, and they would march at the rate of ten *coss* a day without halts—which would take them to the Indus in a month, *viâ* Jaisalmir.' In October, he again wrote to the same correspondent on the weakness of the cavalry in the army destined for Afghanistan, and proposed an increase to that branch of the Bombay expeditionary force, indicating the regiments he would employ, and forecasting a brigade of dashing troopers, to be attached to which, 'simply as volunteer, or in any capacity,' would afford him immense gratification. That he was right in pronouncing the proportion of cavalry to be far too small, the experience of the campaign fully showed. The notification of his own eventual appointment was expressed in flattering terms by Mr. Secretary Willoughby. Government, in complying with his request to share in an expedition for which his regiment had been detailed, could not 'help feeling the great loss' which temporary absence from his important duties in the Máhi Kánta would occasion;

but 'being impressed with the high qualifications' which he possessed 'for rendering the most valuable services' to the cause on behalf of which his zeal had prompted him to come forward, the Honourable the Governor in Council had 'not thought it right to withhold acquiescence' in his wishes.

Captain Lang was appointed to succeed Captain Outram in the political agency of the Máhi Kánta; and on November 21, 1838, the latter officer embarked at Bombay on board the 'Semiramis' steamer, with Sir John Keane and suite. On the 27th the Hujamri mouth of the Indus was reached; but the want of camels and boats prevented further progress for a considerable period. The difficulty was a real one: its importance made it one of those opportunities which men like Outram can instantly turn to account. Two days after arrival in Sind, the Extra Aide-de-Camp was despatched on a special mission to Cutch, to procure that assistance in land and water carriage which the Amirs had failed, or been unable, to supply. On rejoining head-quarters at Gorabári, after an absence of eleven days, he was able to make a satisfactory report of his work. He had proceeded by sea to Mandavi, from which port, after arranging for the despatch of boats, forage, and sheep, he had made a camel and horse journey to Bhúj, to confer with the assistant Resident, and visit the Rao, or reigning prince; he had then returned to Mandavi and sailed, past the mouth of the Hujamri, to Karáchi. This place was, at the time, no more than an obscure fishing-village; but it possessed one or two wealthy native merchants, and Outram was enabled to do much business there, and again on his way thence to camp, in furtherance of the transports so urgently required. His return involved an unsafe journey of about ninety-five miles. 'I went,' he explains, 'without servants or baggage of any kind, determining myself to go overland to camp, and hoping to excite confidence by displaying it in thus going totally

unattended—my object being ostensibly merely to look after camels, but in reality also to feel the temper of the natives, and to endeavour to ascertain the actual intentions of their rulers.’¹ Leaving Karáchi soon after midnight on December 9, he reached camp at 9 p.m. on the 10th, having spent twenty-seven hours on camel-back. On the way he explored a ruined city, besides scrutinising the country generally, and effecting a good stroke of transport work. The people were excited and suspicious—no wonder—but ‘on the whole’ he ‘had no great incivility to complain of, and experienced no difficulties of any consequence.’ It was not, however, until December 19 that the camels from Cutch arrived; they had been delayed *en route* by the hostile action of Shir Muhammad, of Mirpur, one of the lower Sind *amirs* or chiefs. On the 24th the force moved forward, and reached Thatta on December 28.

To make our narrative intelligible at this stage—and with future episodes of Outram’s career in view—it will be well to attempt a brief sketch of our relations with the rulers of that province in which were now encamped the troops forming the Bombay column of the army of the Indus.

The Amirs of Sind were members of a Baluch family called Talpur. According to the territorial divisions of their governments, those belonging to Khairpur, or Upper Sind, were Rustam Khan and his brother, Mubárah; those in Haidarabad, or Central and Lower Sind, were Nur Muhammad and Muhammad Nasir Khan, with their cousins-german, Sobdar and Muhammad; while Shir Muhammad of Mirpur owned the tracts west of the Indus. Of the three ruling branches,

¹ Extracts from Captain Outram’s Journal-letters to his wife were printed for private circulation, and subsequently published under the title *Rough Notes of the Campaign in Scinde and Afghanistan in 1838-9*. We shall have further occasion to quote sparingly from these unpretending but graphic and interesting diaries.

the Amirs of Haidarabad possessed the better known and more important State, but the Amir of Mirpur was the member, personally, most hostile to British influence. Our knowledge of these chiefs originated in our knowledge of their predecessors; but time had worked a change, and passive relations of reciprocal benefit had been converted into a one-sided activity on our part, which caused the new generation of Talpurs to regard the Anglo-Sindi alliance as a sort of inconvenient incubus. There is a formidable blue-book, containing the 'Correspondence relative to Sinda,' from 1838 to 1843, which commences with a treaty of four articles dated August 22, 1809. By this treaty the contracting parties were jointly pledged to 'eternal friendship' and the interchange of agents; and the less powerful of the two signatories was pledged to the more powerful not to allow 'the tribe of the French' to be established in Sind. Eleven years later a second treaty was concluded, much to the same effect, but with no specification of European 'tribes.' In 1832 we renewed and somewhat amplified our written engagements with Mir Murad Ali, the then sole responsible chief of Haidarabad; and made a separate treaty with the State of Khairpur—vowing 'eternal friendship' with it, closing forever 'the eye of covetousness' to its good things, and yet receiving from it, for our merchants, the use of the river Indus and roads of Sind. Then followed a 'commercial treaty' with Haidarabad in 1834; and a treaty of two articles with Mirs Nur Muhammad and Muhammad Nasir Khan, sons of Murad Ali, in 1838. This last instrument was short but significant. It provided for the mediation of the British Government in adjusting differences between the Amirs of Sind, and the Maharaja Ranjit Singh; and the residence of an accredited British Minister at the court of Haidarabad, with liberty to the Amir to send an agent to our court in return. The nature of the mediation to be effected

is apparent in a later treaty of more note and many more articles, concluded between the British Government, Ranjit Singh, and Shah Shuja ul Mulk, of which the sixteenth article is thus expressed :—

‘Shah Shuja ul Mulk agrees to relinquish, for himself, his heirs and successors, all claims of supremacy, and arrears of tribute, over the country now held by the Amirs of Sind (which will continue to belong to the Amirs and their successors in perpetuity), on condition of the payment to him by the Amirs of such a sum as may be determined, under the mediation of the British Government ; 1,500,000 rupees of such payment being made over by him to Maharaja Ranjit Singh. On these payments being completed . . . the customary interchange of letters and suitable presents between the Maharaja and the Amirs of Sind shall be maintained as heretofore.’

In July 1838—or exactly one month after this treaty was ‘done’ at Lahor—Colonel Pottinger, the resident in Sind, was instructed that the minimum of the sum which the Amirs would have to pay in conformity with the article quoted, might certainly be estimated at twenty lacs of rupees (200,000*l.*) ; that they must be made sensible of the advantage of at once coming to terms ; and that in the event of their declining to meet the wishes of the British Government and accept British mediation, they must be prepared for an occupation of their frontier town of Shikárpur and adjacent country, and other such measures as the Shah might eventually determine to adopt.

We need not here enter into the story of this tribute. How it originated, and what were the circumstances of its abandonment and revival, are matters which belong rather to the history of the period than to a separate biography : so also the right we had to mediate between Sikhs and Sindis and Afghans, to the gain of one and prejudice of the other,

when our own interests were at the root of the whole procedure. It is enough for our present purpose to know that the Resident exercised the discretion vested in him, to defer making the ungracious communication to the Amirs; and that the chapter of accidents in which their enlightenment on our 'friendly' intentions is recorded, contains many evidences of intrigue and ill-will in active operation against us.

Such being the state of affairs on the arrival of the Bombay division at the mouths of the Indus, it is not surprising that obstacles were thrown in the way of its progress to join the Bengal forces moving towards Afghanistan: and that the services of Sir John Keane's extra Aide-de-Camp were put in requisition for special duty at Thatta, as they had been seven weeks before, when the Lieutenant-General's head-quarters were lower down the river.

On this occasion, however, the question was not one of boats, camels, or commissariat, but of a new and detailed treaty. Outram was associated with Lieutenant Eastwick, the assistant resident, in a mission to the court of Haidarabad, the particulars of which may be gathered from a perusal of the published instructions addressed by the resident to the former officer. In Colonel Pottinger's letter to Mir Nur Muhammad the names of both emissaries are mentioned; but it is not clear that any distinct duties were assigned to each, nor indeed that the association of a second delegate meant more than that a great military authority having appeared on the scene, his dignity required a representative at any formal visit to be paid to the local *darbâr*. The draft treaty was of twenty-three articles, and besides the usual declarations of peace, and amity, and 'perpetual enjoyment' of present possessions, it provided for a British military cantonment at Thatta; the part payment by the Amirs of our troops permanently quartered in Sind (as these

princes would 'derive such vast advantages' from their presence); the protection of Sind from all foreign aggression, and the unconditional aid of the Sind army if found necessary by the British Government. Lest the Amir should fail to see all the benefits contemplated in this purposed understanding, Nur Muhammad's particular attention was called to the obvious intention that the two Governments should 'really become one'; and it was pointed out to him that the wealth about to 'flow into Sind from the British force stationed in it,' and which would 'give employment to thousands of the people of the country,' must 'cause a vast increase to the revenues from the demand for grain, and every other article of consumption,' and would 'bring merchants from every quarter to settle in the country.'¹ The later opinions of both Lieutenant Eastwick² and Captain Outram on the Sind question, are suggestive that either the sympathy of these officers with the views of their Government must at this early period have been half-hearted, or that their acquaintance with the merits of the case before them was as yet imperfect.

The steamer conveying to the seat of native government the representatives of British power, civil and military, was twice aground on the first, and twice again on the second day after leaving Thatta. Such occurrences represented too closely the normal condition of the classical Indus to have the character of ill omen. On the third day the opportunity was afforded to the passengers to visit the village of Jerak, since the head-quarters of a deputy collector; and, on the

¹ See *Sinde Correspondence*, 1838-1843; presented to both Houses of Parliament by command of Her Majesty, 1843.

² For many years, as Captain W. J. Eastwick, a prominent member of the Directorate of the East India Company, and of the Council of the Secretary of State for India. This able and upright public servant became one of the most active champions of the despoiled Amirs of Sind—a hearty ally, in the cause of justice, of his life-long friend James Outram.

morning of the fourth, the anchor was cast on the river bank at a point some three miles distant from Haidarabad. During the voyage, Outram's keen eye, as we gather from his diary, was searching out the military features of the country. A deputation from the Amirs attended to welcome the new arrivals; but it was not until the afternoon of the following day that the mission was received by the three joint rulers, Nur Muhammad, Muhammad Nasir, and Muhammad Khan. The fourth, Mir Sobdar Khan, owing to indisposition of some sort, was absent. Outram had not been idle in the interim, for he had ridden to the town, and nearly round the walls of the fort, and, in spite of insulting abuse received on passing the Baluch camps, had effected a double reconnaissance of the several approaches to these points. At the reception the chiefs were outwardly polite, and displayed much cordiality, *moribus suis*, towards the British officers; and they readily discussed with them the subject of the treaty. But the behaviour of the Baluch soldiery and many general indications of hostility observed outside the *darbâr*-room, were such as to necessitate a demand for explanation; and so unsatisfactory was the reply, that Eastwick and Outram had no alternative but to re-embark without waiting for a second interview. An attack upon their small detachment of sixty-nine men was averted only by its remaining on the alert throughout the night. The promised answer as to acceptance or rejection of terms offered had been deferred; but a verbal message, to the effect that the treaty would be sent back, was brought on the fourth day by the native agent in our employ. The envoys rejoined Sir John Keane's head-quarters at Jerak, to which place the troops had advanced from Thatta. Their report, and the intelligence received in other quarters, indicating possible aggression on the part of the Sind Baluchis, led to the request for a military demonstration of

our strength from the north, where the commander-in-chief, Sir Henry Fane, had pitched his camp, and where Major-General Sir Willoughby Cotton was preparing to cross the Indus at the head of a Bengal division. The construction of a bridge of boats on either side of the island of Bakhar, to facilitate the passage of an army from the left bank of the river at Rohri, was not a matter of instant accomplishment. And as it happened that the requisition for aid in Central Sind came at a season when progress was suspended on this account, compliance was willingly given. Accordingly, the major-general had himself marched a portion of the Bengal force as far as Kandiára, about a third of the way to Haidarabad, when a dispatch from Sir John Keane caused him to counter-march his men, and return to their starting-place. The prospect had brightened. A change had come over the minds of the Amirs; they had accepted the treaty; friendship had been renewed; and the Bombay division was in full movement up the river. Whether this result was owing to the military demonstrations, and occupation of Karáchi by the naval and reserve forces, or to Colonel Pottinger's diplomacy, or to all combined, we need not stop to examine.

Although Outram does not appear to have taken any prominent part in the brief diplomatic discussion at Haidarabad, Lieutenant Eastwick doubtless felt the advantage of having at his elbow so worthy a coadjutor. On return to Jerak, work was found for him of another kind. He was sent out by the general with fifty Púna horsemen, to scour the *jangal* and make a reconnaissance along the road about to be traversed by the troops. When this task was achieved, he took some six or seven hundred camp-followers to assist in tracking the boats laden with stores, still working up the stream from Thatta, and closed his day's labours by bringing in all to within one mile of the camp landing-place, with

the single exception of one long flat-bottomed craft, which, notwithstanding the employment of 200 men on the work, could not do more than half her prescribed journey. The last duty gave him the opportunity of exploring a burning 'shikárgáh,' or forest, in which the bodies of three officers of the Queen's Royals had been discovered the previous day, and of satisfying himself that the deceased must have lost their way and perished in the flames, without being able to get clear of the *jangal*. On the second day all the boats were brought abreast of the encampment; and the upward march commenced on the day following.

The Bombay division of the army of the Indus broke ground from Jerak on February 3, reaching Kotri in two marches. The position of this station on the right bank of the river, almost immediately opposite to Haidarabad, rendered it a desirable halt. Advantage was taken of the comparatively peaceful aspect of affairs to permit officers, under certain restrictions, to visit the capital. Outram attached himself to a party consisting of the chief engineer, the commandant, and brigade-major of artillery, and other scientific officers appointed to make close examination of the city, its fort, and environs. It was with no small satisfaction that he found the plan, sketched during his diplomatic mission, certified as correct in every respect, while the mode of attack which he had proposed to the commander-in-chief was pronounced to be the most judicious that could be adopted.

Three days were spent at Sehwan, to give time for the whole force to clear the Lakhi Pass;¹ and during these the commander-in-chief, Sir Henry Fane, arrived in the

¹ From Kotri the force moved to Sehwan, by the Lakhi Pass, traversing the rocky spur of that name overhanging the Indus. With the natural obstacles presented at this stage of the march, the passage of artillery was no simple matter. Owing to the encroachments of the river and consequent disuse of the track round the base of the hill, it had become necessary to make

immediate neighbourhood, on his downward route to Bombay, for embarkation to England. Outram was in personal attendance on Sir John Keane when proceeding to meet his senior general, and has recorded the cordial embrace of the two veteran warriors; adding that he breakfasted in Sir Henry's boat, and passed the day with him and his staff, each member of which had a separate boat comfortably fitted up.' Sir Henry's health did not admit of his staying in camp, but he was enabled to ride thither, and derive satisfaction from inspection of the cavalry and artillery horses, before re-embarking in his tiny flotilla. The departure of this distinguished and much respected officer left Sir John Keane commander-in-chief of the army about to enter Afghanistan.

Inclusive of its progress from the Hujamri mouth of the Indus to Thatta, the Bombay division had marched some 224 miles in Sind, up to Sehwan. Shikárpur, where Mr. Mac-Naghten, the envoy with Shah Shuja ul Mulk, had taken up his temporary quarters, was yet at a distance of 132 miles. With little exception, such as presented by the river-reaching spur of the Lakhi hills, the country was sandy, low, and flat, and the monotonous character of the scenery, though pleasantly varied by extensive wheat-fields and other cultivated land, was insufficiently relieved by village and forest. Hot weather, acting upon this monotony, would naturally have a depressing effect upon new-comers; but when Sehwan was left on February 23, there were yet two or three weeks to intervene before the actual setting-in of Sind heat. On February 28, at a point where the upward direction of troops and travellers would turn inland from the

a practical way over the higher ascent. By the skill and labour of the engineers and their assistants, the difficulty was overcome in an incredibly short time by means of a 'zigzag path cut out of and built upon the almost perpendicular face of the hill.'

bank of the river, Outram was ordered by Sir John Keane to start immediately for Shikárpur, and hold personal communication with the envoy. These orders were received at midday, and the recipient was at Larkhána, more than thirty miles off, in the evening. Resting there for the night, he left at nine the next morning, with the two camels on which he had accomplished the greater part of the previous day's journey, and reached his destination at 10 P.M.—a long and weary forty miles, though the distance would have been nothing to a well-mounted rider. He was heartily welcomed by Mr. MacNaghten, whom he found at table with his assistants, Major Todd and Captain Macgregor.

The precise object of his mission is not stated by Outram in the pages of his printed journal. That it related, however, in some way to commissariat arrangements, may be inferred from the fact that the available Bengal officers vested with the responsibilities of that department were summoned to the envoy's tent on March 2, to furnish certain information required by Sir John Keane; and he was able to report that the result of the meeting was 'much more favourable in some respects than he had expected.' On the same afternoon it had been arranged that the Bombay delegate was to be presented to Shah Shuja. His Majesty was so overcome by the heat that he sent to request a transfer of the scene of reception from the formal audience chamber to the place of evening promenade. Thither accordingly went the British officials. Remaining on horseback while the king, sitting in a native *takht-ruwán*, or litter, conversed with them, they were not detained for a long interview. Outram noticed the custom, approved by our authorities, to approach and leave the Shah with much ceremony, as well as the scrupulous observance of prescribed etiquette inculcated by the envoy in our outward relations

with the Afghan court. He adds that his Majesty received him with much affability, and that he appeared to be between fifty and sixty years of age, and of mild manners.

But apart from the journal or his own writings, we gather in another quarter that Outram was really commissioned to obtain, if possible, through Mr. MacNaghten's agency, a large number of camels to supply the wants of the commander-in-chief, in whose camp the mortality among baggage animals had been seriously felt. So grave, indeed, had been the loss, that it was reported impracticable to move the whole Bombay division to the Bolan without a further reinforcement. The arrangement proposed for attaining this end was complicated, and its success depended on the diplomatic adroitness of the procedure adopted. Let us see what light has been already thrown on the situation.

'The self-complacency of his Majesty, and the official dignity of the Envoy,' writes the author of the 'Memoirs of Colonel Outram's Services (1853),' quoting in part from Kaye, 'had been so seriously offended by the contempt for their unsoldierly levy which Sir Willoughby Cotton undisguisedly evinced, and Sir John Keane barely affected to conceal, that Sir William MacNaghten, assuming a high tone, had insisted on a prominent place being given to the Shah in the approaching operations. And the commander-in-chief had cogent reasons for avoiding a rupture with the British Plenipotentiary. He therefore resolved to go through the form of offering a thousand of his own insufficient herd of camels for the use of the contingent; but he determined, at the same time, *that the reverse arrangement should be carried out, if by skilful management it could be effected.*' Outram, we are further told, performed the duty confided to him with a success beyond even the anticipations of his chief, who received from the envoy 'a supply of camels

more than double in number those he had offered for the use of the Shah's contingent.'

It should be mentioned that on February 23, or the day on which the Bombay division left Sehwan, the cavalry, artillery, the 13th light infantry, and three native infantry regiments of the Bengal column had marched from Shikárpur towards the Bolan and Kandahar. The 4th infantry brigade had been detained to escort the Afghan king, who proposed moving at an early opportunity. Outram, having sent on his riding camels half the distance to be got over, took leave of Mr. MacNaghten after dinner on March 3, and started at midnight, by palankeen, to return to Sir John Keane's camp, then pitched at Larkhána. If evidence were needed of the favourable impression made upon the envoy's mind by his energetic visitor, none better could be adduced than the written application for transfer of the latter's services to his own special mission, which had reached the chief before the A.D.C. himself. But the offer was thankfully and respectfully declined on the honourable plea of unwillingness to leave the army while there was prospect of active employment in its ranks. That he was useful to the lieutenant-general, even in his every-day capacity, has already been demonstrated. Now again, on return to head-quarters, his tact and firmness were remarkably evinced in bringing to order some refractory camel-men from Cutch. These camp-followers struck work, positively refusing to advance a step further; and Outram was despatched to quell the mutiny. Assembling all, to the number of two or three thousand, he selected twenty of the most influential of their *jamadárs*, and marked them off in confinement. 'I then,' he writes in his journal, 'ordered the remainder to take on their camels under the surveillance of a body of horse; but they refused. Having warned them, without effect, that we could be trifled with no longer, and

of my determination to flog them all round unless they complied, I was under the necessity of tying up one and giving him a dozen lashes; a second succeeded, and a third—who got four dozen, he having been observed checking the rest when they began to show symptoms of giving in. This had the desired effect; they promised obedience in future, and took out the camels to graze. On their return in the evening, they were again mustered, and told that they should remain under surveillance, unless such of the Cutch *jamadárs* as had been faithful throughout should pledge themselves for their good conduct. The required pledge having been given, they were sent to their duty.' Those *jamadárs* who had been placed in confinement were not released at once, as further security seemed requisite for their future behaviour; but on the day after the example had been made, the mutineers were 'quite obedient.'

A detachment of the Bombay troops, consisting of H. M.'s 17th and 2nd regiments of foot, proceeded from Larkhán towards Gandáva in the Kalát State, on March 11. The commander-in-chief and staff, with horse artillery, the 1st Bombay cavalry, and a wing of the 19th native infantry followed on the 12th idem. After three short stages, each averaging thirteen miles, and a long march across the desert of thirty miles, Outram was despatched on a new mission to the envoy, then in camp with Shah Shuja. Riding all night on a tired camel and, for half the distance, quite alone, through a country of abandoned grain-fields and protective watch-towers—frequented by Baluch plunderers, who evinced their hostility by murdering every stranger—he reached Gandáva (forty-one miles) late in the morning. Thence, on the following day, March 15, he continued his route to Bagh (forty-five miles) upon a pony lent him by the commissariat officer, escorted by two armed Baluchis entertained for the journey. Here he fell in with Mr. MacNaghten, and com-

municated to him the objects of his coming, returning on the 19th to Gandáva, and rejoining Sir John Keane at Panjok, a few miles beyond. Owing to the information which he brought from the royal camp, the chief directed him to hasten back to Gandáva, for the purpose of despatching thence an express messenger to the envoy, conveying the intelligence that his Excellency had resolved upon pushing on with a small escort to Dádar, there to meet the Shah, and accompany his Majesty and the British officers with him up the Bolan, then occupied by our soldiers. The latest accounts from Sir Willoughby Cotton were to the effect that the head of his column was within one march of the top of the Pass, and that it was expected no opposition would be offered to its progress before arrival at Kandahar.

General Willshire was nominated to command the 'Bombay division of the army of the Indus;' but it was not to lose the presence of Outram, though attached to the personal staff of its late commander, and doubtless preparing to accompany him. On March 21, while riding out from Gandáva to meet Sir John Keane, an accident occurred which disabled him for a time from all active work. His horse, making a sudden turn when at speed, fell flat on his side with his rider below him: and the bone of the pelvis, above the hip-joint, was fractured from violent contact with the hilt of his sword. It can well be understood how vexatious to him was the *contretemps*; but there was consolation in the reflection that things might have been worse. The medical officers were of opinion that the utmost detention he could suffer would be for three weeks; and though he might not accompany his chief in advance, he could be safely carried in a palankeen with the troops which would shortly leave Gandáva.

It was on March 31 that the main body of infantry in the Bombay division, with Outram and the dragoons, managed

to get clear of Gandáva. Of the first day's short march to Gagar, the invalid writes, 'I did not feel the slightest inconvenience from the shaking in the palankeen; and, in fact, were it not necessary to remain quiet in order to allow the fractured bone to unite, I believe I might now walk about.' But although on April 29 he was able to ride twenty-two miles to join his chief at breakfast 'in a delightful garden a few hundred yards from the walls of Kandahar,' he had only abandoned the palankeen and resumed his seat on horseback on the 25th.

We need not linger over that month of April, with its sad experiences of starvation for animals, and of death, by the ruthless hands of robber-tribesmen, for unwary men armed or unarmed.¹ Outram, whether on horseback, or borne along from day to day in an ungenial palankeen, noted carefully all the features of the line of country now so familiar to us, and recorded the events of the march. Passing near, or among the bodies of murdered *sipahis* and others belonging to the force, in one narrow defile, at the outlet of the Bolan, he found 'the stench arising from the countless putrefying camels dreadful.' Nor did the horses escape the general suffering. On the arrival of the Bombay division at Kandahar, it was ascertained that about one hundred and fifty of those of the artillery and auxiliary cavalry had dropped on the road from exhaustion. The surviving animals had suffered much, but were pronounced to be in a better state than the horses of the Bengal army, three hundred and fifty of which had been lost. From this and former experiences, the author of 'Rough Notes' takes occasion to remark on the superiority, for work and endurance, of Arab and Persian horses over stud and country breds; and gives the palm, in both respects also, over stud-bred horses to some recent imports from the Cape. The reason of his hurried ride into Kandahar, broken bone

¹ Appendix D.

and all, was General Willshire's lack both of provisions and of information about the road in front—postal communication having been effectually cut off by the marauding tribes. On his arrival, he found that only six days' supplies remained in the commissariat stores. However, his consultation with Mr. MacNaghten resulted in measures which, it was hoped, would relieve the wants of the army till the approaching harvest. Supplies were accordingly sent back, and the Bombay division came up on May 4.

Kandahar now became the head-quarters of the army of the Indus; the Bengal and Bombay divisions, and the Shah's troops being there united under the commander-in-chief. The Shah had made his State entry a few days before Outram's arrival; but the latter was called upon to arrange with Mr. MacNaghten the military programme for a later ceremony of no less significance—the celebration of his Majesty's restoration to the 'kingdom of his ancestors,' a strong expression, perhaps, when applied to a grandson of the founder of any monarchy at all in Afghanistan. 'On his ascending the *masnad*,' we are informed that 'the whole line presented arms, whilst a salvo was discharged from 101 pieces of artillery'; and then that 'the army of the Indus marched round in front of the throne, in order of review, mustering some seven thousand men of all arms, and presenting a most imposing spectacle.' In the evening Outram attended the commander-in-chief to the residence of the envoy, who gave an entertainment in honour of the king's accession, and made a speech for the occasion, as did also Sir John Keane and Sir Alexander Burnes. It was a bad omen, perhaps, that the few lamps which loyalty or obsequiousness had lighted in the streets were totally extinguished when the British guests returned home.

It will be appropriate in this place to reproduce certain opinions entertained and expressed by Outram on the part

taken by the Indian Government in the expedition to restore Shah Shuja to the throne of Afghanistan. We do not ask attention for them so much as pertinent to a biography, as on account of their significance on all our subsequent relations with that country. It was his lot in more than one instance to differ in respect of policy from the authority which he was bound to acknowledge. And among other eminent men to whose views he could not always subscribe were Lord Auckland and Sir William MacNaghten. Both were aware of this divergence of opinion, but neither was dissuaded thereby from employing the intelligent Bombay officer on important military and political duties. Later on, as the Kabul disasters are approached, we shall have more to say on this subject. At present we confine ourselves to letters addressed to friends from Kandahar, at the period already reached in our pages, adding one from Kabul which barely anticipates the narrative.

Outram writes thus to Lieutenant Eastwick, assistant political agent, Upper Sind, on May 6, 1839 :—

Every day's experience confirms me in the opinion that we should have contented ourselves with securing the line of the Indus alone, without shackling ourselves with the support of an unpopular Emperor of Afghanistan, whom, to maintain, will cost us at least thirty lakhs annually, besides embroiling us hereafter with all the rude states beyond, which it must perpetually do. We have now stretched out our feelers too far to pull them back, however, and must and will carry our objects for the *present* triumphantly ; but I cannot blind myself to the embarrassment we are storing for the future : for it is too plain that the Shah is *not popular*, notwithstanding some little temporary enthusiasm displayed by the mob on his entry into Candahar the other day, and the flocking to his standard of a few greedy and needy Afghans, who hope to benefit by any change, and whom the poor Shah is obliged to entertain in his service, although without the means of supporting them. . . . Neither is the Shah's popularity apparent in the country we have passed through, the inhabitants of which have heartily united in injuring

him and us to the utmost of their power : *all* classes—peasantry as well as soldiery—turning against us, robbing and murdering whomsoever they can get hold of belonging to us, and inveigling our people to their villages for no other purpose than cold-blooded murder.

To Major Felix he writes, ten days later :—

If—as I suspect will be the case—Dost Mahomed prefers temporary exile to submission, seeing that the Shah is only upheld by the presence of a British army which must soon be withdrawn, he will return with tenfold popularity to raise the standard of the faithful against a King forced upon bigoted Afghanistan by infidel bayonets. Then will Shah Shooja be in his turn deserted by those who are now seduced to his side by British gold, but who only can be held there so long as the golden stream flows undiminishedly. The fact is not to be concealed that Dost Mahomed, at the outset of this struggle, had the preponderance of *personal* weight in this country, a well-trying, able, and fortunate ruler, against the bad luck ('*bad bakht*'), which goes a great way with natives, and *bad name* of Shah Shooja : and it is not to be supposed that the Dost's temporary expulsion will otherwise than enlist the sympathy of his countrymen, who will hail his return too as the triumph of the champion of the 'true faith' over the hireling slave of '*infidels*'—as they will then be taught to consider Shah Shooja, if they do not already do so. . . . I am of opinion we should be restricted to placing Shah Shooja in possession of Cabool, leaving officers to discipline his contingent, and a resident to guide him ; and that our army should then descend to the Attock before winter, thence to operate on Scinde, or to return to India, as may be required.

. . . For our own sakes I think it better we should pass peaceably through Afghanistan, and fulfil our mission without hostilities, because once involved in warfare, we should have to continue it under lamentable disadvantages in this country. A blow once struck by us at the Afghans will oblige us to become principals on every occasion hereafter, much to our cost and little to our credit. . . . You will be surprised that I should display so little desire for actual war ; but I hope you will give me credit for some discretion, which is as necessary as bravery to a good soldier, and do me the justice to believe that I would weigh well

consequences before plunging into war, when hostilities can honourably be avoided. I have well considered every side of the question, and am now satisfied that British bayonets need never be pushed beyond the Hala mountains for the defence of India; that British armies of any strength could not be supplied or supported for a length of time on this, the Afghan, side of these mountains; and that the natural and impregnable boundary of our Empire is the Indus.

On May 22 he thus expresses himself to Mr. Willoughby:—

It is possible from what we learn of opinions at home, that our armies may be ordered to withdraw from Afghanistan, after seating the Shah at Cabool, without waiting for or enforcing the submission of the rebel chiefs. If unopposed on this occasion, we can do so without discredit, leaving the Shah in possession of his throne, with the support of his own contingent and subjects; but if opposed by Dost Mahomed, we must go to extremity with him, which would be uphill work if he leads us into protracted warfare, and knows how to deal with us—i.e., cutting off our communications, destroying crops and water in our route, attacking baggage on the line of march, harassing our camp by night alarms, cutting off foragers, &c., &c. Eager as I am for service, still so convinced am I that little glory to our arms, and less benefit to the State, could be gained in such a struggle—where our enemy need never meet us hand to hand, and has it so much in his power to destroy our very limited resources—that I shall consider it fortunate if we are permitted the credit of marching in warlike array from the sea, through Afghanistan, to Attock, without any enemy daring to face us! We should then leave behind us a high reputation for power, wealth, and moderation, as, of course, we sumptuously pay as we go (and most lavishly too), prevent any sort of oppression to the people, and forego what they see in our power—the appropriation of any portion of their territory.

The Kabul letter to which we have alluded is to Major Felix again, and bears date August 20:—

Unless to prevent a European enemy obtaining a temporary footing in Afghanistan, and breathing time therein, I am satisfied that

our armies need never enter this country, and that such a measure should be avoided if possible; that it would suffice to maintain our ascendancy tranquilly on the Indus until invasion *is* threatened, when our detachments pushed forward to the main passes, within reach of supplies and support, might defy any army in the world, especially after traversing such a country as Afghanistan,—or, were it feared that our enemy's object was to establish himself in this country in the first instance, that a small force advanced to Cabool—which (being received as friends) would always be practicable to and within reach of our troops on the Indus—would effectually frustrate his design. What I mean to say is, that British power on the Indus must secure the préponderance of our influence here, above that of any European power; and that that alone would most probably prove a sufficient bar to the advance of any hostile army into Afghanistan; but that it would then be in our power at any time to establish troops at Cabool, if necessary, long before our enemies could approach, without a hope being left to them of maintaining themselves in that country, or the possibility of debouching into the valley of the Indus.

CHAPTER VII.

1839.

Ghazni—Outram's employment at, and prior to the Siege—Pursuit of Dost Muhammad Khan—Return from Bamian, and Mission from Kabul to Ghilzai Country—Work in the disturbed districts—Return to Kwatta—Siege of Kalát—Journey from Kalát to Sonmiāni with despatches for Bombay.

OUTRAM left Kandahar with the advance column and headquarters on June 27. His journal represents the march to Ghazni to have been upon the whole uneventful: but habit had inured him to road adventures, and he lays comparatively little stress upon transport difficulties, impudent robberies, and ruthless murders, in which last the Ghilzais were the heroes. Of these there was a kind of daily record. He makes the distance traversed 240 miles and a fraction, and, as there were twenty-two marching days and three halts, the average daily progress was within eleven miles. About two-thirds of the way lay near the right bank of the Tarnak river, the source of which was reached on July 14. Here Shah Shuja overtook the column. At the seventh stage out of Kandahar two of Outram's horses were stolen from their pickets by the Ghilzais. One of the two, a chestnut Arab charger, which the owner considered 'without exception the finest in the whole army,' was a very serious loss; and a reward of 2,000 rupees (200*l.*) was offered, through Sir Alexander Burnes, to anyone who could effect its ransom. Twelve miles south of Ghazni, at midnight of July 20, General Willshire's brigade came up with the remainder of the force; and the whole army, arranged in three

columns, moved the next morning over the intermediate spacious plain. No enemy, however, appeared until the British troops were actually within a mile of the fort, when preliminary operations commenced with the discharge of guns and matchlocks from the walls and outskirts, the clearance and occupation of a garden by our infantry, and the assignment of a position to our artillery. Outram himself had the honour of eliciting the first shot from the fort when reconnoitring; being, moreover, exposed to a heavy fire at sixty yards' distance.

As the day advanced firing was continued generally by the enemy; the 35th and 48th regiments of native infantry, occupying the garden, exchanged shots with the garrison of an outwork; and there was promise of extended skirmishing, but Sir John Keane wisely prohibited the further exposure of his men in desultory warfare. Guns and troops were withdrawn out of range; a systematic reconnaissance of the fort and approaches was effected; and the camp was shifted, across the Ghazni river, to a position commanding the Kabul road on the north. On July 22 the commander-in-chief reconnoitred the place in person, and approving Captain Thomson's proposal to blow open the Kabul gate by bags of powder, and follow up the act by a dash at the gateway, gave all the necessary orders, and made all the necessary arrangements for an assault early next morning.

How Ghazni was successfully stormed on July 23 need not here be narrated. The capture of this strong fortress, accomplished within three quarters of an hour from commencement of the assault, is an event which occupies too prominent a place in history, and has already been too well and circumstantially chronicled, to warrant the obtrusion, at this late hour, of any new account.¹ That Outram's name

¹ Perhaps the most recent and circumstantial version is that contained in Durand's *First Afghan War* (Longmans, 1879.)

does not appear in the despatches is one of those unexplained occurrences, which if it were compulsory on the historian or biographer to fathom, we venture to affirm that few histories or biographies would be written at all. Either would the inquirer not arrive at the root of the matter, or, arriving there, he would find weaknesses and littlenesses which, if not unbecoming his office to exhume, would sorely embarrass him to apportion fairly to the respective possessors. In this case, the omission cannot be accounted for as accidental: nor can it be laid at the door of custom or precedent.

On the eve of the capture of Ghazni, Captain Outram performed an exploit which, as it has already been narrated and eulogised by historians of the Afghan war, we will retail as it has reached us in his own words:—

‘About noon the hills to the southward of our camp were crowned by masses of horse and foot, displaying several standards; their designs appearing to be directed against the Shah’s camp, which lay immediately under their position. Two of his Majesty’s guns, with all his cavalry, supported by lancers, and by a regiment of Bengal cavalry, moved out immediately to oppose this demonstration; and the enemy, who had already begun to descend into the plain, being met by the Shah’s horse under Captain Nicolson, were, with trivial loss on our side, compelled to re-ascend the heights, leaving behind one of their standards in our possession, and four or five of their number killed in the conflict. Having galloped out to ascertain what was going on, I reached the scene of action just before this occurrence, and finding no European officer on the spot, I prevailed on a body of the Shah’s horse to follow me round the hills in the enemy’s rear, where I stationed them so as to cut off their retreat. The enemy, being intimidated by this movement, and repulsed

by Captain Nicolson's gallant charge, ascended the heights beyond all reach of our Horse, whom I therefore left in position, returning myself to the front.

‘Meeting, at this juncture, a small detachment of the Shah’s contingent, consisting of about one hundred and fifty infantry and matchlock-men, under a European officer, I suggested to him the propriety of an immediate attempt to force the enemy from the heights, in the direction where I had just stationed the cavalry. He expressed his readiness to act under my orders and, relinquishing to me the charge of his detachment, which was composed of piquets from different corps hastily assembled, we ascended the hill together. The matchlock men behaved with great gallantry, advancing steadily under a galling fire, and availing themselves of every rock and stone as fast as the enemy were dislodged. They were followed by the sepoys in close order, who occupied every favourable undulation of ground, and were thus prepared to meet any sudden rush that might be made on the part of the enemy. Step by step we thus at last attained the loftiest peak, over the crest of which floated the holy banner of green and white—the largest and most conspicuous in the ranks of the whole host, the first unfurling of which by the Moslem High Priest, who had preached a crusade against the British, had called together a mob of fanatics, who, judging from their reckless personal exposure, must have been deceived into the belief that they were safe under the charm of its sacred influence. Towards this object we made our way, ascending a very precipitous acclivity under a smart fire, from which we were sheltered by the rocks, until on our arriving within fifty paces of the enemy, a fortunate shot brought down the standard-bearer. The whole of our party then rushing up with a general cheer, the banner was seized, whilst the enemy, panic-stricken at this proof of the fallacy of their belief, fled with precipita-

tion to a second hill, whither I deemed it useless to follow them, both because our men were already much exhausted from thirst and fatigue, and because the range, instead of terminating, as I had conjectured, at this point (in which case the fugitives might easily have been driven into the plain), proved to be a succession of steep hills, among which it was not practicable for cavalry to act.

‘Having rested some time therefore, we finally retired, bearing off our wounded—nine or ten in number—and leaving the bodies of five of our opponents lying around the spot on which the large standard had been planted. Ten or twelve others, who had fallen in the contest towards that position, were likewise strewed on the face of the hill, making a total loss on the side of the enemy of thirty or forty killed and wounded, in addition to about fifty made prisoners by the cavalry: one of these latter, on being brought into the King’s presence, stabbed one of the principal officers of state in the open *darbar*—an offence for which the whole are said to have atoned with their lives. On our side the total loss throughout this affair amounted to about twenty in killed and wounded.’

Nor had Outram been an idle or inactive aide-de-camp, in fulfilling the wonted requirements of his office in the field. On the day of arrival before Ghazni, he more than once conveyed his chief’s orders to the troops engaged with, or threatened by the enemy, after fire had been opened on both sides. He himself has admitted that, during the actual assault, the personal staff of the commander-in-chief had very little employment; but he was twice despatched, in that exciting interval, to ascertain the progress of operations, and was the first to announce to His Excellency the entrance of the troops into the town by the Kabul gate. He, moreover, under Sir John Keane’s instructions, placed guns at a

point to command the western face of the fortress, with the view to check the escape of the garrison; and afterwards rode round the eastern walls to make arrangements to intercept the fugitives in that direction. However, as before stated, his name did not appear in the despatches reporting the fall of Ghazni, and he missed his well-earned honours or promotion.

On July 30 the army of the Indus resumed its march towards Kabul, and halted at Haidar Khel¹ on August 3. Here it was joined by Shah Shuja ul Mulk, who, with the Bombay infantry, had been left to follow from Kandahar. Here also Outram received his orders for undertaking a new and important duty—the capture, if possible, of the Amir Dost Muhammad Khan. This remarkable man, against whom we were now unfortunately arrayed in open hostility, was clearly unwilling to risk a general engagement with the invading troops; and the loss of Ghazni had not tended to lower his estimate of our power. Information had just been received that he had fled towards Bamian, a valley on the high road to Turkistan, and about a hundred miles to the north-west of Kabul; and it was determined to send two thousand of the Shah's Afghans in pursuit of him. One Hajji Khan, Kakar, otherwise the 'Nasiru-d-daulah,' or Defender of the State, a person of low origin, who had raised himself from the condition of a seller of melons to that of a State minister, and who had passed from the service of Dost Muhammad Khan to that of the Kandahar chiefs, and had now transferred his allegiance to Shah Shuja, was placed at the head of this body. The detachment was to be further strengthened by one hundred of our own cavalry, regular and irregular, and the following officers, volunteers:—Captain Wheeler, Bengal cavalry, Captain Backhouse, Bengal artillery,

¹ 'Hyderzye' in the 'Rough Notes'; but 'Haidar Khel' seems to be the place intended; it is placed by MacGregor, quoting Hough, Campbell, and Bellew, at thirty-three miles from Ghazni and fifty-four from Kabul.

and Captain Troup, Shah's contingent, Majors of brigade; Captain Christie, commanding regiment of Shah's cavalry; Captain Laurence, Bengal cavalry; Lieutenant Ryves, Adjutant 4th local horse; Captain Keith Erskine, Poona auxiliary horse; Lieutenant Broadfoot, Shah's Gurkha battalion; Lieutenant Hogg, Bombay staff; and Doctor Worrall, local horse. Outram was to exercise command of the whole.

It was a rough bit of work—as the tale of recent experience in Afghanistan will suggest to the reader—and nobly done, though the main object of the expedition failed. Hajji Khan was guide and adviser as well as commandant of the Shah's detachment, and this Afghan played the double game of which his countrymen are so fond, and which they think so suited to their purpose in dealing with Englishmen. On the day of setting out, the two thousand horsemen were awaited till dark. Not half the number came; and of those who did come, not half were considered effective. The greater part were a mere rabble, mounted upon *yábús* and starved ponies. At the outset there was an ominous division of counsels. To the mind of Outram the direction to be taken was obvious: a short and rapidly-made cut across the hills offered the sole chance of intercepting the fugitive. Hajji Khan proposed a start along the high road¹ and, though compelled to abandon his argument, he practically gained his end by the consumption of time and patience. At Goda, after the first night's march of 32 miles, over ranges of hills and amid tortuous river-channels, not more than one hundred Afghans came up with the British officers to the encamping ground: and when, after another day and night of similar or more hazardous

¹ His proposal was to proceed along the high road between Ghazni and Kabul up to Maidan, whence they would turn westward to Bamian, by the high road between Kabul and Bamian. Outram preferred reaching the latter road at a point about three marches beyond Maidan.

riding, the latter had contrived, by clearing a lofty and precipitous pass of the Paghman mountains, to reach the small village of Kádir-i-Safid, barely fifty of their worthless auxiliaries were present. The information received at this place that the Dost was at Yourt, only one march beyond, was a stronger inducement to Outram than the almost utter want of supplies, to push on at all hazards. But Hajji Khan urged a halt on the plea that the force at their disposal was insufficient to cope with the enemy. Outram insisted on moving, and managed in the course of the afternoon to get together some 750 Afghans of sorts whom he induced to accompany his own particular party. Through accident or design, the guides went astray, and in the darkness of the night the way was lost 'amid interminable ravines, where no trace of a footpath existed;' so that Yourt was not reached until the next morning, when Dost Muhammad was reported to be at Kharzár, sixteen miles distant, on the high road leading from Kabul to Bamian. No inducement could get the Afghans to advance another stage until the morning of the following day, August 7; and in the interim, their leader attempted, by every available means, and including even threats, to dissuade Outram from proceeding any further, strongly representing the scarcity of provisions for his men, and the numerical superiority of those whom he sought to encounter. He was unable, however, to carry his point: for he pleaded to one who went onward in spite of every obstacle. When the pursuers arrived at Kharzár, they ascertained that the Amir had gone to Kalu, whither, leaving behind their Afghan adviser, they pressed on the same afternoon, over the Hajji Guk (or Khak), a pass 12,000 feet above the ocean, whence they saw the snow 1,500 feet below them. At Kalu they were again doomed to disappointment. Dost Muhammad had left some hours previously, and it was supposed that he had already surmounted the Kalu Pass, the

highest of the Hindu Kush. Here Outram and his comrades were compelled to remain the night encamped at the foot of Kúh-í-Bábá, 'The Father Mountain,' monarch of that mighty range, and 22,000 feet high: they had been nine hours in the saddle, and horses and men were knocked up. The next day they were overtaken by Captains Taylor and Trevor, with 30 troopers and about 300 Afghans, which reinforcement, though it seems to have inspired Hajji Khan with courage to rejoin his head-quarters, did not a whit diminish his ardour in endeavouring to persuade the British commandant to delay the pursuit. He tried by entreaty, menace, and withholding guides, to keep back this dauntless soldier even when mounting his horse, and in the act of departure: but in vain; before nightfall Outram had crossed the steep Shutargardan (camel neck), a pass some thousands of feet higher than the Hajji Gok, and after dark he halted 'at a deserted village at the foot of the Ghát . . . on the banks of a stream which flows into the Oxus.' Briefly, after six days' hard riding and roughing he reached Bamian to miss again the object of his search, and to certify that, with such a guide and in such a country, it would be madness to continue the chase. On August 11, the day before leaving Bamian, he addressed a letter to the envoy, from which the following passages are extracted:—

'On my arrival at this place on the 9th instant, I had the honour to address you with information that the Ameer Dost Mahommed Khan had escaped beyond the frontier; expressing at the same time my intention to await the result of a letter that had been addressed to his adherents by Nusseer-ood-Dowlah, myself, and others, or the receipt of further orders from yourself.

'The accompanying extracts from my journal will explain to you the circumstances under which I have been compelled

to resolve on returning from Bamian to-morrow, at mid-day, unless supplies, reinforcements, or orders to the contrary shall be received by that time; when, having completed three days at this place, a sufficient period will have elapsed to admit of an answer arriving from the adherents of Dost Mahommed Khan, to the letter addressed to them on the 8th instant, if it ever was really despatched by Hadji Khan Kakur, which I have now reason to doubt.

‘It will be seen . . . that the fugitive might have been overtaken at Hurzar on the morning of the 6th instant, had not our guides, who were under charge of Nusseer-ood-Dowlah’s people, deserted us during the night; that the Khan then insisted on delaying at Yourt, only half-way to Hurzar, instead of pushing on as urged by me to do; and that, although he promised to make up for the delay in the afternoon, he ultimately refused to go on, thus retarding our advance till next morning, the 7th instant, when we expected to overtake Dost Mahommed Khan at Kulloo—to which place, in that hope, I was compelled to proceed with the British detachment alone, unsupported by Nusseer-ood-Dowlah or any of the Afghan troops, who remained behind at Hurzar notwithstanding my personal solicitations to that chief.

‘It will be further seen that he next day again endeavoured to prevent our following the fugitive; that he deceived me by repeated false assurances of Dost Mahommed Khan’s escape being cut off; and, finally, that he formally announced to me his inability to face Dost Mahommed Khan with his own Afghans, not a man of whom, he declared, would fight against the Ameer; even hinting his belief that they were more likely to turn against ourselves.’

So they retraced their steps to the commander-in-chief’s camp, now stationed, not where they had quitted it, but at

Kabul, before the walls of which town Shah Shuja had appeared with the British army on August 6. But the letter to the envoy did not contain the statement of what was done, or contemplated to be done, on the eve of entering Bamian, where the Dost was supposed to be with 200 staunch adherents. We must refer to the diary for particulars of the 'council of war' held on this occasion :—

'It was resolved that on the Ameer turning to oppose us, of which, on our overtaking him to-morrow, as we expect to do, there can be no doubt, the thirteen British officers who are present with this force, shall charge in the centre of the little band, every one directing his individual efforts against the person of Dost Muhammad Khan, whose fall must thus be rendered next to certain. It being evident that all the Afghans on both sides will turn against us, unless we are immediately successful, this plan of attack appears to afford the only chance of escape to those who may survive; and it is an object of paramount importance to effect the destruction of the Ameer, rather than to permit his escape. Although crowded as usual into one small rowtie (marquee), with little to eat, nothing whatever to drink, and no bed on which to lie, saving our sheep-skin cloaks, our little party, always cheerful and merry, has never been more happy than on this night, under the exciting expectation of so glorious a struggle in the morning. All prospect of danger on such occasions as these is met by the soldier with the gratifying conviction that should he fall, he will have earned an enviable place in the recollection of those loved, though distant, friends, in whose memory he most desires to live.'

The sober spirit in which the return of the gallant band from Bamian was effected, may have offered a marked contrast to the buoyant hopefulness which had characterised its original outset: but though disappointed and, it may be,

irritated at the deceit practised upon them, its members had no cause to be crestfallen. It was not alone with rocks and ravines, or want of food, shelter, and forage that they had to contend: but with traitors and enemies in the guise of friends. Let anyone acquainted with Afghanistan and other mountainous and roadless tracts on a like scale, study the detailed map of the country between Haidar Khel and Bamian; and, after taking account of the physical difficulties there presented, accept as a truth that these were as nothing compared to the obstacles raised up, and risks occasioned within the same limits, by man's duplicity; and he will have some idea of the whole situation.

Outram arrived at Kabul on August 17.¹ Four days later, he was placed at the temporary disposal of the British envoy, 'for the purpose of conducting an expedition into certain disturbed districts lying between Kabul and Kandahar, in order to tranquillise the disaffected Ghilzai tribes, none of whom had yet submitted to the king.' His duties were subsequently defined under four heads: the arrest of Mihtar Musa Khan, Abdu-r-Rahman Khan, Gul Muhammad Khan, and the 'Mámá,' four refractory Ghilzai chiefs; the establishment in power of three new Ghilzai governors; the punishment of the inhabitants of a certain village of Maruf, who had wantonly destroyed a caravan *en route* to India from Kandahar; and the reduction of the forts of Hajji Khan, the Nasiru-d-daulah, should his adherents decline to surrender them. The last-named nobleman had been arrested by the king's order, for treason and conniving at Dost Muhammad's escape—a charge eventually brought home to him on evidence.

This little expedition would take its leader far on the way to his own Presidency, and his political functions would

¹ He makes the distance from Bamian only 97 miles; but General Kaye reckons it at 112.

cease on its accomplishment. But there was a prospect of active employment for him in the field, previous to return to India : and he would be thrown into contact with authorities likely to avail themselves of his services in a purely military capacity. It was suggested that he should visit Ghazni, and thence proceed by the road branching off near Mukur, east of Kandahar, to Kwatta. Major-General Willshire, who would probably return to India by the same route, was to be instructed to assist him with men, if requisite, within certain limitations. Meanwhile the force to be instantly placed at his disposal, was composed of the Ghurka infantry regiment, with a proportion of cavalry and artillery from Shah Shuja's contingent ; he was promised also any detail that could be spared from the Camel Battery. Further south, at Kalát-i-Ghilzai, the Shah's infantry regiment from Kandahar, with a few cavalry, and Captain Anderson's troop of horse artillery, were to await his orders. His departure was hastened by a supplementary commission to punish the murderers of Colonel Herring, an officer of the 37th Bengal native infantry, who had been waylaid by a body of armed men near Haidar Khel, and cut to pieces before assistance could be rendered.

Hitherto, history has rendered but scant justice to the manner in which this not unimportant mission was fulfilled. Its general objects were tolerably clear ; but the *modus operandi* was rightly left to the leader's own discretion, on which Mr. MacNaghten had every reliance. Independently of political responsibility, there was work to be done which would test his qualifications for military command, and in this respect his instructions were a *carte blanche*. The envoy had quickly taken measure of his man, and selected him from appreciation of his worth and honour. Shah Shuja received his new commissioner in open *darbâr*, on September 6, introducing him to the Afghan chiefs who were to accompany

him—and whom he cautioned as to their future behaviour—and afterwards conversing with him in his private apartment. The following day Outram made his first march out, agreeably to notice; but on that occasion the whole escort was comprised in 300 of the Shah's cavalry, and 100 of Skinner's horse; and his Afghans did not really join him in force until a full week afterwards.

The semi-official, as well as official correspondence of the day explains how disturbed were men's minds at the capital. The Dost was stirring up mischief in Khulm, and it was considered imperative to expel him from that locality. Nor was this all to cause uneasiness on the part of those dressed in the brief authority of the Bala Hissar. 'I do not remember any period of my life,' writes Mr. MacNaghten unreservedly to Captain Outram, 'at which I was more bothered and oppressed in my business than the present. Both his Majesty and myself have had the utmost difficulty in driving these heavy Afghans out to join you.'


Our business is, however, not with Kabul. The city has been reached, but we have little to do with it in these pages. We must also take leave of the commander-in-chief's camp, about to be shifted from Kabul to Pesháwar and India. It is the story of Sir John Keane's ex-aide-de-camp we have to relate, and he is moving towards Sind again, and the regions of the Lower Indus.

The first serious opposition which the detachment experienced in the Ghilzai country was on September 22. It had then been recently strengthened by a wing of the 16th Bengal native infantry, under Major MacLaren, from Ghazni. Before this, however, Mir Alam Khan, one of the new governors accompanying it, had secured six of the gang concerned in Colonel Herring's murder, and Bakhshi Khan, an eminent actor in the same tragedy, had fallen into the hands of Outram's native assistants; the difficult Kharwár

Pass had been surmounted ; the Kharwár district crossed ; and the Zurmal¹ valley scoured ; forts and property had been captured and made over to responsible persons on the Shah's behalf ; and nine prisoners had been sent in to the care of the Ghazni garrison. Outram thus narrates the affair in his diary :—

‘ Made a night march, in order to surprise the Kanjak banditti, whose haunt I had ascertained to be in the Indran mountains, eighteen miles to the eastward. Arrived as the day broke at a deep dell occupied by the gang, and while the infantry advanced from the front, I despatched the horse in two bodies to cut off retreat from flanks and rear. The ground being very broken and difficult, however, most of the enemy had found time to ascend a precipitous hill, along the ridge of which they must have escaped, had I not fortunately been mounted on an exceedingly active horse, and thus been enabled to gallop ahead and deter them from advancing until the cavalry came up. Finding themselves completely surrounded, they defended themselves most stoutly, and maintained their position until their ammunition was nearly all expended, when on a general rush being made from every quarter at once, they were induced to throw down their arms, after sixteen of the more desperate of their body had been killed, and several others wounded. Even the women assisted in the fray, by handing ammunition to their husbands, and throwing stones at our troops. The loss on our side amounts to three sepoy and one horse killed, and two lieutenants, one *rissaldar*, one *dufadar*, and several men and horses wounded. In the evening we returned with 112 prisoners, comprising some women and children who, with the men killed in the attack, form the whole of the Kanjak

¹ A region reported as too turbulent to be entered by any Afghan king without a large army at his back.




gang. Not a soul contrived to escape, and the whole of their arms and property, together with 112 camels, have fallen into our hands—nearly all the latter bearing the Company's mark, showing that they were stolen from the British army during its advance.'

On September 23, he selected forty-six of the most desperate of the prisoners for transmission to Kabul, and continued his journey to the southward. On the 28th, at Mushkhail, Mihtar Musa Khan, one of the chiefs he was specially commissioned to arrest, and 'leader of the fanatic army' which had 'threatened the British camp the day before the fall of Ghazni, came in and surrendered.' On October 3, at Ushlan, he was joined by the Púna auxiliary horse under Captain Keith Erskine, from General Willshire's camp, then only three miles to the westward; and on the next night, at Mansur, he came up with three nine-pounder guns sent for his use from Ghazni. Thus reinforced, he pushed on, marching forty-two miles in twenty-four hours, to Kalá-i-Murgha, the fort of Abdu-r-Rahman Khan, the principal Ghilzai chief, whose father, in the days of Shah Zamán, had besieged Kabul with 50,000 men, and who had himself kept our army so much on the alert during the march from Kandahar to Ghazni. Outram succeeded in surprising him in his castle, a well-constructed defence with a 'high citadel and wet ditch.' But a wish to rest his troops, and follow up the capture of the place with a dash at the two remaining chiefs in his list (to be brought within reach by a forced march), induced him to defer the attack till next day—a delay which proved fatal. In spite of 500 cavalry surrounding the fort, and two companies of native infantry placed under cover at less than 200 yards from the gate, the garrison, which had been purposely reduced to some eighty select horsemen, sallied forth during the night and, scattering,

rode sharply past the pickets, escaping to a man,¹—owing to neglect of orders by one of the officers on the watch. After destroying the stronghold, and making the best arrangements in his power for eventual seizure of the fugitives, Outram joined General Willshire's camp between Ghazni and the country of the Utak Ghilzais, east of Kandahar. For this ride of twenty miles he was escorted by only two Ghilzais, a proof of the singularly wholesome effect of his recent operations. He had not, however, marched with his Bombay comrades for many days, before a second brush occurred with the Khans opposed to the Shah. Some of the more notorious happened to be in his immediate vicinity. An expedition against the Barakzai tribes, who had plundered and ill-treated the India-bound caravan mentioned in his instructions, was strictly within his tether—and the presence of a British column, and the locality they had reached, offered an excellent opportunity to organise one. Accordingly, a detachment, comprising cavalry, guns, sappers, and native infantry, under Lieutenant-Colonel Stalker, moved out in the direction of the villages of Maruf; and the political officer thus describes his own share of the work then accomplished:—

‘I galloped on with the cavalry and surrounded them before a soul had time to escape. Abu Khan and Jabar Khan, the chiefs of the tribe, together with all their followers, were secured; and they informed against others concerned, whom I also apprehended by proceeding immediately to their villages with a few horsemen. Having placed the prisoners in charge of the infantry, I crossed the valley to the fort of Maruf, which, in consequence of the approach of the Bombay column, had been evacuated some days before. To

¹ Outram states, in his ‘*Rough Notes*,’ that three of the wives of Abdu-r-Rahman, and his sister, who was one of the wives of Dost Muhammad Khan, rode out of the fort with the rest, protected by the darkness, which rendered pursuit of no avail.





my astonishment, it proved to be the strongest fortress that we had yet seen in the country, being constituted with *double* gates, a ditch, *fausse-braye*, and towers of solid masonry, which might have held out successfully against all the *matériel* with which the Bombay division is provided.'

In connection with this concluding passage of Outram's brief but brilliant career in Afghanistan, the following extracts, written on September 23 from the heart of the Ghilzai country, are full of interest and have a present significance. The first was addressed to Mr. MacNaghten :—

. . . . 'Having placed Shah Shooja on his throne, we have done our duty by *him*; but we thus have imposed a further and *sacred duty* on *ourselves*, that of seeing that the government we have so mainly contributed to erect is just and beneficial to the *people*; and we know that oppression and extortion must be the inevitable and immediate consequence of letting loose the Shah's greedy courtiers upon his provinces, so prolific a field for bullying and speculation, especially while yet *unassessed* . . . for even Dost Mahomed's exactions cannot be taken as a fair assessment—latterly, it would appear, having only been limited by the extent of his power to extort; while those of his immediate predecessors may, on the contrary, perhaps, have been too light, owing to their feeble sway.

'We should best preserve the people from over-exactions, and the Shah from imposition—at the same time performing our duty to both parties and to ourselves, which in justice, honour, and policy, we are surely bound to exert ourselves to the utmost to do—by directly supervising and narrowly scrutinising the first settlement of the Shah's revenues. We should render our interference, as it is an obligation to him,

also a benefit to his people, instead of the contrary—a result which the new government might soon bring about if not so controlled, owing to the insatiable demands of those courtiers who fancy they cannot be too highly rewarded for their share in the Shah's restoration (the curse of every *restoration*), or, that they are essential to his stability he would be too apt to make over to them the management of districts, without previously ascertaining their real value, or instituting any measures whereby to protect the people from the extortions of such persons, whose only object would be to *extort the utmost*, without care for the interests either of king or people.

‘By thus acting the part of mediator between the people and the new government, we should soon convince the former of our superior justice and generosity to anything they had hitherto been accustomed to; for *we*, with our independent incomes, can afford to be just and generous, even were we not so, as by nature and education we ought to be, but which the *native* officials cannot be, they having everything to derive from those they are placed over. So far, our interference would tend to render us popular in this country, instead of the very contrary, which we shall too soon become by continuing only to appear, as at present, in the light alone of *supporters* to the Shah; and as our future connection with the Afghans must now, of necessity, become most intimate, we cannot too soon secure it on a beneficial footing to all classes—a result, the direct reverse of which the system of non-interference, so far from promoting, must, on the contrary, inevitably insure.’

The second was to Captain MacGregor, secretary to the Envoy:—

‘I fear the Envoy may think me intrusive in thus volunteering my suggestions, but I think not, for he must

appreciate my motives—being sent here to do my best for the benefit of all parties—even should he not agree in opinion as to the propriety, or policy, of assuming to ourselves so intimate an interference on behalf of these people. Time will show whether I am right; and I do not hesitate to prognosticate that these districts, if left to the direct and uncontrolled management of the Shah's native agents, will never prosper, and will ever prove a *hot-bed of sedition*: whereas, if properly managed, as only they would be *through our intervention*, they may become the most prosperous and contented in the Shah's dominions.


‘I shall ever look back to my passing visit to this quarter with much satisfaction, if I can think I have been in the slightest degree the cause of so great a blessing to these poor people as an *impartial*, but *energetic*, government, and fair *taxation*, without which these districts will cost the king more than he derives from them, and will ever prove a thorn in his side. In saying this, I now take leave for ever of Loghur, Kurwar, Gurdaez, Zoormut, and Kuttywass’—five of the Ghilzai districts, to establish the Shah's authority over which he had been deputed.

Marching with, and occasionally detached from the returning force, Outram continued in discharge of the duty with which Mr. MacNaghten had entrusted him up to the time of his arrival in Kwatta. Especially had he to give his attention to the strongholds of his old associate Hajji Khan, Kákar, which lay within moderate distance of the main track he was following. In some cases, the occupants were openly hostile to the British troops, and to meet these a more thorough procedure than dismantling was expedient; but the insignificance of the building for defensive purposes might save it from destruction. One fort he completely demolished, ‘blowing up every bastion, gateway, and out-

work,' to the apparent satisfaction of the inhabitants of the valley below it, on whom the garrison had exercised a system of aggression made all the more formidable from the possession of the higher stream which supplied water to their villages. On October 31 he marched with the column to Kwatta; and here, as already shown, his political functions would have no field for exercise: they ceased, in fact, on his entering the Shál valley. He would have to find new employment, or take leave of his friends in camp.

But James Outram was not one to be spared from the scene of emergencies, when they arose within his sphere of work. Circumstances had made it more or less imperative, on the part of our high politicals, to call Mihrab Khan of Kalát to account for an obstructiveness which had become dangerous to the interests they sought to protect. It was therefore decided that General Willshire should march against him in his head-quarters. Kalát is situated about a hundred miles south and a little west of Kwatta; and thither the attacking force moved leisurely on November 4, through the large and well watered valley of Mastung. A week from that date they were at a distance of two easy marches from their goal. Outram had accompanied as an amateur up to this point. He was now nominated to attend the general in the capacity of aide-de-camp during the expected action, and to serve with the engineers during the siege. Mihrab Khan had threatened to bring out his whole force to expel or annihilate the Farangi intruders, but, wisely perhaps if unfortunately, contented himself with preparing for defence within walls.

In dealing with facts, we are not called upon to discuss the political merits of the quarrel with Kalát, or criticise the treatment of Mihrab Khan by the Indian Government. Our business is at present with the siege. General Willshire's force consisted of H.M.'s 2nd and 17th regiments of foot, and



the 31st Bengal native infantry: the three together not numbering one thousand rank and file; two guns of the Bombay horse artillery, and four of the Shah's; some sappers and miners, and 150 irregular horse; 'the whole in the highest possible order.' The remainder of the Bombay column had continued their homeward route by the Bolan Pass. On November 12, the general advanced fifteen miles to the station immediately before the capital; and Outram was sent out with Lieutenant John Ramsay, assistant quartermaster-general, and an escort of local horse, to reconnoitre. If the reconnaissance did not elicit the fighting capacities of our enemies, it cannot be said to have done better for our allies. A few mounted scouts were observed to gallop away the moment the party appeared in sight: while, on the other hand, attack was threatened by some fifty horsemen who descended into the plain from an eminence off the road. Beating retreat, however, when they found a resolute front opposed to them, these only halted when their adversaries halted; advancing again when the others retired, and now and then relieving the monotony of the movement by an ineffectual shot. 'This system,' wrote Outram, 'was continued until we had entered a small pass leading through the hills by which Khelat is surrounded, when the enemy once more formed, and suffered us to advance within fifty yards of them, as if here determined to oppose our further progress. They then fired a volley, wheeled, and galloped off—fortunately for us, without waiting to see the result of their bravado, which had sent every man of our escort, saving the *jemadar*, to the right-about! Had our opponents followed up their advantage, Lieutenant Ramsay and myself would have been left to stand our ground as we best might; but it so turned out that the enemy continued their flight to Khelat, upon perceiving which our party recovered courage, and followed them a short distance.'

On the following morning the British troops arrived before Kalát; the town and fortress coming in view so soon as they had surmounted a small range of hills, after a seven miles' march, varied with desultory skirmishing. To Outram, 'it was truly an imposing sight. Some small hills in front were crowned with masses of soldiers, and the towering citadel which frowned above them in their rear, was completely clustered over with human beings—ladies of the harem chiefly—who had assembled to witness the discomfiture of the Feringees, and the prowess of their lords, all of whom, with the Khan at their head, had previously marched out to the heights, where they awaited us in battle array!' We use freely his own words to describe the sequel of that stirring day:—

'No sooner had the head of the British column showed itself, than the enemy's guns, of which there were five in position on the heights, opened upon it; but being ill directed, they were unattended with effect. In order to assemble every efficient man of his small army, General Willshire here halted the troops until the baggage had closed up, assigning the charge of it, and of the sick, to the local horse. It was very evident that the enemy, who greatly outstripped us in point of numbers, were fully bent upon mischief; and our total strength amounting to less than one thousand bayonets, we had nothing to spare in the contest that awaited us. During this delay two companies were sent to clear some gardens on our left; and a body of horse threatening us from that direction, a few shrapnel shells were thrown amongst them, which caused them to withdraw to the fort. The cool and determined demeanour of our veteran general inspired everyone present with confidence of success; nor shall I ever forget the obvious feeling of delight with which his deep-toned word of command, 'Loosen cartridges!' was

received by the soldiers—evinced as it did that an immediate attack was intended, and that serious opposition might be expected.’

According to the plan of assault communicated, four companies of each regiment, in three columns of attack, were to carry the redoubts on the heights under cover of the artillery; two companies were to advance through gardens on the left; and the remaining ten companies would form the reserve. All being in readiness, the columns aforesaid ‘moved steadily forward, preceded by the artillery, which unlimbered at the foot of the hills, and opened a cannonade of shells and shrapnel with such admirable precision, that the masses of the enemy, crowning the heights, were compelled to abandon their position long before the infantry had gained the summit. Observing the enemy endeavouring to draw off their guns, the general despatched me with orders to the column of the Queen’s Royals, which was the nearest to the gate, to pursue the fugitives, and, if possible, to enter the fort with them—but at any rate to prevent their taking in the ordnance. I overtook the head of the column . . . and galloped on to the redoubt at the very moment that the enemy were vacating it; when perceiving them to be engaged in an attempt to carry off one of the pieces of artillery, I called on Captain Raitt of the Queen’s Royals to push down quickly with his grenadiers, and if unable to enter the gate with the enemy, at all events to capture the gun. I accompanied this party, which rushed down the hill, but arrived too late to enter the fort with the enemy, who, however, abandoned the gun outside, and hastily closed the gate after them.

‘Leaving the grenadiers to take post under cover of a ruined building . . . within sixty yards of the gate, so as to be in readiness to enter by it, in case the general might

decide upon following up this advantage by blowing open the gate before the garrison should find time to block it up, as they doubtless would do were the attack to be delayed, I rode back to report progress. The whole of our troops were already on the heights, and the guns were also being dragged up. Four of the latter were directed to play upon the towers commanding the gateway . . . whilst the other two were ordered down . . . for the purpose of battering the gate itself. The general at the same time despatched me . . . with instructions to bring up the light companies under Major Pennycuik to . . . where a mud wall, about four feet in height, afforded shelter within thirty yards of the wall on the opposite side of the gate to that near which the grenadiers of the Queen's Royals were posted. Having brought them at double quick time across the plain to within two hundred yards of the walls, and then directed them to scatter and rush under cover, I returned to the general, 'warning the grenadiers on the way, 'that the gate would be immediately blown open, when they were to rush in simultaneously with the light companies from the opposite side.'

Most of the day's casualties occurred whilst Outram was executing the two duties last named. On both occasions he was the only mounted officer present; but although both the nature of his occupation, and the singularity of his uniform, differing as it did from all others, must have attracted a considerable share of the enemy's observation, he escaped with his usual good fortune. To resume:—

'The two guns now opened upon the gate, and being admirably directed (by Lieutenant Henry Creed, of the Bombay artillery) a few rounds were sufficient to throw down one half of it. The general's signals for the advance of the storming parties not being immediately observed, I galloped down, and accompanied the grenadiers to the gate, after

seeing them in secure occupation of which, I returned to the general, whom I met close to the fort, bringing up the main body of the troops. He immediately despatched me with Captain Darley's Company of H.M.'s 17th foot, with instructions to take the 31st regiment Bengal native infantry along with me, and with these to storm the heights and secure the gate on the opposite side of the fort. After passing quickly round the western face, from which we were exposed to a considerable fire, I placed the company of the 17th under cover of a spur of the hill, and thence proceeded back to seek for the 31st regiment, which I found scouring the suburbs. Having united the two detachments, we stormed the heights . . . where we experienced some trifling opposition from matchlockmen occupying the rocks above; these being soon dispersed we rushed down to the gate . . . driving in a party of the enemy with such precipitation that they had not time to secure the gate, possession of which was thus obtained, and the escape of the garrison entirely cut off.

‘We were here joined by a party under Major Deshon, which had been sent round by the eastern face of the fort, when I directed the officers to leave a detachment in charge of the gate, and with the remaining portion to make their way up to the citadel, which still maintained a fire upon our troops, whilst I accompanied Lieutenant Creed for the purpose of selecting a position from whence to bombard it with the Shah's guns. Placed the guns in position . . . and opened a fire on the citadel, which was continued with destructive effect, until our soldiers had obtained possession. Rejoining the general in the meantime to report progress, I found him at the gate first carried, giving orders for attaching bags of gunpowder to the gates of the citadel, which had hitherto successfully resisted all attempts to enter it from this side. Reported that the party from the opposite quarter had already got well up and, with the aid of Lieutenant

Creed's guns, would shortly surmount every obstacle. Here-upon troops were again sent up to co-operate, and a few minutes more sufficed to display the British standards waving over the highest of the towers of Kalát. All hostilities immediately ceased, and the soldiers displayed much greater forbearance than they usually do on such occasions. Quarter was never refused by them, when craved by cries of 'Amán,' 'Amán,' and before nightfall nearly 2,000 prisoners had been removed from the fort unharmed.

'About four hundred of the garrison are supposed to have fallen in this affair, and amongst them are . . . Mehrab Khan, Wullee Mahommed Khan, and other principal Beloeche chieftains—every person of note having been either slain or captured. Some anxiety was expressed by the general on the occasion of my rejoining him at the first gate, in consequence of the rumoured escape of Mehrab Khan; but I assured him that as the fighting portions of the garrison had been driven back whilst in the act of attempting to decamp by the opposite gate, I entertained no doubt that the Khan was still within the fort, since he could not, in honour, have previously deserted his followers. This afterwards proved to be the case. Foiled on that occasion in his attempt to escape, the chief had returned to the citadel with Wullee Mahommed Khan, of Wudd, and others of his most trusty followers, where they had all died sword in hand; the Khan himself being slain by a shot through the neck, from whose hand it is not known. Considering the small number of our troops, not one half of whom were actually engaged, the loss on our side is severe. Thirty-two were killed, and one hundred and seven wounded; amongst the former is Lieutenant Gravatt of the Queen's Royals, and there are nine officers amongst the latter.'

The next day, working parties were employed in remov-

ing and burying the dead, as well as in collecting prize property.


‘Scattered as the dead bodies are over every part of the town, among houses, the numerous dark chambers of which are not easily explored, it has not yet been practicable to ascertain the number of the slain. The amount of booty is supposed to be very considerable, but we unfortunately do not possess the means of carrying it away, nor is there any market here in which to dispose of it. The arms especially are of very superior manufacture, and the sword of the fallen chief Mehrab Khan in particular, which is of the most costly workmanship, is estimated to be of great value. The members of our little army have with one accord resolved upon presenting this enviable trophy to their gallant leader, General Willshire, in token of their admiration of his heroic bearing yesterday.’

In the despatch, under date November 14, 1839, reporting to Lord Auckland the fall of Kalát, Captain Outram’s good service, in conducting two companies of infantry to take up a material position during the siege, is especially noticed: and the following paragraph is more precise still:—‘From my aides-de-camp, Captain Robinson, and Lieutenant Halkett, as well as Captain Outram, who volunteered his services on my personal staff, I received the utmost assistance, and to the latter officer I feel greatly indebted for the zeal and ability with which he has performed various duties that I have required of him upon other occasions as well as the present.’ Then was added:—‘I have deputed Captain Outram to take a duplicate of the despatch to the Honourable the Governor of Bombay by the direct route from hence to Sonmiáni Bandar, the practicability or otherwise of which for the passage of troops I consider it an object of importance to ascertain.’

The fulfilment of the hazardous duty here indicated, one which had been conceived by Outram himself, supplies an interesting chapter of romance in a singularly active career. There are two roads from Kalát to Sonmiáni, the more easterly of which, by Wadd, separating from the other at Sohrab, and re-uniting at Baila, had been reported on by Colonel Pottinger, who traversed it in the early part of 1810, moving upwards from the sea-coast. On that occasion both Pottinger and Christie had assumed the character of agents to an influential native contractor for supplying horses to the Governments of Madras and Bombay; but, although the actual *status* of the English officers was a puzzle to most inquirers, and their European origin was patent to many, the native dress which they wore kept them from that suspicious and continuous scrutiny with which the Farangi traveller is distressed in his wanderings through the less visited regions of the East. They were three full weeks in getting from Sonmiáni to the capital of Mahmúd Khan, then chief of Kalát: that is to say, they performed the journey in fifteen marches, and halted seven days, reckoning the distance at a fraction above 345 miles.

Outram chose the western route, by Nál; made out his journey in less than eight days, and reckoned the distance 355¹ miles—a figure somewhat higher than that of his predecessor. His movements were necessarily secret and rapid, too much so for accurate survey or observation: for he was travelling at a time of great local excitement, through an enemy's country and amid a rough and rude people. Starting at midnight, disguised as an Afghan, with one private servant only, he left camp under the guardianship of two Saiyids of Shál, who had accepted the responsibility of escorting him, and whose two armed attendants made up the whole party. There were thus six persons in all—mounted on four ponies and two camels,


¹ The Itinerary attached to his Diary has become a valuable reference.



carrying provision for themselves, and as much as practicable for the animals. On the first day, they were nineteen hours in the saddle, ran the gauntlet through a host of inquirers and families flying from Kalát, and met with many adventures. For some time they had to travel in company with the family of the prime minister, out of whose wardrobe Outram's disguise had been provided. Fortunately, it proved of too mean a character to provoke identification. When resting or refreshing, the Saiyids skilfully managed, as a rule, to keep their charge in the background, and to answer all questions put, as if in every case addressed to themselves. But Outram had to play more than a silent or sleeping part. The comparative fairness of his complexion was alone likely to arouse suspicion, and, this once aroused, any over-anxiety to escape notice would add fuel to the fire. He had been introduced as a 'Pír,' or saintly man, and had to support the character according to his ability. These 'Pírs' are in great local request in Sind and Baluchistan. What wonder then that in one case it fell to his lot, sorely against his conscience, to utter a charm over a tuft of hair which the owner of a sick camel brought for that particular purpose! On the second day, they were little molested, owing to the deserted state of the track through which they rode; and they slept with safety and comfort among uninhabited ruins. On the third day they were in the immediate neighbourhood of Nál, too large a place to enter into *en masse*, but too important to be passed without procuring there a supply of grain for the horses. Here Outram and his personal attendant lay concealed while his escort did the marketing; but one Saiyid delayed his return so long that the Englishman, anticipating mischief, was on the point of declaring himself to the chief of the village. As to the other Saiyid he was discovered in a small fort, 'assisting at the *coronach* for the dead chief, the tidings of whose fall at Kalat had been received that very afternoon.'

At night they resumed the hazardous march, and did not draw bridle until dawn; their great object being to outstrip the exciting intelligence of the capture of Kalát. After having traversed thirty miles of country without espying a trace of human habitation, they availed themselves of the bank of a river to lie down and sleep until 7 a.m. of the fourth day. The genial mildness of temperature here experienced was a pleasant contrast to the bitter and perishing cold they had lately endured. About that hour they awoke to find that their guide had decamped. But such an occurrence was not extraordinary; and the mishap was soon remedied by the enlistment into their service of a stray shepherd. Eight hours in the saddle, over a good but wholly deserted road, brought them across a lofty range of mountains to the bed of the Urnach river, where water and a little green grass for the horses, and a little tamarisk for the camels—the first green foliage seen since leaving Kabul, with the exception of a few junipers on the Kákar hills—supplied a wholesome addition to the scanty allowance of grain on which the poor beasts had up to this time subsisted. After a repose sufficient for travellers eager to reach a most dangerous journey's end, they again started at midnight, and, moving silently through cornfields and straggling hamlets, threaded the pass over a range of mountains seemingly higher than that of the previous day, by a road utterly impracticable for guns, and incapable of being made so, unless at immense cost of time and labour. This day, the fifth, was a hard one: they dismounted after having been eleven hours in the saddle, and passed the day in a ravine scantily supplied with water, and green pasture for the cattle. In the evening, they continued the journey for seven hours over another range of mountains: not having seen the trace of any inhabitant during the whole eighteen hours' ride. But the monotony of the brief halt was broken by the





apparition of 'a ferocious-looking Baluchi . . . armed with a long matchlock,' to Outram, as he was reading a copy of the Bombay 'Times' procured from one of the garrison at Kalát. How the unexpected visitor came there—on a high bank overlooking the object of his attraction—was a mystery: no sooner, however, did he hear a call to the Saiyid and attendants, and see them rise in response, than he made off. We need not continue the journey in detail. Passing the large town of Baila, the capital of the Las Baila district—before break of day, so as to avoid observation—the travellers reached Sonmiáni in safety at ten in the forenoon of November 23, having made a last march of fourteen consecutive hours. During the entire journey Outram was obliged to content himself with subsistence on dates and water, to carry out his assumed character of sanctity.

At Sonmiáni, he made himself known to the Hindu agent of Sett Nao Mall, a merchant of Karáchi, whose long attachment to British interests has been rewarded in recent years by the third class Order of the Star of India. This man treated the new comers with great hospitality, and at once provided a boat for the conveyance of his English guest to Karáchi. The latter took with him on board his Afghan *yábu*, of which he relates that, although not more than thirteen hands in height, it had carried himself and saddle-bags, 'weighing altogether upwards of sixteen stone, the whole distance from Kalát . . . in seven days and a half' (an average of nearly forty-seven miles per day), during which time he had passed one hundred and eleven hours on his back.'

On arrival at Karáchi, he astonished his brother-in-law, General Farquharson, by coming unexpectedly upon him in the dress of a native, sword and small shield inclusive. The general thought him looking very well, and little changed, except, indeed, that the hair was thinning on the top of his

head. His visitor's appearance he afterwards described as follows:—A small *pagri* (native turban) composed of a twist about as thick as one's finger sparsely bound about his head, the hair cropping through the interstices; white native tunic and trousers; native slippers; all very dirty and mean-looking. There was no saddle on the pony—merely a cloth over his back.

From Karáchi he embarked, on the evening of November 24, for Bombay. Not many days after arrival there, he learnt that at midnight, on the date of his departure from Sonmiáni, the son of Wali Muhammad Khan, chief of Wadd, killed at the siege of Kalát, had reached that port from the interior in pursuit of him, expressing much disappointment and irritation at missing his intended prey. Outram attributed his escape, in a great measure, to the forced march of fifty miles he had made from Nál, whereby he had 'outstripped the flying tidings of the overthrow of Khelat.' Under Providence, his wisdom and energy had certainly outwitted his pursuers.

CHAPTER VIII.

1839-1842.

Honours and Rewards—Political Agent in Lower Sind—Political Agent in Sind and Baluchistan—Retrospect of Upper Sind History—Mirs Sohrab, Rustam, and Ali Murad—Journey to Kwatta—Investiture of the Khan, and Treaty with Kalát—Work at Dadar—Departure of Lord Auckland, and Arrival of Lord Ellenborough.

FOR his services at Kalát, Captain Outram was promoted to Major on November 13, 1839; but the omission of his name from Sir John Keane's despatches was one of those undoubted grievances which, under precedent and prescriptive custom, he might, had he seen fit, have fairly agitated. That he did not do so is an instance of that self-denial which was ever a marked feature in his character. To a man constituted as he was—possessing a keen sense of justice and great facility of appreciating the inner, as well as outer life around him—the consciousness of self-sustained injury at the hands of authority, however jealously suppressed or hidden, could not fail to be severely felt. And if it be true Christian teaching, that what we plead in our case should be admitted by us in the case of others,¹ the converse will not assuredly be disallowed, that as we judge of others so may we judge of ourselves. It is not Outram's own ambition, nor is it the assumption of his friends, but a well-known fact, that, had common justice been done to his claims, he would have been gazetted a Major for Ghazni, and, consequently, a Lieutenant-Colonel for Kalát. The Court of Directors in London seemed to think he *had* obtained the two steps, and Lord Auckland

¹ F. W. Robertson.

congratulated him on the supposed well-earned promotion.¹ As it happened, he lost three years of rank in the higher grade, and after honours.

He also received the thanks of both the Bombay and supreme Governments for the 'very interesting and valuable documents' relating to the Kalát-Sonmiáni route, which, in the spirit of General Willshire's instructions, he had placed before them. The perusal of these had afforded the Governor-General 'much satisfaction.' Prior to this, moreover, the envoy and minister with Shah Shuja had conveyed his Majesty's bestowal of the second class order of the Durráni Empire, in 'acknowledgment of the zeal, gallantry, and judgment' which he had displayed in several instances during the past year, whilst employed on the King's immediate behalf. Three of the instances in which his 'merit and exertions' were 'particularly conspicuous,' are specially cited :—

First, on the occasion of his gallantly placing himself 'at the head of His Majesty's troops engaged in dispersing a large body of rebels, who had taken up a threatening position immediately above his Majesty's encampment on the day previous to the storm of Ghazni.'

Secondly, on the occasion of his 'commanding the party sent in pursuit of Dost Mahomed Khan,' when his 'zealous exertions would in all probability have been crowned with success, but for the treachery' of his Afghan associates.

Thirdly, for 'the series of able and successful operations'

¹ Paragraph 6 of a Despatch from the Secret Committee of the Honourable Court of Directors, dated February 29, 1840, expresses concurrence in the praises of the Indian Government 'bestowed on Captain Outram, and in the propriety of paying the expense of his journey from Kelat, and of conferring upon him *the brevet rank of Lieutenant-Colonel.*' No explanation was ever offered why this particular promotion—officially announced to 'Lieutenant-Colonel Outram' by the Government of Bombay—did not have effect; and no remonstrance on the subject was ever submitted by the officer concerned, who considered that 'honours *sought* are not to be esteemed.'

conducted under his superintendence, 'which ended in the subjection or dispersion of certain rebel Ghilzai and other tribes, and which have had the effect of tranquillising the whole line of country between Kabul and Kandahar, where plunder and anarchy had before prevailed.'¹

Outram's stay at the Presidency was not a long one. Even before his arrival there, Lord Auckland had addressed to him a flattering and kindly letter offering him the appointment of political agent in Lower Sind in succession to Colonel Pottinger, about to give up his charge of Sind and Cutch from the first day of the New Year. After consultation with friends, he quickly made up his mind on the subject; and on Christmas Day, 1839, he wrote a brief letter to the Governor-General from Bombay, expressing his grateful acceptance of the post, and determination to fulfil the duties which it involved to the best of his ability. He at the same time despatched a few lines to Mr. Colvin, his lordship's private secretary, entering into certain details in connection with his proposed office. The pecuniary gain would not be great, in exchanging the Máhi Kánta for Sind: because the expenses in the latter province would be heavier: but he cared little or nothing for this. Only he doubted lest the abolition of the title of 'Resident,' held by his predecessor, might, by an apparent diminution of dignity, impair his usefulness in the eyes of the natives. It was a question whether the designation should not on public grounds be retained; but Lord Auckland preferred for the nonce adhering to his first proposition, and, on the separation of Lower Sind from Cutch, reconstructing the former as a political agency.

In a home letter written on the last day of the year, we have better evidence of his real feelings on the subject of the new appointment. From it we learn that his experience of

¹ See also Appendix E.

the countries he had lately traversed had taught him 'to look upon Guzerat as a paradise in comparison;' and the nature of the Sind climate caused him some apprehension on his wife's account. But he consoled himself with the reflection that, while Haidarabad would be his permanent headquarters, Karáchi, which offered the advantages of sea-air, was available for a change at any time; and he recommended that Mrs. Outram's outward voyage be so timed that she should rejoin him at the close of the very hot weather. When writing thus he contemplated sailing from Bombay within a week for Cutch, proceeding from the place of disembarkation to Bhúj, where he would receive charge of his office from Colonel Pottinger, and then continue his journey across the large waste flat called the 'Rann,' to Haidarabad. Let us pause for a moment longer over a page or two of private correspondence.

Mr. Bax—whom we need not re-introduce to the reader—no sooner heard of his friend's nomination to Lower Sind, than he wrote from Harsol to congratulate him on the Governor-General's approbation of his services. 'How many people,' he remarks, 'have emerged into fame and notoriety who have not accomplished a hundredth part of what you have accomplished! . . . You will get to the top of the ladder, as you deserve.' Then—in evident allusion to expressions of gratitude towards himself on the part of his correspondent, whom he charges with overvaluing the little he had ever done in promoting his successful career—he warmly adds, 'Your own right hand—your own sound heart and right sense—your own energy and enterprise—have accomplished everything—and I knew a dozen years ago they would raise you to fame whenever opportunity offered.'

The next letter—his own—we give in its entirety. It is addressed to Mr. MacNaghten, eight days before departure from Bombay:—

‘I beg to thank you for your two kind letters dated November 4 and 30, in both of which you express the expectation of further warfare in the north-west. My object in now writing is to remind you that in *that* case my humble services are always at your command, and I trust you will not scruple to command them to the utmost for any temporary military and political service you may think me fit. Most gladly shall I obey the summons, for, in addition to zeal for the public service and anxiety to distinguish myself, which formerly led me to Afghanistan, I have now the further impulse of personal gratitude to the Governor-General, to you, and to the Shah. Pray remember also that I require no pecuniary advantage, and would accept of none; for the moiety of my salary in Scinde, which I should still receive while absent on duty, is most handsome and far above my deserts. I look upon it not only to more than compensate for any services I may have to perform in that country, but also as the purchase in advance of all that I could ever do hereafter in the public service. My wife will arrive in Bombay about May, but I would not wait on that account. As a soldier’s wife, she knows, and will admit, my first duty to be to the public, to which all private and personal considerations should be sacrificed. She has two sisters in Bombay to receive her, with whom she will be more satisfactorily situated—so much nearer the scene of operations than if in England. Please order me how, when, and where to go, and what to do; you will find me punctual to tryste, and ready to perform whatever is expected of me in any quarter. At the same time pray write for the Governor-General’s sanction to my temporary absence from Scinde, the duties of which could, I hope, be fulfilled for the present by my assistants, as no great steps for the improvement of our relations in that quarter can be entered upon until everything has been effectually settled in the north-west. In the

meantime things can be maintained as they are, by them as well as by me.'

Outram embarked at Bassein on January 13, 1840, arrived at Mandavi on the 22nd, and was with Colonel Pottinger at Bhúj on the 25th of the same month. This officer's infirm state of health prevented his continuous attention to business; so that it was not until February 24 that the political agent reached head-quarters at Haidarabad. He had, however, been subjected to a five days' delay at Lakpat, whence the first march includes the passage of a creek, and more than forty miles of dreary flat on the Sind side. His reception was all that could be desired. Arrived at a certain point, the representatives of the Amirs insisted on supplying him with every requisite for self and suite, without payment, and at each stage; and at the second march from the capital he was met by a member of the reigning family, and other noblemen of distinction. On approaching the residency, after dark, he was overtaken by the sons of Mir Nasir Khan, and Mir Sobdar Khan, respectively, deputed to congratulate him on his coming; they further insisted on accompanying him to his quarters. The next morning, according to local custom, fifteen trays of sweetmeats, and immense quantities of provisions were sent by each of the four Amirs: the former were accepted, but the latter respectfully declined.

In all these preliminaries of an intercourse which afterwards ripened into a fixed deference and personal regard on the part of the Talpur chiefs for their British adviser, and into more than common sympathy on Outram's part for the misfortunes of those to whom he became the representative of an absorbing power—there was nothing exceptional or contrary to everyday experience. The sugar of compliments and smooth speeches has no truer or deeper meaning than that of the trays loaded with material confectionery; but

the force of personal character works otherwise, and tells even upon the selfish, sluggish Oriental, when it finds opportunity. And as weeks rolled on, the political agent, from a mere diplomatic presence, grew, as it were, into a benevolent personality. It is quite true that, in writing to Mr. Secretary Willoughby from Kandahar in May 1839, he had adverted to the 'treachery and underhand opposition . . . experienced from the Amirs,' as justifying our subversion of the native Government. But whatever ideas he may then or at any other time have entertained, or expressed, on the political exigency of making Sind a British province, he had not long received charge of the Haidarabad residency, before his kindly nature evinced itself in a more congenial contemplation. The day after his arrival, he addressed to the Governor-General the formal report of his instalment in office. Four-and-twenty hours later, he solicited Lord Auckland's instructions on a proposal suggested by a report of his assistant, Lieutenant Whitelock, to teach English to the sons of Mir Nur Muhammad. He was of opinion that 'the greatest benefit would be derived from the intimate intercourse that might be established between the sons of the Amir and the gentlemen of the Agency, who would be reasonably expected to superintend their education.'¹

And so will it be found, if we trace his subsequent acts, always remembering the motives which we may safely attribute to the doer. The wish was rather to conciliate and win the heart by philanthropic measures, to preach the theory and illustrate the practice of mutual benevolence, than to enforce argument, and carry out the political objects of his Government by intimidation and braggadocio. Where necessity caused him to deviate from the line of his natural inclinations, he acted but in loyal obedience to

¹ *Correspondence relative to Sindh, 1838-43*, presented to both Houses of Parliament by command of Her Majesty, 1843. No. 232, pp. 234-5.

the orders of lawful superiors, a refusal to acknowledge which would have been tantamount to mutiny; while to decline the responsibilities thrust upon him would have been desertion from his post. To have vacated his appointment at such a time, moreover, would have been a mistaken kindness to the Amirs; for no successor that could have been chosen to support a policy shortly to culminate in territorial annexation, would have been so gentle and sympathetic to the fallen as James Outram.

We do not dwell in any detail upon his official work in Lower Sind. It was, upon the whole, more locally important than generally interesting. The two main features, in 1840, were the reduction of taxes on inland produce brought to the British camp at Karáchi, to which may be added the relief of the Indus traffic from vexatious tolls; and the negotiations with Mir Sher Muhammad of Mirpur, whereby this restless chief was brought into quasi-amicable relations with ourselves. In 1841 he had to deal with the very intricate question of the transfer of Shikárpur to his Government, and no wonder that he was unsuccessful. The Amirs were to be made consenting parties to an arrangement which would deprive them of an important possession on the right bank of the river, and which was to be ceded to us in lieu of the subsidy guaranteed to our Government by treaty. Such a task was neither gracious nor easy of accomplishment. The proposed proceeding was distasteful to the Talpur chiefs, especially Nasir Khan, who looked upon the cession of lands as dishonourable,¹ and was particularly tenacious of the fancied honour of nominal sovereignty² involved in this instance. Eventually the negotiation fell through, in favour of alternative measures, soon after followed by wholesale confiscation. Outram's treaty with Mir Sher Muhammad was, on the

¹ *Dry Leaves from Young Egypt*. By an ex-Political. (James Madden, 1851.)

² *Sind Correspondence* before noted, N.º. 308, foot-note.

other hand, a signal success, and called forth the high approval of the Governor-General of India in Council.

In diplomatic ability to cope with Orientals, few officers could be found superior to Colonel Pottinger, whose experience and sound judgment rendered him a more than commonly safe representative of his country in Cutch and Sind. His successor publicly acknowledged the value of the late Resident's advice, given to him during his short stay at Bhuj, and stated that it would ever be his wish and pride to follow, as closely as he could, this gentleman's example and policy in his personal intercourse with the Amirs, and the general conduct of his duties. But the geniality and warmth of heart brought into play for the occasion were his own; and though these might not fall into the classification of strictly diplomatic qualifications, they performed the offices of diplomacy with, at times, admirable effect. If a sneer at the well-meant exertions of his fellows be ever justifiable in a patriotic statesman, it is wholly and especially misapplied when raised at honest men who, discarding the mask and cloak, strive to achieve political objects by honest means. Success in such endeavours may be, often is, and oftener still might be, the result of untiring and uncompromising straightforwardness. The charm of Outram's character was never more strikingly exemplified than on the occasion of the sickness and death of Mir Nur Muhammad of Haidarabad.

The story is told in that opposite of all romance, a Parliamentary blue-book. It is in the words of the political agent himself, and is vivid in its simplicity. Before making our extracts, we would recall to the reader the figures of the Talpur Amirs of Sind, drawn or described by Crowe, Burnes, Pottinger, Eastwick, and others. They were men for the most part portly in person, but of dignified exterior; of semi-Persian, semi-Jewish physiognomies; courteous in manner,

and of frank and open address ; dressed, much as their attendants, in *angrikhás*, or 'tunics of white muslin, neatly prepared and plaited, so as to resemble dimity,' with *kamarbands*, or sashes of silk and gold, wide Turkish trousers of coloured silk, and the national head-gear, of cylindrical form, resembling an inverted European hat, covered with the gay brocade known as *kimkhwáb*. Nur Muhammad, we are told, presented a great contrast to his brother Nasir. He was, in fact, rather an exceptional Talpur Baluch, and is described by Edward Eastwick as possessing 'a thin, cunning countenance, and quick, twinkling eyes, expressive of suspicion and distrust ;' whereas the other was a man 'of enormous bulk,' with an eminently handsome face, and winning ways which might have been those of 'a highly-polished English nobleman.' We have now to speak of the former chief, the senior representative of the reigning family.

Outram had not seen Nur Muhammad for some days from motives of delicacy. The Amir's state of health was such that recovery seemed hopeless ; and negotiations were in progress to which it was neither kind nor prudent to draw his attention. He would, probably, it was thought, seek for promises which could not be accorded ; and frequent visits might give a semblance of wished-for interference in family affairs which was to be avoided. One day, however, the invalid expressed a desire to see his English monitor, who would, at the same time, introduce a physician, a fellow-countryman, to prescribe for his malady :—

We were met at the fort gate [wrote the political agent] by Meer Shahdad, Meer Noor Mahomed's eldest son, who conducted us to the dwelling where the Ameer's married wife resides, to which his Highness had been lately removed to die, on all hope of recovery being given over. Meer Nusseer Khan, and the other sons of their Highnesses, received us when we dismounted, and the former led me to the sick Ameer's bedside, who, on seeing me, attempted

to rise, which I hastened to prevent ; but his Highness, hailing me as his brother, put his arms round me, and held me in his embrace a few minutes, until I laid him quietly down. So feeble and emaciated had the Ameer become, that this exertion quite exhausted him, and it was minutes afterwards before he could speak, when, beckoning his brother Meer Nusseer Khan, and youngest son Meer Hoossein Ali, to the bedside, he then took a hand of each, and placed them in mine, saying, ' You are their father and brother, you will protect them,' to which I replied in general but warm terms of personal friendship, adding that I trusted his Highness himself would long live to guide and support them ; but this the Ameer had evidently given up all hope of, and appeared to regret that he had given Doctor Owen the trouble of coming so far, though very grateful for the prompt manner in which his wishes had been attended to. Meer Shahdad, the eldest son of Meer Noor Mahomed, was present when the circumstance above mentioned took place, but appeared neither surprised nor chagrined at the preference displayed by his father, and continued to join in the conversation as if nothing had occurred.

Doctor Owen, having satisfied himself as to the nature of the complaint, galloped home to prepare some preliminary medicine, I remained for some time afterwards, at his earnest request, with the Ameer, who became quite a changed person, rising from the depth of despondency—in the conviction that he could not live beyond a few hours, or days at the utmost—to cheerful hope, on my imparting the Doctor's opinion that his case was not hopeless, if his Highness would implicitly follow medical advice in all things. He declared his determination to accept the condition, but begged of me to return with Doctor Owen in the evening to see that the gentleman was fully informed of his case from first to last.

In the evening I returned accordingly, accompanied by Mr. Whitelock and Dr. Owen. We were met a few hundred yards from the palace by Meers Shahdad and Hoossein Ali, and conducted to the Ameer, whom we found very cheerful and happy, from the impression that the medicine which Doctor Owen had sent in the morning had already benefited him. He conversed cheerfully with Mr. Whitelock and myself, especially expressing interest in our success in China . . . and trust that all enemies of the British would ever be discomfited . . . with much apparent sincerity.

In the course of the interview, Meer Hoossein Ali, the Ameer's younger son, came from the inner apartments and whispered in his father's ear, who smiled, and informed me that the Khanum (the mother of his sons) sent to say she hailed me as her brother with much gratification, to which I made a suitable acknowledgment. On inquiry afterwards, I learnt that this is considered an extraordinary proof of friendship, such as never heretofore displayed except to the nearest relations.

Ten days later, Major Outram reported the demise of the sick Amir on the previous morning. Dr. Owen had been unremitting in his attendance on his patient, and his prescriptions had been the means of alleviating the sufferings of the dying chief, although it had been out of his power to check the progress of disease. The report continues:—

The remains of his Highness were carried to the grave at 10 a.m., and buried within the mausoleum of his father, the late Moorad Ali, attended by a large concourse of chieftains and followers, besides the immediate relations of the deceased, and sons of Meer Sobdar Khan, and by Lieutenant Whitelock and myself in mourning costume—a mark of respect to the memory of Meer Noor Mahomed Khan, which my public duty, as well as personal friendship for the departed chief, induced me to pay. The attention appeared to be deeply appreciated by all, and especially by the brother and sons of the deceased, who embraced me affectionately before the assembled multitude, and placed us with themselves and Meer Sobdar's sons during the mournful ceremony. . . .

I have every reason to lament the loss of Meer Noor Mahomed Khan, and do so most sincerely, both on public and private grounds. Whatever that chief's secret feelings towards the British may have been, certainly his acts latterly were all most friendly, and I cannot but place faith in almost the last words the dying chief uttered, solemnly protesting the sincerity of his friendship for the British Government, not only because, being then perfectly aware that he had but few hours to live and, seeking nothing, he could have had no motive for deception, but also, because I had myself always found his Highness most ready to forward our interests, and least ready to welcome reports prejudicial to us, which, during

late exciting times, were so industriously propagated, and greedily devoured by those more inimical to us. In fact I am satisfied that Meer Noor Mahomed Khan at last perceived that it was wiser to cultivate our friendship than hopelessly to intrigue against our power; and he had sense enough on more than one occasion, when the signs of the times encouraged others to hope for our discomfiture, to prognosticate that temporary reverses, or the machinations of the factions, would but cause the firmer riveting of our power; and I have lately ascertained that, on the occasion of Meer Nusseer Khan's deputing agents to Mecca, Meer Noor Mahomed positively forbade making use of the opportunity to communicate with the Shah of Persia, and strongly expressed his sense of the folly of continuing their former underhand practices, and determination not to countenance them in future.

Of the late Ameer's personal feelings towards myself, I had latterly received many affecting proofs, especially during the last three days of his existence—when I daily visited his Highness, on finding that my doing so gave him real gratification. On the 4th instant, the morning before his death, the Ameer, evidently feeling that we could not meet again, embraced me most fervently, and spoke distinctly to the following purport, in the presence of Dr. Owen and the other Ameers: 'You are to me as my brother Nusseer Khan, and the grief of this sickness is equally felt by you and Nusseer Khan; from the days of Adam no one has known so great truth and friendship as I have found in you.' I replied, 'Your Highness has proved your friendship to my Government and myself by your daily acts. You have considered me a brother, and as a brother I feel for your Highness, and night and day I grieve for your sickness.' To which he added, 'My friendship for the British is known to God. My conscience is clear before God.' The Ameer still retained me in his feeble embrace for a few moments, and, after taking some medicine from my hand, again embraced me as if with the conviction that we could not meet again.¹

On the Amir's death, the question of succession and inheritance arose, and immediate decision was urgent, in

¹ *Correspondence relative to Sindh, 1838-1843*, presented to both Houses of Parliament by command of her Majesty, 1843, pp. 268-69.

anticipation of coming difficulties. Well it was that its disposal was not left to the will of native partisans. Outram undertook it, as he undertook everything, in an earnest and honest spirit, and entered upon the task with single-mindedness and thorough conscientiousness. His long and elaborate reports on the subject are lasting certificates of the labour so ungrudgingly bestowed, in fulfilling a trust which was almost as much personal as official. In acknowledging the uses of his individual influence exercised in the matter, Government directly approved of the part he had taken in bringing about a settlement. But his time was occupied in affairs of a more distasteful nature than even family disagreements among Sindi-Baluch chiefs in whose welfare he was interested. The frauds and general peculations of one Jetha Nand, a Múnshi in the employment of the British Government, gave him untold trouble, and tried his patience sorely. This person—besides unlawfully enriching himself at the cost of his employers to the value of nearly 40,000*l.* by business transactions, the accounts of which were falsely rendered—had bribed the servants of the *darbár* with such judicious roguery as to deter the Amirs themselves from giving evidence against him. To English ideas of justice, the imprisonment and dismissal which followed the detection of his misdeeds were but mild awards in satisfaction of a long course of complicated villainy. Among Orientals the shame of such offence is rather in discovery than commission. Neither in perjury nor in forgery is there the same intensity of crime recognised in the East as in the West ; but we shall hereafter have more to say on the Indian idiosyncrasy in this respect.

On August 18, 1841, Outram had taken his leave of the Haidarabad court ; and we find him then addressing instructions, on board the river steamer Comet, bound for Sakhar, to his assistant, Captain Leckie, regulating the conduct of our future relations with the Amirs in those parts.

His official despatch concluded with a request that certain presents might be given to certain native secretaries attached to the *darbâr*, as a trifling mark of 'gratification with the very friendly tone' pervading every international discussion in which he had had a share during the eighteen months of his residence in Sind. In the previous October, the Secretary to the Government of India had written to the political agent at Haidarabad, informing him that possible failure in health might compel Mr. Ross Bell, the political agent in Upper Sind, to relinquish his duties, and that in such case it was Lord Auckland's wish that Major Outram should assume them, in addition to his existing charge of Lower Sind, with the full authority committed to that officer. Now, the contingency spoken of had arrived.

Men in high places had formed their own opinion on Outram. They had judged him for themselves apart from the wretched intervention of interested advisers, too ready to submit a false estimate of character of those whom they personally dread or dislike; and consequently their appreciation was a true one. Lord Auckland's letters to him in Sind are full of confidence and friendliness. On one occasion, he had thought it necessary to explain to the Governor-General the particulars of an untimely honour paid to him at Haidarabad. His Lordship good-naturedly replied: 'You need not have made any apology for the salute which was prematurely fired by the Ameer of Sind upon the rumour of your promotion. I must feel that goodwill exhibited . . . whilst it is an evidence of kind personal feeling towards you, is an exhibition also of goodwill towards the Government which you represent, and I readily therefore admit of such a compliment being paid you.' At a later period, when he had taken up the higher post for which the Governor-General had specially selected him, Lord Auckland refers to a certain policy which his nominee had adopted, slightly at variance with home instructions. 'It is

generous and bold,' are the expressions used; 'I am always disposed to turn to the judgment of those in whom I place such confidence as I place in you.' But the fulness and freedom from reserve with which these semi-official papers were written, afford the truest and strongest evidences of the Governor-General's sentiments towards his political agent. In like manner, at Bombay, successive governors were proud to acknowledge him as one of the officers of their own Presidency. The signs of distinction which Sir John Malcolm had observed in the dawn of his career were not delusive. Some twenty years afterwards, Sir James Carnac, the outgoing governor, addresses Outram, when still political agent in Lower Sind, in the following strain:—'I cannot bid adieu to this country without bidding you, if you will allow me to use the expression, an *affectionate* farewell. I shall always hail the day when we became personally acquainted, as one of the *bright* spots of my career in life. I entertain for you most sincere sentiments of regard and respect, and you will ever find me, I trust, when thinking or speaking of you and your valuable services, influenced strongly by those impressions. I foresee, please a kind Providence, a career before you which will give full scope for the display of all those eminent qualities with which you are endowed.'

The appointment to Upper Sind, honourable and flattering as it was, had its drawbacks and inconveniences, in that it was subversive of domestic arrangements. Mrs. Outram had again arrived in India before the first half of 1840 had quite passed away; and it had been agreed that the hard-worked political agent in Lower Sind should obtain leave to visit the Presidency, meeting and returning thence with his wife to Haidarabad, where his principal amusement in leisure moments had latterly been the superintendence of the building of a 'Residency.' But a delay of months had scarcely been anticipated; and although the lady had reached Bombay

at the beginning of June, it was not until January 24 in a new year that Outram was enabled to fulfil his intention. And then—such were the continuous exigencies of his employment—their short sojourn together in Sind was but the prelude to another lengthened separation. In May 1841, Mrs. Outram's delicate health rendered a change necessary to Karáchi, where her brother-in-law, Brigadier Farquharson, was in command; and when her husband was summoned to the still more unhealthy region of Upper Sind, where no proper accommodation for ladies then existed, it was judged advisable for her to return to Europe once again, he, meanwhile, proposing to follow her thither, on well-earned and long-anticipated furlough, at the earliest possible opportunity.

Colonel Pottinger had not been left alone in the conduct of Sind diplomacy. It had been found necessary to depute a second agent to Khairpur; so Sir Alexander Burnes, always *en route* somewhere, was stopped on a mission to Kalát, and directed to revisit the old Ráis of Upper Sind. He was to explain to him the part he would have to play in the approaching spectacle of the army of the Indus, and the few requirements he would have to meet—among them the cession to his English allies of the fortress of Bakhar. It was true that he had taken this island-stronghold, in his younger days, by the aid of his own good sword; but what of that? it was only required as a loan by very intimate friends. These friends could not, by the terms of the treaty before concluded, covet anything similar on either bank of the river; and this possession was happily isolated in mid-stream. And so one army came from the north-east; and another army from the south-west; and Sind was thrown into terror and confusion. The Amirs of Haidarabad struggled, and were silenced; the Amir of Khairpur groaned, and gave in. A further treaty with Mir Rustam was the result of these proceedings. On January 10, 1839, the ratification of the Governor-General thereto

fairly annulled the independence of the Khairpur State. 'Friendship, alliance, and unity of interests' ushered in a set of articles whose general tendency was to prove, as it appeared, the existence of the two former an anomaly, and the latter impossible. Shortly afterwards, Burnes found another, though not a fresh field for employment, and plunged, for the second time, into the vortex of Afghan politics. A new star was now observed in the Sind horizon.

Towards the middle of 1839, Mr. Ross Bell, of the Bengal Civil Service, was appointed political agent at Shikarpur.¹ The policy which he had been sent to carry out with the Amir of Khairpur and his brother, would occupy, if set forth in detail, several pages in the exposition; but the substance of it may be expressed in very few words. It was to befriend those who did what we required them to do, and to punish those who thwarted and opposed our objects. His official labours were not confined to Sind. He had important duties, besides, beyond the Sind-Kalât frontier, which required his presence and the exercise of all his energies. The burden of responsibility was heavy, and the strain upon the mind excessive. The action required was for the most part impulsive, and too immediate to brook the delay of a reference to Calcutta; and consultation with others on the spot, whatever the issue, would be ignored at head-quarters, where all confidence and control were given to, and intended for acceptance by a single individual. The situation in Kalât in 1840-41 was especially critical. Mihrab Khan had paid the penalty of resistance to our armies and failure to advance our interests, with his life, and we had put up in his place young Shah Nawaz—a descendant of Mahabbat Khan, the chief deposed by Ahmad Shah—arbitrarily annexing part of the country to Afghanistan. But our proceedings had not satisfied the people; and a revolution shortly broke out in favour of Nasir Khan, son and

¹ Appendix E.

heir of the deceased Mihrab. Our nominee was compelled to abdicate ; and the British representative at Kalát was imprisoned and afterwards murdered. We found ourselves engaged in a serious and untimely conflict ; to retire from which, with the least possible loss of honour and prestige, would necessitate a reversal of Government policy. The dilemma had been caused by our awkward interference in the affairs of a neighbouring State in a spirit of selfish interest ; and though late in the day for moral reflections, there was no more politic remedy than to practise justice. Wisely, but tardily, we paid attention to the popular cry ; and Mr. Ross Bell, at the time of his last illness, was busily engaged in conciliating the ruler whom we ought never to have refused to recognise. Independently, moreover, of the Kalát succession, the prestige of our native soldiery had been shaken by more than one military disaster in the hill country of the Baluchis.

In Upper Sind we were involved in the most ungracious task of extracting payment, from doubtful and not over-solvent debtors, of an obsolete money claim on behalf of our particular king of Afghanistan ; and the arguments of Mir Ali Murad, in the matter of his inheritance under Sohrab's will, had gained an attentive hearing from the British agent. This same Ali Murad, his half-brother Mir Rustam Khan (old enough to be his grandfather), and Nasir, eldest son of another brother Mubárah, were the leading native chiefs awaiting Major Outram's arrival at Sakhar, in August 1841.

The political agents in Upper and Lower Sind were not personal acquaintances ; but their correspondence is that of men trusting, to say the least, in each other's ability, zeal, and good faith. Among the many private and semi-official letters which passed between them, one from Mr. Ross Bell at Kwatta, dated June 1841, informed Outram that, in the event of ill-health, the writer had been instructed to make over his office to him ; that he had become a constant invalid,

whose only chance of permanent restoration was, according to the medical officer, to proceed home or to sea by the earliest date possible ; and that he proposed to leave Kwatta at the end of September, *en route* to the coast by the Bolan and Sakhar. On July 21, Lord Auckland wrote to Outram in anticipation of his assuming charge of Mr. Bell's agency, calling his attention to the urgency of impressing on the native mind that such appointment would in no way imply a change in the Government views with regard to Baluchistan ; the main object being 'the pacification and the prosperity of the countries' within his range. On August 11, Outram had heard a rumour of Mr. Ross Bell's death, and thus wrote to the assistant political agent, Lieutenant Wallace :—

'Should Mr. Bell have fallen a sacrifice to that abominable climate, I shall post up immediately, and I hope you will be able to stay till then. . . . In the event of the head of the office being now vacant, I shall at once write officially to Captain Brown and yourself to inform you that I have assumed it on the strength of my confidential instructions of September, and in the meantime request you to act conjointly.'

But a week before the date of this last letter, Mr. Ross Bell had died, and Lieutenant Wallace had assumed charge of the agency on his own responsibility, reporting the act and his reasons to Lord Auckland's private secretary, Mr. Colvin. Outram had received confirmatory tidings of the early report of the casualty on August 12, within a week from which date we have seen him writing farewell instructions on board the river steamer. A detention of three or four days at Haidarabad was unavoidable, to enable him to complete his pending business with the Amirs ; but as this was a State necessity he could submit to it with comparative com-

posure. He must have chafed, however, over the slow passage of the vessel up the stream to Sakhar, which place he reached (in company with Lieutenant French, who had left Sakhar to join him) on the evening of August 24. Two whole days spent upon a sandbank had prolonged the weariness of that Indus journey. From Sakhar to Kwatta is a distance of some 250 miles, of which three-fifths are over a dreary desert. He appears to have left the former station on the morning of the 25th, but he was in all probability detained nearly two days at Shikarpur to allow for posting bearers, or such other *dâk* arrangements as were necessary. We know that he reached Kwatta on September 2, for his report to that effect caused the Governor-General to express satisfaction at the promptitude with which he had joined the headquarters of his office. It is also on record that he halted two days at Dádar to let the *dâk* be laid up the Bolan Pass, the same bearers that brought him thus far on his way having to go on. He must therefore have accomplished his arduous journey, at a fearfully hot season, in the short space of five days of actual travelling.¹ Whether the time be reckoned from Sakhar or Shikárpur (a shorter distance by 24 miles), the feat is a remarkable one when the climate, country, and means of conveyance are taken into account.²

¹ *Memoir of Services*, page 92.

² The following extracts from Colonel Dennie's letters, published in that officer's *Personal Narrative of the Campaign in Afghanistan*, will give some idea of the sufferings of a solitary European traveller, wending his way from Sakhar to Kwatta—sufferings experienced by Outram, not only in August 1841, but again in June 1842; to say nothing of return journeys. If by rapidity of movement he was less exposed to the evils noticed by Colonel Dennie, it should be remembered that he took this route *in the height of the hot season*:—'We ascended from Dadur to that place (Quetta) through the Bolan Pass, an elevation of between 5,000 and 6,000 feet, having previously traversed at its foot a long dreadful desert plain, from Shikarpoor to Dadur, of about 160 miles . . . As for the heat, God be praised you can form no conception of it! *I have escaped*, and can only tell you that I shudder to look back

The work before Outram was of a difficult and complicated kind. His letter to Lord Auckland of August 13, from Haidarabad, had broken ground in his new sphere, and well deserved the term 'excellent' applied to it by the Governor-General. It indicated a wonderful aptitude on the part of the writer to comprehend the large question with which he had to deal, and it boldly grappled with detail. In it, among many other subjects discussed, he advocated the union of Upper and Lower Sind and Baluchistan, including the districts of Shál and Kachi, under one control, rather than the formation of two distinct agencies, likely to be conflicting; he proposed stations for European soldiers in case necessity should arise for the permanent occupation of Baluchistan; and he showed cause for sending down detachments of corps from Kalát to Sonmiáni, in place of marching up from the latter port with reinforcements, as had been authoritatively contemplated. A few days later he supplemented this despatch by one addressed to Mr. Colvin, from the Indus steamer, in which he drew out a scheme of establishments. His proposal was to give fourteen assistants to the political agent, and to divide them into three classes: three first class for Upper Sind, Lower Sind, and Baluchistan; five second class for the same localities, with Sonmiáni and Shál; and four third class for all these except Sonmiáni. The cost would be about 500*l.* per annum less than that already sanctioned, irrespectively of the

at what I and those with me underwent. . . . Colonel Thompson, who commanded one of the regiments of my brigade, and who followed me a few days in the rear, died instantly in his tent, and Lieutenant Brady, H. M. 17th Foot, fell dead in the same manner, their bodies turning as black as charcoal. Between fifty and sixty persons of another convoy were suffocated by the breath of this same deadly simoom, which sweeps across the desert at intervals during the hot season, dealing destruction to all within its influence . . . To give you a correct notion of the temperature, the thermometer stood, in the tent of a young officer, my aide-de-camp—a smaller one than mine, and termed a hill tent—at 125 degrees !'

political agent's own salary, on which there would be a further reduction ; but the appointment of a first and third class assistant for the management and revenue collections of Shikárpur, would show a counterbalancing expenditure apart from political charges.¹

After the re-occupation of Kalát in November 1840, by the troops under Major-General Nott—a measure resulting from the revolutionary action taken by its inhabitants—Colonel Stacy of the Bengal army had been directed to assume charge of our relations with the Brahúi State. This delicate and difficult duty involved the reconciliation of the young Khan and his adherents with the destroyers of his house. Undertaken in pursuance of a voluntary offer, it appears to have been performed with single-mindedness and ability. The Colonel's own narrative has the ring of conscientiousness and honesty, and is at the same time interesting and instructive. We see in it a fit sequel to the romance of the previous twelvemonth, during which the fatherless boy had been, more or less, a fugitive, debarred from his lawful inheritance. For ten months Nasir Khan coquetted with those who, in spite of protestations and profession, could hardly be regarded as disinterested well-wishers, but whose responsible representative eventually won him over by perseverance in a new and honourable policy. On the eve, however, of full attainment of the object desired, when the young Khan had consented, and was actually on his way to visit the camp of the British political agent, the news of Mr. Ross Bell's death caused inevitable delay in bringing matters to a satisfactory conclusion. It became essential to await the coming of a successor invested with similar powers. Meanwhile, Colonel Stacy was requested by Lieutenant Wallace, the acting agent, to repeat the assurance of continued kind feelings on the part of his Government

¹ Appendix E.

towards Kalát; and to say that in Major Outram the ruler would find a warm advocate and friend. A month passed, at the close of which the newly appointed agent arrived at Kwatta. Nasir Khan had been kept amused and much in the same temper as before, through the unremitting exertions of Colonel Stacy and his countrymen. On September 4, he set out from Mastung, attended by his English adviser, to meet Major Outram. Captains Browne and Knyvett went out to welcome him a march from Kwatta. We quote Colonel Stacy's own account of the meeting :—

We rested the day of our arrival; and according to the custom of the country mutual inquiries passed between Major Outram and the Khan. After seeing him comfortably established in a tent pitched for him, I went to Major Outram, and was most kindly congratulated on the success of my exertions, and the zeal with which I had pursued the object of my duties. The next morning was fixed for *darbár*.

At 8 a.m., I accompanied the young Khan to the *darbár*, and introduced him to Major Outram. The brigadier commanding the troops, Major-General England, Captain Bean, and eight or nine officers were present. As might be expected, the youth was rather embarrassed at first, but on Major Outram's assuring him of the kindly feelings of Government towards him, he expressed his desire to become an ally of the Company, the value of whose friendship he said he was fully aware of. He added that he had often heard of their justice and liberality, and he had come to enrol himself amongst the number of their servants (*khizmatgar-i-kampani*), to live under the shade of their flag, and that he was willing to agree to whatever terms the Company might prescribe. Though abashed at first, he gained more confidence as the novelty of the scene wore off. In about half an hour the presents were introduced, and the Khan shortly after took his leave. A salute of twenty-one guns from the civil lines, which was repeated in camp, announced the happy event of the Khan's acknowledging the paramount power of the British Government and his alliance with it.

The next important day to be marked, in the political annals of the place and period, was that on which occurred

the Khan's installation under British auspices. But the importance of this procedure was greatly enhanced by the circumstance that, two or three hours prior to its occurrence, there had been formally concluded a treaty of friendship between the Indian Government and State of Kalát. The earlier business was transacted at a *darbár* held in the forenoon by the British political agent; to which Nasir Khan came, accompanied by the whole of his *sardárs* and principal people, with one or two exceptions owing to sickness. On this occasion the treaty was publicly produced, as agreed upon, and read out by the minister, the words being repeated by the young chief himself, who, at the close, said, 'I agree' (*kaful*), and, taking his signet from his bosom, put on the ink and applied the seal. The later ceremony was carried out in the afternoon at a *darbár* held by the Khan, whither Outram proceeded, in company with the brigadier-general, and attended by all the gentlemen of the agency and escort. Indian custom at Muhammadan courts seems to have regulated the details of investiture. When the formalities were over, we learn that 'every British officer heartily shook hands with the Prince, followed by every individual in the room, while a royal salute was fired from the Khan's own guns in very good style. The young chief was visibly affected—almost to tears—by the good feeling displayed towards him by the English gentlemen; and general and sincere were the thanks, loudly expressed by the principal natives, to Colonel Stacy for his friendly exertions to bring about so happy a consummation.'¹ Outram and the other officers then accompanied the Khan on horseback to an open space without the walls, where the Brahúis exhibited their horsemanship. At night they returned to the Mírí, or palace, to see the national dance, 'in which all ranks and classes heartily joined.'

¹ Major Outram to Mr. J. R. Colvin, October 7, 1841.

The treaty with Nasir Khan was one of nine articles, of which the first four were almost identical with a draft which had been prepared by Sir William MacNaghten, and sent to Colonel Stacy before Outram's appearance on the scene. It so happened that Lord Auckland's specific instructions for guidance in the matter did not reach the political agent until the second day after the Khan's formal acceptance had been signified. The fortunate hour for the investiture had been fixed by the Mullahs and, when so fixed and approved, it was thought that ample time had been allowed for the receipt of the expected despatches from India. Execution of the treaty would precede installation, because the last and more popular ceremony would thus be admitted as a consequence of the first, in due regard to British *prestige*. But the modifications of the Governor-General were not such as to cause any serious difficulty; and eventually, ratification was accorded to eight articles to the following effect :—

1st. Acknowledgment of vassalage to Kabul.

2nd. Restoration to Kalát of the two first of the three districts of Kachi, Mastung, and Shál, which had been resumed on the death of Mihrab Khan.

3rd. Power to station British, or Shah's troops in Kalát when necessary.

4th. British counsels to be paramount.

5th. Protection to be afforded to merchants, and no undue exactions made.

6th. No negotiations to be carried on with foreign powers, without consent of British and Shah's Governments.

7th. Assistance to be rendered by British Government, if judged necessary, in the event of external aggression or dispute.

8th. Provision secured for the maintenance of Shah Nawáz Khan, the former chief named by British Government.¹

It is not too much to say that if, in our recent war with Afghanistan, the previous occupation of Kwatta has facilitated the advance of our troops from the southward, we owe something of the advantage so gained to the annulled Anglo-Brahúi treaty of October 6, 1841.

Outram remained at Kalát until October 14, when he set out on his return to Dádar, which station he reached in a fortnight, travelling to and through the Bolan Pass. His letters at this period, official, semi-official, and private, show how actively he was employed in keeping order and open communications, both jeopardised by the action of hostile tribes and the numerous robbers infesting the neighbourhood of the Passes. The brief experience of the country gained two years before had not been without its value; and he knew his surroundings well enough to apprehend the true distinctions which marked the strange, wild characters brought up daily to his tent, whether calling themselves Afghan, Brahúi, or simply Baluch. At Dádar he fixed for a time his head-quarters, and would, doubtless, have carried into effect many proposals for the pacification and well-being of the Khan and his subjects, which he submitted to the Governor-General, had not disastrous tidings from Afghanistan drawn his attention to more pressing matters.

He was a little sensitive on the subject of certain guns which the Marri Baluchis had captured from our soldiers; and he had written semi-officially to Mr. Colvin, pointing out, with characteristic detail, his reasons for seeking the

¹ This treaty became a dead letter within a year of its ratification, as the vassalage contemplated was to Shah Shuja and his heirs, and not to the Barakzais. It was formally annulled by a new treaty in May 1864, the third article, however, being retained in a modified form.

peaceful recovery of these uncomfortable trophies, reserving to his own unfettered diplomacy the actual process he would adopt to bring about their ready restoration by the Marri chief. On November 14—the day after writing this letter—he communicated to the secretary that he had received from Major Rawlinson, at Kandahar, information of a nature likely to arrest the homeward progress of the Bengal troops, whose arrival at Dádar, from Afghanistan, he had been contemplating. Four days later, he reported, ‘with much regret,’ for Lord Auckland’s information, a still more serious state of things as represented in a letter from the envoy with Shah Shuja to Major Rawlinson; and on November 20 he wrote as follows to Mr. Willoughby, then looking forward to the coming of Sir W. MacNaghten, the Governor elect of Bombay:—

‘There are deplorable accounts from Cabool! I sent you the day before yesterday copy of a note from Sir. W. MacNaghten, dated November 1, showing that he was still there; so there is no possibility of his getting away before spring, I should say. Neither can the brigade from Candahar go beyond Ghuznee, on account of the snow. But it is impossible the rebels can keep the field during winter. . . . neither can they hold the city under the guns of the Balla Hissar . . . Under the present aspect of affairs, however, we must keep all the troops we have in the country, and it may be necessary hereafter to push more troops to Candahar, which may be sent by the Sonmeanee route in February. Moreover, Captain Hammersley reports from Quetta that he considers the desertion of his Kaukers from the Rangers the prelude to a general Kauker insurrection connected with the Cabool disturbances, and it is possible I may have to act against them from hence. But this I do not apprehend to be likely; nor do I think a general rising of that tribe will

take place. . . . It is proper to be prepared however.' To Mr. Colvin, on the same date, he writes :—

'I have every confidence that the Murree chief is coming to me, and, if he does, the peaceable submission of all the Hill tribes of Northern Cutchee is certain. It is possible that the machinations of the traitor (suspected) Naib of Shawl may have extended to them; but it is not likely, for there can scarcely have been time to communicate with them, and I really am not in the least degree apprehensive on the subject.'

Later again—but still in the same month of November—his letters express a fear lest communication with Kandahar should be rendered insecure by the enforced evacuation of Kalá Abdullah, near the entrance, or at about eight miles east, of the Khojak Pass. Annoyance on this score is, however, somewhat mitigated by the arrival in his camp of the 'high priest' of the Kákars and others of the tribe, to tender the submission of their chief Ghafúr Khan, who had been, up to that time, opposed to all conciliatory advances on our part. December was naturally a month of great anxiety. The following extract is from a letter to Mr. Willoughby, written on the 4th :—

'So critical a state of things, as represented throughout the whole line of communications with Cabool and in the capital itself, at the last accounts dated November 9, renders it incumbent on me to devise every means of preparing support for Candahar, from whence principally we must look for the retrieval of our affairs should we be driven to extremity at Cabool; for our line of posts is more complete, and the obstacles are neither so numerous nor so serious by the Bolan and Sonmeanee routes as they appear to be by the Khybur. I consider we are secure in the Bolan Pass, with the command

above and below, and the Brahoe tribes on the left of the Pass in our interests—even should the Kakurs turn against us, which I do not apprehend. . . . I do not think the inhabitants of the Pisheen valley are likely to become malcontent, and if they do, there are no commanding situations from Quetta to the Kojuk where they could attempt to arrest our troops, except the Koochlack Pass, which is commanded from Quetta; and our position at Killa Abdoolla could be strengthened in case of necessity, to afford a flanking party to take up a commanding position at the crest of the Kojuk on all occasions of troops and convoys passing over. From thence to Candahar, no very commanding positions occur easily tenable by an enemy in the face of our troops. At Kelat-i-Ghilzie and Ghuznee we are impregnable, provided provisions have been laid in in plenty, which I presume must be the case, as those places were to be held under any circumstances. Our communications with Cabool can therefore, I consider, be best reopened by that route.'

On the 7th, a hopeful disposition had apparently restricted his main attention to the work immediately before him. 'We are still,' he writes to Mr. Colvin, 'without direct accounts from Cabool; but the tranquillity at Candahar is a strong proof that the insurrection is quelled. . . . The Khan commenced his progress through Cutchee this morning, accompanied by Colonel Stacy, who is instructed to encourage the young chief to personal inquiry into the affairs of the country,' also to induce his pupil 'to invite all aggrieved parties freely to state their grievances.' The Kákar negotiations had progressed favourably, and Ghafur Khan was to be taken to one of the assistant politicals, in order that the settlement with him might be formally concluded. But so far from the insurrection being quelled at Kabul, the disasters to our army in that city were, when Outram was writing, fast approaching to the bitter end.

On the 11th, owing to the receipt of bad news again, he thought it prudent to warn the head-quarter wing of H.M. 41st foot at Karachi, to be ready to embark for Sakhar, in the event of having to push on the other wing from Dádar upward. He also directed the 2nd native grenadiers, under orders to return to Bombay when relieved, to stand fast for the time in Upper Sind. On the 15th he heard of the flight of the Durráni Naib of Shál, a disaffected Afghan, closely related to one of the more prominent opponents of the Shah; and requested Brigadier-General England to send up the wing of a *sipahi* corps, so as to complete a force at Kwatta consisting of two strong regiments of native infantry (minus three companies at Kalá Abdullah), two nine-pounders of European (Bombay) artillery, and two nine-pounders of the Bolan rangers, with a company of Bengal artillerymen. He would then be 'under no anxiety whatever, were the rebels to come in their utmost strength against that post:' a contingency which might reasonably be contemplated with the object of stopping communications with Kandahar. In the young Khan he placed full confidence: he was satisfied of his disinclination to join any combination against the British. He closed a long letter to Mr. Colvin, discussing these subjects, with the statement that he was about to send up his report on the assistants and establishments of his agency, which he had reduced nearly a lakh (10,000*l.*) annually, without detriment to efficiency, and independently of reductions in the cost of the Indus flotilla. On December 18 he officially reported to the Governor-General the reforms already effected in these respects, and those about to be effected, addressing to Mr. Colvin a semi-official communication on the same question the day following. He also wrote to Mr. Colvin on the latter date to point out that, should rebellion break out at Kandahar (but *only* in that case), it would be advisable to withdraw the detachment of troops at the intermediate post of Kalá Abdullah; and he added:—

‘Should the counter-Suddozye league prove true, I shall have no fear of any serious agitation extending to this quarter and to the Ameers; but I have little doubt the early appearance of reinforcements from Guzerat and at Sonmeeanee will keep down the disaffected under any circumstances. Colonel Stacy has effected a satisfactory treaty with the Murrees . . . and nothing but the most untoward events in Afghanistan, and the spread of insurrection to our very borders, will cause any risk of serious agitation within my charge, and I am not apprehensive that it will extend so far, or that I shall be unable to quell it if it do take place. Although I have no fears for our Quetta post, I agree with Major Rawlinson in the policy of moving *up* as many troops as the accommodation at Quetta can possibly shelter.’ Five companies were to march thither on the day following, and this addition to the force was, he believed, the utmost that could be accommodated. It was afterwards arranged with Brigadier-General England that a company of the 41st regiment of foot, completed to one hundred men, should at once move through the pass with the head-quarter wing of the 25th native infantry. Outram explains his chief aim to have been, the moral effect produced by the passage of troops *up* the Bolan, at a time when, according to Major Rawlinson, there was a growing impression that we were about to evacuate the country.

He wrote to Mr. Maddock, Secretary to the Government of India, on December 22 :—

‘No excitement has been caused in this country by the exaggerated rumours of disasters to us in Afghanistan which pour in from Candahar. There is little sympathy between the Affghans and Brahoes; and nothing but a general rise against us *on the score of religion* would tend to infect the tribes of Beloochistan. . . . I consider that it must be impossible for the rebels to overcome our troops, *if in the*

Balla Hissar, and with three months' provisions—as reported in the last accounts we have received from Jellalabad.' And to Mr. Colvin on the 23rd :—

'Lest his Lordship should be under anxiety regarding Quetta, I enclose the copy of a letter just received from Lieutenant Hammersley which, although evidently written for no other eye than my own, shows so exactly the feeling of the garrison, that I need not apologise for sending it, as affording the best security that our troops at that post cannot be beaten. I never had any anxiety on that subject; but the dangerous move of evacuating Killa Abdoola was, I confess, a source of some anxiety.' Then, in allusion to the return of the detachment from that fort: 'I was much delighted to learn of its safe arrival at Quetta, only five stragglers having fallen, slain by the Affghan horse in our own pay, who turned upon us when they found us in retreat.'

The traitors referred to belonged to a body of cavalry known as Bosanquet's; but what were these events to the more widespread calamity which had overtaken our countrymen and their native associates at Kabul? On the date last named, while Outram, in his usual untiring spirit and readiness to cope with detail, was discussing on paper, with Mr. Colvin, as also Colonel Stacy and Lieutenant French, the questions arising in his more immediate *entourage*, Sir William MacNaghten was shot by Muhammed Akbar Khan—the last of a series of individual murders soon to be followed by wholesale slaughter and all but annihilation. This intelligence did not reach Dádar for some four weeks; but in those days there was little in the general condition of Afghanistan, or the political situation in that country, to render the Anglo-Afghan alliance a fit subject of congratulation to British officers in North-Western India, especially at Christmas and the New Year. How cheerily, however, our 'warden

of the marches' wrote to despondent friends, even at this gloomy Christmas-tide, and notwithstanding his thorough grasp of the real perils of the situation—a grasp of which his many letters of this period give detailed proof—the following note to Mr. Willoughby, dated December 27, is a specimen :—

‘ Depend upon it you need have no fear of my napping in fancied security, from the fair professions of these people. Of course I know that, however *individuals* might feel well-disposed, they could not resist a sudden and general impulse of religious enthusiasm. But I have little fear of any outbreak being attempted, having so many screws secured in every direction that each chief would wait for his neighbour to begin first, and they cannot combine without my knowledge. Keep a good heart, my dear friend—“nil desperandum”—all will yet go well—we shall rise like the phoenix, resplendent from our ashes.’

On January 20, 1842, when retribution was all that remained to complete the tragedy, Outram wrote to Colonel Stacy :—‘ This is a lamentable *finale* to poor MacNaghten’s career : but just what he ought to have expected from treating with the rebels at all. I am glad that after-negotiations appear to have been broken off under another attack on the cantonment, which I trust must have been followed by the garrison cutting its way into the Bala Hissar. . . . I think it may be as well to tell the Khan the whole truth at once, ascribing all our losses to treachery. . . . and giving hope that we still hold the Bala Hissar, which it is possible the cantonment garrison may have made their way to. However, exercise your own discretion as to at once informing the Khan and chiefs, or delaying till arrival here, which would perhaps be better. Tell what great preparations are making for re-invading the country, and that in three months all Afghanistan will again be subdued.’

Little by little, the whole truth became known,¹ and Outram's abundant energies were taxed to the utmost to support the failing prestige of his country.

Throughout the trying occasion how keen was his mortification, how ardent his desire of honourable retrieval, how competent his appreciation, can only be thoroughly known to his fellow-workers, apparent as they may be from the numerous letters of which the record has been preserved. Nor should the labours of his coadjutors be lost sight of in this retrospect. It has been already well said, in reference to the occasion, that 'to provide for the sustenance and safety of the weak and scattered military posts within their jurisdiction; to inspire confidence in quarters wherein panic threatened to consummate the very evils it apprehended; to aid in the retrieval of our tarnished honour by providing our generals with the means of prosecuting a war of retribution; and to do so through the agency of those whom we had wronged, and who were incited to rise against us—such were the duties which Major Outram and his able staff were called on to perform.'²

We now approach the period when a great change was made in the *personnel* of the Indian Government. Independently of special and exceptional circumstances, the season had just arrived for new appointments in high places at Simla and Calcutta, and prescribed habit would take its course. On February 28, 1842, Lord Auckland was relieved from his arduous and responsible duties; and British India passed under the rule of his successor, Lord Ellenborough. Two days before, the departing Governor-General addressed a long and highly interesting letter to Major Outram, from which we feel at liberty to make the more pertinent extracts:—

'You will feel, as we all of us feel, that our first solici-

¹ Appendix E.

² *Memoir of Services.*

tude must be for the troops in advance; but you will never lose sight of the great consideration that the basis of safety and of power throughout the districts under your influence is at Sakkar and Shikarpore. And I should generally prefer a moderate force very securely placed at Shikarpore, to a large cantonment at that place, and I would have your magazines and the main body of your strength in the more healthy and accessible position of Sakkar.

‘It has given me pleasure to learn that you think it possible that the Khan of Kelat may at no distant period be safely entrusted with the defence of Shál, of Dadur, and Seebee—and it might perhaps be good policy that he be made to feel at once our disposition to give to him and his tribes this accession of power and of territory as soon as our difficulties in Afghanistan shall be brought to a close.

‘It is possible that a very large force may in the end be collected by you for the summer in Shál and Mastung, and you might safely hold the language which may please you best, to all around you: and as the cold weather may approach, you might settle on your own terms all the countries which lie between Shál and Kurachee, always following out, however, that excellent plan of conciliation on which you have acted towards Belochistan. I would endeavour to save at least thus much of our late accessions of power from the disasters which have been brought upon them. This is probably the last letter that I shall have to write to you, and I would take my leave of you with an assurance to you, that you have from day to day, since your late appointment, added to that high estimate with which I have long regarded your character, and which led me to place confidence in you. It is mortifying and galling to me to feel that plans which you had nearly brought to successful maturity, for great improvement, for the consolidation of

security and influence, for the happiness of the population of immense tracts, and for your own and our honour, should be endangered by events of which our military history has happily no parallel. You will, I know, do well in the storm, and I trust that, as far as the interests confided to you are concerned, you will enable us to weather it.'

And he did well, as the world has testified; and the storm *was* weathered, as history has certified. But 'the race is not to the swift, nor the battle to the strong, neither yet bread to the wise, nor yet riches to men of understanding, nor yet favour to men of skill.' Were there not thousands of instances of merit unacknowledged, to be drawn from the annals of everyday life; did not lame and halt ones reach the goal, when the nimble-footed fail; was not strength subdued by cunning, the bread of the wise given to charlatans, and wealth marred by ignoble uses; and were not the ignorant and unworthy set in honourable seats—how could we interpret this passage of an undying record left by the wisest of kings to after-generations? Surely the wisdom of these golden words is in their truth.

CHAPTER IX.

1842.

Retrospect of Outram's work in Sind and Baluchistan, from February to November, 1842—Return from Dádar to Sakhar—Disaster at Haikalzai—Letter to Mr. Maddock, on available military resources—Return to Kwatta—Subordination to Major-General Nott—Transfer of the Shál and Sibi districts to Kalát—Displeasure of Governor-General—Return of General England's force to Sind—Arrival at Sakhar of Major-General Sir Charles Napier—Outram remanded to regimental duty.

LORD Auckland's departure might have been personally a source of greater distress to Outram, who had so long enjoyed that nobleman's confidence, had it not occurred at a time when the honour of his country was at stake, and when so much responsibility in the maintenance of that honour devolved upon himself. Had it been possible to instigate his zeal and energy yet further in the cause, the arrival in India of a new Governor-General would have proved a likely means of imparting the required stimulus. But he was in reality at boiling-point; and his efforts were now directed to putting pressure upon others—in many cases upon men invested with public functions like himself, though higher in the official scale, and some of them cast in a different mould. He had written, only a few days before Lord Ellenborough had set foot on Indian soil, to Major Rawlinson in Kandahar, expressing delight at being made the channel of communication to General Nott, in forwarding the direct orders of superior authority to hold fast in that city.¹ 'The Govern-

¹ Among the many official reports left by Sir James Outram is the copy of a correspondence between General Nott and Major Rawlinson, bearing date

ment of India,' he told Mr. Willoughby, 'had at last recovered from its panic, and displayed the determination and vigour necessary for this crisis.' In a previous letter to Lieutenant Hammersley, he had expressed his hope that Kandahar would hold out as Sale had resolved to do at Jallálabad, at any rate until the views of the new Governor-General became known; adding, 'I cannot believe that a retrograde movement will be allowed by Lord Ellenborough . . . until we have rescued or avenged our captured countrymen at Cabool. I doubt not General Pollock will immediately force the Khaibar Pass to Jallálabad, and, having discretionary power, will then push on to Cabool, where by that time dissensions among the Afghans will favour him.'¹

To Colonel Palmer, commanding at Ghazni, he addressed a remarkable letter, almost on the eve of Lord Ellenborough's disembarkation, giving strong reasons why the orders to evacuate his post, issued upon due compulsion from Kabul,

February 1, 1842, consequent on the receipt of orders to evacuate Kandahar. We quote two remarkable passages, each worthy of preservation. The latter officer writes:—'I am led to believe that we should avail ourselves of the discretion which is left to us by Government, and shape our proceedings rather with the view to prospective, than immediate retirement, aiming to create such an impression of our power in the minds of the inhabitants of this part of Afghanistan, while we remain in the country, as shall efface the memory of the disasters at Cabul, and lead the people to respect our national character, if not to remember with gratitude the many benefits we have conferred on them.'

In the reply, the view of the situation is thus stated:—'I think our instructions from Government will be widely different from those dated December 3, 1841, and until we receive further orders *I will not consent to retire from this country*. I could offer many reasons for this determination, but at present it is not necessary.' Some one has underlined in pencil the words here rendered in italics, and written in the margin of Outram's copy: 'This is very good; we may be sure he is in his position at Candahar.' Kaye alludes to Major Rawlinson's letter of February 1 in an extract from that distinguished officer's MS. journal of the 21st idem, but does not quote from it.

¹ In the P.S. of a letter to Major Rawlinson at this period we find Outram's summary of the tactics most suitable for warfare in Afghanistan, viz.: '*Attack the enemy on every occasion*, and disabuse the opinion now obtaining that the Afghans are a match for us in the field.' So think, and so act, our gallant frontier officers now.

should not be obeyed. He strove to re-assure him by the prospect of speedy relief which the despatch of a brigade up the passes from India would enable General Nott to afford him from Kandahar. 'We can have no fears for your force in the meantime . . . ' he wrote :—

Nothing could touch you in the citadel, even though the enemy may be in possession of the town ; for of course you would leave no artillery in the town, and your musketry from the citadel alone, must render the town a dangerous occupation for the enemy. We hear they attempt to mine you, but fear not that you will fail to counteract such efforts by sallies, and the occasional favour of shells and other combustibles, for nowhere could they find shelter to commence their operations under so commanding a fire ; if a lodgment is effected, we know it would be destroyed by countermines or outward sally ;—doubtless you would have frequent opportunities of destroying any stores of powder the enemy might collect for the purpose of loading a mine, by the rifle practice of your officers with Norton's shells (egg-ball, with tin tube let in at the small end, filled with powder, and closed at the outward end by a percussion cap)—by mining they may draw off the water from your wells, but still we fear not for you, the river running directly under and within range of your musketry. In fact, we are quite satisfied that you would cheerfully meet and undergo every difficulty rather than surrender on *any terms*, which, as in the dreadful Cabool instance, would be destruction. It is feared that the Cabool artillery given over to the enemy, may be brought against you when the roads will admit of their transport, but we have every hope that in the meantime the rebel chiefs will be too much occupied by dissensions among themselves to think of you ; or, in the expectation of our advance from Peshawur, they may keep the artillery at the capital, or send it to oppose our troops ; but even should it be brought against you, you have some good artillery to oppose, by the aid of which we doubt not you would successfully resist all efforts of the enemy, in the confidence of ultimate relief. General Sale has no fears for Jallalabad, where he has strengthened the works and laid in provisions. All is quiet at Quetta, and in Scinde and Belochistan at present ; Lord Ellenborough, the new Governor-General, is expected at Calcutta about this time ; the

birth of a Prince of Wales, and an extensive brevet in consequence, is the only news of interest by the last mail. Our affairs are prospering in China, and the Burmese, Nepaulese, &c., betray no hostile intentions.

The history of the first Anglo-Afghan campaign is too well known to require any separate, or expository sketch in these pages. We do not, therefore, think it necessary to explain all allusions to passing events, in our extracts from the papers before us. Yet it is well to state that, in reviewing the work of one man at that critical period, we are not confining the retrospect to Outram's own correspondence¹—full and varied as it is. Reference also is made, where desirable for truth and clearness, to independent narratives.

It must be premised that the position of Major Outram in Sind, and of Mr.—better known in later years at the Council Board as Sir—George Russell-Clerk, on the north-west frontier, was that of men who had good reason to fear that an ignominious withdrawal of our forces from Afghanistan was contemplated, without an effort either to release our captives or to restore our most dangerously shattered prestige. They both foresaw the disastrous results of such a solution of our embarrassments, a solution fatal to the future peace and prosperity of India. They both saw how easy it would be for Pollock and Nott to open the way for retreat by aggressive action and the consequent release of our prisoners and reassertion of our power. And they both risked their all in persistent endeavour to induce the Governor-General to see things in the same light and act accordingly. It is not our province to follow the fortunes of the chivalrous Bengal

¹ Of the twelve correspondents, whose names appear on the title-page of the selections from Outram's letters written in 1841-42, and printed for private circulation, but two are now living, Sir Henry Rawlinson, and Sir George Clerk. Sir Henry Lawrence, General Nott, Colonel Sutherland, Sir James Carnac, Sir Richmond Shakespeare, the political assistants, Hammersley and Browne, and the secretaries Maddock, Durand, and Willoughby—have all passed away.

civilian, but it will be seen how his like-minded comrade fared in the struggle. It would but weary the reader to multiply quotations from Outram's many letters bearing on the one aim. Directly and indirectly, officially and demi-officially, by appeal and by allusion, he continued to press the matter during these drearily busy months; others, besides the Generals Pollock and Nott, strove towards the same end, and at last prevailed—after a fashion. Henry Lawrence, himself commissioner of Pesháwar during the crisis, and a correspondent of Outram's—though personally, then and for many years after, a stranger to him—has had naturally something to say on the subject; and thus wrote in the 'Calcutta Review' of September 1845: 'James Outram in one quarter, and George Clerk—a kindred spirit—in another, were the two men who then stood in the breach; who *forced* the authorities to listen to the fact against which they tried to close their ears, that the proposed abandonment of the British prisoners in Afghanistan would be as dangerous to the State, as it was base towards the captives. These counsels were successfully followed: the British nation thanked our Indian rulers, while, of the two men, without whose persevering remonstrances and exertions Nott and Pollock might have led back their armies, without being permitted to make an effort to retrieve our credit—Clerk was slighted, and Outram superseded!'

These words supply the key to what has now to be related in regard to a cloudy period of James Outram's career. The experiences of 1879 will enable the English reader the better to appreciate the events of 1842. But it must be borne in mind that we were then strangers throughout the independent territories which lay within Major Outram's jurisdiction—from Karáchi on the ocean to the Khojak Pass—strangers, moreover, whose proceedings had tended to alienate into enmity both Sindis and Baluchis; that the

passes above Dádar and the Peshin valley swarmed with predatory tribes then unaccustomed to the curb, and who had yet to learn the inexorable sweep of the Farangi sword and the inexhaustible flow of Farangi gold ; that these were days when the spell of our success had just been rudely broken, while all those upon whom we intruded ourselves had only too good cause to dread our rapacity, and distrust our motives ; and that while 'etappen' arrangements were then undreamt of, it was the political agent who had to extract from these invaded territories means of transport, local supplies, and nearly all else needful to an army in motion, save hard cash, powder and shot. On him it fell to 'manage' predatory hordes, to maintain communications, to organise local levies, to be the 'intelligence department,' and much else besides. All this in addition to what may be termed 'diplomatic' functions throughout these varied principalities and tribes ; with which were connected undefined, or one might say infinite, civil duties involved in efforts to check misrule and ameliorate the condition of the peoples within his influence. In the case of Baluchistan, these duties included the administration of Shál, and other important tracts. This is but an incomplete *résumé* of the work which tasked the energies of Major Outram and his single-minded assistants during the protracted crisis of 1841-2. We must, however, confine our extracts and allusions to a few of the more personal features of the time, leaving the reader to fill in, *ad libitum*, the everyday details of duty and of danger, of worry and of anxiety, of responsibility and of perplexity. The mass and variety of correspondence available are enormous. Illustrations of points dwelt upon might be multiplied to any extent ; but patience must not be overtried, and to condense without obscurity is no easy task. We may insert here a letter of May 19, 1842, to Mr. Clerk, not only as illustrative of the above remarks, but as contain-

ing views of general policy which are of weighty interest in our own days :—

I note with regret—but not surprise—that your opinions as to the measures proper to be pursued in Afghanistan do not meet those of the Governor-General, who cannot with all his *home* Indian experience, help being swayed in his estimate of the physical difficulties to be encountered in Afghanistan, and of Afghan prowess, by the results of the past six months. Now these, it must be evident to any *practical* man capable of judging the *true value* of both, were brought about by neither the one nor the other. There exist no further physical difficulties (to signify) than what have already been overcome—the passage of the Khybur on one side, and that of the Bolan and Kojuck Passes on the other; and as to the *prowess* of the Afghans, our experience of four years among them, during which we have had some twenty or thirty hand to hand engagements with them, ought to have lowered instead of raised in our eyes their character in that respect; for in no instance—except in that absurd business of Hykulzye—have they ever been able to cope with us, however superior in numbers, or in strength of position! Every engagement only tended to heighten the despair of the enemy of ever being able to compete with us in the field; and had it not been that our own measures at Cabul drove certain chiefs to desperation, and our insane arrangement of placing treasure and *godowns* (depôts) within their power, enabled those chiefs to inflame the rabble, and commit the whole city, by laying open those stores to indiscriminate plunder—at the same time incapacitating our troops—at this moment, I say, the Afghans would have continued subservient; and as it is, will succumb to any demonstration of our strength. This *you* and *I* know, and every officer of experience in Afghanistan is convinced of. But his Lordship cannot but give heed to the more timid counsellors who preach ‘*prudently* withdrawing from *further* contest’ against an *exasperated* NATION—having in his recollection the struggles of Spain against Napoleon’s efforts, and his disastrous expulsion from Russia! True, the parallels *appear* complete, but they are not really so, and cannot be drawn until 30,000 British bayonets can keep all Europe in subjection, as they now do India. Then—but not till then—will the rules of European warfare extend to Asia. Had we heretofore estimated our enemies in this quarter of the globe on such equality,

we never should have obtained India, nor should we have retained it; and if Lord Ellenborough is induced to swerve from the only course now left us for recovering our honour, through an over-estimate of *any* Asiatic enemy—from that period will be dated the decline of our power in India; and those nearer home will be encouraged to lay their heads together, and to oppose the Government on every favourable opportunity for raising a disturbance. Our armies must be increased to overawe the then turbulent, but hitherto peaceable population of India, while at the same time the revenues decrease owing to such disturbances, until either the people become too powerful, or the country too impoverished to admit of our continuing the government.

With such a result in view, I shall continue to urge, by every means in my power, directly or indirectly, what I with you feel to be the most advantageous course, until we are committed beyond recall, which I still hope the favourable turn of affairs in Afghanistan, and General Nott's decisive opinion, may avert; or, until reproved for intruding such opinions—which I may now expect to be, since you, whose opinion is entitled to so much greater weight, have been checked in expressing what, as coming from me, has hitherto escaped notice only from being less entitled to consideration.

One other extract will complete the general view of Afghan politics. The anxiety here expressed regarding the course of action to be decided on by Government, and by General Nott under his perplexing instructions, formed the chief of the heart-burdens which weighed upon Major Outram throughout this period of doubt and mystery. In June his hopes were raised by Pollock's call to Nott to advance on Kabul upon his (Pollock's) own responsibility as senior officer, and the strength of the indefinite latitude just accorded to the generals. Outram urged Nott strongly to act on this soldierly summons, but was disappointed; and anxieties were only set at rest by the tardy advance in August. He thus continued his train of thought in a letter to Sir R. Shakespear, General Pollock's military secretary, of May 21:—

I am much obliged to you for your very interesting and instructive, letter, dated 4th inst. and lose no time in thanking you for it, and in assuring you that I cordially coincide in all your views, excepting in the advisability of assuming Afghanistan to ourselves, which you appear to lean towards, in preference to the alternative of withdrawing after re-occupying Cabul, which I would prefer. I have always been opposed to the *location* of our troops in Afghanistan; and to show you what my sentiments were on the subject so far back as this time three years ago, I enclose an extract from a letter I wrote the Bombay Secretary when we were at Candahar in 1839. Late events have of course strengthened that opinion; but I have ever been adverse to withdraw our troops, *after we were committed* in the country, until we can do so with honour: and I agree with you that cannot now be, *until we have re-asserted our power at Cabul*. You will have been thunderstruck, as I was, on the receipt of the Governor-General's orders of the 19th ult., which I observed were forwarded to General Pollock, and, I conclude, were to the same effect as those sent through me to General Nott, of the same date; and I am pretty sure that the sentiments of Generals Pollock and Nott, yourself, Mr. Clerk, and indeed every practical man concerned, coincide with mine.

. . . . I must say, however, that I would recommend the return of the united armies by this route, instead of by the Khybur, which for the reasons stated in a letter I addressed to Mr. Maddock on the subject,¹ I would abandon altogether; returning the whole army by this route, wherein there is no chance of obstruction, such as retiring troops would be subject to in the Khoord Cabul and Khybur passes. The only pass of any difficulty on this route, the Bolan, we hold the key of in the Brahooes, and I am sure I could ensure the passage of our armies by this route without the slightest loss.² From hence, a portion might be shipped round to Calcutta, and the rest march by land to the upper provinces. I shall continue in much anxiety till I hear General Pollock's determination on receipt of the order of the 19th April—still feel little doubt as to the course he will adopt.

¹ In an official despatch, dated May 2 (which is not given in the Blue Book).

² It will be seen hereafter how Outram fulfilled this pledge, in withdrawing General England's portion of the army, under far less favourable circumstances than would have attended the return of the whole united army, after having been victorious at Cabul.

About March 10 he left Dádar for Sind, and Sakhar on the Indus was selected as a convenient spot both for his local work and keeping open the communication with Afghanistan. As regards the change of locality, Sakhar may have the advantage over Dádar in cheerfulness and beauty of outer scenery, but for the six months commencing with March the heat is simply indescribable in both places. At such a time the charms of landscape can only be appreciated by the most æsthetic of Englishmen as a brilliant opera can be appreciated by a listener with a splitting headache. He had been at Sakhar for two or three days when, on March 27, he thus addressed Captain Durand, private secretary to the Governor-General :—

I am waiting with much anxiety the development of Lord Ellenborough's views in our present most difficult position. I almost fear the very many and serious obstacles which present themselves against the only course left to retrieve our honour, will deter his Lordship from attempting it at present. The most serious is, the feeling which has displayed itself among the sepoy's of General Pollock's force of late : but if he can induce them to go on to Jellalabad, I do hope the rest would be plain sailing ;—certainly if they can be persuaded to pursue their march on Cabool it would be so, aided by a simultaneous advance from Candahar—and provided Colonel Palmer maintains his position at Ghuznee, which I am sorry to find by the accounts from Cabool, dated 5th inst., he was thinking of evacuating ; but I am in hopes that my letter from Dadur (which I despatched on the 24th ult., and was to have been delivered in twelve days) would reach that officer in time to cause him to defer such a step until he receives the positive orders of Government, for I am happy to see that young Conolly has thrown obstacles in the way, calculated to cause delay. I hope that having thrown up the Pass General England's brigade, will be approved of by the Governor-General : whatever course may be resolved on, it was equally necessary—either with the view to the *advance* or *retreat* of General Nott's army—and indispensable to provide supplies of treasure and ammunition, which were absolutely necessary to enable the Candahar troops to move,

or hold out. Moreover, the movement up the Pass was equally so to prevent the hill tribes rising, and closing the Bolan Pass, and stopping our communication altogether ; independently of the moral effect of that movement in favour of our captive countrymen in Afghanistan under any circumstances, and of our cause, should it be determined to relieve our positions. Whatever may happen elsewhere, I am under no apprehensions of the Ameers of Scinde openly committing themselves, or that their united powers could shake us here if they did ; but I am relying on our being reinforced by one regiment from Ferozepore, which is necessary for the security of this extensive and straggling cantonment.

To Mr. Willoughby he also wrote on the same date, forwarding a copy of the letter from which we have last extracted. In this he says :—

I think Brigadier England wrong to move on to Pisheen as he appears to intend, before the remainder of his brigade ascends the Pass, for that movement will *now* do no good either to General Nott (who says he is not prepared to send an escort to receive the supplies) or to any one else ; whereas, his remaining at Quetta a week longer, will enable his rear detachment to join, and deter the tribes from attempting to oppose it going up the Pass,—or, he would be at hand to aid the ascent of the troops should they do so. As General England is not prepared to march on to Candahar till his *whole* brigade is assembled, surely he should wait till the rear detachment joins him, when the mere fact of his doing so *insures* its safety, which otherwise *may be* jeopardised.

Being at Quetta, he was ready to carry on the supplies to the Kojuck, had General Nott been prepared to send so far to receive them ; *but the latter not being so*, and, moreover, it having been determined that Brigadier England's whole brigade is to take on the supplies the whole way, what possible use can there be in moving off from Quetta to *Pisheen*, there to await the junction of his rear detachment, at too great a distance to support it in the Pass should it be opposed ?

Outram was no diplomatist in the too commonly received sense of the term 'diplomacy.' Had he belonged to the

times of Machiavelli and Richelieu, or moved in the social spheres of Talleyrand and Metternich, he could not have shared the laurels of success with adepts such as these. Open and honest in his ordinary dealings, only under some strong conviction of doing service to his country could he have been otherwise than plain-spoken. But reticence may be a virtue on occasions: and he could not brook that the rumour of our proposed abandonment of Afghanistan should be spread abroad one moment before the dread fiat to that effect had gone forth. 'Don't let out,' he said to Lieutenant Hammersley in the postscript of a note dated March 28: 'that Government contemplates ultimately withdrawing from Afghanistan. It is satisfactory to find, however, that it is determined to re-establish our power in the meantime. *That I shall let out readily enough.*' The very day on which this note was written, occurred a serious disaster to our troops. General England was defeated at Haikalzai, a village in the Pishin valley, about 30 miles above Kwatta, suffering a loss of 27 killed and 71 wounded. He had left the latter cantonment, escorting treasure, *en route* for Kandahar, without awaiting a detachment in completion of the full force at his disposal which had yet to work its way through the Bolan. His reasons for moving thus early, contrary to Major Outram's advice and General Nott's orders, were stated to be the want of forage at Kwatta, and the probability of obtaining a better supply at Kal'a Abdullah, four marches beyond. At this place, some eight miles east of the mouth of the Khojak Pass, he had purposed to remain until joined by the remainder of his brigade.

This serious mishap was retrieved on April 28, exactly one month after its occurrence, when the enemy's position at Haikalzai was attacked and carried by General England, with a loss of 10 wounded only, and the brigade passed on, with its treasure convoy, to Kandahar. But its effect was not fa-

vourable to British prestige, weakened the influence of British political officers, and materially embarrassed the local government. There arose from it, moreover, questions of a disagreeable nature, the discussions of which were attended with bitterness, though confined to our own camp. On one side it was urged that the military authorities had been misinformed of the strength of the enemy and the erection of stockades; on the other, the accuracy of the information afforded was defended in both respects, and the supposed importance of the enemy's defensive works was disallowed. The controversy found its way into the Bombay newspapers, and in one of them—the 'Times'—an account of the Haikalzai disaster appeared, so closely resembling the general's own official despatch on the subject dated two-and-twenty days before, as to lead to the impression that the text of that record had through some unknown agency been made available for the public enlightenment before attaining the period of legitimate publicity. Outram felt keenly the matter of this premature publication for two especial reasons. First, because he considered the reflections made therein upon the conduct of the *sipahis* engaged to have been unjust, and based upon wrong assumptions; and secondly, because he could not acquiesce in the censure awarded his assistant, Lieutenant Hammersley, for want of proper acquaintance with the disposition and movements of an enemy which had successfully opposed our troops in their advance from Kwatta.

As regards the native soldiers, it was his belief that they would ever follow and ably second a European leader. They had 'already proved on fifty occasions,' he maintained, that they were 'able and willing to meet Afghans in the field—aye, and always beat them too when led against them, without any other European assistance than that of their European officers.' In the case of Lieutenant Hammersley, Outram's open and generous advocacy brought him under the displeasure of

the higher authorities. Construing the remand of that officer to regimental duty as consistent with temporary retention of appointment, pending a further inquiry into the supposed cause of his removal from political employ, Outram took upon himself if not actually to suspend a Government order, certainly to interpret it to the advantage of his subordinate, whom he looked upon as a hardly-treated Government servant. He kept Hammersley in his post at Kwatta, on the fair plea of urgent requirements; and addressed letters on his behalf to Generals Nott and England, and Colonel Stacy. But those were busy times, and there were not many who, in the midst of heavy, responsible, and very serious work, would willingly go out of their way and devote their little leisure to inquiring into an individual grievance on which, if they had not themselves already spoken, the opinion of superior authority had been openly expressed. Among the names of men who came forward on the occasion that of Outram was almost the only influential one denoting a thorough-going, fearless advocate of the officially condemned lieutenant. It is little to be wondered that the result was failure to establish his case; and to his request that his assistant might be allowed to draw office allowances up to date of final decision on his appeal, the Secretary to Government with the Governor-General informed the political agent that compliance was impossible. 'It would,' to quote the despatch, 'sanction the step which you took of suspending that officer's removal from his situation, pending a reference to the Governor-General as to the ground upon which you assumed that he had been removed.' This decision, however, was never communicated to poor Hammersley, who died three days before the date which it bore. His mind had become seriously affected by the treatment he had experienced, and this treatment formed the subject of his incoherent utterances to the last. What Outram himself anticipated, as the

result of his chivalrous stand on behalf of his subordinate, we find in a letter to Mr. Willoughby:—‘ See this correspondence about Hammersley, which I take it will end in his Lordship sending me to my regiment.’

Lord Ellenborough’s despatches, or the withdrawal orders, written on April 19, have given rise to much comment and controversy. We have no intention of discussing their merits in these pages, or comparing them with the previous instructions to Generals Nott and Pollock, Sir Jasper Nicolls, and Mr. Clerk, of March 15. Such a criticism of general policy belongs to history rather than biography. But one arrangement of the Government of India, ruling the subordination of the political to the military authority in Lower Afghanistan, Sind, and Baluchistan—in other words, investing General Nott with the chief political as well as military control in those parts—directly affected Outram. His first impression, on receipt of it, was that the change in his position was due to a too free expression of opinion in his correspondence with General England, of which a copy had been submitted by himself for the Governor-General’s information. The conclusion was natural enough under the circumstances: for this was not the sole instance in which the tone of his Calcutta letters, contrary to former practice, might be judged significant of mistrust or even censure, quite as much as of confidence or cordiality. At the same time, he admitted the wisdom of leaving the military commander unfettered and wholly responsible during the operations of war; and in due course received a laconic reply to a question put on the subject to Captain Durand, explaining that the extension of Major-General Nott’s command had no reference to him individually, but was part of a general measure.

Mr. Clerk, having forwarded a copy of two important letters he had addressed to Government, regarding the possible military movements and political questions to which

the violent death of Shah Shuja had given rise, Major Outram thus wrote officially to Mr. Maddock on May 2, 1842:—

‘We are well-informed that Kelat-i-Ghilzie and Candahar are amply provisioned at present; and General Nott, having the means of keeping a strong brigade in the field, to which will be added Major-General England’s brigade, now marching on Candahar, insures the command of the resources of the country, communication with Kelat-i-Ghilzie, and the ability to provision that fortress and Candahar to any extent requisite. Upwards of 20 lacs of treasure are now at the disposal of General Nott, which, with the facility of selling bills on India, arising from so large an introduction of specie, removes any apprehension of want in that respect for a long time to come. A sufficiency of medicines, rum, &c., for six months for the whole force above the pass is now with the army. I believe, also, that a considerable supply of ammunition has been taken on by Major-General England. . . .’

He then proceeds to estimate the probable strength of the Kandahar garrison, when reinforced, the means of carriage available, and the defensive arrangements requisite for posts such as Kwatta, Dadur, Sibi, and Chatar, adding:—

‘So long as we are in power at Candahar, there is no risk of disturbance below the passes in Cutchee or Sind.

‘I have thus shown that General Nott will have it in his power, on the junction of the Bombay troops, either at once to take the field at the head of 10,000 men in support of General Pollock’s advance upon Cabool—leaving every military position throughout southern Afghanistan, Beloochistan, and Sind in sufficient strength; or, should the forward movement from Jellalabad be delayed for a season, his troops may maintain their present positions so long as necessary.

. . . I now proceed to state what are our prospects of securing increased means in camel-carriage for further reinforcements during such delay.'

The details then given in respect of camels would hardly interest the reader, however indicative of the writer's capacity to deal with the most practical of commissariat questions in the East. His conclusion is thus expressed :—

'With the above means, and the carriage which can be hired in this country, I estimate that two strong brigades could be equipped in time to ascend the Bolan early in October next, so as to pass though Shawl and reach Candahar before the severity of winter.'

The proposals contained in the remainder of the letter are based on the hypothesis of a concentration of the whole force, for the cold weather, at Kandahar, after the re-occupation of Kabul. They embrace the question of the future government of Afghanistan, and suggest the fitting course to facilitate the return to India of the British troops. We add one paragraph which bears directly upon a leading topic of the past year's campaign, and involves a consideration which may at any time be revived :—

'As so immediately connected with the interests of my charge (Beloochistan), I may be allowed to offer an opinion on the Candahar portion of the arrangement: 1. If this were a separate kingdom under Timour Shah, maintained by a British subsidiary force, our troops could always be supported *viâ* the Bolan or Sonmiáni routes (for the late temporary suspension of our communication could never have occurred had the simple precaution of securing water in Killa Abdoolla been taken, or a fortified post been placed in the Kojuck Pass); they would never have to encounter the vicissitudes of the extremes of climate; we should secure as

commanding an influence over the neighbouring kingdom of Cabool as if our armies continued there—because its principal channels of commerce would lay through the Candahar territory, on which the ruler of Cabool would rather depend than either the routes through the Khyber and Punjab on the one side, or Balkh and Bokhara on the other; even the products of those countries would reach Cabool more cheaply, safely, and perhaps more expeditiously by the well-protected (as they might be under this arrangement) roads from Shikarpoor, or Herat, *viâ* Candahar; we could exercise an equally commanding check to the maturing of hostile designs against British India, either at Cabool or Herat; and we should the better secure our engagements to Kelat. 2. Leaving Timour Shah in possession, but without military support, our influence at Candahar would always be paramount from being in power on the Indus, and commanding her communications with India, but of course, without military support Timour's kingdom would be liable to constant anarchy, commerce would not be fostered, and the territory of our ally, the Khan of Kelat, would be liable to infringement. . . . Whether those evils, or the advantages on the other side, are of sufficient magnitude to warrant the expense and inconvenience of maintaining a large army at such a distance as Candahar, it is not my province to discuss; and the question which must arise as to how we are to maintain our pledges to Kelat under the second arrangement, can be considered hereafter if required.'

It has been remarked, with truth, that Indian officials of the higher grades are often much overtasked in the performance of their professional duties; and that the daily routine of a London Government office is, as a rule, child's play to that of a zealous, conscientious, and responsible Anglo-Indian functionary, engaged in civil and political administration. If

this be so in ordinary times, how much stronger would be the argument under the influence of the crisis resulting to British India from the Kabul insurrection of 1841? Outram's work at Sakhar—for the ten weeks of his sojourn there in the hot weather of 1842—if judged from his correspondence only, must have been arduous in the extreme. Yet contrasted with like evidences of the immediately preceding months at Dádar, it was much in accordance with his usual practice. At these times, the number of his correspondents, the precision and frequency of his semi-official communications to each, the scope, length, and minute detail of his strictly official despatches, addressed on one occasion to the Supreme Government, on another to Bombay, or to Generals Nott, England, or Farquharson—cannot but strike the observer as marvellous. They certainly give speaking testimony to the clearness of head and exceptional ability of the writer.

On May 10, Outram received a letter from Mr. Maddock, in which was the following sentence:—‘Unless you should have received instructions of a different tenor from General Nott, you will, without prejudice to your health, at the first convenient period proceed to Quetta, or to such other point as may enable you to give the greatest aid in facilitating the movements of Brigadier England and the Major-General.’ The same day he wrote to Captain Durand:—

I have to-day received his Lordship's orders to proceed to Quetta, and shall make immediate arrangements for doing so, which I might have hesitated to do, supposing that the order arose from my own proposition to you in my letter of the 18th ultimo. This had chiefly in view to induce General England to advance to General Nott's support, that event having happily been already accomplished; but as I observe Mr. Maddock's letter, dated 28th, has taken twelve days on the way, mine of the 18th could hardly have reached you on the 28th, or tenth day. I conclude, therefore, that the order for my proceeding to Quetta must be solely caused

by his Lordship's opinion that my place is above the pass just now; and as I can with perfect confidence entrust the conduct of affairs here to Lieutenant Brown during my absence, I must admit that Quetta is the most important position for my exertions—to facilitate so delicate an operation as the retreat of a large army down mountain defiles before an elated enemy; and moreover to carry into effect the necessary arrangements of our future relations with the Khanate of Kelat, prior to the abandonment of the upper countries, on the subject of which I addressed Mr. Maddock officially on the 7th instant.

You must be well aware that it is at some personal risk I shall pass the burning plains of Cutchee so late in the season, or ascend the Bolan when no military escort is available for me; and I remind you of this circumstance, not with any view to enhance my services, which I value not as anything equal to what is due by me to my Government, but in the hope that this, perhaps my last opportunity of advocating a policy which I deem vitally essential to our interests in India, may be permitted to me—should you see no objection to lay my humble opinion privately before his Lordship, which it would be presumptuous in me to have intruded officially through Mr. Maddock.

You have seen with what confidence General Nott looks forward to the result of a combined advance on Cabul from Candahar and Jellalabad. General Pollock also appears to have no doubts on the subject, provided carriage can be furnished to him before the proper season to advance is past, which I consider may be any time from the beginning to the end of June or even July. In the meantime dissensions between the Barukzye and Suddozye factions with, probably, the secret influence of the Kuzzilbash tribes on our side, will weaken the enemy to such a degree that while the one party would hail our support with delight, the other would be in no condition to oppose our entrance to the capital; nor, even allowing that the enemy did continue united to oppose us, can there be a doubt of the result, at a season when the harvest is available, and the climate is congenial to our troops. Even supposing that the Bala Hissar is held against us, I should be equally confident of speedily reducing Cabul with General Nott's siege train (four 18-pounders), in addition to the splendid field artillery with Generals Pollock and England, and also at Candahar, and we know that the rebels are deficient in gun ammunition.

Had I any personal military reputation, however great, I should have no hesitation in staking the whole on this result, i.e. that we should take Cabul, by the end of June or July, dictate our own arrangements there, and march on Ghuznee (which need not be approached by General Nott on his advance to Cabul, as it can be turned), having taken which, winter the whole army at Candahar, if too late to pass Quetta (although during ordinary years the Bolan Pass may be descended at all times), and *then* withdraw from Afghanistan on such terms as will preserve us and our allies—the Seikhs, Brahooes, and Sindians—from future insults at the hands of the Afghans.

Or, should General Pollock be disabled, by deficiency of carriage, from a forward movement this season, and find it inconvenient to support his large army at Jellalabad, he might leave adequate garrisons there and in the Khybur, and await his time at Peshawur, while General Nott can preserve his positions at Kelat-i-Ghilzie and Candahar, by securing his communication with Quetta by a post in Kojuck, without a chance of the enemy attempting any one of those positions, disheartened by previous failures, and by seeing them newly stored, reinforced, and strengthened. To this alone General Nott would confine his operations this season, if our final triumph is put off till the next. Moreover, his troops could be better supplied while thus divided, than if all were united on one spot, and he would be more ready and able to take the field when the time arrived, with a certainty of meeting no opposition on the side of Kelat-i-Ghilzie at all events.

If, therefore, a *temporary* retirement on Quetta only is contemplated—which the orders to General Nott to destroy the defences of Candahar and Kelat-i-Ghilzie would denote—I would beg most earnestly to advise that the orders to General Nott be so far modified as to leave it to his own discretion either to abandon or sustain his present positions, at any rate till October, before which period he could not descend the Bolan Pass, or traverse Cutchee, on account of the heat.

By remaining as at present, he commands, and will gather in, the resources of the country sufficient to provide for the campaign next season, if it cannot be concluded in this; he holds all the strong positions and a secure communication throughout the country from Sukkur to Kelat-i-Ghilzie; he breaks the confidence of the enemy, whose dissensions in the meantime he would be in a posi-

tion to take advantage of, should any particular turn, favourable to the views of his Lordship, in the interim occur; he insures the safety of the Cabul prisoners who, so long as we hold our positions in the country, would be preserved by those in whose possession they are, with a view to making their own terms when we re-assert our power, which they will dread so long as we do not withdraw; he reverts agitation in Scinde and Beloochistan so long as he remains in power at Candahar; and he preserves his troops in health and plenty, who, if all are brought to Quetta during the hot season, will suffer from that dreadful climate, even more severely than last year, owing to the assemblage of so large an army on the spot; while the valley of Shawl and neighbouring districts under Kelat would be unable to afford provision and forage for so long a period.

How far you may deem yourself warranted in communicating the opinion of so humble an individual as myself to his Lordship I cannot judge; but such is my opinion, founded on some practical experience and much consideration, i.e. that if Generals Pollock and Nott are allowed to exercise their own discretion as to advancing on Cabul this season, they may very probably find that they can do so without risk of failure; but that, if the campaign is deferred for a season, we shall be in a much better condition to enter upon it at our convenience by retaining our present positions until then, which we *can do without difficulty*.

I think an apology to a comrade, having the honour and interests of our country equally at heart, can hardly be required for this letter, which, however, I leave to your discretion, and that of Mr. Maddock—should you both do me the favour to exercise your judgment upon it—whether or not to lay before his Lordship.

I hope to have everything ready to leave this by the 15th, and to arrive at Quetta in a few days, being unencumbered with baggage or followers, who cannot pass through Cutchee now.

True soldier as he was, Outram, as will be seen, resolved not only to obey the letter of the instructions received, but to carry out in a loyal spirit the duties required at his hands. He was, however, mortal, and could not but feel aggrieved at the *modus agendi* adopted towards him, so different from

that to which he had been accustomed under former masters. Opening his heart to Mr. Willoughby, he has left us another letter bearing the same date as that just laid before the reader, but couched in a different strain. 'I go up,' he writes to the friendly and sympathising secretary, 'to officiate in the immediate neighbourhood, and as the humble subaltern of General Nott, where so lately I was supreme; I pass through the heat of Cutchee, and the dangers of the Bolan, to the deadly climate, privations, and annoyances of Quetta, from a comfortable house, and the comparative ease and luxury of this station—with certainly less cheering prospects, under *these* circumstances, but with undiminished zeal, and determination to fulfil the duty assigned to me, however degrading that may be in my opinion, and however lowered my personal position; but I must here in justice to myself add, that it is not my intention to remain in this country, in the subordinate capacity so assigned to me, one hour after the withdrawal of the army, and hostilities have ceased; when the necessity for a *military dictator* in these countries no longer existing, I should degrade myself by continuing in a lower position than that to which Government had thought proper to raise me, and in which, so far from in a single instance incurring displeasure, every act of mine has been highly approved, and every measure successful. Unless, therefore, the Court of Directors are pleased to order that, on the termination of hostilities in Afghanistan, General Nott's political powers over me are withdrawn, I most assuredly must respectfully resign the line in which I have so long endeavoured to serve them, and join my regiment, a poorer man than when I left it, nearly twenty years ago.

'It is in no bitter spirit I write this; these are simply the feelings of an honourable man willing to do his duty so long as he can do so without dishonour, but not gro-

velling enough to submit to the least degree of *disgrace*. As such you have long known me, my dear friend, and ever shall know me while I live.

‘I might have hesitated, probably, so strenuously to urge an immediate advance on Cabool, *now the Shah is removed*, had we not been fully equal to the task but *being so*, and having been at the cost of throwing the troops into Afghanistan, why now stop half-way?’

Fifteen days later, he transmitted intelligence to General Nott, which appeared to warrant the assumption that if he and General Pollock could advance that season on Kabul, they would carry everything before them. Stating his own opinion that Lord Ellenborough’s orders of April 19 were based on the supposition that Nott’s actual strength was insufficient to carry out the objects in view, and that the advanced positions of Kandahar and Kalât-i-Ghilzai would be untenable in winter, he dwelt upon his Lordship’s evident intention to recommence active operations at a later period, when reinforced from England. ‘I still hope,’ he continued, ‘that late favourable events in Afghanistan . . . may induce Lord E. to allow you to exercise your own discretion as to whether or not to prosecute the campaign at once, or to hold on your present positions.’ Then, after discussing the present and prospective means of carriage for the army, and stating in detail the number of camels and bullocks available, or likely to be available, for possible movements, he thus referred to home intelligence which had recently arrived by the Overland:—

‘This does not look as if the instructions Lord Ellenborough received by this Mail would authorise *backing out* of the scrape we have got into; and I have every hope we shall soon see the consequences of the home advice in new instructions from his Lordship of a more wholesome tenor

than those of the 19th ult. I leave this on the 1st proximo, and expect to be at Quetta on the 10th, where I shall be ready to receive, and most willing to execute, your commands.'

Accordingly, on the night of June 1, installing Lieutenant Brown in his own vacated post at Sakhar, he left that place to repeat the old, dreary, and perilous journey to the Passes beyond the desert. The frontier posts of Khan-garh, Chatar, and Sibi were taken on the way, and subjected to minute inspection. Reaching Dádar on or about the 8th, he was delayed there two days, to enable him to move rapidly through the Bolan, and on the night of the 11th he was again at Kwatta. Here Outram remained until the end of September, to play, as he had done elsewhere, an active and important part in the drama then engaging the attention of our statesmen at home and in India—and, be it added, to contribute materially towards its happy *dénouement*. But his personal action, while patent to the world about him, was unrecognised where it should have been rewarded: in some cases it was misrepresented, and, as we shall have to show, an incident of zeal on his part was magnified into deliberate error. At first there were, amid the thunder-clouds, gleams of sunshine and other signs of fair weather. Notwithstanding the little consideration evinced towards their political agent in the matter of subordinating his work to military control, and the doubtful courtesy of the curt replies to his references, the authorities in Calcutta were occasionally pleased to throw out expressions of approbation at a devotion out of the common order. 'His Lordship wrote to you,' are Captain Durand's words, in a letter of May 21, replying to Outram's of the 10th idem, already reproduced *in extenso*, 'upon the subject of your moving up to Quetta prior to the receipt of your request for permission

to go there ; and with the hope that it might be done without too great a risk on your part of health and safety. His Lordship anticipated that neither of these considerations would by yourself be allowed to weigh against a call for your services where deemed most necessary ; but still, he fully appreciates the readiness with which you willingly incur such risks in the execution of your duty.' Again, on learning of his later movements, the private secretary was instructed to forward to him the Governor-General's approval. 'I am directed . . . to inform you that his Lordship highly appreciates the public zeal you have manifested in the performance of your duty at much personal risk, by proceeding at this season to Quetta, where your exertions are especially required in aid of Major-General Nott's army.' Between five and six weeks later, came the merest scrap of a note written by Lord Ellenborough himself, in which was the following passage :—'I am much gratified by the accounts received from you to-day of the extent of carriage now at Major-General Nott's disposal, and of the facility with which you think it can be immediately increased. It is essential that the Major-General's army should have furnished to it ample means of moving in any direction ; and I indulge the hope that, through your zealous and able exertions, this has now been done.'

Perhaps, however, the highest as the most substantial testimony to the value set upon his services by the Indian Government would have been the despatch of May 22, had its provisions ever been carried into effect. This paper was a remarkable one in its way, pregnant with matter, and withal brief and business-like. It opened with a quasi-lament over a system which admitted the employment, in countries to the north of India, new to our intervention, of a number of British officers equal to that of the salaried *employés* in H. M. diplomatic service throughout Europe. It expressed

the Governor-General's intention to reduce this overgrown institution to within reasonable limits, and sketched out an administrative staff for the Lower Indus, consisting of an envoy, with private secretary, and three secretaries of legation, besides whom, and a commandant of escort, no European officers would be required. It gave the envoy power to nominate and remove any and every member of his establishment, and to leave their distribution and disposal under his absolute control. It touched upon the delicate question of individual fitness, for the service contemplated, of certain European officers then in Sind or Baluchistan. Finally, Outram was requested at once to prepare nominal lists of natives whom he would propose to employ, together with a note of the duties to be entrusted, and salaries to be awarded, to each; and, as a climax to the whole project, the last of the twenty paragraphs in the despatch informed him that he himself was to be the Envoy. Thus was it worded: 'It is necessary for me to acquaint you that, on the formation of the reformed establishment, it is the intention of the Governor-General to bestow upon you the appointment of Envoy, his Lordship being perfectly satisfied with the zeal and ability you manifest in the discharge of your duty.'

But the promise here held out was not fulfilled; and, as we have already led the reader to infer, Outram never *was* the Envoy. He replied with sufficient fulness to the requisition made, to elicit an expression of the Governor-General's pleasure, in finding that his 'zealous attention' had been given to the subject; but there the matter dropped. Only he was desired, without waiting his Lordship's final orders, to adopt 'every practicable means of economy' to reduce the expense of the offices under his supervision, an object to which it will be remembered he had already turned his thoughts with substantial result.

Had the situation been more favourable to the work required, he would have fulfilled these Government behests both readily and completely. But he had other and more urgent work to attend to, in the interests of the same Government in Kalát, and to these he gave his first spare hours. In this instance, his views were, unfortunately, not those of the Governor-General. Again, had there been no Kabul disaster to repair, and had our troops never penetrated the passes of the Bolan or Khaibar, Outram would have found ample occupation of his time in putting on a sound basis British relations with Sind and Baluchistan. In neither country had our interference produced a result on which the nation, in or out of Parliament, could be heartily congratulated: and where justice has been once superseded by expediency, it is not always easy to prove satisfactorily, to comparative strangers, that the act is a mere exception to the rule. As it happened, the exigencies of the moment made Afghanistan a primary consideration; but Baluchistan, represented by Kalát, was not to be shelved or set aside; for, even in connection with the larger State, it had a special political value. To Sind we shall have to revert a little later.

During his stay at Dádar, in the winter of 1841-42, a period to which we have already referred, Outram's hands were indeed full. Had it been possible, he would then have gladly devoted himself exclusively to secure to Kalát a good government, and to enhance generally the influence of its Khan. But the urgent nature of his exceptional duties on the occurrence of the crisis in Kabul, and for many months afterwards, not only forbade the concentration of his energies on any isolated measure of diplomacy, but took him away for a time from the side of his Brahúi *protégé*. Thus, in March 1842, under the pressure of circumstances, the young chief had been deprived of his two best friends and supporters.

Colonel Stacy—rejoining his regiment to accompany Brigadier General England up the Pass, and share in the reverse as well as after-success at Haikalzai—had been replaced, in attendance on the Khan, by Captain Pontardent, of the Bombay artillery. Just three days later, Outram himself left Dádar for Sakhar, whither, for the time, he was to shift his head-quarters. But the political agent would allow neither locality, nor the pressure of internal politics, to draw off his attention wholly from his double charge, or lessen his responsibility a whit in the conduct of our relations with Kalát or Sind. His correspondence with the new agent at the former place was continuous and comprehensive. Among the topics discussed in it, none had a greater importance than the ownership of the Shál district, better known to us under the more popular name of Kwatta, its principal town.

Early in May, from the furnace of his summer quarters at the Sakhar residency, Outram put before the Governor-General his proposal—since virtually adopted by Lord Dalhousie and his successors—to substitute pecuniary for military help to the Khan of Kalát, upon the withdrawal of British troops from Kandahar. To this end, he recommended that a lakh and a half of rupees (15,000*l.*), the sum originally suggested by Captain French, be given—ostensibly, and in some sense practically—in commutation for tolls as well as remuneration for protection of merchandise. At the same time, he enclosed extracts from demi-official letters which he had addressed to Mr. Colvin in the beginning of the year, on the policy to be pursued with the Kalát State in the contingency that had now arisen, viz., our impending withdrawal from Afghanistan. As the writer was informed, in reply, that his correspondence, when embracing matter of a political nature, should be submitted through Major-General Nott, disposal of the reference became an affair of considerable

duration. Two despatches on the subject were transmitted to the General. A fortnight after, he wrote this 'demi-official' to Mr. Maddock:—

'General Nott merely acknowledges the receipt of my various letters relating to Kelat, but gives me no instructions whatever, or any intimation of what are his views. Neither does he appear into to intend to enter any consideration of the subject; for in a private letter to Lieutenant Hammersley he thus expresses his opinion: "When the Government gave me political authority, it could only have been intended the power of putting my veto on what I may deem injurious; it could not have been meant that I should interfere with details. The charge of an army of 25,000 men is quite enough." Seeing that I can look to no instructions from the General regarding the settlement of Kelat, and considering that our future quiet in Sind depends so much on a wise permanent arrangement with the chiefs of Baluchistan before we leave this country, I shall be obliged again to solicit his Lordship's consideration to the subject. . . . As I have been directed to address Government only through General Nott, officially, I must trouble you in a demi-official form, so soon as I receive a reply to a reference I have made to Captain Pontardent.'

But between the date of his second despatch to General Nott, and this letter to Mr. Maddock, he had written to the former officer asking for sanction to make over to Kalát the districts of Shál and Sibi, in the spirit of Lord Auckland's intimation that it might be good policy if the Khan were 'made to feel our disposition to give to him and his tribes this accession of power and of territory so soon as our difficulties in Afghanistan should be brought to a close.' The young Khan had behaved loyally towards us throughout a

period of disquiet and disturbance. Even on the very day that the assistant political agent at Kwatta heard of General England's reverse at Haikalzai, that officer reported well of Nasir Khan's fidelity. 'The Khan is staunch to us,' he then wrote, 'but would like a Barukzai at Kandahar.' There were other reasons why Lord Auckland's views of a fitting reward to Kalát should be acted on in anticipation of the winding-up of our relations with Afghanistan. To Outram's mind, the aspect of affairs in his neighbourhood gave an urgency to the case which brooked neither delay nor circumlocution. We quote from two paragraphs of his letter to the Major-General:—

'It appears to me that by now placing the territories in question in the Khan's hands, he will be enabled to secure their possession before the withdrawal of our troops, which, if delayed till that event, he might be unable to effect; and as I can see no advantage to us from holding them (further than merely continuing their general control as at present but on *his* behalf), I think that in fairness to the Khan we should now make them over, and during the remainder of our stay assist him in establishing government.

'Should any treaty be entered into with any of the Afghan powers, I beg to suggest that the cession of Shál and Sibi be formally stipulated; otherwise, the Khan being in possession of those districts will be a plea for the Afghans making war on him, whom we are bound by treaty to protect against foreign enemies. Although the late Khan of Kelat was not possessed of Sibi at the time we took possession of the Khanate—and that district, though once in his possession, had generally continued an appendage to Kandahar—still, as the high road of the Afghans into Kachi (which the fortress of Sibi commands), as well as being a check on the hill tribes, and as a natural fortress of Kachi, I would most strongly

recommend that it be not given up to the Durrani on any consideration. . . .'

How the general regarded the acknowledgment of his political suzerainty, expressed by the submission to him of the political agent's proposals, may be gathered from his already quoted letter to Lieutenant Hammersley ; but perhaps the following full text of his reply to two out of the three references on the Shál and Sibi transfer will not be bad presumptive evidence :—

'Kandahar, June 28.

'My dear Sir,—I have the pleasure to acknowledge the receipt of your letters as per margin.

'(Signed) W. NOTT, Major-General.'

At this particular juncture, there were dangerous intriguers moving about the State of Kalát. One Muhammad Sadik, a leader of Afghans hostile to Shah Shuja's cause, was seeking to bring about a coalition of Brahúis against the British power ; and one Muhammad Sharif, who had fled from British custody at Sakhar, was supposed to be plotting with similar intent, using Muhamínad Sadik as his instrument. Outram would have rejoiced in receiving renewed sanction to strengthen the Anglo-Brahúi alliance, and so defeat the machinations of its opponents, by an act of such palpable friendliness as restoring a whole district to the Khan's territorial possessions. But the unwillingness of the Calcutta magnates to take so decisive a step was a difficulty not easily to be removed without a bold stroke of individual responsibility. Time was precious ; opportunities once missed might never occur again. There was no veto against carrying out Lord Auckland's expressed wishes referred to by Outram. The latter, reasoning from experience that he was right, and risking the rest, took upon

himself to do that for which he had vainly asked sanction, and to which sanction, if withheld, had not been refused. He cut the Gordian knot by making over Shál to the Khan, acquainting the Supreme Government with the circumstance, and soliciting authority to dispose in like manner of the district of Sibi.

As an independent exercise of judgment, the accomplished fact was coldly accepted and curtly noticed by Lord Ellenborough and Major-General Nott. Neither censure nor approval of the policy followed were vouchsafed in either case. In the letter addressed to Major Outram on the occasion from the Governor-General's head-quarters at Allahabad, we read that 'it may have been expedient to transfer Shál to the Khan of Kelat at that particular time, if it were determined that it should ultimately belong to him'; while the communication from Kandahar, acknowledging the report, 'with pleasure,' and adding, 'I daresay the Government will approve of your proceedings regarding Shál,' qualifies the courtesy so evinced by the words immediately following:—'but it was my wish to retain Quetta until my army encamped there; this would have been convenient. I regret you did not wait for my orders.' Fortunately, Outram could inform the General that the transfer would in no way interfere with his arrangements; for that our military occupation of the town would remain as before, and the resources of the district were at his disposal. More trouble, however, was involved in disposal of the question at Allahabad.

The despatch of the Supreme Government did not confine itself to the abstract fact of the transfer effected under Lord Auckland's implied sanction. It dealt with certain collateral circumstances. Outram, in excess of zeal for the interests of the State, having had recourse to a diplomacy foreign to his nature, had laid himself open to a charge of error; and the action thus taken, though not even noticed by his immediate

superior at Kandahar, was commented upon by the Governor-General in a manner which could not but wound him grievously. Not a word of objection to his proposal had been communicated by Government; so that when the General declared himself unwilling to interfere in political matters, he interpreted his position to be that of a responsible officer, virtually authorised to act on the responsibility vested in him. In this view he had addressed the Khan to the effect that he had received authority to make over the district to his Highness, as though 'a reply on the subject had just been received.' We quote from Outram's own letter, in which he certainly did not make the best of his case, but reported the occurrence against himself with the most ingenuous frankness and persuasion of rectitude. And he further aggravated his imputed offence by laying before Government a copy of his letter to Captain Pontardent, instructing that officer to explain to the Khan that the political agent had come to Kwatta mainly with the object of carrying out the transfer aforesaid—a statement strictly in accordance with the announcement contained in his letter to Captain Durand of May 10, already quoted. In the last-noted communication the two main objects of his projected move to Kwatta were specified—viz., to facilitate the retreat of the army down the passes, and to 'carry into effect the necessary arrangements of our future relations with the Khanate of Kelat, prior to the abandonment of the upper countries, on the subject of which I addressed Mr. Maddock officially on the 7th inst.' The restoration of Shál, in accordance with Lord Auckland's unrepealed instructions, was unquestionably the most important of these necessary arrangements, and, of the two objects, the settlement of Kalát affairs was that which most called for the presence of the political agent in person.

The term 'error' has been applied to Outram's procedure: but assuredly it was something more than the desire to

dispense even-handed justice which prompted a rebuke such as this :—

‘The Governor-General will not now consider to what extent, if at all, and under what circumstances, if any, it may be justifiable to resort to fiction in political transactions, but his Lordship must observe that to resort to fiction in communications to a native chief, without the shadow of justifying necessity, if any such there can be, is conduct inconsistent with the character which he desires the diplomacy of India to maintain, and calculated to shake the confidence of the Government in the fidelity of the communications it may receive from its own officers.

‘The Governor-General trusts that he shall never again have occasion to remark upon similar conduct, which he has witnessed with the greater regret on the part of an officer so able and so zealous in the performance of public duty as you have heretofore shown yourself to be.’

Outram’s reply was respectful and dignified. We quote from the concluding paragraphs of an important public despatch which introduces the personal exoneration, as it were, incidentally :—

‘In conclusion, I beg to be allowed to express my regret that my measures should have caused the severe displeasure of Government, and with the utmost deference to declare that throughout my public career no measure of political expediency, however urgent, has ever in my mind warranted a wilful departure from, or perversion of, the truth, such as I understand to be imputed to me in the despatch alluded to.

‘In the enclosures to my despatch to your address . . . I intimated the necessity for making over Shál and Sibi to Kelat before evacuating Baluchistan—a measure, the prospect

of which the late Governor-General had authorised me to hold out to the Khan. In your reply . . . no objection was made to that proposition, but I was directed to communicate in all matters relating to Kelat through Major-General Nott. It never occurred to me, consequently, that any objection was intended to the transfer of Shál, which I naturally considered one of the most important measures to be carried into effect previous to our withdrawal from Baluchistan, and a part of the final political settlement with the Kelat State . . . the principal object of my being sent up to Quetta, as a matter of course—although to aid General Nott to withdraw the troops was certainly specified, and was considered by me as a consequent duty.

‘. . . Your despatch . . . adverts to there not having been “the shadow of a necessity” for the communication to the chief of what is designated “a fiction”—I had declared in . . . my letter on which you thus animadvert, that the necessity was extreme, in the following words which I beg leave to quote, to save the trouble of reference: “I hope the measures I have had recourse to, with a view to counteract such designs—which, if successful, would have thrown Baluchistan into a flame, and involved a war with the Brahúis—will be approved by his Lordship, and have the desired effect.”

‘Under this explanation, I sincerely and earnestly hope that I may be exonerated in his Lordship’s mind from the supposition that I could wilfully pervert truth under any circumstances; and at the same time I submissively claim for any errors of judgment which I may inadvertently commit, such indulgent consideration as his Lordship may deem just to an individual situated as I here am, with no instructions or precedents to guide me; . . . harassed in body and mind by my incessant endeavours to forward the public service; kept in ignorance of the measures intended by the authorities at Kandahar, which I am expected to forward; and surrounded

by a fanatical and treacherous people whom I have to preserve in good faith, although naturally opposed to us by religion, and by awe of our enemies their neighbours—besides being goaded by recent recollections of the many hardships they have suffered at our hands, such as spoliation of their territory, sacking of their capital, and slaughter of their Khan and principal chiefs. In successfully working as I have been under these disadvantages to effect almost impossibilities, and at the sacrifice of health and every reasonable comfort, I had hoped to earn the approbation of his Lordship's Government; but although so bitterly disappointed, I shall not relax in the slightest degree my endeavour to forward the public interests.'

We have purposely dwelt upon an ungracious passage in the high and honourable career under review, hitherto little discussed, because it relates to a charge which, in the heat of much-to-be-deplored after controversy, was the severest that could be revived against James Outram; and because the rude form of its expression so affected his sensitive temperament that, were we to slur over the incident or leave it wholly unnoticed, our biography would be unwarrantably incomplete.¹

¹ Mr. Lushington, an advocate of Lord Ellenborough's policy, in *A Great Country's Little Wars*, thus speaks of the restoration of Shál: 'The portion of his dominions taken from him (the Khan of Kelat) has since been restored by Lord Ellenborough. It is worth observing that to this single act of justice we may attribute the subsequent tranquillity of the country.' Further on, he alludes to this measure as 'almost the only spot upon which the eye can dwell with pleasure, in the dark history of our four years' supremacy beyond the Indus.'

Palmarum qui meruit ferat! How can we doubt that this act of justice, and the efforts of Outram and his assistants in 1841-2, paved the way for a better understanding with the Baluchis in later years, the full fruit of which has been seen in our operations of 1878-9. When Dr. Stocks travelled through these regions in 1850, he found the name of Outram still honoured above all others in Baluchistan. He transmitted to him a letter from one Kurd chief, old Allah Dinah, of Merv, with a postscript from another, in which the former offers 'to be always ready, as in 1842, to perform any service that may be re-

Not many hours after despatch of his letter reporting the cession of Shál, Outram was present at the capture of Muhammad Sharif, effected by Lieutenant Hammersley in command of a party of Púna horse. He explains with characteristic modesty and consistent self-denial, that he had himself accompanied his political assistant merely to afford the weight of his 'authority for any ulterior measures that might have been necessary.'

Though General Nott must have received his famous permission to withdraw *viâ* Kabul on July 20, Outram could only thus write on August 1 to Mr. Willoughby: 'Not being honoured with his Lordship's confidence regarding what is to be done by General Nott, and the General having bound Rawlinson to the strictest secrecy, he is unable to inform me; I can but give you, therefore, such insight into what is intended, as I glean from officers of the camp who have correspondents at Kandahar. This, it appears, is decided: i.e. that General Nott takes the bulk of his army northward, and General England brings the remainder this way.'

We need not linger over the events of that memorable month of August, during which Generals Nott and England moved out of Kandahar, the one in the direction of Kabul, the other in that of Kwatta; or of the still more memorable month of September, when Ghazni was deprived of the Somnát gates, and Generals Nott and Pollock entered Kabul from different sides, triumphantly to reassert the power of British India. Throughout the two months named, Outram was at his post, ever active and busy, striving to

quired of him; while his comrade, Syud Wais Shah, of Mastung, 'desires remembrances of former passages and adventures of the road,' adding that 'many others, be they of greater or lesser note, hold yet good memory of Outram Sahib.' Allah Dinah told Dr. Stocks that he was ready at Outram's call, with his whole clan, to open the Bolan and act according to orders.

fulfil the instructions, while conscious of the unjust displeasure of the Supreme Government; marvellously successful in counteracting the opposition, and obtaining the support of those among whom he was placed; and finally securing, in despite of many and serious obstacles, the practically safe and unobstructed passage through the Kohjak to Kwatta of General England's troops on their way back to Sind and India, the 'impedimenta' of the column being carried on Brahûi camels. Constant mental worry, and the distress naturally caused by the death of his assistant, Lieutenant Hammersley, at whose bedside he had watched for several nights, brought on an affection of the brain, which might have terminated fatally in the case of a man of less seasoned strength, and which compelled him, hardy as he was, to employ Captain Richardson as a temporary amanuensis. But his energy and fine spirit carried him safely through the crisis.

A letter to his old friend Mr. Bax gives a graphic view of what was really a most critical act in the drama then in progress. Its date is September 6. Elsewhere he speaks of his illness as having 'speedily brought him to the brink of the grave':—

We have weathered a storm, which had long been brewing in this quarter—fomented by the Ameers' agents from Scinde, and Mahomed Sadeeq and Saloo Khan, rebel Affghan leaders, all of whom were striving to cause the Brahoes to rise—the former, with a view to occupy us above the passes, while they should disturb the small force in Scinde, the latter that the Candahar troops should be unable to detach towards Cabool. All these schemes were thwarted, however, by various precautions and counter-workings, and by the capture of the principal mover, Mahomed Sherif—a Syud who escaped from confinement at Sukkur (two days after I left that station to come here), at the instigation of the Ameers' minister, who deputed him to embroil the Brahoes with us. I 'chuppaoced' (surprised) him in the midst of the Kakur tribes,

whom he had enrolled for the purpose of bringing against us here, simultaneously with certain disaffected tribes of Brahoes (who had been successfully tampered with), and the Affghan rebels. This averted the first convulsion ; but a second nearly followed when it became known that Candahar was evacuated, and that only a very small force was to return this way, having no Europeans in its composition, and scarcely any artillery, and no cavalry, the main body of the forces being taken on by General Nott to Cabool. This caused the mischief-brewers again to bestir themselves in the endeavour to seduce the Brahoes to join in opposing General England in the Kojuck, and to close the Bolan Pass. Suffice it to say that in this again they were foiled, and not only have the Brahoes continued faithful, but they will also fulfil their pledges to supply our forces with the requisite carriage cattle (6,000 camels), for which we are dependent on them, General Nott having taken almost every beast of burden with him. The very delicate operation of passing the troops down the Bolan, when having the appearance of a *retreat*, will, consequently, be effected without opposition, I trust, and with the aid, moreover, of the very tribes whom it was scarcely but fair to expect, *under such circumstances*, would at least do all in their power to discompose us, if not openly turning against us. . . .

From the above you will observe that I have incurred his Lordship's displeasure, and that I have been ill. The first was caused by my taking on myself to restore the province of Shawl to Kelat, after in vain seeking instructions for two months (having stated that its immediate restoration was essential to preserve the Brahoes faithful)—*which restoration had previously been pledged by Lord Auckland!!* Notwithstanding which, and our treaty with the Khan of Kelat, Lord Ellenborough was for leaving him and the Affghans to scramble for what we ourselves had robbed Kelat of in the first instance! My having taken this . . . on my own responsibility, caused the extreme wrath of his Lordship. . . . So much for my own affairs—Oh! by the bye, I forgot the allusion to my late illness; it was a serious bout of brain fever, of which I thought little, and the doctors thought serious. Now to turn to the satisfactory fact that our troops *are* on the march (though at the eleventh hour, and doing what ought to have been done two months ago) to Ghizni and Kabul.'

To his mother he wrote cheerily at the same time:—

‘We are about to withdraw to Sukkhar, and then we shall have 10,000 men, which insures the peaceful management of our affairs in Sind, and all will be satisfactorily settled by the end of the year. In the course of this month we move down into the plains, and by about the middle of next, not a British soldier will be on this side of Sukkhar. In the intended new arrangements, I am to be styled Envoy, with Secretaries of Legation, &c.—higher titles than Political Agent and Assistants—but I do not expect any increase of salary. The duties of my new appointment will be quite a sinecure compared to what it was heretofore, when I had personally to traverse all Sind and Baluchistan with fifteen Assistants scattered over the country. . . . Everything is quiet within my charge; and I am enabled, without difficulty, to furnish the means of moving our troops from the people of the country, which is satisfactory, considering how strenuously it has been the endeavour of our enemies to turn the Brahúis against us for some time past, and how much their people had suffered at our hands until their Khan submitted a year ago.’

On or about October 1, he bade farewell to Kwatta. Before leaving, he despatched one of his last letters to his esteemed friend and trusted adviser, Colonel John Sutherland. In this he ‘poured out his vexations’ on public and private matters, and entered into a long account of the ungenerous treatment which he had experienced at the hands of the Supreme Government. And it was unjust as well as ungenerous; but the climax had not yet been attained. Another injury was to be inflicted, the cause of which can only be traced, on the one hand, to that secret pernicious influence which affects an Indian pro-consul as well as a European Court, and, on the other, to the infatuation yielding to that influence. He thus unburdened himself to his confidant:—

‘Human nature could hardly be tried beyond what I have had to endure during the past few months. The disgrace

of our Cabul disasters; the bare thought of the possibility of the more disgraceful abandonment of our honour and of our imprisoned countrymen, which was contemplated; the anxiety regarding my own Mahomedan charge; all this of a public nature have I had to endure—which, however, could be compensated by the retrieval of the honour of our army, insured by the order to march on Cabul, although issued at the eleventh hour, were it not for anxiety regarding the prisoners who *now* are jeopardised, but would not have been so had we advanced, as we could have done and should have done, two months earlier. Now for my private vexations. I complain not of military supersession, because where warfare is likely to occur, the responsibility should never be divided, and of course should rest on the military commander; I complain not of being bandied like a racket-ball, up and down this abominable pass, because it is my duty to go wherever it is thought I am most required; but I do complain of the *lackey* style in which I am treated by the Governor-General; of the bitter reproof he so lavishly bestows on me when he thinks me wrong, and I know I am right; of the withering neglect with which he treats the devoted services of those in my department; of the unjust sacrifice of one of my most deserving assistants; of the uncereemonious dismissal of five others without any communication to myself whatever on the subject. Such treatment (caused solely by his Lordship's vexation at my advocacy of the advance on Cabul and poor Hammersley's cause) would have goaded many men to madness; but I verily believe it has been the resurrection of me from the very jaws of death—like Marryat's middy—for, when in extreme danger the other day (brought on, by the bye, by attendance on the death-bed of poor Hammersley, whose death the medical men declare was accelerated, if not positively caused, by the treatment he received), the most insulting letter I ever received in my life . . . arrived; my

eager desire to reply to which gave a fillip to my system from which I benefited at any rate.'

Accompanying General England through the only part of the Bolan Pass where molestation was considered likely, and himself aiding to flank the heights at the head of Brahúi auxiliaries, he pushed on alone to Dádar. Here he prepared his long report of the evacuation of Baluchistan, and of the services rendered by himself and the officers under his orders during the critical period through which they had lately passed. At the expiration of three days, he rode rapidly into Sakhar. There were reasons for this speed, independently of political requirements and the storm-cloud overhanging the province to which he was returning. He had to report himself to a new superior officer—one whose acquaintance he had yet to make, and whose sympathy he sought to enlist, if not for himself, at least for those who had done good service in his department. But it is now time to introduce a new actor, destined to play an important part in the drama of which the closing scene was to be laid in Sind.

In the autumn of 1841, Major-General Sir Charles Napier, a tried soldier of the Peninsula, and ex-governor of Cephalaria, then in his sixtieth year, accepted from Lord Hill the offer of a command in India. Arrived at Púna, after taking over his military charge, he did not restrict his attention to the mere neighbourhood of his place of sojourn, but soon turned his thoughts to the critical state of British relations with Afghanistan. Before long he had submitted to Lord Ellenborough, among more general remarks, his opinion on the operations necessary to be undertaken for recovering our prestige and strengthening our position in that quarter. Eventually, in August 1842, he was directed to proceed to Sind and assume command of the troops there

and in Baluchistan, with entire control over the political agents and civil officers. If the action of their chief be any criterion, this nomination was neither distasteful to the latter, nor unexpected by them. Some months prior to its notification, Outram, with a view to securing the presence of a military leader fitted by rank, experience, and energy, to direct the movements requisite to retrieve his country's reputation, had set his eye upon the old soldier as the wanting man for the left bank of the Indus, and sought to impress upon Mr. Willoughby his own conviction to that effect. 'Despatch him in a steamer,' he wrote unreservedly to the secretary on April 14, 'even if he has to stop at Sukkhar.' Referring again to the wished-for arrangement in a letter to Captain Durand of April 16, he says of the proposed nominee: 'General Napier, whose character seems formed for such a crisis.'

The General had been at Sakhar for about a week when Outram arrived there on October 12. There is every reason to believe that their mutual regard was as genuine as their first meeting was outwardly cordial. They consulted together freely and unreservedly on the more urgent political questions of which they had to take professional cognisance; and the long Dádar report was willingly delivered over to the superior officer for submission to the Governor-General. Especial attention was given to the pending negotiations with Sind, where both the Haidarabad and Khairpur rulers were, more or less, disposed to resist the demands of the British Government. It is not improbable that the return of General England's troops may have led to the supposition that we had been compelled to evacuate Afghanistan, and thus encouraged them in their unfriendliness. Under the orders of Government, communicated before his departure from Kwatta, Outram drew out a return of complaints against the Amirs for submission

to Sir Charles Napier. Before receipt of this paper the General had himself commenced a memorandum of observations on the occupation of Sind for the Governor-General's information. Among many pertinent paragraphs one asserted that several chiefs had neglected their treaty obligations; and pleaded 'abundant reasons' why, in the position then held by us in the country, we should take to ourselves Karáchi, Sakhar, Bakhar, Shikarpur, and Sabzalkot. With reference to this view, Outram repeated his impression that the parties who had 'most deeply committed themselves' were Mirs Rustam and Nasir Khan of Khairpur, and Mir Nasir Khan of Haidarabad. But the proposals involved a considerable amount of detail, into which it would be impossible to enter. We will therefore only add, to this notice of them, that the 'memorandum' was completed after personal communication with Outram, to whom the original sketch was handed for perusal. 'His experience of these countries,' wrote Sir Charles Napier, 'his abilities, and the high situation in which he has been placed by the Governor-General, render his opinion very important.' 'Since his arrival,' he continued, 'he has given me every assistance.'

On October 22, Outram told Mr. Willoughby: 'I work with hearty goodwill under Sir Charles, because he works heartily with me, and sympathises in my degradation.' The term is a strong one; but the severest blow of all had not then been delivered. On October 26, as we gather from a letter of that date again addressed to Mr. Willoughby, Outram had been remanded to his regiment, and the political establishment had been dissolved. Of the promised appointment of Envoy to the States on the Lower Indus, not a syllable was said. Neither by official nor semi-official communication was a word of explanation on the subject offered. The order bore date the 20th of the month; and thus it ran:—

‘The Governor-General requests that Major-General Sir C. Napier will express to Major Outram and the other political officers, his thanks for the zeal and ability they have manifested in the collection of the means of carriage and supply, and in their various transactions with the native chiefs and tribes, tending to facilitate and secure the descent of the several columns of the army.’

Such was the only recognition, such the only reward, ever vouchsafed to Major Outram and his hard-wrought assistants, so far as Lord Ellenborough and the Government of India were concerned: and in point of fact the only official return Outram ever received for ‘these three eventful years’ of exceptionally arduous and important service, was this curt remand to regimental duty. Nevertheless Lord Auckland stated in the House of Lords on February 26, 1843: ‘He took that opportunity of saying that, throughout these transactions, to no man in a public office was the public service under greater obligations than to Major Outram; a more distinguished servant of the public did not exist, and one more eminent in a long career.’ And the President of the Board of Control, Lord Fitzgerald, in reply, expressed his ‘cordial’ concurrence in the terms applied by Lord Auckland to Major Outram’s services.¹

¹ The reasons assigned by Outram himself for Lord Ellenborough’s displeasure are detailed in the letter to Mr. Willoughby of October 22. Be it observed that in each case he had *deliberately* sacrificed his own interest to the demands of right and public honour:—

‘My real offences being such as he cannot forget, i.e. my advocating poor Hammersley’s cause, and opposition to the disgraceful retreat (from Afghanistan) once determined on; for in the only instance in which he fancied he had room to find fault, he has tacitly admitted that I was in the right—at least so I read the acknowledgment of my letter defending the cession of Shál, without comment or disapproval, which otherwise would have been expressed freely enough, I presume. . . . As my name does not go up with his despatches, announcing the Kabul victories, of course I shall have no share in the honours that will be showered. . . . But I regret nothing that has passed; indeed you are well aware that I fully laid my account to suffering personally in the cause

Many personal regrets at the treatment experienced might be added to many personal testimonials of unrequited service, to prove how public opinion was shocked at this unexpected result of a campaign to the success of which Outram had so essentially contributed. But we content ourselves with an extract here and there from the papers before us.

The late Brigadier-General John Jacob was, at this time, a subaltern in command of the Sind Horse. His services in protecting the line of march of the returning troops through Kachi had been handsomely acknowledged by General England, who had attributed to his exertions 'the miraculous tranquillity of the country,' and who had given him charge of the outpost of Khangarh—now Jacobabad—with two companies of infantry and two guns, in addition to his own irregulars. 'I have just received,' he wrote to Outram on October 27, 'your letter . . . about the abolition of the politicals. As far as we small fry are concerned it must be a matter of perfect indifference, I should think, to all; but *everyone* must be indignant at the . . . way in which *you* have been treated. . . . Pray accept my best thanks for all your kindness to me. One thing you may be sure of, namely, that no man was ever looked on with more profound respect and admiration than yourself, not only by your friends, but the very party against you. They might as well try to put out the sun as to throw your services in the shade!'

Much in the same strain is Colonel Sutherland's letter of October 31, in which he writes:—

'I was . . . prepared to congratulate you on attaining the highest office in the department, and you may judge of the dismay with which I received last night the order of the 19th. I could not at first believe that it applied to *you*, and I of Hammersley, months ago; and were it all to do over again, I would not vary my course. I am prepared for the worst, and fully expect it.'

cannot yet believe that it is intended to affect you injuriously. . . . If services such as yours are not to be rewarded, what is to become of us who have been leading inglorious lives in tranquil India; and if his Lordship seeks to reward only military services, where, in the lists of those who have most distinguished themselves, or raised the military reputation of their country, will he find anyone more deserving than James Outram ?'

An address from the clerks of the Sakhar agency, under date October 29 - among the eight signatures to which are those of men who did much good after-service in Sind, in higher and more responsible positions—was full of gratitude and sympathy. The language may have been a little soaring and ambitious, but there can be no doubt that its spirit was genuine, and that the good wishes expressed in it were sincere. To Outram this evidence of appreciation must have been gratifying; and none the less so because it especially acknowledged the kind consideration he had shown for the personal welfare of each member of his establishment in seemingly trivial but really significant acts.¹

On October 28, Sir Charles Napier had officially written his compliance with Major Outram's request to proceed, when convenient, to Bombay, intimating at the same time that a steamer had been placed at his disposal. 'I cannot allow you to leave this command,' he added, 'without expressing the high sense I entertain of your zeal and abilities in the public service, and the obligations I personally feel towards you for the great assistance which you have so kindly and so diligently afforded to me; thereby diminishing in every way the difficulties that I have to encounter as your successor in the political department of Sind.'

Nor was this all that the newly arrived commander had

¹ See Appendix F.

to say of one whose single-minded usefulness and nobility of character had been foreshadowed to him during his short stay in Bombay, and personal acquaintance with whom set the seal of truth upon local report. We learn from the journals of the day that on November 5, a public dinner was given to Major Outram by the Military Society at Sakhar, on the occasion of his departure from Sind. At this, nearly one hundred officers of the three Presidencies were present; among them Sir Charles Napier, who, as chairman, spoke as follows:—

‘Gentlemen,—I have told you that there are only to be two toasts drunk this evening; one, that of a lady (the Queen) you have already responded to, the other shall be for a gentleman. But before I proceed any further, I must tell you a story. In the fourteenth century there was in the French army a knight renowned for deeds of gallantry in war, and wisdom in council; indeed, so deservedly famous was he, that by general acclamation he was called the knight *sans peur et sans reproche*. The name of this knight, you may all know, was the Chevalier Bayard. Gentlemen, I give you the “Bayard of India,¹ *sans peur et sans reproche*, Major James Outram, of the Bombay army.”’

¹ This honourable epithet has since become permanently linked to the name of Outram. The fitness of the connection was quite recently referred to in an anniversary sermon, grandly eloquent in its simplicity, delivered by the Dean of Westminster to a crowded congregation in the Abbey.

CHAPTER X.

1842—1843.

Back in Sind again.—The Amirs and their Downfall.—Extracts from Journal.—
Defence of Haidarabad Residency.—Embarkation for England.

IF Outram's departure from Sind occasioned a spontaneous ebullition of personal regard on the part of his many friends in that province, his return to Bombay was, in every sense, a moral triumph. A Government letter, acknowledging his report of arrival, expressed the great satisfaction with which the Governor in Council had perused Sir Charles Napier's letter to his address, on taking charge of the political department he had vacated, and further assured him of the 'high gratification' which the Bombay authorities had derived 'from observing the eminent zeal and ability' with which he had 'discharged the important duties confided to him during the three past eventful years.' And in token that these were not mere words of compliment, the Governor, ten days after his arrival, offered him command of the Púna horse, an appointment just placed at his Excellency's disposal; stating his regret that there was then no post available which, in point of responsibility and emolument, would approach nearer to those he had already held in the Western Presidency, 'with such distinguished advantage to the public service, previous to . . . joining the Commander-in-Chief, in the field.'

But Outram was not disposed to remain in India one day longer than necessary, unless the State really required his presence. The formation of an army of reserve at Firúzpur had certainly made him scent possible warfare, and he had

written to Captain Durand on the subject before leaving Sakhar. But Lord Ellenborough's reply to his request to be allowed to perform in the field the military duty for which he had become available, received in Bombay, held out little prospect that his wishes would be gratified. His Lordship, it was set forth, would with pleasure make use of his services for active operations, but he trusted that there could be 'no necessity, after return of the army from Afghanistan, for any such taking place.' The Bombay appointment, honourable as it was, offered no temptation to him to forego his homeward visit after nearly twenty-four years of almost incessant work. So returning his grateful acknowledgments for the Governor's consideration, he declined the cavalry command on the plea of having sent in his application for a year's furlough.

How it was that the home project was again deferred, and that the further aid of the superseded political agent was again required in Sind, under a new designation but for the solution of an old question, we shall leave Outram to relate presently in his own words. It so happened that he was invited to a public dinner organised by the community of Bombay for the purpose of bidding him an honourable farewell, and testifying to him, on his embarkation for Europe, that his Indian career had been highly appreciated by his fellow-countrymen in the East. At this banquet all political and official matters were carefully eschewed; and Mr. Fawcett, of the house of Remington and Co., who presided on the occasion, being hampered by no ties or traditions of the covenanted service, must have been regarded as a thoroughly independent chairman. Among other happy eulogies on the guest of the evening, he said: 'Well has he been compared by a gallant officer, in another place, to the knight who, above all, bore the character of being *sans peur et sans reproche*—the noble Bayard, the pride of chivalry, the glory of France; for like him, bold in the field, wise in council, courteous and gentle in the chamber, wherever he

has moved he has been admired, respected, and beloved. The whole course of his service has been so marked with distinction that, were I to endeavour to follow it, I should have to trespass too long on your patience.

But the speaker was compelled to add that, contrary to the original object of the great gathering, their guest would need encouragement for renewed work rather than their good wishes for temporary repose. Relieved from his duties, and about to revisit his native land, he had just re-appeared among them. Now, under sudden exigency, at the call of the State, he had been replaced in harness :—

‘ With that readiness to sacrifice all personal considerations which marks his character, knowing that the post of duty is that of honour, without hesitation he is preparing to return, and a few hours will see him on his route. Those who know him best cannot but be assured that, whatever the duties may be that will be entrusted to his charge, they will be fulfilled in a manner beneficial to the public interest, and honourable to himself. . . . We will not say “ Farewell,” but we will cheer him on his course.’

A few days later, a similar entertainment followed at the club—more of the nature of an affectionate recognition of a comrade’s merits by members of the civil and military services—but we have no space to quote the expressions of confidence and esteem to which utterance was then given. Truly, the sunshine of social and official sympathy which the battered ‘ regimental captain ’ found awaiting him when he returned, a snubbed and degraded man, to those who had known him best and longest, was well calculated to cheer the warm heart which had so long chafed and toiled under the mysterious despotism then ruling the destinies of India. It encouraged him as he entered on one more phase of depressing duty under circumstances which his own journal will best explain :—

‘ Having made every preparation for returning to England after twenty-four years’ absence, on the first application for leave from my duty that I had ever made—taken my passage in the steamer which was to sail on January 2, 1843—written by the previous mail to my wife and mother to meet me in London (from Edinburgh) by February 10 or 12—and in the belief that the Government of India had no further occasion for my services after the summary manner in which I had been dismissed, on November 15, from the political control of Sind and Beloochistan, without thanks or acknowledgment of any sort (and even without the direct communication from Government which courtesy, at least, would dictate towards a person who held one of the most responsible situations in India, and who had committed no error, or, at least, had been accused of none)—I was surprised at receiving, on December 12, the following letter directing me to return to Sind, should Sir Charles Napier require me, but without expressing the slightest consideration for my own wishes or convenience, and without any reference to the Bombay Government, and its Commander-in-Chief, at whose disposal I had been placed.

“ From the Secretary to the Government of India.

“ To Major Outram, &c., &c.

“ d/ Camp Buddes, November 24, 1842.

“ Sir,—Major-General Sir C. Napier having intimated a wish to employ you as a Commissioner for the arrangement of the details of a revised treaty which is to be proposed to the Ameers of Sind, I am directed to inform you that the Governor-General will sanction any such appointment; and you will hold yourself in readiness to proceed to join the Major-General as soon as you may receive from him the notification of his requiring your services.

“ I have, &c., &c.

“(Signed) T. H. MADDOCK.’

‘The summary manner in which I had been removed from my late important charge, where I had been so long the representative of Government, and the unceremonious manner in which I was ordered back to serve in a subordinate capacity where I had previously been supreme, caused my most intimate friends to advise my declining again to place myself at the Governor-General’s disposal to the sacrifice of my private interests, especially considering my previous treatment at his Lordship’s hands, and the ungracious manner of my recall to Sind.

‘But the principle which has ever guided me throughout my career of service—implicit obedience to the orders of Government (and when, as in this case, *orders* were conveyed, and no option was left to me)—I had no hesitation in following on this occasion, and accordingly replied as follows:—“Sir,—I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter dated 24th ultimo; and to forward, for the information of the Right Honourable the Governor-General of India, the copy of a letter I addressed in consequence to the Political Secretary to the Government of Bombay, with that gentleman’s reply, and of my letter to the Adjutant-General of the Bombay army, in accordance with which I purpose embarking in a steamer which proceeds to Sind to-morrow. I expect to arrive at Sukkur about the 30th instant. Dated Bombay, December 13.”¹

‘My departure from Bombay was delayed till December 16, in consequence of the arrival, by the Suez mail on December 14, of General Ventura, for whom the steamer in which I was to proceed to Sind was directed to be detained a couple of days. The only notice I received from the Governor-General of the devotion to Government I had thus

¹ We regret that economy of space compels us to omit the letter which Major Outram drafted in his journal as expressive of what he would have written had he considered his ‘private conscience and feelings prior to public duty.’

displayed, was the simple acknowledgment of my letter through his secretary.'

Outram embarked on the date stated in the steam-frigate 'Sepiramis,' which anchored off the Hujamri mouth of the Indus on December 21. He then shifted into the 'Euphrates,' one of two river-steamers towed by the larger vessel, and moved up the stream. On December 24, after dark, he was at anchor off the Haidarabad agency. During her upward course from Thatta, the Euphrates had been hailed by numerous boats bringing deputations from the several Amirs sent to welcome their old acquaintance and adviser, and anxious to obtain his assistance under the continually recurring perplexities which met them at every new step in the negotiations with his countrymen and successors. To avoid embarrassing discussions, he had been compelled to pass them by on the plea of insufficient time. At Haidarabad also, though he left the landing-place at an early hour in the morning of the 25th, he found messengers from the Amirs begging him to await visits from their masters; and excused himself from receiving them on board much in the same words used to the deputations. He, however, availed himself of the occasion to address a letter to the *darbâr*, thanking the chiefs for their attentions, and expressing regret at inability to attend upon their Highnesses then, with a hope to return soon from Sakhar, after consultation with Sir Charles Napier.

The journal continues :—

'The information I obtained during my voyage up the Indus, and my previous knowledge of the chiefs of Sind, satisfied me that the reports of their warlike preparations were unfounded, probably promulgated by themselves, in the hope that our demands would be less stringent, if we supposed them in any way prepared for resistance. . . . I well knew

that they themselves were quite conscious of their inability to oppose our power; that they had no serious intention of the sort; and that nothing but the most extreme proceedings and forcing them to desperation would drive them to it.

‘On my arrival at Sakhar on the night of January 3, I was much distressed, therefore, to learn that Sir Charles Napier had actually marched some days previously to depose Mir Rustam . . . induced thereto by the subtle acts of Mir Ali Murad, who, in the first place, had promulgated reports of the hostile intentions and preparations of the other Amirs . . . and led the General to address them in a strain to which they had not been accustomed. . . . At the same time their fears were promoted by the misrepresentations of Ali Murad as to the General’s real intentions towards them, he pretending to keep well with us . . . to save them, but really playing his own cards to their ruin. Accordingly Sir Charles having written to Mir Rustam and the others to disperse their troops and disarm their followers . . . Ali Murad led Mir Rustam to believe that . . . our intention . . . was to seize his person and family. In that supposition the old chief was induced to fly in one direction; Mir Nasir Khan and Muhammad Husain in another; and Mir Muhammad Khan to his fort in the desert, Imamgarh; all these parties being represented as in hostile array. Rustam’s party was said to number upwards of 2,000 warriors, daily increasing; Nasir Khan’s about 8,000; and Mir Muhammad’s fort to be garrisoned by 500 men. On the flight of Mir Rustam . . . the Amirs of Upper Sind were directed to obey Ali Murad as Ráis, to whom was to be given over also the fourth shares of their territories, or the customary support of the chiefship. This, in addition to the cession of Sakhar, Bakhar, and Rohri, and all the territory on the eastern side of the Indus above Rohri, which had been previously required by the new treaty. . . . Such was the

state of affairs when I joined Sir Charles Napier at Diji, about 30 miles SE. from Sakhar, on January 4. I found the General preparing an expedition to proceed against Imamgarh, for which we marched the next night with a detachment consisting of about 350 men of H.M. 22nd regiment, mounted on camels, two 24-pounder howitzers of the camel battery, and 60 of the Sind irregular horse, and accompanied by Ali Murad and a few mounted followers.'

At Diji, Outram took the opportunity of submitting to Sir Charles Napier his views as to what were the real objects of the Amirs in pursuing the shuffling practice for which they had become distinguished, and especially in the intrigues and self-seeking of Ali Murad. The general, on his side, discussed with Outram the course which it seemed most advisable to approve for the better government of Sind in the future. He inclined to the belief that a single chief would be preferable to the oligarchy under which the province had groaned for so many years. Outram, while admitting the advantage of a powerful and undivided rule, doubted the wisdom and dwelt on the injustice of subverting, impoverishing, and rendering hostile to ourselves the feudal chiefs as then acknowledged; and had no confidence in the measures which Ali Murad would introduce if placed at the head of affairs. But let us revert to the pages of the journal:—

'We marched from Diji at 2 A.M. on January 6. While riding with the advance shortly after sunrise, we met a man on a camel, whom I recognised as an attendant of Mir Rustam, and who, on seeing me, immediately dismounted and threw himself at my feet. I took him aside and asked him why his master had fled. . . . He replied that, having heard of my arrival, the Amir had sent him to seek me to represent his miserable state, and to beg my kind offices with the General. Having ascertained from the man that the Mir's camp was

situated only a few miles off our line of march, I went back to Sir Charles, told him what I had learnt, and begged to be permitted to go myself to Mir Rustam to communicate the messages of assurance which he (the General) had transmitted through Ali Murad previous to the Amir's flight, but which I was sure the latter had not honestly delivered. . . . Sir Charles allowed me to go: I took with me Captain Brown A. D. C. (at his own request) and two horsemen. Having to pass Ali Murad as I diverged from the road, I was necessitated to inform him where I was going, and to avoid showing mistrust invited his minister to accompany me. Luckily there was no time to precede me with any false reports to Mir Rustam's camp; otherwise the old man would have again, doubtless, been scared away by representations that the British troops were coming to attack him, it being Ali Murad's object to prevent any direct communication between us and his victims, and to promote the belief that Mir Rustam was only bent on hostility. We came upon the Amir's camp, at the distance of about ten miles, pitched on an elevated spot in the midst of jungle. On our approach being seen the utmost consternation was observable in the shouting and hasty assemblage of the armed followers, while the chiefs themselves mounted their horses to fly on the supposition that we were the advance of a *chuppao*. My name being called, however, I was gratified to see confidence immediately restored: the chiefs dismounted and came to meet me, at the same time keeping back their somewhat excited followers. I was embraced by them all most cordially, and taken into their principal tent, a single fly not twelve feet square, in which and a few wretched routies they and their families had been exposed during the late heavy rains. I was distressed to observe that Meer Roostam, who is seventy-two years old, looked very much older and more broken than when I last saw him; he had been, and still was unwell,

caused, doubtless, by exposure and anxiety, the evidences of which were plainly traceable on his benign and venerable countenance. The poor old chief freely disclosed, in the presence of Ali Murad's own minister, how basely he had been deceived; how he had been driven by his brother (Ali Murad) to fly in dread of seizure and transportation; further, how Ali Murad had pledged himself to watch over his interests whilst he himself stayed with the British General. I gave the old man, who expressed anxiety to go in person to Sir Charles, every comfort that it was in my power to offer; but not wishing to expose him to the heat and fatigue of the journey in his then weak state, I said it would suffice to send the eldest of the other chiefs to receive the General's assurance in his behalf, and recommended that he should go back with his family and followers to Khairpur, there to await in quiet and shelter our return from the expedition on which we were engaged—the object of which I told the chief in order that he might see that we had not been in pursuit of himself. After conversing a short time and drinking sherbet with the Amir, I took a cordial farewell of all the chiefs old and young, and proceeded to the spot fixed on for Sir Charles's encampment, accompanied by Mirs Ali Akbar (second son of Mir Rustam), and Dost Muhammad (brother of Mir Nasir Khan); we arrived at about 3 P.M. In approaching the General's quarters we had to pass through Ali Murad's camp, who seeing the chiefs with me, came forward and embraced them with an affected cordiality, and desired them to visit him on their return from the interview with Sir Charles. Meeting his visitors outside, the General took them into his tent, where we all sat together on the carpet in the absence of chairs. The chiefs delivered their message, setting forth that Mir Rustam Khan had previously signified his acquiescence to the new treaty, and was ready to sign it, and to submit to any condition that might be imposed; that he had

fled in consequence of its having been represented that, notwithstanding the General's assurances, transportation was to be the lot of himself and family; and more to the same effect. Sir Charles replied, through the Munshi, in kind words, but in the decided tone and terms which would be addressed to European rebels. The chiefs evidently considered the matter less than the manner, and remarked moreover, that the General neither referred to, or spoke to them through me, which was further calculated to weaken their confidence. I endeavoured to remove this impression by suggesting to Sir Charles, after he had finished, to proffer them his hand, with a view to show his sincerity; and this he very readily did. Before returning to Mir Rustam the chiefs unfortunately went to Ali Murad, who had a long conference and secret interview with them—which ended, I was afterwards grieved to learn, in buying them over to his interests against those of their own father. They saw Ali Murad's power established, and that of Mir Rustam gone, and the ingrates gladly secured to themselves the pledge of the continuance of their own possessions, with an increase thereto from the rising sun: consequently (as I have to-day ascertained through a spy I sent into Rustam's camp for the purpose of watching proceedings) so far from giving any confidence to the poor old Mir, his scheming deputies described the angry tone of the General, and conveyed only, as his orders, that they were all to proceed with their families to the fort of Dijji, and there remain under Ali Murad's protection. They also dwelt on the obviously little influence I had with the General, and argued, therefore, that no dependence could be placed on my doing anything for them. Thus was effected Ali Murad's object in preventing the return of Mir Rustam to his own home at Khairpur . . . where it had been appointed that all parties were to meet me for the arrangement of the details of the treaty and settlement of all differences. . . . He sought to

drive the other Amirs to commit themselves either by acts of aggression, or by keeping "out," so as to induce the General to confiscate their lands and make them over to him—the rapacious man not being content with the whole power, and upwards of half of their remaining possessions which had already been assigned to him.

‘I represented this to Sir Charles, and suggested—with a view to convince Ali Murad that he would gain nothing more by persecuting his brethren further, and that, therefore, his best policy would now be to obtain for himself the merit of appearing a mediator in their behalf—that it should be distinctly intimated to that chief that, should the other Amirs drive the British Government to confiscate their estates, they would not devolve on him, but be attached by the British Government. Sir Charles, whose kind heart always induces him to adopt the most humane course, readily acceded to this, and wrote to Ali Murad accordingly; but unfortunately here, where a decided expression would have convinced that chief, the whole effect of the measure was annulled by the termination of the letter thus:—‘at least I think that would be done,’ or some expression to that purport, which, encouraged as Ali Murad is by the uniform kindness with which the General always treats him, while it gave the Amir an idea of our object, left him the hope of still effecting his aim. Indeed he had now the assurance to write a long letter, advocating the advantage of giving him the entire control of the property of the State, as well as its government—all the other Amirs and chiefs to rely on him for support.

‘These discussions occurred during our march to Imamgarh, where we arrived on January 11. Mir Muhammad Khan, who never had an idea of opposing us (as had been represented), of course fled on hearing of our march from Diji, leaving nothing in the fort but a little grain, and a large quantity of powder which had apparently been stored

there for years, and which, although a very inferior stuff, and caked like hard mud, came into play in blowing up the fortress. This, as a stronghold to which the chiefs of Sind might hereafter have recourse in the event of rebellion, it was a good measure to destroy; for although we had made good our march with a detachment of artillery, infantry, and horse, sufficient to take the place when it got there, it was very evident we might very easily have been prevented reaching it, by filling the few scanty *cutch* wells at our halting places in the desert. The demolition of this fort will also destroy the confidence of the chiefs of both Upper and Lower Sind in their other desert strongholds, such as Shahgarh, Umarmot, and others.

‘The distance from Diji to Imamgarh measured very nearly eighty miles, which we had made in seven marches—the first three through thick jungle, and a not very bad road, the remaining four through an ocean of loose sand hills sometimes very high and steep, over which we had much difficulty in taking the guns (two 24-pounder howitzers of the camel battery). Fatigue parties of infantry were constantly required to drag these up the ascent, although sometimes 25 camels were yoked to each besides. During the 13th, 14th, and 15th, the detachment halted, while the sappers were occupied in blowing up the fort, in utterly destroying which all the powder found in the place (7,000 pounds) was expended.

‘During our stay at Imamgarh a confidential Munshi arrived from Mir Rustam, charged with a last appeal to the General (as he communicated to me verbally on the evening of his arrival, when too late to present him). During the night Ali Murad’s minister, Ali Husain, got hold of the man, and bought him over to his master’s interests. Next morning I ascertained that they were occupied together for upwards of an hour: the result was the delivery of a letter

of a very different purport, more calculated to irritate than to conciliate, the fictitious document having been substituted for the real one by inserting it within the cover to which Mir Rustam's seal was attached. Fortunately I had obtained a clue to the villainy that was going on, and warned Sir Charles of it prior to the receipt of the letter, which accordingly he estimated as it deserved.

‘On the night of the 15th, I departed from Imamgarh for Diji, *en route* to Khairpur, to prepare for the meeting of the chiefs of Upper Sind, and Wakils of the Amirs of Lower Sind, which had been fixed for the 25th, and determined to make one more effort to save Mir Rustam. I made a *détour* to his camp (which still continued where I had left it) and arrived there about 10 A.M. The old chief and all about him received me very civilly, and appeared grateful for the trouble I took on their account, but their confidence in me was evidently much shaken. The corrupted Munshi (who had returned from the General's camp) had doubtless aided those previously in Ali Murad's interests in misrepresenting my real feelings—and their suspicions, consequently, that I was insincere in my friendly professions, were further confirmed when I declared to the Mir, in order that no unfounded hopes should be raised, that it was not in my power to alter the arrangements which had already been decided by the Governor-General, i.e. the terms of the new treaty, and the elevation of, and pledges to Mir Ali Murad; but I said it was my desire to settle all details, and the arrangement of the territory that remained, as much as possible, fairly towards all parties. The Amir then remarked, “What remains to be settled? Our means of livelihood are taken;” adding, “Why am I not to continue Ráís for the short time I have to live?”

‘He gave me a sort of vague promise to follow me in two or three days to Khairpur, but at the time appeared so

dejected and despairing, that I had little expectation he would do so. He parted kindly from me, however, as did the others, and I continued my journey to Diji, which I completed on one camel (upwards of 90 miles in consequence of the *détour* I had taken) by six o'clock on the evening of the 16th. My only escort through this "hostile" country was a couple of Baluch horsemen.'

It was, perhaps, in the brief interval after meeting at Diji, and before setting out for the desert-fort at Imamgarh, to which we have already referred, that the marked difference of opinion on Sind politics between Sir Charles Napier and Major Outram first found expression; and that the germs appeared of a controversy which, to whatever extent developed in later years, was unfortunately never, at any subsequent time, exhausted in manuscript or printed volumes. Amid the many statements and counter-statements addressed to the public by the principals in this paper-war and their advocates, there might be no serious difficulty in seeking out the main issues, but no material object would be gained in the process, and there is manifest harm in needlessly reviving an ungracious theme. Nothing could have been of brighter augury than the first impressions mutually derived at Sakhar in the autumn of 1842. 'Our acquaintance has been very short,' then wrote Sir Charles to the younger officer, with that generous frankness for which he was remarkable, 'but I trust it will continue long. I assure you that the high opinion which I everywhere heard expressed of your character before I had the pleasure of your acquaintance, has been more than confirmed in my mind during the few days we have served together; and I only regret that we did not meet at a more early period and in the field. Believe me when I say that wherever you may be, my best wishes and sincere respect and friendship will follow.' Outram's openly avowed admiration of the General has been already noted in

the preceding chapter. But his letter to his mother dated January 12, 1843, is more to the point still. It was addressed from Imamgarh, at the close of the week's march they had had together over a desert country; and after that each must have opened his mind to the other in personal conversation on the nature of the work they had undertaken :—

‘You will not know where to look for the place whence this is dated . . . so I must explain that it is a small fort, situated in the midst of the desert, about 100 miles a little to the eastward of south of Khairpur, the capital of Upper Sind—a stronghold where the chiefs of Sind are in the habit of taking refuge when in rebellion or pressed by foreign invasion. . . . I found, on joining the General, that he had been led into the field by hostile indications on the part of the Amirs, and that he had been encamped in the neighbourhood of Khairpur some days before my arrival. . . . I had ascertained sufficiently on my voyage up the Indus, however . . . and by previous experience of these people, that they were instigated to feeble attempts to arm by mistrust of us, and with a view to defence rather than any idea of acting offensively: and, as my duty is peace-maker, I hope I shall have the happiness to be instrumental towards preserving amity. My present chief, Sir Charles Napier, is fortunately so good and kind-hearted a man that he never would drive the Amirs to extremity so long as he could prevent bloodshed, and I myself am satisfied that all will be quietly settled . . . he and I are equally anxious to prevent warfare. We shall be back at Khairpur about the 20th instant, when, I doubt not, the chiefs will combine to arrange matters amicably. . . . After arranging with the Upper Sind Amirs I shall have to go to Haidarabad to effect a settlement with those of Lower Sind: so I fear my calculation of going home in the March steamer is wrong, and that I cannot, at any rate, get away before April. In the meantime I am very un-

comfortably situated, having brought nothing up with me but a few suits of clothes, in the determination not to stay in this country. My position as subordinate, where formerly I was supreme, is very grating ; but of course I must suppress all such personal considerations in a sense of public duty ; neither do I complain, or work less zealously than if I were as formerly. Indeed it would be most ungrateful to Sir Charles Napier were I to do otherwise ; for he is most kind and considerate.'

On January 20, Outram proceeded to Khairpur, and there he found the Wakils of the Lower Sind Amirs ; but no representative on the part of those of Upper Sind was in attendance except Ali Murad's minister, who had accompanied him. That Amir himself remained with Sir Charles, and must have been well pleased to be rid of an English officer who, with full knowledge of Sind affairs, had such good cause to suspect and scrutinise his acts. We need not now pause to inquire to what extent the non-fulfilment of Outram's wish to bring about an interview between the General and Mir Rustam is to be attributed to the scheming of this ambitious younger brother. Certain it is that the old chief, impelled to destruction, under some strong and secret influence, fled, and became confounded with our enemies. January 25, the last day allowed to the fugitive Amirs for submission, passed away without the appearance in the British camp of any of the parties, either personally or by proxy.

About this period, Outram was informed through Sir Charles Napier that the Governor-General had fixed his salary, as 'Commissioner' in Sind, at 1,500 rupees (150*l.*) per mensem. He acknowledged the intimation in the following non-official letter :—

'My dear Sir Charles,—I have to-day received your letter forwarding that from Government fixing my salary at 1,500

rupees per mensem. So far from murmuring at the amount, (although less by 200 rupees than I received as political agent in Guzerat years ago,¹ from which I was transferred to Sind on no suing of my own) I really do not consider that I deserve so much, for, in fact, I have been unable to effect anything as commissioner as yet, and see little prospect of doing more.

‘Whatever may be my private objections to receiving what possibly might be construed as a pecuniary favour,² I must, without reference to any personal feelings whatever, abstain from accepting public money which I have not earned. I beg you will not be annoyed with me, therefore, for declining to take advantage of the authority to draw salary as “Commissioner,” or rather the salary assigned to me personally not being that which commissioners in India enjoy.

‘Pray do not suppose that I purpose officially objecting to receive the money, or that I purpose taking any notice whatever of the matter: I merely purpose allowing the half-sheet of Government foolscap to remain a dead letter—or, rather, I have destroyed it, that I might not be tempted hereafter to make use of it.

‘I shall simply draw my Captain’s pay in the field to which I have an undoubted right without being beholden to any. I am too glad of the honour of your friendship and confidence to require or wish for further advantage so long as I continue with you. I shall defer sending this letter, however, until you dispense with my services, lest it should induce you to do so one day sooner than you otherwise intended.

‘I am, &c. &c. &c.

‘(Signed) J. OUTRAM.’

¹ The political agent’s monthly salary in Sind and Baluchistan was 3,250 rupees (325*l.*)

² The following note was Outram’s own on the record:—‘This has no allusion to my dismissal from office of course, but to an accusation from his Lordship of political dereliction from veracity which was not withdrawn, although the refutation was received, and was unanswerable.

The writer of this letter, delivered to the General on February 20, was, however, influenced by other motives than here expressed, in acting as he had done. Foreseeing the utter ruin of the Khairpur chiefs, he dreaded lest they should involve in the same calamity their cousins of Haidarabad, men towards whom he was attracted by the recollection of a lengthened friendly intercourse, and he had solicited the General's permission to remove to the city of that name, in the hope of adjusting matters by personal interference. In another letter to Sir Charles Napier, bearing the precise date of that declining the salary, will be found the following passages :—

‘I am sorry to confess myself unable entirely to coincide in your views, either as respects the policy or justice of, at least so suddenly, overturning the patriarchal government to which alone Sind has been accustomed. . . . I say *patriarchal*, for, however we may despise the Amirs as inferior to ourselves, either in morality or expansion of intellect, each chief certainly lives *with*, and *for*, his portion of the people ; and I question whether any class of the people of Sind, except the Hindoo traders . . . would prefer a change to the best government we could give them. . . .

‘The specific I advocated was, affording protection to the trading classes who should seek to locate in the bazaars of our cantonments, and refuge to the serfs as cultivators in the proposed Shikarpoor farm (obtained on fair terms of purchase). I was sanguine that the mere force of example, which the prosperity of our bazaars and flourishing state of our farm must have afforded to the neighbouring chiefs, would have caused them, from motives of self-interest, similarly to promote trade—consequently to cherish their Hindus and foster agriculture—and consequently, again, to improve the state of the serf. The facility of obtaining protection under British

laws in the heart of Sind, must have compelled the rulers so to govern their people as to prevent their seeking our protection : thus our object would have been gained without either the appearance or reality of injustice.

‘ It grieves me to say that my heart, and the judgment God has given me, unite in condemning the measures we are carrying out for his Lordship as most tyrannical—positive robbery. I consider, therefore, that every life which may hereafter be lost in consequence will be a murder, and I cannot but think that the sudden revolution we seek to effect is as little called for by necessity, as unjustifiable in fact. . . .

‘ Until we entered Sind, I verily believe all classes in the country were as happy as those under any government in Asia. The amity with which four rulers at Haidarabad, and four at Khairpur, acted together, was dwelt upon by all who visited these countries with wonder and admiration. Although every chief ruled his own people, each brotherhood had one head, or “ Rais,” for the conduct of the foreign relations of the State, and whose power interposed in internal quarrels. I do not justify our location in Sind under the terms of the former treaty (my objections to which, stated to Colonel Pottinger at the time . . . I submitted to you), and undoubtedly our coming here has been the cause of much misrule. For instance, we destroyed the ruling head of Lower Sind where now six chiefs have equal powers ; and we undermined the power of the “ Ráís ” of Upper Sind to his ultimate destruction. I am, therefore, very sensible that it is our duty to remedy the evils which we have ourselves caused, and my idea as to the mode in which we might have done so I have stated above. . . .

‘ You observe that I myself had pointed out Ali Murad’s previous consistency of character, and advocated his claims to the “ Ráís ”-ship. I did recommend that his claims to that

dignity, when it became vacant by Rustam's death, should be admitted, as consonant with the customs of the country, and as politic, because Ali Murad never would have submitted to the domination of any of his nephews, and in any struggle with them would have been victorious . . . and because Ali Murad is personally a more able man, as far as we can judge, than any of the others, and, under our strict control and guidance, might be prevented from misusing his power; but I never contemplated conferring the chiefship on him *before* the demise of Mir Rustam—a usurpation which must turn all classes against him, who otherwise would have been as ready to support Ali Murad as any of the others . . . I never had any idea of dispossessing *any* of the other chiefs of *any portion of their territory* to uphold Ali Murad's power, which is sufficiently secured by our countenance . . . I consider that the superior share of territory assigned to the Ráis by Meer Sohrab, was for the maintenance of troops necessary to protect the State against foreign aggression which, as I before remarked,¹ is no longer required under British protection. . . .

‘Had I been in your position, of course I must have obeyed; as it is, I consider myself fortunate that I am here as your subaltern . . . for I know you will never order me to do what my conscience condemns; and if I find it impossible to arrange details which the parties spurn, and you are satisfied that I have honestly exerted myself to the utmost of my ability, I hope you will allow me to depart—which I shall do, I assure you, with a heavy heart, for it is my most earnest desire to serve you usefully, in gratitude for the extreme kindness I have ever experienced from you.

‘I fear I can be of no manner of use here now, but still hope I may possibly do something at Haidarabad, both with the Upper and Lower Sind Amirs, should you send me there.

¹ Appendix G.

‘ I make no excuses for the freedom with which I have expressed myself, because you asked my sentiments, and, I know, would expect me to give them without disguise. . . .

‘ I cannot close this without expressing my sorrow that you should have such a very low estimate of the Amirs personally. I call them “children” merely in reference to their puerile dealings with us and foolish suspicions, but they are much like most Oriental princes, and, in my opinion, equally able to manage their own affairs. . . .

‘ It is with very great concern I write what may possibly cause you annoyance, or presume to differ from you in opinion, my dear Sir Charles, but you would consider me unworthy of your esteem did I hesitate to express my sentiments when you call for them.’

In restricting our extracts, we have omitted very much valuable matter ; but the object of selection has been rather to show the general views of the writer on the question with which he had to deal, than to instruct the reader in the very intricate details of Sind history and politics, a thorough comprehension of which must be acquired out of the range of biography. It is but fair to add the General’s brief but genial reply :—

‘ My dear Outram,—Your long letter, and dinner, came in together, and I only write just to say I have not read it—*ergo*, can’t answer it. I went to the end just to see if you had heard aught of the Vakeels, and see a few words about giving me annoyance. My dear friend, you cannot do that ; a man that can be annoyed at a friend who tells him frankly his opinions, even had they not been asked and are honoured, has neither good sense nor good feeling ; and I assure you, you may trust that I have enough of both to avoid such weakness.

‘ Whatever your letter contains, whether we agree or

not, nothing can affect the sincere regard with which I am, always,

‘Yours, &c., &c.,

‘(Signed) C. NAPIER.’

Sir Charles Napier did not long tarry in the deserts around Imamgarh. Having shown that this isolated stronghold was not inaccessible to his troops, and having destroyed its more material defences, he thought it well to abandon the uninviting locality. On January 18, he was within reach of provisions and water in abundance. Four days later he was at Pir Abu Bakar, a station near Diji. Here, agreeably to his report to the Governor-General, he was to be joined by the remainder of the force, with which he would advance towards Haidarabad, should the negotiations which Major Outram had undertaken not progress satisfactorily. We have shown that nothing had been done up to January 25. On the 28th the General wrote from Haláni, about twelve miles from the Indus, and on the high road between Khairpur and Haidarabad, that the Lower Sind Amirs had all sent *vakils* with full powers to Major Outram. Those in Upper Sind having made no sign, had been addressed by a special proclamation extending the time for appearance up to February 1. Military operations, it was stated, would go forward; but the persons of the chiefs would be respected, and all considered as friends up to the specified date. Outram himself was, in accordance with his request, ordered to Haidarabad; but the letter of instructions miscarried, or was treacherously withheld, and he did not leave Sakhar until February 4, reaching his destination by steamer on the 8th idem. Sir Charles was then at Daulatpur, about 90 miles north of Haidarabad.

Amid the clouds and smoke of controversy in which this particular passage of history has been enveloped, we discern

and may safely lay down as fact that, while the General officer who exercised civil and military control in Sind was, in accordance with his own views and under the thorough sanction of the Governor-General in India, hastening to bring about a crisis which he believed to be both excusable and imperative, his Commissioner was in the false position of one acting against his judgment and conscience, but under a sense of inexorable duty.

On the day of his arrival at Haidarabad, and on the day following, Outram held conferences with the Amirs. At these were present Mir Nasir Khan and sons, and Mir Muhammad Khan, representing the ruling chiefs of Lower Sind, and Mirs Rustam Khan and sons, Mir Nasir Khan, and Mir Muhammad Khan of Khairpur. The Commissioner pressed upon them the acceptance of the new treaties; but the resistance displayed was of a determined character. It was argued by the Amirs that, having never broken the old agreements into which they had entered with the British Government, there was no necessity to impose upon them new and objectionable terms as punishment for an offence which they had not committed. In the light of free agents, they declined them *in toto*. There was one condition, however, on which they would be induced to submit: that was, the restoration to Mir Rustam of the turban of sovereignty. They further begged that the march of the British troops might be delayed; otherwise it would be impossible for them to withhold the Baluchis from aggressive operations. On the afternoon of February 9, deputies from the Haidarabad Amirs waited on Major Outram, and applied the seals of their Highnesses to a written pledge to sign the new treaty. Three days afterwards, a further conference was held, at which the Persian copies of the draft treaties were produced, and a formal request made to the Amirs, both of Upper and Lower Sind, to affix their seals in the presence of the British

Commissioner. The meeting was so far satisfactory that the Haidarabad Mirs, also Mirs Rustam and Muhammad of Upper Sind, did as required, and Mir Nasir Khan of Khairpur promised compliance on the following morning. But it was evident, from the signs out of doors, that the Baluchis meant mischief, and, notwithstanding the precaution taken by the chiefs against outrage, one of the British officers of the escort was struck by a stone. On the following afternoon, confidential agents from the Amirs waited upon Major Outram to ask for assurances on behalf of Mir Rustam, whose rights the Baluch Sirdars had pledged themselves to uphold. As it was impossible to give these, the deputies expressed themselves to the effect that there was little hope of allaying the excitement of the people. The Commissioner, they urged, had demanded that the Amirs should control their soldiers and subjects, and had promised that the General would carefully consider their alleged grievances. If any replies on these points were to be made they would bring them that night. Otherwise it was to be taken for granted that their masters could do nothing further. The messenger did not return that night. Sir Charles Napier was then sixty miles from the capital, at Sakarand, where he had halted three days in compliance with Major Outram's request.

On February 14, Outram saw cause to believe that open hostility was intended by the Amirs. Independently of appearances in his immediate vicinity, our seizure of certain men of the Marri tribe, reported by the General, would, he thought, bring matters to a crisis. He wrote to Sir Charles accordingly, and addressed a request to the officer commanding H.M.'s 41st regiment, then *en route* to Karachi, to halt at Thatta, or the former place, pending further orders for its disposal. On February 15, he wrote his now historical despatch to the General, describing the attack upon the British Residency near Haidarabad. It was characteristic of the

writer that he desired the officer in command of the escort to report the brilliant affair. Sir Charles Napier, however, returned Captain Conway's despatch, insisting that as Major Outram's diplomatic functions had ceased with the first shot fired, it was his duty to report, as senior officer present. To this Outram was only reconciled by the General's assurance that his representation of Captain Conway's gallant service would most benefit the latter. The official account is brief : but we curtail it in order to add a few particulars heretofore unpublished :—

My despatches of the last few days will have led you to expect that my earnest endeavours to effect an amicable arrangement with the Ameers of Sind would fail ; and it is with much regret I have now to report that their Highnesses have commenced hostilities by attacking my residence this morning, which, after four hours' most gallant defence by my honorary escort, the Light Company of Her Majesty's 22nd regiment, commanded by Captain Conway, I was compelled to evacuate, in consequence of our ammunition running short.

At 9 A.M. this morning, a dense body of cavalry and infantry ¹ took post on three sides of the Agency compound (the fourth being defended by the 'Planet' steamer, about 500 yards distant), in the gardens and houses which immediately command the inclosure, and which it was impossible to hold with our limited numbers. A hot fire was opened by the enemy, and continued incessantly for four hours ; but all their attempts to enter the Agency inclosure, although merely surrounded by a wall varying from four to five feet high, were frustrated by Captain Conway's able distribution of his small band, and the admirable conduct of every individual soldier composing it, under the gallant example of their commanding officer and his subalterns, Lieutenant Harding and Ensign Pennefather, Her Majesty's 22nd regiment, also Captains Green, of the 21st regiment native infantry, and Wells, of the 15th regiment, who volunteered their services, to each of whom was assigned the charge of a separate quarter ; also to your aide-de-

¹ Ascertained, afterwards, to have amounted to 8,000 men under the command of Mir Shahdad Khan, his cousin Mir Muhammad Khan, Nawab Ahmad Khan Laghari, and many principal chiefs.

camp Captain Brown, Bengal engineers, who carried my orders to the steamers, and assisted in working her guns and directing her flanking fire. Our ammunition being limited to forty rounds per man, the officers directed their whole attention to reserving their fire and keeping their men close under cover, never showing themselves or returning a shot, except when the enemy attempted to rush, or showed themselves in great numbers. . . . Our hope of receiving a reinforcement and supply of ammunition by the 'Satellite' . . . being disappointed, on the arrival of that vessel without either, shortly after the commencement of the attack, it was decided at 12 A.M., after being three hours under fire, to retire to the steamer while still we had sufficient ammunition to fight the vessel up the river; I requested Captain Conway to keep the enemy at bay for one hour, while the property was removed, for which that time was ample, could the camp followers be induced to exert themselves: accordingly, after the expiration of another hour (during which the enemy, despairing of otherwise effecting their object, had brought up six guns to bear upon us), we took measures to evacuate the Agency. Captain Conway called in his posts, and all being united, retired in a body, covered by a few skirmishers, as deliberately as on parade, carrying off our slain and wounded.

So far the official report. We add a supplementary statement from a source not less authentic.¹ It should be premised that the Residency, as already shown, was situated in an enclosure or compound, the wall of which was from four to five feet high. This wall was built more or less parallel to the then river bank; its length—roughly N.W. to S.E.—was probably 300 yards, and its breadth 200. Included herewith were two smaller enclosures on the N.W. face, in which the doctor and his assistants had houses. At the S.E. end was a village, with bazar and orchard appertaining. The gate was on the N.E. side, the direction in which lay the city of Haidarabad.

¹ An original draft in Outram's handwriting, which has had the advantage of supervision by an officer who bore the chief part in the honourable and notable exploit narrated—Captain, now Major-General, T. S. Conway (C.B.).

The position for the first three hours is thus described :—

To the westward an approach by the bed of a *nullah* was watched by a party of fifteen men under Lieutenant Pennefather, guarding the wall.

To the front,¹ four scouts watched a body of horse, and occasionally fired shots to keep the assailants at a distance.

Twenty men, under Captain Wells, manning part of the wall, watched the gate : some ten men more being placed in reserve under cover of the cook-house, in readiness to repel any sudden rush to this quarter.

Twenty men under Lieutenant Harding manned another part of the wall. The whole were obliged to lie very close in consequence of the commanding fire from the flat-roofed upper-storied houses in the neighbouring compounds ; and never showed their heads above the wall, except when the enemy threatened a rush at the gate, or to surmount the wall on the opposite side. Each man bored a hole with his bayonet, through which to watch the enemy, and to fire at every favourable opportunity.

There was also a party of thirty men to watch the enemy occupying the adjoining village, outbuildings, and detachment lines, in dense masses. Of this party a corporal and three men were posted in a convenient building to prevent the enemy surmounting some flat-roofed stables available. One particular position, considered the most important, was occupied by Captain Conway himself, although from time to time he visited other posts. Conductor Keily, with a commissariat guard of a Naigue and three *sipahis*, kept the entrance from the bazar.

A flat-roofed office of considerable elevation was held by Captain Green and fifteen men—stationed at the windows, or wall, and on the roof. This position commanded the bazar square and communication with the vessels, and prevented

¹ The gate-side—i.e. looking towards the city—is the 'front.'

the enemy showing himself outside the orchard wall; he was, moreover, kept in check by the fire from the 'Planet' steamer.

At the expiration of three hours—when it was decided to withdraw after one hour more, and the enemy were bringing up their guns, not before observed—it was resolved, as a preparatory measure, to abandon the front positions of the compound. Accordingly, at a preconcerted signal, the parties posted there fell back to the Residency, which then became the front line of defence.

The hour allotted for carrying off the baggage having terminated, the retreat was sounded, on which all posts except one were abandoned, and the men closed in double march at a gate appointed. When formed, Captain Conway marched the party by sections to the river front of the still guarded post, and then marched in column directly down to the steamer, the march being the signal for the last batch of defenders to drop from the windows, and cover the retiring column by skirmishing to the rear in extended order.

About the period of the second formation, Captain Brown, having observed the enemy preparing a battery behind the embankment of a *nullah*, transferred himself from the 'Planet' to the 'Satellite' steamer, which had then arrived, and took up a position in her, so as to rake the *nullah* and prevent the enemy placing three guns they were bringing up against us—and which were afterwards used in position to annoy the vessels in their upward passage. While the 'Planet' was occupied in bringing off the 'flat,' three guns were brought through the Agency compound, and placed in battery under the trees in front of the gate where our soldiers had last formed. Their fire was met, and almost entirely kept under, by the 'Planet's' single twelve-pounder; and the detachment was embarked without loss—the wounded and corpses of the slain having been previously removed on board.

The first object being to secure the fuel depôt at the village of Kotri, about three miles up the opposite bank of the river, ere yet the enemy had time to destroy it, the 'Satellite' steamer was immediately despatched for its protection, until a sufficiency of wood to enable both vessels to pursue their course up the river had been laid in. The three guns formerly alluded to as having been withdrawn, which in the meantime had been brought into position higher up the river, opened their fire as the 'Satellite' passed. She returned the fire, and by her good practice dismounted one gun.

The next point was to carry off the large flat which was moored to the shore immediately opposite the enemy's guns, to effect which the 'Planet' remained. The flush decks of the river-steamers affording no protection from shot for those on board, the officers commanding them had prepared bulwarks, previous to the embarkation of the troops, by piling up every movable article. Under this cover all except those employed in working the vessels were well protected; but the removal of the unwieldy flat was an operation which obliged all hands belonging to the 'Planet' (and especially her commander, Mr. Cole) to expose themselves much. That they did so with impunity is extraordinary, because they were under a very hot fire for more than twenty minutes. The enemy, emboldened by the departure of the 'Satellite,' sought to approach the remaining vessel across the dry bed of the river; and only fell back to the 'long shot' position after examples had been made among the more venturesome of their number. Three times did the 'Planet' fail to attain her object: and three times had she to return and go round before bringing off her charge in tow from under the hostile guns. During this proceeding the soldiery on board had kept their fire in reserve, as heretofore, only opening as opportunity was afforded by the increased audacity of their opponents.

The 'Planet' then followed the 'Satellite,' running the gauntlet of the artillery, and the fire of the enemy from every hollow which afforded cover, with no loss. Large bodies of the enemy kept company with her for about two miles up the river, when they departed. The 'Planet' having delayed at Kotri on the right bank, while the 'Satellite' was completing her fuel, both vessels continued their upward course until sunset, when they anchored for the night about ten miles above the Agency. On the 16th they pursued their voyage at daylight, and at 9 A.M. anchored opposite to and about a mile from Matári, where, shortly afterwards, the advanced guard of the army arrived.

Outram wrote that in the operations above described, the loss on our side was only two killed and eleven wounded; while there were, on the side of the enemy, more than sixty killed, and 'probably the usual estimate—quadruple of that number wounded.' This extraordinary disparity he attributed to the 'judicious disposal of our men, and their steady maintenance of their posts, to draw them from which all attempts of the enemy failed—except to the extent of springing up,' whenever the latter tried to close, 'delivering their fire, and again squatting, before the enemy had time to take aim or even fire.' Thus it was, he continued, that the assailants 'became momentarily less daring, and were at last obliged to bring up six guns to force an imperfect low-walled enclosure of 200 yards square, defended by only one hundred men against countless numbers possessing commanding positions and cover up to our walls on three sides.'¹

¹ In the rough memorandum written by Outram, from which the above account is taken, it is added that when the army reached the Residency on February 19 (four days after the assault), three of the guns were found still on the river bank. The other three had broken down on the road between the Residency and town, in the attempt to take them back. The official report gave two men killed of H.M.'s 22nd regiment and one camp follower; ten

He joined his chief at Matári, a town situated only sixteen miles north of Haidarabad. Between the two places was the village of Miáni—a name common in Sind to the abode of fishermen; and around Miáni were gathering the available forces of the Sind Amirs.¹ From Matári, on the day of his joining, it was arranged that Outram, in company with Captain Green, Lieutenants Wells, and Brown, his co-defenders of the Residency, and 200 convalescent *sipáhis*, should be despatched on a night expedition. The object was to attain a position which would enable them, at an early hour of the morning, to burn the Miáni and neighbouring *shikárgáh*, or forest, in which it was expected the enemy would collect, and from which, when collected, their dislodgment would be difficult. That the proposal was Outram's own may be certified on perusal of his report of arrival at the Matári ferry, addressed to the General before the latter had reached the town of Matári, and had pitched his camp between it and the river. But the necessity of clearing the *shikárgáhs* by some means, whether by land or water, was obvious to Sir Charles Napier, who had, moreover, reason to suppose that the enemy's left flank was posted in them, and that an army of 22,000 men was in position at Miáni! In Outram's diary of February 16, the entry is as follows:—‘At 12 . . . force arrived at Matári, and encamped about a mile from the steamer. Visited Sir Charles Napier, who instructed me to take two hundred men next morning to burn the *shikárgáhs* which skirted his line of march, while he should continue his advance to within a few miles of the city, where I was to join him.’

wounded, among whom were Mr. Conductor Keily, Mr. Carlisle, the agency clerk, two of the steamer's crew, four men of H.M. 22nd regiment, and two camp followers, and four camp followers missing.

¹ Outram's belief that there was really ‘no preparation’ for hostility on the part of the Amirs, will be readily reconciled with this aggregation of armed chiefs and retainers hastily brought together. Such Oriental local armaments are commonly procurable at a very short notice; and in the then temper of the Baluchis, a summons to arms would be rather anticipated than awaited.

On the 17th we read :—‘ Occupied all day in endeavouring to destroy the *shikārgāhs*, in which we had to traverse many miles. There being no wind, the woods burned very slowly and partially. We only saw one body of about 500 of the enemy, who made off on observing our approach ; we heard firing in the direction of the army, which continued till 1 P.M. I proposed to take our detachment round the *shikārgāh*, so as to fall upon the retreat, towards the city, of the enemy, who would doubtless have retired before Sir Charles. The officers, however, considered their men too much knocked up to attempt an enterprise involving a further march of some miles. We returned to our vessels about sunset, and shortly after learned from the natives the severe action which had taken place. I decided on making my way to Sir Charles’s camp with 100 men, to be in time to partake in the advance on the fortress, which we considered would take place next morning.’

The firing heard was indeed from the battle-field. The severe action reported by the natives was that of Miáni. A struggle had occurred, the result of which, in the words of the Governor-General, ‘ placed at the disposal of the British Government the country on both banks of the Indus from Sakkhar to the sea, with the exception of such portions thereof as may belong to Mir Ali Murad of Khairpur, and to any other of the Amirs who may have remained faithful to his engagements.’

Sir Charles Napier prefaces his despatch describing the victory with a notice of the risks run at Haidarabad by his Commissioner, and of a plot laid to murder Major Outram and his companions which had happily been frustrated ; and thus speaks of the attack on the Agency :—‘ The report of this nefarious transaction I have the honour to enclose. I heard of it at Hala, at which place the fearless and distin-

guished Major Outram joined me, with his brave companions in the stern and extraordinary defence of his residence against so overwhelming a force, accompanied by six pieces of cannon.' At the close of the same paper, he reverts to the subject: 'The defence of the Residency by Major Outram and the small force with him against such numbers of the enemy was so admirable, that I have scarcely mentioned it in the foregoing despatch, because I propose to send your Lordship a detailed account of it, as a brilliant example of defending a military post.'

Of the burning the *shikárgáhs*, he says:—

'This was an operation of great difficulty and danger, but would have been most important to the result of the battle. However, the enemy had moved about eight miles to their right during the night, and Major Outram executed his task without difficulty at the hour appointed, viz., nine o'clock, and from the field we observed the smoke of the burning wood arise. I am strongly inclined to think that this circumstance had some effect on the enemy. But it deprived me of the able services of Major Outram, Captain Green, and Lieutenants Brown and Wells, together with 200 men, which I much regretted, for their sakes.'

But we left Outram about to rejoin the victorious army. The diary continues:—

'February 18.—At 2 A.M., marched with 100 men for the camp, eight miles distant, which we reached just before daybreak; our road lay along the course of the Falaili. The field of battle, over which we passed, plainly showed, in the bright moonlight, from the heaps of slain covering it, how severely contested the action must have been. We were soon in possession of the particulars of this very sanguinary, at one time doubtful, and finally decisive conflict. Our loss, in pro-

portion to the numbers engaged, was very heavy : 19 officers and 256 men, and 95 horses killed and wounded out of about 2,700 actually in the field. There were many chiefs, and upwards of 5,000 killed and wounded of the enemy.

‘Early in the morning, messengers came into camp to tender the submission of the Amirs. Sir Charles gave them till mid-day to surrender unconditionally; otherwise, our troops would march at that hour on the capital. Before the time specified had elapsed, Mirs Hasan Khan, Shahdad, and Husain Ali Khan, the Amirs of Haidarabad who had led the enemy, came into camp and surrendered unconditionally. The two former were detained as prisoners, but the latter was released by Sir Charles at my intercession, out of respect to the memory of his late father, Mir Nur Muhammad, who, on his death-bed, had consigned the youth to my guardianship. Overtures were also made by the Amirs of Upper Sind, who were informed that no other terms than unconditional surrender would be given.

‘*February 19.*—Marched past Haidarabad to the banks of the Indus, and encamped close to the Agency, now a heap of ruins. Mir Rustam Khan, and one of his sons, and Nasir Khan of Khairpur came into camp, and surrendered as prisoners of war unconditionally. As nothing further can now be done until the Governor-General’s orders are received, and as my functions as commissioner ceased on hostilities breaking out, Sir Charles Napier has granted me permission to return to Bombay, for which I shall embark in the “Satellite” steamer to-morrow at noon, bearing the despatches.’

On the march from Miáni to the site of the Haidarabad Residency, the British commissioner rode side by side with the fallen chiefs. One of them, Mir Nasir Khan, asked him, with some show of curiosity, where he had been during the

action of the previous day? He had looked for him, he affirmed, through his spy-glass, after the rout of his Baluchis, in order that he might surrender to a personal friend; but, failing to recognise him among the British officers, he had gone on his way with the rest. This statement accorded with the testimony of Lieutenant Fitzgerald, of the Sind Horse, who had observed one of the principal Amirs, mounted on a camel, answering to Nasir's description, long hovering about the retreating army, and otherwise acting in an unaccountable manner. On Outram's explaining the cause of his absence from the field, the Amir admitted that there had been an intention, on the part of his people, to occupy the *shikārgāhs*, but that they had changed their minds. It is highly probable that the plan of firing the forests from the rear having transpired before the period of its execution had arrived, the enemy modified his tactics accordingly, and was driven to fight at once in the open—a course which gave the British general the opportunity of bringing the campaign, in a few hours, to a comparative close. Outram gratified Nasir Khan much, by telling him how great credit he had gained with the British officers for the gallant fight he had maintained; and amused him, even in his natural despondency, by turning to Mir Shahdad, also riding near, and stating that *his* failure to make good the assault upon one hundred men with a force of eight thousand, was as much the ridicule as the other's action was the admiration of the English army. The fact is that the treachery of Shahdad, which had become evident, merited severer treatment than conveyed in a roadside rebuff. This chief had asked Outram's permission to bring his followers to the Residency, for the protection of its occupants, on the very eve of the attack upon the place, which it was felt that he himself, to all intents and purposes, had led and instigated.

Taking leave of the General, his companions in arms and

native friends, Outram embarked in the river steamer. It cannot be said that he parted from any with a light heart, or free from cares, as much for others as on his own account. The widow of the late Mir Nur Muhammad had petitioned him on behalf of her sons. Of these, although Shahdad was entitled to little consideration at his hands, the other brother, Husain Ali, was his especial *protégé*. But for the Talpurs generally, he felt a sympathy which few of his brother officers in Sind could quite understand; and he had misgivings on the future, too, of the Amirs and their families, whose unsought association with the powerful foreigner had brought about their ruin. Off Thatta, on February 22, he wrote to his friend, Lieutenant Brown, the following brief letter:—

‘As you are the custodian of the captive princes, let me entreat of you, as a kindness to myself, to pay every regard to their comfort and dignity. I do assure you my heart bleeds for them, and it was in the fear that I might betray my feelings that I declined the last interview they yesterday sought of me. Pray say how sorry I was I could not call upon them before leaving; that, could I have done them any good, I would not have grudged . . . any expenditure of time or labour on their behalf; but that, alas, they have placed it out of my power to do aught, by acting contrary to my advice, and having recourse to the fatal step of appeal to arms against the British Power.’

Before the last day of February, Outram had again landed in Bombay, and been received with kindly consideration and cordiality by the Governor, Sir George Arthur. He had purposed returning home by the steamer of March 1, but the result of his conference with His Excellency made him defer his departure for at least another month. The suggestion that he still might be wanted in Sind had been put to him with new arguments which his own modesty and self-abnega-

tion had not before suffered him to entertain ; and he could not brook the bare notion that personal pique in one instance, and mere difference of opinion in another, had caused him to abandon a scene of action in which he might still be exceptionally useful. Instead, therefore, of taking leave of his Presidency friends preparatory to embarkation, he wrote, on the last day of February, a letter to the Governor, enclosing a long memorandum on the merits of the 'Sind question,' but personally, full of excellent feeling. One passage may be extracted :—

‘You are so good as to think that although Sir Charles permitted my departure, he might really have wished my stay ; and that I might be of use in the arrangement of the details of whatever settlement may have to be carried into effect in Sind. It never occurred to me that possibly Sir Charles, in his kind consideration for my personal convenience, may have let me come away sooner than he otherwise would have wished ; and it is with compunction that I reflect on the enormous labour which he certainly will have to go through during the coming hot season, much of the minor details and drudgery of which I might save him from.

‘If such is really the opinion of Sir Charles, I would re-join him with alacrity and pleasure on the footing of an acting aide-de-camp, as which, I should have no voice of my own in the *policy* Sir Charles might adopt, and merely should have to carry out to the best of my ability the details which he might entrust to me, which would be far preferable to me to the situation in which I was formerly placed, when, *having a voice*, I was bound to raise it as my conscience dictated.

‘Simply as aide-de-camp to Sir Charles, the *military* allowances of which situation are *defined*, there can be none of the personal scruples which I entertained to receiving his Lordship’s bounty on the former occasion, and I should not

grudge the time and trouble that might be incurred in working out the settlement of Sind during the ensuing hot season, so long as I were serving *under*, and *for*, Sir Charles Napier.'

Sir George Arthur, in replying to this letter, generally approved of the course which the writer had pursued in delaying his return. About a week afterwards, Outram himself wrote fully to Sir Charles. Speaking of Sind, he wished to Heaven the General were out of that country, adding:— 'or that if you do stay, I were with you, as a humble military aide-de-camp (not a *political* or *commissioner*) for I cannot but fear you will have a most troublesome time of it, the dangers of which I would with all my heart share with you in that capacity. As I believe Sir George Arthur wrote to you, I have not the presumption to think that I could be of much use in a purely military line, but it would gratify me to share your fatigues and dangers, and I should be no longer called upon to officiate out of that line. . . .

'I am sick of *policy*; I will not say yours is the *best*, but it is undoubtedly the shortest—that of *the sword*. Oh, how I wish you had drawn it in a better cause!'

He touched, moreover, on other than official matters: for he had been to see Lady Napier, and her family. Had he had ten times the distance to go, he wrote, he would have been more than rewarded by the outward indications of a happiness which the sight of one who had so recently shaken the gallant general by the hand had afforded.

While at Bombay, the rumour that a second engagement in Sind was imminent, caused him formally to volunteer his services there in a military capacity; and he proposed to accompany a detachment of artillery then preparing to embark. In reply he was informed by the Secretary to Government that with reference to his 'former position in Sind, and distin-

guished services,' considerations existed which induced 'the Hon. the Governor in Council to think it inexpedient that Government should accept the offer.' Independently of his letter to Sir Charles which we have quoted, he wrote twice to his secretary on the subject, using, on the second occasion, these words:—'I certainly did not anticipate any further open hostilities when I left . . . and I shall ever blame myself for having come away when I did if they do take place. I wish I was again with Sir Charles, to share his fatigues and dangers. . . . as his subaltern and a mere volunteer. As such I asked to return the other day, when unfavourable reports were brought down.'

We have alluded to Outram's warm reception at Government House in Bombay. It need scarcely be said, however, that on his return to the Presidency, he had been welcomed in all quarters, official and non-official, with every demonstration of regard and respect. On March 25, a meeting of his friends was held, at which it was unanimously resolved to present him with a sword of the value of 300 guineas, and a costly piece of plate. The copy of the resolutions then passed and forwarded to him was acknowledged with 'feelings of gratitude and pride,' which he expressed himself at a loss to describe. 'I have always felt,' he wrote to Mr. Le Geyt, one of the committee of subscribers, 'that to obtain the applause of my comrades in arms is the highest honour to which I could aspire, but when I perceive men of all classes unite with them in according to me this distinguished mark of approbation, I feel my merits have been greatly overrated, and that it is to their partial estimate of the services I have performed that I am indebted for this splendid token of their approbation.'

'I accept with gratitude the sword thus presented to me. It will be my most cherished possession while I live, and, on my death, it shall be bequeathed to my representa-

tive, as the most highly valued gift I can bestow.' There were no fewer than 511 subscribers to this testimonial.

On the sword ran this inscription :—

'Presented to Major James Outram, 23rd Regiment Bombay Native Infantry, in token of the regard of his friends, and the high estimation in which he is held for the intrepid gallantry which has marked his career in India, but more especially his heroic defence of the British Residency at Hyderabad, in Scinde, on the 15th February, 1843, against an army of 8,000 Beloochees with six guns.—Bombay, April, 1843.'

Marked on one side of the blade :—

'Major James Outram.'

On the other :—

'*Sans peur et sans reproche.*'

With further reference to the Bombay meeting, the following letter was addressed to him in whose honour it was held, three or four days later, by Bishop Carr, of Bombay.¹

¹ In fitting contrast to this honourable testimonial from his own church, may be mentioned the award to Major (then Colonel) Outram of a gold medal from the late Pope Pius IX. for services referred to in the following letter, dated from the English College in Rome, January 31, 1860 :—'His Holiness Pius IX. has commanded the undersigned rector of the English College in Rome to forward to you a gold medal ; and he has desired that it should be sent without delay, as a testimonial of gratitude for the kindness displayed by you on various occasions to poor Catholics under your command, or stationed within your Residency. As soon as the Holy Father received information that an English bishop was on his way to Calcutta, he ordered this medal to be prepared and sent by that opportunity to you ; but as the bishop had unfortunately quitted Naples, it was sent to me, and I write by the earliest post to apprise you of this act of consideration on the part of His Holiness, and to ask you whether you wish me to send it to England, to your agent in London, or whether I am to send it by Malta through some other channel.

'Allow me to add that I feel highly honoured in having been chosen by the Holy Father as the medium of communication with you ; and I shall be happy if you ever visit Rome, to present you to His Holiness, and to render you any other service in my power.

Accompanying it were a Bible and Prayer-book, with these words in the good old prelate's hand writing, 'Thou hast covered my head in the day of battle;' and 'This is Life Eternal, that they might know Thee, the only true God, and Jesus Christ whom Thou has sent':—

Bycullah: March 29, 1842.

'My dear Sir,—Amongst the friends who assembled in the Town Hall on Saturday, in order to offer you a tribute of their respect, there probably was none who felt more admiration of your conduct in the late campaigns, and in your former situation, when you were reducing the Bheel tribes to habits of order, than myself. I felt, however, that I could not consistently take part in the offering of a sword, as it is the object of my office and ministry to keep the sword in its scabbard, and to labour to promote peace. With these views, and with feelings of great respect for the intrepid bravery, ability, persevering activity, and I will add, forbearance towards the weak, which have marked your conduct, I venture to offer you a small tribute of respect, and to request your acceptance of a Book, a blessed Book, in which you may find support in the hour of trial, and consolation at that time when the sword must be laid aside, and when external things must cease to interest. In it, my dear Sir, is to be found a peace which the world cannot disturb. I pray that this peace may be yours, and with sentiments of much admiration and respect, believe me to be, Sir, very sincerely yours,

'THOMAS BOMBAY.'

Outram returned home by the steamer of April 1. Though he was not to reappear in Sind, either in a civil or military capacity, his connection with that country was by no means severed. His acquaintance with its people and

politics would be soon put to a new and crucial test. It would occupy his thoughts in the West, as it had already done in the East. But nearly twenty-four years of unbroken service in India should suffice to complete one section of the career we have undertaken to describe: and a thorough change of scene points to an appropriate division of our subject.

BOOK II.
MIDDLE AGE.
1843-1856.



CHAPTER I.

1843-1845.

Home.—Return to India.—Nimar.—Disturbances in Southern Maratha Country.—Kolapur and Sawant-Wari.

ABSENCE from England for a quarter of a century may bring about distaste and unfitness for the climate and ways of the old country ; but the sight of home, even after so many years, can hardly prove a matter of indifference to the returning wanderer. In Outram's case this long period had been almost reached : the full vigour of manhood had replaced the undeveloped powers of youth ; and there had been much growth and formation of taste in India to dim the colour of boyish association. But family ties and patriotic instincts ever exercised a strong influence over him ; and in a letter addressed to his mother from Malta, on his homeward voyage, the old filial affection burns brightly as ever. He thanks heaven that he is ' now on the high road ' towards her, and calculates the precise date on which he may be actually proceeding from London to Scotland.

As it happened, the satisfaction of revisiting his native land had more of alloy for Colonel Outram than falls to the average lot of the Indian officer availing himself of a long-deferred furlough to Europe. Even his richly-deserved honours were not to be matter of pure congratulation. True that the Sind gazettes enabled him to turn his face homewards a brevet Lieutenant-Colonel and C.B. ; but this was exactly what he had been officially led to consider himself three years before. How friends and comrades viewed his promotion was well

expressed in the words of the most eminent of the Governors under whom he served. Mr. Elphinstone, in a letter to an East India Director of the day, took occasion to remark that had the honours been received agreeably to original promise, Colonel Outram would then, under ordinary precedent for distinguished military service, have been an aide-de-camp to the Queen and K.C.B.—rewards quite irrespective of exceptional work in the political department.¹ But, personal considerations apart, his mind was full of cares and anxieties concerning the honour of his country and on behalf of the Amirs of Sind; and it was natural that he should wish the home authorities to understand what had been his own share of responsibility in the treatment of the deposed and exiled chiefs and the annexation of their lands. He felt, moreover, constrained by honour and duty to represent the circumstances of these unfortunate princes in the light which, to his appreciation, was that of truth. His own intimate acquaintance with the more prominent members of the fallen dynasty, and especially the legacy of trust committed to him by one of the number on his dying bed, made him keenly sensitive to the necessity of pleading a cause which, without such advocacy, could not obtain a legitimate hearing. In taking this course he knew full well that he once more, and

¹ The exact words may be quoted:—‘. . . two distinctions which had been promised, and more than promised, long ago. Had he received these honours at the time, he would now (on the principle which must have been observed of advancing each officer one step) have been made aide-de-camp to the Queen and K.C.B. All this is written as if Colonel Outram was merely a military officer who had distinguished himself in the Afghan campaign, and who now again shared with many others in the services lately performed in Scinde; but you are well aware how far this is from Colonel Outram’s real position. Besides his ample share in the planning and conduct of various military enterprises, his political services for several years have been such as it would be difficult to parallel in the whole course of Indian diplomacy . . . Considering all these services, and the high station held by Colonel Outram when he performed them, the appearance of his name among crowds of subalterns is rather a humiliation than an honour.’

this time perhaps hopelessly, imperilled both reputation and prospects. Indeed, to initiate at head-quarters an attack upon the policy of the Governor-General and of others high in power and influence might seem deliberate official suicide. He did not at the time anticipate that disinterested efforts on behalf of the Amirs would involve a breach with a man whose friendship he especially valued, and whose character he especially admired—Sir Charles Napier. But no considerations whatever could restrain him from what he believed to be the straight line of duty, particularly when it implied justice to the oppressed, the misrepresented, or the maligned—and such he believed the deposed Amirs to be.

Lord Ripon was at that time President of the Board of Control; but it was not only with that nobleman that his Indian experience and repute placed him in communication. Sir Robert Peel, then Prime Minister, sent for, and received from him a statement of his views on the Sind question: and he had also to meet similar requisitions from the Chairs of the Court of Directors, as well as from the Duke of Wellington through his secretary, Mr. Arbuthnot. He found that most important official documents had never reached the home authorities—such as his notes of conferences with the Amirs; and he was enabled to supply copies, as well as to submit verbal explanations of these. Arrival in London was consequently not immediately followed by departure to join his family in the North. It was on a Saturday afternoon in May. Installing himself at the Burlington Hotel in Cork Street, he proceeded at once to the India Board, where he had to await the coming of the President, who was on a Cabinet Council, and did not appear until 6.30. P.M. too fatigued for new work. There was no remedy but to defer the interview until Monday. On Monday, his Lordship was closeted with the Prime Minister, and on appearance at the office in the afternoon, apologising

for the exigencies of his high position, had to hurry off again to a Cabinet Council. We need not continue these details to explain how it was that days passed before Outram rejoined his family at Cheltenham, which place was fixed upon as a more convenient temporary residence than any part of Scotland. A letter to his mother, dated May 25, may, however, be quoted:—‘The truth is that my going to Edinburgh at all till the next India Mail arrives, is very much against the wish of the Court of Directors. . . . I believe they concede it out of kindness to me; and discussions daily arise from which reference has to be made to information which I have to afford. To-day, for instance, I was closeted with the Duke of Wellington’s secretary two hours, and shall again be required by Lord Ripon to-morrow, and am liable to be so every day till it is decided what has to be done. I feel, therefore, that I should be deserting my post to go away at this moment.’

During his nominal stay at Cheltenham, he was perpetually on the move between that place and London. In the former town he was invited to a dinner to be given to him by the Anglo-Indian residents, but declined the honour. His health was good, although he was annoyed by the remains of an enormous Sind boil on his cheek. This at one time kept him under treatment and, in a note to his wife written from London, he mentions that his face is such a figure he is ‘ashamed to go’ even ‘to the club.’ From Cheltenham he and Mrs. Outram moved to London before the close of the season, and were presented at Court. It was a great pleasure to them in those days to meet with their old friends of Khandesh, Mr. and Mrs. Bax. After the ceremony of presentation, in which both ladies bore a part, Outram ran up to Scotland for a hasty visit of less than a fortnight to his sister Mrs. Sligo at Seacliffe, and his father-in-law in Forfarshire. This absence from London and the

vicinity was the occasion of an unfortunate *contretemps* which he imagined ever afterwards might have afforded grounds for a misapprehension affecting his loyal courtesy—if such a term be admissible. He received an invitation to a State Ball when in Scotland, and having no skilled courtier at hand to point out the command which the honourable compliment implied, he took it as an ordinary civility, and excused himself on the plea of absence from London. Had he understood the true nature of the case he would, of course, have made a point of hurrying up, at any cost, in obedience to the gracious summons. Not only was the fault overlooked, but the great honour was accorded him of an invitation to a second State Ball immediately succeeding the first. This, however, through some mischance, he did not receive until the specified day had passed; and in tendering his explanation he unwittingly fell into the error of preferring it demi-officially, through a personal friend among the nobility, instead of submitting a formal apology, which he vainly regretted he had failed to do when too late conscious of the omission. Those who knew him, and how deep and chivalrous were his loyalty and attachment to the Sovereign, would rightly interpret acts such as these to be mere indications of a camp and ‘out-of-door’ training—results which men are accustomed to consider the accidents rather than the incidents of a career.

From the lodgings and distractions of London, and the lionising, which he cordially disliked but now found himself subject to, it was decided to move to Brighton. Mrs. Outram preceded him; but he soon rejoined her, having accomplished in the interim his journey to Scotland and back. From Brighton, after a short stay, they crossed to Dieppe and went on to Paris. The dweller among Bhils and Brahúis, Afghans and Sindis, not being an expert in the French language, found little permanent attraction in

Parisian theatres and other amusements; and avoided 'sights,' in the general sense of the term. His mind was full of Sind; and he had already, before coming to the Continent, placed certain papers in the printer's hands and received the proofs for correction—processes which, when once essayed, are seldom restricted to the one occasion. He missed even the frequent official references made to his knowledge and experience by the Directors, or by authorities less immediately connected with India; and he longed again to talk over at the clubs, with men interested like himself in the subject, past and passing events and possible future contingencies affecting the honour and welfare of our still growing British Empire in the East. Accordingly a sudden return to lodgings in Brook Street took place before the end of September; and in London he remained, until quitting England for India on December 1 of the same year. In November, when he had been only six months in the enjoyment of his furlough, intelligence was received in London of the revolution of Lahor and murder of the Maharaja Sher Singh. War with the Sikhs was foreshadowed; and Outram indulged in the hope that his services would be made available in the North-West.

He addressed himself in the first instance to Lord Ripon, expressing his desire to return by the next outgoing mail, instead of awaiting the expiration of his furlough; and solicited his Lordship's good offices to enable him to find employment under Lord Gough in the capacity of a mere volunteer, without encroachment on the General's patronage in respect of personal staff and field appointments. At the suggestion of Lord Ripon, however, the application was transferred (and with success) to the Duke of Wellington, who, as Commander-in-Chief of Her Majesty's army, both at home and abroad, would naturally have less scruples than a civilian in recommending an officer for military service.

Nor was this the only communication that Outram had to make to the Board of Control preparatory to re-embarkation for the East. Circumstances had transpired to render advisable the submission in the same quarter of a memorandum designed to counteract any injurious misrepresentation of his proceedings in Sind which might possibly reach the Home Government; and this paper was given in, as a precautionary measure, on the eve of his departure. The 'possible' misrepresentations had then, indeed, reached the Home offices, but they were not shown to him whom, personally, they chiefly concerned, nor was he favoured with any intimation of their existence or arrival. Before he could learn anything of them they were to be put before Parliament and the country, a procedure which occurred in March 1844. The memorandum which he had thought proper to prepare by way of precaution had been returned in the previous January, with an intimation that it should have been sent through the Government of India!

Fortunately we need not dwell at length on the painful controversy occasioned by his strictures on the annexation which followed the battles of Miáni and Dabba, the utterance of which at home was but a natural consequence of the situation in which the late political agent and commissioner in Sind found himself placed on leaving Western India. When Outram was at Bombay in March, just before embarkation, the question arose as to the propriety of putting a full exposition of his views on the Sind complication before the Governor-General. Nothing, however, was done in the matter. Sir George Arthur, then Governor, did not think that his Government could express any opinion on the subject, and it was doubtful whether the submission of any individual remarks, without an accompanying letter of comment, might not lead to the writer's detention in India. But his sympathy with the Amirs was well known to the authorities

both in Sind and Bombay ; and, when about to leave Sind, he had placed before Sir C. Napier a full and clear statement of our relations with those princes. After his arrival in England, some of his Indian friends kept him *au courant* of local events. Among them Major Gordon forwarded from time to time an account of the captive Amirs, over whom he had been placed as superintendent at Sasur, noting the affectionate manner in which they spoke of 'Outram Sahib' as their best friend. Mirs Sobdar and Nasir Khan, and the old Mir Rustam Khan of Upper Sind, all took advantage of Major Gordon's correspondence to address their old acquaintance, detailing their griefs, and assuring him, in their own handwriting, of their kindly remembrance and regard. He had, therefore, always at hand, the case of the Amirs of Sind up to the latest dates ; and, in imparting freely to the Home Government his information and opinions, he laid himself open to no charge of secret or inconsistent action. He was advocating a cause which he had before openly espoused in India, and attacking a policy from which he had already publicly dissented in the same quarter. That the difference of opinion with his temporary chief, admitted at first in so friendly a spirit by Sir Charles Napier, should have become aggravated into a serious rupture, must be attributed to the excitement of the times and the introduction of new elements of discord as the controversy progressed—elements aggravated by the intervention of partisans whose bitter pens revelled in paper warfare. Ample evidence has been recorded on both sides to guide the impartial reader to a correct judgment ; and if he wade through all the volumes that have been printed on this one subject only, he will hardly fail to regret the time spent and energy wasted by the litigants on an argument which would better have been debated by professional pleaders in the law court or council chamber. Whichever view he take, we have no fear that the ability,

integrity, or honesty of purpose of the subject of this biography will suffer in his estimation. As regards the sentence of history, Time, the great soother of contention and often the fairest discriminator between public controversialists, has already, in part, pronounced its judgment; and the full decision will follow in due course. One of those incidental revelations which afford pregnant 'materials of history' has recently laid bare to us the secret councils of the powers that were in 1843. An article by the Right Hon. W. E. Gladstone, in the 'Contemporary Review' of November 1876, *apropos* of Russian proceedings in Asia, contains the following most remarkable passage:—

A notable example occurred in 1843, when Sind was conquered by Napier, under the auspices of Lord Ellenborough. That conquest was disapproved, I believe, unanimously by the Cabinet of Sir Robert Peel, of which I can speak, as I had just entered it at that time. But the ministry were powerless, inasmuch as the mischief of retaining was less than the mischief of abandoning it, and it remains an accomplished fact.

Under the unexpected light which thus breaks upon an otherwise shrouded page of our annals, we see the Bayard of India stand more than justified in his riskful championship of the helpless Amirs. But the contest proved a long and costly one for him. Allies able and not uninfluential took up the cause with him, and eventually he emerged from the struggle, firmer in the saddle than ever—scathed, indeed, and weary, but with his modest scutcheon brightened rather than blurred. For years the uncongenial paper warfare dragged on, the incubus of a life—each day of which brought its full burden of public care—and the source of misrepresentations, misunderstandings, and aspersions peculiarly trying to a sensitively honest nature.

For ourselves, long and close experience with the chiefs and people of Sind under British rule has not shaken our

faith, acquired at first sight, in the justice of Outram's argument. It shall now be our business, in these pages, to give as much as possible an incidental character to this phase of the Sind question. In the excellent spirit which has guided a comparatively recent biographer in his allusions to it,¹ we see a precedent and a model which may well and wisely be followed as closely as circumstances permit.

There is one passage, however, in the book under reference, which we may not leave quite unnoticed. We do not revert to it so much on account of its pertinency to our own biography, as from the wish to complete a deeply interesting correspondence which cannot but reflect lustre on the memories of those between whom it arose. No reprint of already published letters, or summary of their contents, will now be given. The consciousness that certain feelings, though essentially human, are too sacred, in some sense, for repeated expression, forbids us to retrace, in any but the faintest outline, the following occurrence of the year 1858. The elder Mrs. Outram, then an octogenarian, wrote a letter, full of sorrowful reproach, to General Sir William Napier, in correction of a too hasty statement on his part as to the death of her son Francis, which had caused her much pain. To this appeal the General sent a short but touching and noble reply. We have now to add that this reply was forwarded, with a copy of Mrs. Outram's generous acknowledgment, to James Outram, then almost at the zenith of his fame. Upon receipt, he addressed to his mother the following letter, from which few portions have been omitted, lest the force of the original should be impaired. It must have

¹ *Life of General Sir W. Napier, K.C.B.* By H. A. Bruce, Esq., M.P., vol. ii. p. 165:—'This painful controversy, which thus arose between the two brothers . . . and a man who has gained the respect and admiration of thousands, and who possessed in a very remarkable degree the quality of conciliating the warm affection of those about him, is here dismissed.'

been written—and the text bears evidence of the accuracy of the date—on the very day that its writer, at the head of the 1st division, retook the Residency, during that brilliant series of operations which resulted in the final capture of Lakhnao by Sir Colin Campbell :—

‘As you did not send me a copy of your first letter I can only infer its substance and tone from the very meagre allusions you make . . . and from the manly and touching acknowledgment it drew forth from one who—may God forgive me for the harsh and unjust judgment—I believed incapable of acknowledging an error. Your reply to this brief but affecting note was worthy of yourself, my noble-minded mother, and due to your correspondent. And *his* concluding note was worthy of a brave and good man.

‘I was *very much* affected when I read these documents, and my first impulse was to write a letter to Sir William Napier expressive of the emotions their perusal had awakened—and venturing a hope that there might henceforth be a cessation on his part of all bitter *feelings* towards your son. But, on reflection, I abandoned the idea. For our controversies have been so numerous, and so complicated, that I could not, without writing a volume, have explained to him how thoroughly he and his brother had misunderstood my feelings and misinterpreted my conduct to the latter. Nor could I have satisfied him how innocent I was of those unworthy innuendoes and unmanly sarcasms which their over-zealous partisans had persuaded Sir William and Sir Charles to discover in my writings. And I feared, moreover, that he might attribute my communication to wrong motives—to a dread of future attacks—or to a sneaking anxiety to get him to modify, in future editions of his books, what he has already written. But I am not even yet satisfied that I ought not to have written to him. If to write was my duty, as a Christian,

no consideration of the trouble it would involve and no fear of misconstruction, ought to have prevented my performing it. Think over the matter, dear mother, and give me your opinion. If *you* think that I ought to write, I *will*; even though my doing so were to bring down on me fresh attacks from his powerful pen—though it is most ungenerous to suppose that such would be the case. It would be a satisfaction to me, situated as I now am—of whom it may emphatically be said that in the midst of life I am in death—to feel assured that *others* were at peace with me. But it most concerns me to be certain that *I* am at peace with *them*, and if I know my own heart, I can solemnly declare before that great God at whose judgment-seat I may in half an hour be called to stand, that I do, from the bottom of my soul, forgive Sir William Napier all the harsh, and, as I believe, utterly undeserved, epithets he has lavished on me, all the monstrously untrue statements regarding me which his ardent temperament led him to believe without due inquiry, and his fraternal affection to record as history—and all the injury to my worldly interests and advancement which has resulted from his own and his brother's hostility towards me. As regards his brother, few have even heard me *speak* harshly of him. All who have been much with me can testify to the warmth with which I ever dwelt on his noble and generous qualities, even when he was most bitterly assailing me. *You*, mother, know the intensity of the love that I ever bore that man. *You* know how deep the pain which the severance of our friendship cost me. *You*, at least, know how little I imagined that I was preparing for its severance when—impelled by a sense of the duty I owed my ward,¹ and giving effect to an intention of which I had apprised Sir Charles, and of which he *seemed* to approve—I implored Lord Ripon

¹ The Sind Amir, Hussain Ali, consigned to Outram's charge by his father Mir Nur Muhammad, on his dying bed.

to show that mercy to him, and the other Ameers, which I thought it cruel in Lord Ellenborough to withhold. And you know that when Sir William accused me of seeking to injure my late chief—to intercept the gratitude of Parliament, and the favour of his sovereign from one whom it was then my *proudest* boast to call my friend—he accused me of that which (though doubtless he believed it) was as utterly the reverse of true, as that I was under pecuniary obligations to mercantile firms connected with the Indian Press, or any of the other egregious fictions which he and Sir Charles were persuaded to accept and promulgate as facts. It was not in human nature not to feel indignant when misrepresented. It was too much in consonance with fallen human nature to regard and treat the misrepresentations as *intentional*—to repay harsh words and unkind imputations with harsh and unkind rejoinders—to return railing for railing. All this I did; but long ere Sir Charles was called away, I often bitterly, and with a deep sense of humiliation, deplored the loose run I had given to my irritated feelings, and the licence I had allowed my pen. And when the grave closed over him, I had, from the bottom of my soul, forgiven him in respect of all I had thought he had done requiring my forgiveness. Once, and once only, since then, have I spoken of what I considered the wrongs he had done me. This I did in the excitement of a speech delivered at a dinner given me at Calcutta, just at the time his posthumous work appeared. And the words—such as they were—were hardly uttered ere they were repented of. But this is too painful a subject to dwell on longer. I have said enough to satisfy you as to the state of my own feelings. Advise me as to whether I should write to Sir William. If so, suggest to me what I should say—and I will act on your suggestions.’

Assuredly, the seal has now been set to a controversy

so ill according with the heart-spoken sentiments of the controversialists.

Armed with a letter from the Duke of Wellington to the Commander-in-Chief in India, Colonel Outram left England for the second time, bright with the sentiments of loyalty, cherished from his boyhood, but in far more serious mood than on first setting out. He contemplated returning by an early steamer from Bombay, should no prospect of immediate service offer: and it is probable that a communication from Sir Charles Napier, which only reached him at Malta, confirmed him in this intention. It was now evident that, owing to his statements to the Board of Control, and other official quarters in London, aggression was threatened at home, requiring measures of self-defence: and there would at the same time be a hostile influence to counteract in India. Writing from the outward-bound vessel near Aden, on the last day of the year, he begged Mrs. Outram to form no plans for joining him until she had received his letters, or heard definitely of his movements, by the mail of February 1.

By that opportunity, though he had no positive information to impart of his prospective movements, he could show that a return to old associations had worked a change in his way of thinking. Disembarkation on Indian soil had had, for the moment, something of the effect of the trumpet-sound upon the war-horse. He now stated his resolution to remain for a time in India. That resolution was made at the instigation of men on whose judgment and friendship he could rely, and its wisdom was evident, inasmuch as withdrawal from the land of his professional career because he could not find active service there, or employment to his liking, would have been to avow himself an aggrieved man. A letter addressed to his wife on January 23, told of his arrival at Asirgarh, *en route* to the Governor-General's camp

at Gwalior. The battles of Panniah and Maharajpur had been recently fought, and were still the subject of current conversation at Indian mess-tables. To Outram's mind it was not clear whether the result of those victories might not rather encourage than discourage the Sikhs to face us, believing themselves, as they did, greatly superior to the Marathas. He could say nothing of his own chances of field service until reaching Sir Hugh Gough's head-quarters; but the Bombay friends with whom he had held personal communication since his return, were not sanguine of his success in the teeth of opposition from an authority higher than that of the military chief. A still deeper cause of distress to him was the indifference expressed by so many of his brother officers on the annexation of Sind, coupled with subversion of the native rule in that province—a proceeding which he looked upon in the light of usurpation. His rate and mode of travelling at this time were not such as to soothe his temper, or lead him to forget his cares. Bearers could not be procured to carry him at all stages, and between Aurangabad and Asirgarh he had to ride on village tattoos, putting his palankeen in carts. From Indore he anticipated having recourse to camels.

Three weeks later, he thus wrote to his mother from Fathpur:—‘Fancy my being in the same camp yesterday with Lord Ellenborough, to whom I proffered my attendance as in duty bound, and to show I did not shun to meet his Lordship, after all I had done at home. He, however, . . . declined the interview, unless I would state my reasons in writing; so we did not meet,¹ and now he is on his way to

¹ The draft of a letter to Mr. Melvill on this subject is more explicit, and may here be quoted:—‘With a view to lay my proceedings in England before Lord Ellenborough, if allowed the opportunity, and to show the respect due to the Governor-General, being in the neighbourhood of his Lordship's camp, I proceeded there to solicit the honour of an audience, intimating to the private secretary that I had no *official* objects, but that I was ready to display all that

Calcutta, having previously sent me the offer of an appointment.'

The inferiority of this post,¹ political charge and revenue management of Nimar, an appendage to Indore, compared with the offices which he had previously held, certainly gave a warrant to the supposition that its refusal was anticipated; but Outram had the good sense, acting under the advice of Colonel Barnewell and others, to conquer his personal objections, and accept the offer. He thus describes the scene of his impending labours:—

'It is situated on the banks of the Narbudda, on the road between Asirgarh and Mhow, called Mandlesir. There we shall have a good house and garden, a doctor and his wife, and one or two officers. A detachment of troops is always stationed there; it is a pretty place also . . . but there are jungles to pass between it and Khandesh, which are not safe till January. . . . I had fully made up my mind to return home for another year, when I found there was no chance of anything to do in the Punjab, and in the supposition that I should never be restored to the political department during Lord E.'s *régime*. Having now been replaced in it, however, I trust he will see the necessity . . . of raising me to my proper position, a year or two in which will enable

I had advocated or communicated at home relative to Sind before the Governor-General, if required to do so. The interview was declined on the ground that no private audiences are granted, except under certain rules (with which, by the bye, I had already complied) . . . His Lordship having previously objected to my joining Sir Hugh Gough, a situation was then offered to me of a very inferior nature to what I had held (an *assistantship* under Indore), but which under my peculiar circumstances, and denied military service—with which view I had returned to India before the expiration of my furlough—I was necessitated to accept, and did so, I trust, in sufficiently submissive and becoming language.'

¹ Both in salary and importance, it was less than that which he had held ten years before. Thus, the whole of his services since leaving Khandesh in 1835, as political agent in the Máhi Kánta, political agent in Lower Sind, and political agent in Sind and Baluchistan, became, as it were, annulled.

me to return to you, for I declare I am determined to do so in two or three years at furthest.'

His journey from Bombay to the Upper Provinces, and back to Mandlaisir, occupied a period of nearly two months. This, for a part of the country where there were no facilities for locomotion, was considered quick travelling. He reached his new destination on March 10, having seen Gwalior and the Taj at Agra—'which alone,' he wrote, 'would repay the journey'—and having 'met with much civility and attention from everybody except Lord Ellenborough.' We obtain some insight into his daily life after a fortnight's experience of his Nimar head-quarters, in a letter again addressed to his mother:—'I go to office at sunrise, stay there till 10 o'clock, receiving petitions, and transacting business personally with the natives; breakfast at 10; then remain in my office at home, doing official correspondence, &c. till dinner at 4; ride out after dinner; then have tea, and read till bed-time.' He was in anxiety at this time about Mrs. Outram's health, and desirous of ascertaining through his mother whether she would be strong enough to join him in India after the rains, so as to guide his own prospective movements. As to the position which he had advisedly accepted, he comes philosophically to the conclusion that he is 'banished in this quiet corner until Lord Ellenborough goes home.'

His craving for active service may in a measure have been abated by the consciousness that his military rank was insufficient to obtain for him high command in the field; but he could not shut his eyes to the fact that, had his good work already performed met with the reward bestowed on his comrades for far less brilliant achievements, this obstacle would not have existed. 'I can scarcely hope,' are his words in a draft letter to Mr. Melvill, written during his first

month at Mandlaisir, 'that I may be so fortunate as to obtain the honour of a Queen's A.D.C., but the sooner you do confer it on some of your lieutenant-colonels, the better, to afford a few active officers sufficiently high in army rank for the secondary commands in the field. . . '

We have already stated that Outram's precautionary memorandum, left in the hands of the authorities in London, was returned to him in January 1844. Let us now add that the option of withdrawal was part of the same procedure, and that the honest-hearted soldier, ignorant of coming blue-books, and of publications more or less condemnatory of his views and actions, did as his masters at home evidently wished him to do, and cancelled the *pièce justificative* which was so soon to reappear as an essential instalment of after volumes. And what was the bitter sequel? In his comparative seclusion the news reached him that Parliament had discussed the affairs of Sind and its Amirs, the debaters having been guided by the light of incomplete despatches and papers wholly unaffected by his anticipatory comments, although these, in some instances, had the full force of counter-statements. This was a severe blow to him, and hard to bear. He had foreseen that the fate of the deposed chiefs was sealed; and he daily became more sensible that neither could voice be raised, nor pen or brain exercised with any practical success on their behalf. But the manner in which his efforts to benefit them had been received at home, and the little regard paid to his Sind experiences and long Indian service in the acceptance of a decision which ought in fairness to have been directly influenced by both, disheartened and hurt him. His personal character, was, moreover, involved; and to remain silent looked to him like admission of error. Yet, while he felt in possession of ample material wherewith to establish his ase, and defeat his opponents, he was de-

barred from defending himself without official permission ; and he doubted whether such permission would be granted in compliance with any request on his part.¹ Write an appeal, however, he must to the Secret Committee. If not to get abroad, it might, he reasoned, be placed among the secret archives : and he consoled himself with the reflection that his heir might extract it thence at a time when his own contemporaries had passed away from the busy world around. Meanwhile he would submit in silence to the injurious condemnations to which he had been subjected, and to the ruin which he not unnaturally, if somewhat impulsively, conceived had befallen him as a public man.

The residence at Mandlaisir was not of a protracted character, nor were the duties of the post which kept him there calculated to draw out the high qualities of the holder. Yet if it be regarded for him as an episode of repose, the notion must be restricted to the exigencies of official routine, for beyond giving due attention to local requirements, his mind was busy and 'perplexed in the extreme.' In his home and Indian correspondence the tone is less buoyant than of old ; and the mood is occasionally the reverse of cheerful. He goes so far as to complain that his friends forsake him in his difficulties ; he laments the waste of days in the, to him, inaction of Nimar life. That this gloomy picture was mainly that of a harassed isolation we may judge from the many letters of the period addressed to him, from various quarters in terms of evident affection. Friends and advisers, such as Colonel Barnewell, and Messrs. Tucker² and Melvill

¹ Permission was solicited for publication of his letter to Sir Charles Napier, in reply to one which that officer had published, but the request was declined by the Government of India.

² Mr. St. George Tucker, the well-known Director of the East India Company. Outram, hearing that one of this gentleman's sons (St. George), a young civilian, had been wounded in a gallant encounter with Dacoits, about the time that he himself was going to the Governor-General's camp in 1844, posted more

in England, and Mr. Willoughby in India, showed that he possessed the sympathy of the old Company's best and truest servants. Mountstuart Elphinstone always expressed an interest in his career, and at this period of it, as before and after, proved himself his sincere well-wisher. But he dreaded for him the threatening paper-warfare. 'If he were sure of complete success,' he wrote to Colonel Barnewell, 'it would be no compensation for devoting himself to a life of obscure controversy, instead of going on in his career and forcing people to acknowledge his former services by fresh instances of his zeal and ability.' The distinguished statesman, however, who gave such sound counsel, would never have lent his sanction to the confinement of his *protégé* to the obscure limits of an assistant-political's duties at Mand-laisir. Out of the circle of civilians and his 'native infantry' companions, he found a valued correspondent in his old acquaintance, Major Orlando Felix, whose shrewd, cheery letters have in them much of solace and sunshine.

Lord Ellenborough's recall in May, and the succession of Sir Henry Hardinge to the Governor-Generalship, did not restore his equanimity or fill him with new hope. He had reason to believe that his name had been favourably mentioned to the latter; but he was conscious at the same time that the endeavours of his friends might succumb to a powerful hostile influence. On September 10, 1844, the day on which he had completed a six months' service at Nimar, Outram resigned his appointment, and proceeded to Bombay with the intention of returning to England. The resignation had been contemplated from the time of his acceptance of the office, but the resolution to go home was sudden. It had not been mentioned in his August letter to Mrs. Outram, on the arrangement for whose outward passage he had then

than 100 miles out of his way to visit him and offer a twofold tribute of condolence and congratulation.

written at length. Had the application for leave been answered in time from Calcutta, he would have left by the mail in the beginning of October; but delay in the receipt of the reply¹ necessitated his waiting for that of November 1, when he would take leave, in the first instance, only to Egypt—afterwards, to Europe or not, according to circumstances.

The detention proved a fortunate one, for, meanwhile, an outbreak in the Southern Maratha country, or that part of Western India which is situated within the coast line between Bombay and Goa, had assumed a greater importance than had originally belonged to it in the eyes of the local government. A detachment of troops under Colonel Wallace of the Madras army, sent from Belgám for the restoration of order, had been checked in an attempt to take from the Garhkari (or hereditary occupants) the strong fort of Samangarh on September 24; and, two days before, the troops of the Kolapúr Rajah had been driven away from the fort of Budargarh by a bold sally of the rebel garrison. The British commander was awaiting reinforcements and battering guns; alarm was spreading throughout the disturbed tract; and fears, in some cases amounting to panic, were entertained for the stations of Ratnagari, Vingorla, and even Belgám itself.² As might have been expected, Outram, with alacrity, placed his services at the disposal of Government. They were accepted: he was put on 'special' duty; and on October 11, he appeared in Colonel Wallace's camp.³ On the morning of

¹ By notification in the *Calcutta Gazette*, dated September 24, 1844, Lieutenant-Colonel Outram, C.B. Assistant in charge of Nimar, obtained permission to resign his appointment, preparatory to applying to the Government of Bombay for permission to proceed to Europe on furlough on urgent private affairs.

² *Calcutta Review*, No. 7, Article 7, Volume iv. (1845).

³ He had left Bombay in a *patamar*, or large native boat, disembarking at Vingorla, whence to Samangarh, he describes his journey to have been a very unpleasant one, 'in a deluge of rain the whole way.'

the 13th, he was present at the taking of Samangarh; and in reporting that event the next day to division head-quarters, the officer in command of the troops wrote thus: 'I cannot conclude without giving expression to the feelings of pride and gratification I could not but entertain when an officer of Lieutenant-Colonel Outram's high character, well-known gallantry, and established fame, placed his services at my disposal, not only during the storm of the Fort of Samangarh,¹ but during the subsequent operations on the same day of the wing of the 5th light cavalry, under Captain Græme, against a large body of the enemy. On both these occasions Lieutenant-Colonel Outram's services were valuable; and I have requested Lieutenant-Colonel Outram, C.B., in this day's orders, to accept my best thanks and grateful acknowledgments.' The despatch from which this is an extract, was supplemented by Captain Græme's report, expressing his sense of the obligations under which he felt himself to Colonel Outram, who had accompanied him 'throughout' the cavalry affair noted, and to whose 'experience and guidance' he attributed much of the success obtained.

The fall of Samangarh was, however, by no means the termination of these disturbances. A few days prior to this event, the detachment from Belgám became a part only of the force brought together to crush the rebellion against authority, which now threatened to spread far and wide; and Major-General Delamotte, commanding the southern division of the army, had been placed at the head of the troops in the field. Outram had reported himself, as in duty bound, to the General; and we are told that he joined his camp 'in a political capacity.'² But this definition of the

¹ There is good authority for stating that he was the first man in at the assault, and, for several minutes, stood alone among the enemy

² *Calcutta Review*.

'special duty,' on which his official designation showed him to be authoritatively employed, would give but a faint idea of the work he had actually to perform. The term, be it said, is a vague one at all times, and is not unfrequently used in the case of officers whose zeal and intelligence in responsible positions are more trusted by Government than are the judgment and capability of its own secretariat in providing them with distinct instructions. It is, moreover, convenient in its very vagueness, for while allowing to the ruling powers the full merits of an agent's success, it saves them from a too direct responsibility in the event of failure. In the present instance, irrespective of a distinction in grade, Outram's duties were practically those of a joint special commissioner with Mr. Reeves, the recognised commissioner or political agent for the Southern Maratha country: for the two officers advised together, or acted independently, according to circumstances. He was also an improvised chief of the staff, or head of the intelligence department, to the General commanding, careful to take advantage of his military rôle to join in all active operations in the field. It was the intention of Government to set aside the civilian 'inter arma,' and place him under Colonel Outram; but to this the latter objected, in recollection of many a well-contested 'first spear' in pig-sticking days long gone by; and he was accordingly appointed in conjunction with his old friend. While the detailed tactics of the British authorities and their native opponents at this early stage of the *imbroglio* are not without interest, they involve too complicated a story to be here repeated. A glance at the main incidents will suffice to illustrate generally the part taken in the campaign by Outram until his return to Bombay in December. We learn from a distinguished and trustworthy writer, reviewing the events in the year following their

occurrence,¹ that this officer 'wherever employed, threw into all proceedings that moderation, energy, and ability which have everywhere so strongly marked his career;' that he and Mr. Reeves offered at a fitting opportunity, and with certain exceptions, 'an amnesty to all who would willingly return to their allegiance,' but that 'few, if any, accepted the terms: a strong presumptive proof that the unfortunate men had real grievances.' Further, that 'the day after the capture of Samangarh, Colonel Outram, with Colonel Wallace and 500 men of his brigade, proceeded to Kaghāl, one march from Kolapur, to procure the release of the minister,' a certain Daji Pandit, whose training in an Anglo-Indian *kachchhari* may have rendered him obnoxious to the Rajah's refractory subjects; but that it was not until October 24, when the detachment had been strengthened, that the prisoner was set at liberty from the strong fort of Panāla, on which occasion, 'the young Rajah of Kolapur, with his aunt and mother and the majority of his chiefs, left the city, and joined the British camp.' The real leader of the rebellion, Babaji Ahirakar—who had imprisoned the minister, usurped the government, and instigated a raid into British territory, with the robbery of a local treasury—absconded at the head of 500 Kolapur troops to the fort of Budargarh, whence, on the subsequent surrender of the place to the general commanding, he again found means of escaping to Panāla. Six days afterwards, Colonel Ovens, the British resident at Satāra, who had been appointed special commissioner in the Southern Maratha country, and would, on joining, have taken the place of the joint commissioners, was captured on a *dâk*

¹ *Calcutta Review*. The article is attributed to the late Sir Henry Lawrence. The reviewer prefaces his remarks thus:—'The tone of our remarks upon Colonel Outram may savour of partial panegyric to those of our readers who have not followed Outram's career as we have done; but no personal feelings can mingle in our praise of a man whom we have never seen, and whom we know only by his public acts.'

journey from Satára to Kolapur, and carried prisoner to the same Panála stronghold.

A few words of comment are here necessary. Colonel Outram had been just a fortnight in camp when Sir George Arthur wrote to offer him the appointment of political agent in the Southern Maratha country, subject to the confirmation of the Government of India, explaining that the situation contemplated was 'a post of honour, the duties of which required great decision and vigour, combined with discretion.' Knowing, however, his strongly-expressed intention to take advantage of his unexpired furlough, unless required for particular service, the Governor considerably stated that if that intention were still unchanged, he need not, of course, consider himself under any obligation to remain in the Southern Maratha country. The wound was now re-opened; Outram respectfully declined the offer; not on the ground surmised, but from a sense of self-respect. Pleading the unremedied wrong, he briefly drew attention to the particulars of his treatment in Sind, and since his last return to India. He had been 'removed from one of the highest and most responsible situations under the Government of India—the political charge of Sind and Baluchistan,' notwithstanding the expressed approval of his services in it by high authority, and he had accepted an inferior position to prove his zeal and loyalty. Circumstances had occurred to obviate the necessity of his return home; ¹ but, on completion of the work in hand, he would be grateful for permission to revert to regimental duty. 'I do hope,' he wrote, 'that when I have restored quiet, and have placed matters in this country

¹ His friend, Colonel Barnewell, wrote strongly to dissuade him from the step, and he had reason to believe that the appointment of Resident at Baroda might be offered to him if he remained. This he could accept with honour, and would be some kind of compensation for his late treatment at the hands of Government. Above all, Mrs. Outram's health had so much improved that she proposed joining him very shortly in India.

on such a footing that they can be satisfactorily transferred to any person whom you may appoint permanently to the office, I may be allowed to join my regiment, there to remain in humble repose after the incessant wear and tear of body and mind which I have had to undergo for so many years past; for I consider that by accepting permanently any situation inferior in rank, importance, and emolument to what I have heretofore filled with—I presume to think—advantage to the State, although the contrary to myself, I should sign my own admission of the justice of the treatment to which I allude.’ Upon receipt of this reply, intimation was made to Outram that Colonel Ovens, Resident at Satara, had been appointed special commissioner for the settlement of the Kolapur state and territory, on whose arrival he was requested to return to Bombay.

It is important that these facts should be clearly understood, because the proceedings of the special commissioners, Mr. Reeves and Colonel Outram, were not all approved by the Bombay Government, and the impression may have been left on the minds of some persons, that this disapproval had to do with the nomination of Colonel Ovens. As to the particular acts which elicited adverse comment, it appears that objection was taken to the division of forces at Kolapur, when concentration had been desired; as also to the move to Kaghal; but above all to the proclamation of the amnesty, of which mention has been made above, and which the authorities erroneously inferred had been so worded as to include all the leaders. The responsibility for these measures was not merely accepted, but actually claimed by Outram.¹ More characteristic of his chivalry than illustrative

¹ The subsequent despatch of the Court of Directors, dated September 17, 1845, reviewing the whole proceedings in the states of Kolapur and Sawant-Wari, satisfactorily explains Colonel Outram's conduct, and attributes the disapproval of his measures to the imperfect information obtained on the subject by the local government.

of his worldly wisdom, was the reply to the despatch which first communicated the doubts of Government on the propriety of the action of the joint commissioners. He therein says:—‘Had the responsibility . . . rested avowedly with me, I should have left the result to prove the policy, but as my immediate superior, Mr. Reeves, has alone incurred the displeasure of Government for those proceedings, I feel myself bound to say that if blame is merited, I at least ought to share it; for I cannot but be conscious that I advocated the course which has been thus condemned; and, under the circumstances in which I was placed, when I so advised, it is possible that that gentleman may have been somewhat influenced by my opinion.’ He then continued an elaborate defence of the line of conduct pursued by himself and his colleague, which eventually brought upon him the severe strictures of the Governor-General, as well as of his own immediate superiors. The tendency to justify his acts was displayed on this occasion in so marked a manner, that we can hardly wonder at the sequel; and explanations of his boldness, if it be not indiscretion, must be looked for in the circumstance that the chief blame had been laid on other shoulders than his own, and that he was rather censured by implication than directly.

But, however open to question was the decision of error in judgment passed upon the joint commissioners, the unexpected seizure and imprisonment of Colonel Ovans on November 16 kept them for some time longer in their responsible posts. It was not until December 1 that Colonel Ovans was released by the Gadhkari on the reduction of their stronghold; and Outram did not take his departure from camp before the 17th of that month. In the interim he had won fresh laurels in the field, as we find from the following extracts.

Lieutenant-Colonel Poole, of H.M. 22nd regiment, re-

porting to Major-General Delamotte, on November 29, 1844, the capture of the Pettahs near the gate on the north side of the Forts of Páwanganh and Panála, writes:—

‘On ascending the hills, the enemy, who were in considerable numbers, commenced firing on us from behind rocks and other cover, and were immediately driven into the Pettah by the skirmishers. The main body of the party were there halted under cover on the edge of the Pettah, the advance parties, half European and half Native, moving on under Ensign Budd, H.M. 22nd regiment, and Ensign Black, 2nd grenadiers, led by Lieutenant-Colonel Outram, and attended by Captain Clarke, 2nd grenadiers acting brigade-major. The enemy were speedily driven into the Fort of Panála; the party then passed close under the gate of the Fort, enabling Colonel Outram to make a full and satisfactory reconnaissance; then, moving on, took post under cover just below the neck of land connecting the two Forts, whence Captain Clarke was despatched by Colonel Outram to the main body, which was conducted by that officer, under Colonel Hickey’s orders, through the whole of the Pettahs in succession to the spot where Colonel Outram was posted, the enemy during the whole time keeping up a heavy fire of artillery and matchlocks from the walls.’

Lieutenant-Colonel Brough, of H.M. 2nd regiment, reporting, on December 2, the storm of Panála on the previous evening, remarks:—

‘The heroic Lieutenant-Colonel Outram, C.B., was in his accustomed place, the front rank.’

And Major-General Delamotte, in his own despatch of December 3, says:—

‘The difficulty of reaching the walls was very great from

the rugged and steep ascent which led to a ledge or path by which they (the storming party) were obliged to proceed, flanked by a very heavy fire from the walls, and large stones hurled down upon them as they advanced, which they did in the most gallant manner, to the breach. Among the first and foremost I noticed :—

‘Lieutenant-Colonel Brough, commanding the storming party; Lieutenant Graham, leading engineer after Major Peat was disabled; and the gallant Lieutenant-Colonel Outram, C.B. I beg now to bring to the favourable notice of his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief. . . . Lieutenant-Colonel Outram, C.B., who, on all and every occasion, tendered his services, and from whom I received valuable information and suggestions.’

A Government notification, of December 9, announcing the storm and capture of Panamá, thus recognises the service here alluded to :—

‘The Honourable the Governor in Council begs in particular to offer his best thanks to . . . and to Lieutenant-Colonel Outram, C.B., of the 23rd regiment of Bombay N.I., who volunteered his services and was among the foremost who entered the Fort of Panamá.’

That he had, at this time also, regained the full approbation of Government for his political work may be inferred by perusal of the Secretary’s two despatches to his address, dated December 2 and 12 respectively. The first, referring to his reception of a delegate from the rebel camp, states :—

‘The Honourable the Governor in Council entirely approves of the whole of your proceedings now reported. The letters addressed by you to the Sirdars and to the Gadhkarris of Panamá and Páwargarh are written exactly in the proper

spirit.' The second bears upon his prolonged detention on special duty:—

'The seizure and confinement of Lieutenant-Colonel Ovans, the officer appointed to relieve you, having still kept you for a longer period than was intended in your position at Kolapur, the Honourable the Governor in Council has much gratification in recording his great satisfaction that you have thereby had an opportunity, during the military operations that have been in progress, of displaying those high qualities as a soldier, for which you have been ever distinguished; whilst your subsequent proceedings at Kolapur, more particularly after the seizure of Lieutenant-Colonel Ovans, have generally been marked with prudence and firmness.' Finally, the Government of India thus addressed the Governor of Bombay in a later despatch on the same subject:— 'The Governor-General in Council entirely concurs in the opinion of Lieutenant-Colonel Outram's conduct since the capture of Colonel Ovans, and while the latter officer was retained by the garrison of Panála, as mentioned in the fifteenth paragraph of your letter to Lieutenant-Colonel Outram; and it is with much satisfaction the Governor-General in Council records his entire approbation of that conduct, and his opinion of the temper, judgment, and discretion which have marked Lieutenant-Colonel Outram's proceedings on every occasion subsequent to the occurrence above alluded to.'

During the imprisonment of Colonel Ovans, Outram begged repeatedly that he might, on public considerations, be allowed to take his place, but the former officer would not entertain the idea for a moment. Outram argued that the rebels, knowing how favourably their prisoner was disposed towards them, would readily consent to his release, in the belief that he might, when at large, effect an arrangement in

their favour; but Ovans thought that the exchange would only place his substitute in danger, do him himself no good, and be injurious to the character of Government.¹

While yet *en route* to Bombay, the receipt, at Satára, of a letter from Mrs. Outram, intimating her proposed departure from England on February 1, confirmed him in his resolution of remaining in India; but he still entertained the idea of going to Egypt, for he could meet his wife at Alexandria. Scarcely, however, had he reached the Presidency when his services were placed at the disposal of the Commander-in-Chief, and his presence was required to aid in the suppression of serious disturbances in Sawant-Wari—a tract south of the country which he had just quitted. Writing to his mother on December 29, he tells her that the quarter to which he is moving is so ‘inundated with troops’ that he expects to find ‘all warfare over’ almost before he gets there; that he has ‘a month to spare’ before proceeding to meet Mrs. Outram, and will occupy it with the portion of his regiment then employed in the field; and that

¹ We are enabled to supply two of the letters which passed on this occasion, dated November 21 and 22 respectively:—

‘My dear Ovans,—I again beg that you will propose to the garrison to take me as your substitute; they see you are favourable to them, and they deem me inimical; the hope, therefore, that (were you) at liberty you might effect something for them, while they would consider me nearly equal security in their hands, will induce them readily to accede to this arrangement which, for private as well as public considerations, I earnestly implore you to consent to.

‘J. OUTRAM.’

‘My dear Outram,—As I said before, your coming to take my place here is quite out of the question. It would only place you in danger, and would do no good, and would be injurious to the character of Government. My object is, whatever may happen, to uphold our name and fame. But these men have not, as yet, by word or deed, thrown any indignity on me or the Government. It is natural enough their keeping me here for their own safety, but this is the extent of their present offence. But, under no circumstances will I consent to your coming here, or to any other person coming here, in my place.

‘C. OVANS.’

his sudden departure that evening must account for a hurried letter. But he had not attached the importance to his new military duties which they merited. It was no matter of mere regimental command, for which his services had been required by the head of the Bombay army. On January 4, we trace the first of his detachment orders, dated Vingorla, appointing his staff; a week later, he is at Sawant-Wari, detaching a hundred men under an English officer back to Vingorla; and three days afterwards, he is, under instructions from division head-quarters, organising a light field detachment of his own, 1,200 strong, composed of European and Native infantry, sappers, artillery, and local troops.¹

The truth is that the insurrection had taken a shape that foreboded all sorts of evil consequences, unless the prestige of British power were at once asserted and maintained by strong, decided action. The fugitives from Kolapur had, on the destruction of their forts, and about the time that Outram was relieved from his joint commissionership, sought to avoid the detachments of troops overrunning the surrounding lands by taking refuge in the nearest *jangals*, whence they effected a junction with some two thousand of the Wari people under the Phund Sawant and Anna Sahib. These two chiefs had become notorious by acts of violence and lawlessness, and were then engaged in stopping the roads and laying waste a great part of the Konkan. Their strength was mainly in the difficult nature of the country they occupied; but there were not wanting other obstacles to the successful progress of invaders than inaccessible rocks, im-

¹ 'In his first march from Vingorla,' according to Murray's *Handbook of India*, part ii. Bombay, 'Colonel Outram had a narrow escape. Riding at the head of the column with Captain Battye, of the 21st N.I., he was observed by a party of rebels posted in trees, and was known by his blue coat to be the *bara sahib*, or officer of the highest rank. A volley was fired at him, but the bullets intended for him struck Captain Battye's horse, which fell dead, shot through in three places.'

penetrable forests, and impassable ravines. Miasma, which had ceased to affect them, was a powerful element in checking the advance of their foes. Frustrated attempts to reach the more prominent offenders had already given confidence to the rebel forces, in spite of defective organisation and the absence of discipline; while owing to their readiness to scatter on all occasions, it was not easy to assail them with an effective or decisive blow. To an officer directing operations against such an enemy, experience with Bhils, Kúlis, and even Afghans would not have been thrown away. He of whom we are writing possessed this qualification, and natural gifts besides peculiarly suited to the due accomplishment of his task. 'Never,' says the before quoted writer in the 'Calcutta Review,' 'was the magic power of one man's presence more striking than on Outram's return to the seat of war. . . . From January 14 matters took a different turn; . . . hitherto the three brigades had been playing bo-peep with the enemy. But now, at length, a decided movement was announced for hemming in the rebels in the valley of Sirapur. Twelve hundred men were placed under Outram, with orders to beat up the low ground from Wari towards the forts of Manohar and Mansantosh; Colonel Carruthers, with a brigade, was to occupy the Seevapoor valley on the other side of the ridge on which those forts are situated; while Colonel Wallace was on a given day to descend the Ghats. . . .' The date named was that on which the details of the light field detachment were assembled at Sawant-Wari. On the morning of the 16th their movements had been planned, their marching arrangements completed, and they advanced upon the enemy.

If there has been controversy on the merits of certain commanders engaged in the operations that ensued, and in respect of certain of those operations, there has been no question raised as to the good work then done by James

Outram. If there had been complaints of delay and inactivity in attacking and dispersing the rebels before his appearance on the scene, when he did appear, no such charges could be laid at *his* door. His progress in suppressing the rebellion was rapid: his movements were well considered and well executed; and his success was brilliant. Cutting his way through thick and hitherto unexplored *jungle*; ascending high and steep passes; seeking, where practicable, to co-operate with his brother leaders, but generally compelled to act on his own sole discretion; marching, in one stretch of twenty-four hours, a distance of forty-six miles—in fine, allowing no moral or physical obstacle to be insuperable, he drove the enemy from one stockade after another, occupied their villages, and, on the 8th day after setting out, stationed himself before the fort of Mansantosh. On January 24, disappointed in not obtaining two expected mortars, his energies were restricted to watching the play of the single howitzer which his old friend Captain Pontardent had brought up the previous evening, and was now directing against the stronghold. His own report may be quoted for the proceedings of the next day:—

‘Two 5½-inch mortars, having arrived during the night, were placed in position 600 yards from the Fort, and the howitzer moved up to the same. Having determined on storming the stockades, lest longer delay should enable the enemy to strengthen them still further, I sent Lieutenant Peyton with the company of 23rd regiment to occupy a belt of jungle running up to the scarp of the Fort to the left of the stockades, with orders to ascend till within forty or fifty yards of the scarp, where the cover was sufficiently dense to shelter his men from the stones hurled from the Fort above, or shot from the stockades in flank.’

Here let us explain that Manohar and Mansantosh are

situated on two lofty rocks, perhaps a mile from the foot of the Ghats, and thirty-five miles from Vingorla; they are separated from each other by a profound chasm. The height above the plain is about 2,500 feet.

The lieutenant's instructions were to lay close until the advance for the storming party was sounded, and then to push up and take the stockades in flank while the attention of the enemy was distracted by the assault on their front. A false attack on the neighbouring fort of Manohar, by the pickets on the opposite side, was to be made at the same moment, so as to draw off the defenders of the stockades to that quarter. But the shelling with which the day's proceedings opened had not the immediate effect expected, and the attack was deferred until 11 A.M., a later hour than intended. Then, the advance being sounded, Outram was disappointed at seeing the 23rd skirmishers (his own regiment) rise from their cover at the bottom, instead of near the top of the *jangal* belt. Not being so high up as the head of the storming party, they could not attain, in time, the position requisite to bring about the contemplated diversion.

'Relying, however,' he continues, 'on the gallantry of the troops composing the storming party, and feeling the ill effect of further delaying to take the stockades, I sounded to the head of the stormers to throw out skirmishers to the left. . . . Lieutenant Gardiner gallantly led, thus turning the flank of the enemy's position. The whole steadily ascended the steep ridge, at the top of which a succession of three stone stockades were occupied by about 150 of the enemy, who opened a heavy fire upon the stormers . . . also exposed to showers of stones from the top of the Fort immediately over them. The stockades were carried with little further difficulty than that of climbing the very steep ascent, and the enemy fled the moment they saw their flank

turned. Lieutenant Munbee, of the engineers, who led the advance, and Lieutenant Gardiner, who led the flankers, were the first to enter the stockades, immediately followed by Captain Jacob, 2nd grenadiers . . . also Lieutenant Belfield, H.M. 17th regiment, and Lieutenant Battye, 21st regiment N.I. Those officers then pushed on to the steps leading up to the gate of the Fort, with the few men up with them, and were there awaiting further support when I arrived on the spot.'

As the fugitives from the stockades avoided entering Mansantosh, it was doubtful whether serious opposition was to be looked for from behind its walls. Its immediate capture was, in any case, an important object, because its fall would ensure that of Manohar also, and possibly result in the apprehension of the chiefs in both places. Upon the whole Outram thought it well to lend a favourable ear to the step which Lieutenant Munbee gallantly volunteered to take—viz. to apply powder-bags to the gate. Five officers¹ and a few men of H.M. 17th and 22nd regiments, accompanied the directing engineer on this occasion, but the attempt was unsuccessful and some loss ensued.² The result was distressing, and circumstances would not have justified any hasty instructions for a second experiment of the kind. Meanwhile, attention was given to prevent the egress of the garrison preparatory to repetition on the following night. One party was left in possession of the steps leading to the gate; a second party was placed under shelter in the gap between the two

¹ Captains Le Grand Jacob, and Hume; Lieutenants Gardiner, Battye, and Schneider.

² The return of casualties had not been made up when Outram wrote the report from which the above account is obtained. But he knew that in this attempt, and the previous advance on the stockades, five men had been killed, and five officers and several men wounded. He attributed the check received to the delay in the original attack, which enabled the enemy to collect the piles of stones with which the storming party was overwhelmed.

Forts, to prevent the despatch of succour from Manohar; and the third side of Mansantosh was secured by the occupation of the stockades and a cave at the bottom of the scarp on the west. Outram had had no opportunity of reconnoitring the scarp on the fourth side, which was not within the limits of his charge; but he understood that it was so perpendicular as to prevent the possibility of escape, in the face of the troops co-operating in that quarter, whose mortars had opened fire on the previous day.

Accordingly, at an hour after dark on January 26, Lieutenants Munbee and Schneider, supported by Lieutenant Mardell, who had volunteered his services with some native riflemen, were in position on the steps; but the storming party had miscalculated the time necessary to reach the spot, and did not arrive until the rising moon made their purpose too apparent for successful accomplishment. The enterprise was therefore again deferred for another twenty-four hours, at the end of which time Outram, confident in the secure retention of the garrison of Mansantosh, hoped to see effected a complete investment of Manohar as well, by the exertions of his brother commanders. He was, however, greatly surprised and chagrined to find in the morning that both forts had been evacuated; their garrisons having slipped out on the sides supposed to be watched by the co-operating brigades.

Writing on the date of this unlooked-for event, Outram says:—

‘The escape of the garrisons, including, I believe, the young Rajah and all the chiefs of the rebels, at a time when their capture was so possible, and their escape might have been so easily prevented, is most deeply to be regretted. I hear that they have made their way down the jungle in front of the Menohur gate, and coming over the Sassudroog ridge.

some distance beyond the post which I established thereon (and made over to the other brigades), passed on to the Visla jungles, where they were seen at four o'clock this morning. I shall now direct my endeavours to follow them up.'

He *did* follow them up, and there was more fighting in the thick *jungal*, in which some *sipāhis* were killed on our side and much loss of life occurred on that of the enemy. Eventually the resistance subsided, and negotiations were opened with the Portuguese authorities of the bordering State of Goa for the delivery of those insurgents who had sought a refuge there. By the end of April the campaign was at an end. We have attempted no account of it as an historical narrative; but in confining ourselves to Outram's story of his own operations, we have certainly not drawn the reader's attention to the least stirring part of the whole. One or two brief extracts, however, from the 'Calcutta Review' may be added with advantage. It is there stated:—

On January 20, a combined movement was ordered upon the high peak to the west of Munsuntosh. The main attack was to be made by Colonel Carruthers, who, supported by a portion of Colonel Wallace's brigade, was to carry some stockades in his front, and then move up the Dakhan-wari or Sivapur side of the ridge, while Colonel Outram was to make a diversion from the Shirsaji or Gotia valley. This last detachment performed their part; but on reaching the summit of the peak, from which an extensive view was commanded, no sign appeared of either brigade. They saw the stockades which Colonel Carruthers was to have attacked, but which being now taken in flank were abandoned, the enemy flying to Munsuntosh, within 800 yards of which fort Outram established a post. Colonel Carruthers's brigade had been prevented by the nature of the country from taking their full share in the operations of the day. The next morning another combined movement was made on the village of Gotia, immediately below the forts; again the nature of the country favoured Outram, the

advanced guard of whose detachment captured the village with all its stockades, though very strongly situated. . . . Colonel Outram was . . . left unsupported, to carry on operations against Munsuntosh. One of those accidents which no human foresight can obviate, frustrated his attempt to gain that fortress by a *coup de main*. . . . Outram had skilfully thrown out parties to command the debouches from the south and south-west faces of the forts, leaving the remaining portion of the cordon to be filled up by the brigades. — failed on his part, and thus suffered the rebel chiefs, who had all been engaged, to escape over the Sisadrug ridge, close to one of his posts, into the Goa territory. Outram followed hard upon their track, had several skirmishes, took many prisoners, and on one occasion nearly captured the chief. Again he scoured the wild country beneath the Ghats, encouraging the loyal, and beating up the disaffected villages. The nature and value of his services during the operations . . . are not to be measured by the actual opposition experienced or loss sustained, but by the estimate formed by other commanders of the obstacles and enemy to be encountered . . . the promotion bestowed on him amply proves that Government took the same view of his conduct throughout the campaign as did General Delamotte, Colonels Brough and Wallace, and indeed all his comrades.

His proceedings at Goa were distinguished by tact combined with firmness, and a straightforwardness which, though natural and void of effort, was highly effective. In the first instance, Captain Arthur, military secretary to the Governor of Bombay, had been deputed to confer with the Governor of the Portuguese settlement on the best means to be adopted for preventing insurgents from Sawant-Wari finding an asylum in his territory, and for apprehending those already there. Further personal communication becoming necessary, Major Stevens, Outram's able staff officer, was sent. Then Outram himself had to go; and the letters which he addressed at this period to Mr. Secretary Gomez are instructive and interesting, read in connection with his reports to Government. The question under discussion was a delicate one, and all the more so because, independently of British

prestige, the credit of a second European Power was involved in its solution. On April 15, Colonel Outram was enabled to report, for Sir George Arthur's information, that all the objects of his mission to Goa had been satisfactorily concluded by the surrender to that Government of all the insurgent Sawant-Wari chiefs, and most of the inferior leaders in the insurrection. 'The Hon. the Governor in Council has great satisfaction,' wrote the secretary in acknowledging this report, 'in now recording his approbation of the temper, ability, skill, and judgment which you have evinced in all your communications with the Goa Government. I am at the same time desired to intimate to you that the Governor in Council chiefly attributes to your exertions the present favourable prospects of the immediate restoration of tranquillity in the recently disturbed districts.'

But this was a small part only of the publicly-expressed recognition of services rendered. Official acknowledgments were indeed multiplied. The Governor in Council recorded his opinion that 'the energy, boldness, and military skill displayed by Lieutenant-Colonel Outram, and the rapidity and success which characterised all the movements of his detachment in a particular degree, entitle him, and the officers and men under his command, to the thanks and approbation of Government.' The Commander-in-Chief of the Bombay army, Sir Thomas MacMahon, expressing the pleasure felt in communicating the praise thus bestowed 'for zeal, activity, skill, and gallantry,' added the words 'which you have so conspicuously evinced on all occasions.' Not only did Lord Hardinge endorse the approval of Sir George Arthur, but the Home Government also; and we learn that Her Majesty's Ministers considered that 'but for the conciliatory policy adopted by Colonel Outram, they might have been involved in a disagreeable misunderstanding with the Government of Portugal.' The despatch on the

subject of the Kolapur and Sawant-Wari disturbances, which reached India from the Court of Directors near the close of the year, was highly eulogistic of the share taken in their suppression by 'this distinguished officer.'¹ As an instance of how universally admitted was his high character throughout India, even at this stage of his career, the Adjutant-General of the Madras army—referring to his favourable notice, for the Marquis of Tweeddale's information, of the services of an assistant-surgeon of that Presidency—writes:— 'His Lordship receives with much pleasure a testimony of merit from an officer whose praise is so honourable to Dr. Forester.'

As early as February 3—when intelligence of the events immediately following the evacuation of Mansantosh and Manohar must have just reached Bombay—the appointment of Resident at Satára was offered to Outram by the Governor, through his military secretary. Acceptance having been notified in the interim, the formal nomination was communicated in the following terms:—

'The Honourable the Governor in Council having observed with great satisfaction the gallant and energetic spirit in which your late operations in the Sawant-Wari territory have been undertaken, and the ability with which they have been carried into execution, I am desired to inform you that, to mark the approbation with which these services are regarded by Government, he is pleased to appoint you to the office of Resident at Sattara and commandant of the troops at that station.'

Owing to the work still before him in Sawant-Wari, his orders to join were not issued until May 3, when they were forwarded by the Commander-in-Chief, writing in his own

¹ See Appendix H.

name to express the satisfaction with which he made the communication. Again did his Excellency avail himself of an opportunity to publish his 'high sense' of the 'zeal, ability, and energy' evinced by Outram throughout his services in the Southern Maratha country and Sawant-Wari—thereby signifying how fairly and honourably the promotion accorded had been earned.

It was now stated that the presence of the new Resident was urgently required at Satára. Handing over, therefore, all necessary papers to Captain Le Grand Jacob, political superintendent of Sawant-Wari, he left for his new destination, and joined his appointment on May 26, 1845.

APPENDICES.

APPENDICES.

APPENDIX A.

GENERAL WASHINGTON AND DR. JAMES ANDERSON, page 7.

THE following letter, from a copy found among the papers of Mrs. Margaret Outram, will be read with interest :—

‘Mount Vernon, July 25, 1798.

‘Esteemed Sir,—Your favour of February 8 came safe, and would have received an earlier acknowledgment if anything had sooner occurred worthy of communication. I hope you have not only got relieved of the fever from which you were then recovering, but of the languor with which it had affected you, and that you are now engaged in the literary pursuit of which you gave the outlines ; and which, with your pen and arrangement of the subjects, must be curious, entertaining, and instructive. Thus persuaded, if you propose to carry the work on by way of subscription, it would give me pleasure to be numbered among the subscribers. I little imagined when I took my last leave of the walks of public life, and retired to the shades of my vine and fig-tree, that any event would arise *in my day* that would bring me again on a public theatre ; but the unjust, ambitious, and intoxicated conduct of France towards these United States has been, and continues to be such, that they must be opposed by a firm and manly resistance, or we shall not only hazard the subjugation of our government, but the independence of our nation also, both being evidently struck at by a lawless, domineering power, who respects no rights, and is restrained by no treaties, when it is found inconvenient to observe them. Thus situated, sustaining daily injuries, even indignities, with a patient forbearance, from a sincere desire to live in peace

and harmony with all the world, the French Directory, mistaking the motives and the American character, and supposing that the *people* of this country were divided, and would give countenance to their nefarious measures, have proceeded to exact loans (or in other words contributions), and to threaten us—in case of non-compliance with their wild, unfounded, and incoherent complaints—that we should share the fate of Venice and other Italian States. This has roused the people from their slumbers, and filled their minds with indignation from one extremity to the other of the Union ; and I trust, if they should attempt to carry their threats into effect, and invade our territorial as they have done our commercial rights, they will meet a spirit that will give them more trouble than they are aware of in the citizens of these States.

‘When everything sacred and dear to freemen is thus threatened, I could not, consistent with the principles which have actuated me through life, remain an idle spectator, and refuse to obey the call of my country to head its armies *for defence* ; and therefore have pledged myself to come forward whenever the urgency shall require it.

‘With what sensations, at my time of life (now turned of sixty-six), without ambition or interest to stimulate me thereto, I shall relinquish the peaceful walks to which I had retired, and in the shades of which I had fondly hoped to have spent the remnant of a life worn down with cares in contemplation on the past, and in the enjoyment of scenes present and to come of rural growth, let others, and especially those who are best acquainted with my ways of thinking, decide ; while I, believing that man was not designed by Providence to live for himself alone, shall prepare for the worst that can happen.

‘The gardener you were so obliging as to send me continues to conduct himself extremely well ; he is industrious, sober, and orderly, and understands his business ; in short, I never had a kind servant that pleased me better ; and what adds to the satisfaction is, that he himself is content, having declared that he never was happier.

‘My best wishes always attend you ; and, with great esteem and regard, I am, Sir,

‘Your most obedient and obliged humble servant,

(Signed) ‘GEO. WASHINGTON.

‘Dr. Jas. Anderson, in or near London.’

And again :—

‘ Philadelphia, Dec. 10, 1798.

‘ Esteemed Sir,—Hearing that the ship (“Suffolk”) by which the enclosed letter was sent was captured by the French, who never restore any of mine, I do, to avoid the imputation of inattention to your favours, and the correspondence with which you honour me, send a duplicate, being, with very great esteem and regard, Sir,

‘ Your most obedient and obliged humble servant,

(Signed)

‘ G. WASHINGTON.’

APPENDIX B.

KHANDESH AND THE BHÍLS, page 51.

THE area of Khandesh, roughly estimated in 1833 at 20,000, and in 1843 at 13,000, is recorded in the latest published reports at 10,162 square miles. Official statements make the population 1,070,000; or an average of 105·33 to the square mile. The Trigonometrical Survey, has yet, we understand, to publish the full results of its work for this particular subdivision of Western India; but the unhealthiness of the country at certain seasons, and physical difficulties encountered, have been productive of delay. Much is in progress, or remains to be done on the western side, and something on the south-east of Khandesh to complete the survey.

Khandesh once played an important, if a brief, part in Indian history. At the dawn of the fifteenth century, it became an independent State; and one Malik Raja, son of Khan Jahán, to whose family belonged some of the most respectable of the Dehli nobles, under Allahu Din Ghilzai, is considered by Farishta the first of its thirteen Faruki kings. Entrusted by Firuz Toghlak with the command of 2,000 horse he was afterwards granted by the same monarch the districts of Talnair and Kerind. He was also made Sipah Salár, or chief military commander of the whole province and, the 2,000 horse having been authoritatively raised to 3,000, he found means to increase the number of his mounted retainers to 12,000. On the death of Firuz he invaded Gujrát, laying waste the districts of Nandurbar and Sultánpúr. In 1399 he was succeeded by his son Nasir, and up to the close of the sixteenth century, when the province became absorbed in the Imperial territory, and its affairs were administered by Abul Fadhl, Wazir of Akbar the Great, Khandesh remained a separate State, or, as we read it, kingdom.¹

¹ See vol. iii., *passim*, Elliot's *History of India*, edited by Professor Dowson.

Low, bare hillocks, sinking gradually to the valley beyond, mark the south-eastern boundary of the 'Collectorate' of Khandesh, which contains sixteen *talukas*, independently of recent transfers to Nassik. Of these, Sauda, Yáwal and Chopra, on the east, touch the Northern or Satpura hills, while the Chálisgaon district is merged in the Southern or Satmala range. The land revenue is estimated at 40 lakhs (40,000L.): total gross revenue about 50. Although Khandesh is stated by Thornton to be a great valley, or basin, traversed throughout, from east to west, by the Tapti, the passage of this river is through the more northern of its territorial divisions, and therefore hardly answers the description of a central line. According to the same authority, the lower part of the Collectorate is in general fertile, 'the soil consisting principally of a rich mould of a dark reddish-brown colour, formed, apparently, for the most part, of the disintegration of the Trappean rock. There is indeed a considerable portion of sand as well as hard, unkindly soil mixed with gravel; yet the better descriptions predominate.'¹

Farishta, in his account of the Kings of Khandesh, associates the Bhíl with the predatory Kúli of Gujrát. According to this historian, they both suffered severely from the famine in the days of Malik Raja, the first king; and had habitually infested the roads and disturbed the peaceable inhabitants of towns prior to the reign of Adil Khan Faruki I., at the close of the fifteenth century.²

Noting the local tendency to limit the term 'Bhíl' to lawless and savage men who live separate from their fellows, Captain Graham explains at the same time that it is also given to many who do not acknowledge it. He is of opinion that, irrespective of the common Bhíls of Khandesh who vauntingly merge all class distinctions in the one generic name, there are no more than seven clans in the province which merit mention. These are the Tarvis, a fine race of Muslim converts, with the dark, diminutive, and barbarous Nahals in the north-east; the fierce and surly Muhammadan Hindhis in the south-east; the milder Matwaris, Burdas, and Dorpies in the north-west; the wild Khotils of the Satpura mountains, and the unmitigated savages of the Dáng, or Dángchis, who reside below the Western Gháts. Mr. Boyd makes three divisions of Bhíls only:

¹ Gazetteer, under the head 'Candeish.'

² Briggs: translation of *Farishta*.

i.e. those of the hills, almost all under different chiefs or Naiks ; those of the plains and villages ; and the Tarvis or Muhammadans in the east. The Nahals and others, he does not consider sufficiently important for separate notice.

With regard to the amnesty generally offered on the inauguration of the humane policy adopted in 1825, there was diversity of opinion as to the degree of blame to be attached to offenders. Some thought the Bhil a victim of treachery and cruelty in the past, and attributed his ruffianism and malevolence to misconception of his fellows : believing that if he could only discriminate between the humanity of the newly-arrived Western ruler and that of the displaced Oriental despot, he would readily recognise in the first a benefactor and friend. Others again were less disposed to wholesale judgment in favour of a white and in condemnation of a dark-visaged administrator, and these naturally threw the onus of misdoing on the Bhil himself, setting down his mistrust and estrangement to his conviction that he deserved no forbearance at the hands of any government under the control of which he might chance to come. This was the view of Colonel Robertson, an able and experienced officer of the old and justly-honoured school of Indian politicians. His opinion on the Bhils may be further quoted with advantage:—

‘ They had in general no property, and what they had there is no instance of their having been deprived of. The Government would not, I think, from mere wantonness, have selected this class as the objects of cruel and merciless persecution. . . . To relinquish the life they were leading was a course very far from the wishes of the Bheels. . . . If for the Naiks such a change was unpalatable, it was more so for those who adhered to them ; who, comparatively speaking, rioted in the plenty which their leaders’ courses yielded, and who, by forsaking them, returned not only to a listless life, but also to an income not more than sufficient for their support, as well as to a humble station in the community and corresponding duties—none of which would be agreeable to them, after passing a long time in a state of the rudest independence (almost of all restraint)—who, in the hills, beyond yielding a very slight obedience to their leaders, were under no control, and came and went as they chose ; they were all equals, and they shared in all that was got by plunder, the extent of which was only limited by their own exertions. We may fancy how unpleasantly the call to return to their proper

station and duties must under such circumstances have sounded to the Bheels in the hills; and how, even if tempted by prospect of a provision their leaders felt inclined to yield, their adherents must have thwarted their intentions.'

The town of Cháligáon bears the name of a *táluka* or district, containing in 1863 a population of between thirty and forty thousand, and more than one hundred and forty registered Government villages. To the natural advantage of a river on its northern and eastern side, it adds the possession, by artificial endowment, of a railway in its centre.¹ But its contiguity to the Nizam's territory on the south—where a high wall-like range of hills, supporting on their summit an extensive table-land, extends to almost the entire breadth of the district—has made it, even in recent years, a difficult ground for satisfactory settlement: and in the days of which we write, it had none of the benefits of more modern skill and appliances. The revenue commissioner, Mr. (now Sir Barrow) Ellis, in reporting of the locality in question some sixteen years ago, speaks of the 'turbulent characters' of this frontier, whom he would suggest keeping in order by a more effective police supervision than theretofore exercised.

Exclusive of the small nucleus of regulars, Outram's light infantry consisted of Bhils only; the pay of the men being fixed at five rupees monthly, with an additional rupee for outpost duty. Clothing was supplied by Government. At the outset only $4\frac{1}{2}$ rupees was actually paid over, and that in daily instalments of two annas, the balance of twelve annas in a long and ten in a short month being given on the last day when acquittances were taken. The clothing consisted of a *pagri* (*pagiya*), or turban, dyed green; a white *angrikha* (*angarkha*), or vest; and a *gurgi*, a kind of knee breeches, made double and of strong cloth. This was found suited to their tastes, and gave them a respectable appearance. In Outram's report of September 1, quoted in the text, are the following passages, regarding his new levies:—

'They are daily improving in cleanliness, and beginning to ex-

¹ The reader, desirous of becoming acquainted with this part of Khandesh, can do no better than refer to the published papers on the assessment proposed for the Dhúlia and Cháligám *tálukas* contained in the *Selections from the Bombay Government Records*, No. lxxii., New Series (1868).

pend their surplus pay at the end of the month in purchasing shoes or ornaments. This dress will last about six months, and is well calculated for a *police*, being uniform and looking well with native arms ; it is also the cheapest that could be given, the whole expense being $3\frac{1}{2}$ rupees.

‘I was unable to proceed in hutting more than thirty men, grass not being procurable so late in the season ; the rest I have quartered in empty houses in the town without infringing on any prejudice of the inhabitants, who were, at first, very averse to their neighbourhood, and had many causes of complaint against the Bheels, who were then rather disorderly ; but latterly such complaints have entirely ceased, and their behaviour is to the satisfaction of everyone.

‘I have, for the present, divided the corps into two classes, the one consisting of the men for general police duties, the other of those whom I hope to train and discipline as light infantry. The latter are selected from the youngest and most intelligent ; of this class there are only at present about twenty.

‘The duties I yet exact are light ; from the former a daily and nightly guard of a Naick (or lance) and six privates ; from the latter whom I wish to attach as much as possible to my person, two orderlies are supplied daily.

‘In pursuance of what I deemed prudent, i.e. exacting early service from them, I detached several parties to recruit. The ill-success of two which were sent to the greatest distance I have already shown, but the fidelity they evinced on that occasion was more gratifying than the most complete success. I have reason to be equally well pleased with all the parties I detached in the neighbourhood, all of which, though meeting with little success, deserved the trust I placed in them, and exerted themselves to the utmost.’

The following interesting particulars from the pen of Sir Bartle Frere came to hand at too late an hour for embodiment in the text, but in time to be here added :—

‘Candeesh is one of the richest provinces of Western India, formed by the basin of the Taptee river, somewhat lower and more sheltered than the general table-land of the Deccan, with better soil and better water. It had been rich and populous during the flourishing days of the Delhi empire ; but as that empire fell into

decrepitude, Candeesh suffered from being on the great roads leading from the cradle of the Mahratta race in the southern Deccan to the fertile plains and cities of Hindoostan. From the rise of the Mahratta power every year saw the Mahratta hordes advancing northwards to their annual plundering expeditions, or returning with their plunder to the safer recesses of the Deccan and, as the province possessed but few great fortresses between the range of Ghauts on its western border and Asseeghur on the east, Candeesh gradually became devastated by passing bands of plunderers to such an extent, that the jungle overpowered the cultivation, and the greater part of the province lapsed into a state of forest—while the few inhabited portions suffered from almost annual inroads of Pindarees or Mahrattas, or from the incursions of Bhils. This wild mountain race had in previous ages been driven to the rocky fastnesses of the ranges which encircle Candeesh on all sides; but, encouraged by the distracted state of the country after the rise of the Mahratta power, they plundered what little was left to the defenceless villagers, and perpetuated the desolation caused by the passage of armies.

‘To such an extent had the devastation of the land and the increase of jungle proceeded when the country came into our possession rather more than sixty years ago, that Mr. Chaplain, the first Commissioner who took over that part of the Mahratta Peishwa’s dominion after its conquest in 1817–18, reported that the first year’s police returns showed a total of 30,000 cattle destroyed by tigers within the province. It soon after fell to the Hon. Mount Stuart Elphinstone to arrange for measures required to render life and property secure in Candeesh, and to restore its ancient prosperity. He selected for this purpose two men whom he used to name “his sword” and “his plough.” Outram was “the sword,” and Captain Charles Ovans was “the plough,” and to both were allotted young military officers carefully chosen for their enterprise, courage, and other military qualities. I know of only one who still survives, Colonel Patrick French, who assisted Captain Ovans from the first, and subsequently succeeded him as Bhil agent, his business being to make the acquaintance of the wild Bhil tribes, to settle them down to agriculture, train them, and teach them to use the ploughs and cattle which were given them by the Government.

‘ Whilst this was the work of the “plough,” Outram was to raise and command a corps of Bhils, who were to be employed as military police in the wilder parts of the country, to stop marauding and gang robbery, to rid the country of tigers and other wild beasts, and to do whatever else was required to render life and property in the province secure.

‘ It is difficult to convey an adequate idea of the difficulties which beset both classes of officers. The country, unsurveyed and imperfectly known, was everywhere covered with dense jungle ; the climate was often malarious and dangerous to health ; but the great difficulty of all was the seeming impossibility of gaining the confidence of the Bhils, and inducing them to accept the well-meant measures devised for them by the British Government.

‘ This was mainly owing to the manner in which they had been treated by our predecessors, the Mahratta governors of the province, who had adopted a system of forcible retaliation, often accompanied by treachery, which had rendered the Bhils suspicious of everything offered to them by their civilised fellow-men. The following anecdote may illustrate the kind of treatment the Bhils used to receive from their Mahratta rulers. About forty-five years ago I was trying, as assistant Magistrate, a magisterial case, in which two Bhils were accused of theft, when a Brahmin of high rank under the Mahratta government came in to draw the pension which had been assigned him after the conquest. He sat and listened with some interest to the proceedings till the case was concluded, and then remarked that “the *sahib* was taking a great deal of unnecessary trouble ; that these kind of people would go on thieving as long as there was anything to steal ; and that formal trials and civilised punishments were altogether misapplied in their case.” I asked him how he would deal with them, and he said, “ Well, I was once employed in Candeesh myself, when I was a young man, under a Soubedar famous for the vigour of his administration and the peace he maintained in the country. These Bhils were then very troublesome, and after sundry expeditions, with very little result, the Soubedar came to the conclusion that formal military operations were useless against such an enemy. He, therefore, desisted from sending out detachments of troops, and having managed to communicate with some of the Bhil chiefs, invited them to a conference. At the conference he told them that he had

become convinced of the necessity of making it worth their while to abstain from plundering, and that if they and all the chiefs of the neighbouring forest country would meet him, he would arrange terms by which they would be in the receipt of fixed money allowances. The bait took, and on a day appointed they all assembled to have a grand feast to ratify the arrangement made, when the Soubedar caused troops who had been in concealment to fall upon them, and they were all exterminated." In answer to my expressions of horror at such a proceeding, my visitor informed me "that it would doubtless have been wrong had they been reasonable beings, but they were little better than monkeys, and had all the attributes of wild beasts, and could only be dealt with by measures similar to those necessary for exterminating beasts of prey"—and he left me with evident pity for the philanthropic weakness which prevented a young Englishman from agreeing to the lessons of age and experience.

'Such had been the treatment to which the Bhils had been used under our predecessors, and it was long before Outram and those who joined him in the undertaking could regain the confidence of the Bhils, even sufficiently to induce them to join his camp.

'One young officer who gave me graphic accounts of his early life with Outram was Douglas Graham—afterwards well known as one of the most daring huntsmen in Western India; some thirty-five years ago, the companion of Sir William Harris in his mission to Shoa, the southern kingdom of Abyssinia; and later again, political agent at Kolapoor in the southern Mahratta country. Graham had come out strongly recommended by some of his Scotch connections to the Governor, the Hon. Mount Stuart Elphinstone, and as soon as Mr. Elphinstone had gauged the capacity of his young *protégé*, he told him that he thought he could not do better, in order to make a man and a soldier of him, than send him up to assist Outram in the task on which he was then engaged, the civilising of the Bhils, and raising a corps for the protection of life and property in the wilder parts of Candeeah, to be composed entirely of that race under officers, some native and a few Europeans, carefully chosen from the ranks of the Bombay army.

'Young Ensign Douglas Graham accordingly journeyed up to join Outram (mounted on a pony, the only means of conveyance at that time), by paths through jungles, which are now traversed by

the great railway from Bombay to Calcutta over the Thul Ghaut. Nassik, the famous Hindoo city of pilgrims, and Maligam, the headquarters of the troops which garrisoned Candees, were almost the only towns he saw till he joined Outram at a village on the verge of civilisation on the eastern skirts of the great chain of the Syadri Ghauts. Outram had come to this village at the earnest request of the inhabitants, who represented to him that—suffering as they always did from the depredations of the tigers, who had almost the whole of the country between that and the Surat coast to themselves—their existence had been made quite intolerable by a huge tigress, who preyed upon their cattle and occasionally their women and children. She had taken up her abode in a long tunnel, cut through a spur of a hill, in more prosperous times, by the Mogul rulers of Baglan, to convey to the village the water of a distant stream. Douglas Graham found Outram with a few Bhils recently attached to him by what they had heard of his hunting prowess, planning with the villagers his scheme of operations against the tigress. She had ensconced herself in the tunnel, a passage of considerable length through a hill composed of soft *tufa*, which had been cut out sufficiently to enable two men, stooping, to walk abreast and clear the water channel of obstructions. The water was, at that dry and intensely hot season, only a few inches deep, and afforded a pleasant lair to the tigress after her nightly foray. The villagers could not tell, as she had walked along the watercourse, by which end she had entered, and there were places inside large enough for her to turn, so that it was impossible to say which way she might be lying in watch for anything she heard approaching. Outram's first question to his young friend was, "whether he had brought his gun." Of course he was answered in the affirmative, and the single-barrelled fowling-piece, duly inspected, was pronounced to be strong enough to be loaded with ball; in fact, Graham, for the last two days of his journey, had been convinced that there were beasts of prey behind every bush, and like a brave young Scot had charged his piece with a bullet, determined to do his best in any encounter which might offer. He saw that Outram was evidently musing whether it was fair to deprive his young assistant of a chance of distinguishing himself, or whether it might not be better to wait till he was more practised as a shot. Graham felt bound in honour to

press his right to accompany his chief, so Outram explained to him that they would have to walk in with the water over their ankles, and stooping, with the certainty that the tigress would hear their approach, and would turn round and enable them to see her position by the glare of her eyes. "We will go in as quietly as we can," he said, "but if you catch a sight of her eyes, take a very steady aim and fire between them: take care not to fire too high, and you will be sure to hit her in some bad part. If she cannot turn round in the tunnel she will come straight to us, and you must throw yourself flat on your face; do not mind the water, but keep your head low, and she will to a certainty make for the light behind us, and get out into the open; be sure you take good aim between the eyes." This was a comfortable position for a boy perhaps of sixteen, but Graham begged not to be left behind, and accompanied his chief, devoutly praying, as he afterwards confessed, that the tigress might go out at the other end and give them a chance on more equal terms. This she did, and Graham had the gratification of putting a shot into her before she was killed among the bushes on the outside, having satisfied his chief that the youth was made of the right stuff for a Bhil agent's assistant.'

APPENDIX C.

PACIFICATION OF THE MÁHI-KÁNTA, page 148.

THE following extract from the 'Bombay Gazette,' published in 'Allen's Indian Mail' of March 1, 1879, appears to be a fitting addendum to a chapter relating Outram's experiences and work in the Máhi-Kánta. Though the name of this distinguished officer may not have been mentioned by the framer of the address presented to Sir Richard Temple, it is probable that among the Europeans and natives in whose presence it was read and responded to, there may have been one, or more than one, to whom it would naturally occur in connection with the reforms inaugurated at the dawn of the preceding half century :—

'SIR RICHARD TEMPLE AND THE MAHI KANTA CHIEFS.—During his recent tour in Guzerat H.E. the Governor of Bombay held a durbar at Sacha, which was attended by thirteen chiefs of the Mahi Kanta, headed by the Maharaja of Edar. One Thakore was offended at the place assigned him and went away, and a second was accidentally absent. After the presentation, H. H. the Maharaja of Edar read the following address with a strong, clear voice, and distinct, tolerably correct pronunciation, showing a fairly good knowledge of English :—

"To his Excellency the Honourable Sir Richard Temple, Bart., G.C.S.I., C.I.E., Governor of Bombay.—May it please your Excellency,—I beg on my own behalf, and on that of the other chiefs, sirdars, and people of this province, to bid your Excellency a hearty welcome to the Mahi Kanta. Your Excellency is the second Governor of Bombay that has visited this province. We hail your arrival, and rejoice that you should see and judge with your own eyes the vast changes and various reforms that have taken place since the Honourable Mountstuart Elphinstone paid a

visit to the Mahi Kanta more than half a century ago. Owing in a great measure to the policy adopted by that statesman, rapine and violence have given way to peace and tranquillity. Where there were marauding bands of robbers and outlaws, a thriving and prospering agricultural population now till the ground, secure of reaping the fruits of their toil, and the habits of nearly all classes have changed for the better, while education is extending even to the Kolee. We cordially acknowledge that to the protection of the British Government the Mahi Kanta is indebted for this happy change, and we trust that under its fostering care the people of this province will rise still higher in the scale of civilisation. We rejoice in your Excellency's visit, not merely on official grounds, but also because we are glad to meet thus face to face the statesman whose administrative ability and untiring energy are so renowned throughout India. In conclusion, we beg to express our sincere and grateful thanks for the kindness you have shown, and to assure your Excellency of our firm loyalty and unswerving devotion to our gracious Sovereign Queen Victoria, Empress of India, and we pray that you will be pleased to lay these our sentiments at the foot of the Imperial Throne."

'In reply his Excellency said that he was glad to make the personal acquaintance of the Mahi Kanta chiefs in their own province, and to hear an address in English so well read by the Maharaja of Edar. His Excellency was aware that an English education was not within the reach of all of them at present, being more or less expensive, but hoped that such vernacular education as was obtainable would be availed of for the rising generation. His Excellency was glad to be able to visit the Mahi Kanta, and to see for himself the state of the province. He enjoined the Thakores to make it their business to increase the productiveness of their territories and ameliorate the condition of their subjects, by carrying out irrigational projects, by the careful study of agriculture, and by introducing reforms. His Excellency animadverted on the Byad system, regretting the frequency of disputes between the Thakores and their relations and dependents; and ascribed it to the faulty system of allotting to the Byads some portion of land or village property, whilst reserving the right of levying certain local imposts on the produce or tenure of these allotments. His Excellency advised the Thakores to accord to the Byads some means of

subsistence less calculated to cause trouble and dissatisfaction, averring that a small allotment free of reserve was much better than a large assignment burdened with some bond of contention. On the other hand, his Excellency admonished the Byads not to embarrass their tribal rulers, the Thakores, by factiousness, and warned them that such conduct would be gravely discountenanced by Government. In conclusion his Excellency congratulated the Thakores on the complete abolition of female infanticide.'— *Bombay Gazette*.

What a contrast does the educated Maharaja of Edar present to the Fath Singhs and Suraj Malis of Captain Outram's time !

APPENDIX D.

FIRST ADVANCE INTO AFGHANISTAN, page 168.

THE occurrences of April 1839, as regards the Bombay column, were not of an importance or interest commensurate with the progress of an army of invasion or occupation in a country so disturbed as Afghanistan. The experiences gained, however, were useful, and may be studied with advantage by present and future soldiers, merchants, or travellers. Let us examine them as handed down to us, and select the more salient passages on the record. Attacks and robberies, or attempted robberies, by Baluchis were very frequent, and required to be met with spirit and promptitude. Severe examples were made to deter the offenders; but their audacity knew no bounds and, on the very skirts of the camp, camels were driven off and camel-drivers stripped of their property in the broad light of day. During the six marches through the Bolan, only on one day, the second, were the troops with whom Outram proceeded really opposed, and they suffered no loss in repulsing their adversaries by means of a cavalry charge. Not so with the Major-General, who was a march or two in rear. His baggage was attacked with considerable spirit at the pass; forty-nine camel-loads of grain were carried off, five horses killed, and three troopers wounded. On the other hand, many of the enemy are said to have been then slain by our men. Beyond Kwatta, at Haikalzai, the rear guard was fired on and a camp-follower missed, but no further harm done; beyond Haikalzai, a peon was cut down and three camels and an officer's horse were abstracted without redress obtained; but few, if any, like misadventures, between the Bolan and Kandahar, have place in Outram's journal, as coming under his own observation. He mentions, however, that, as at the Bolan, so, before and after joining the artillery at the Kohjak Pass, General Willshire was subject to molestation, and that his brigade

had had several affairs with horsemen hovering about the baggage, in which upwards of fifty of the assailants were killed, with the loss of only two or three on our side.

The Bengal column and Shah's contingent had been harassed by these attacks on a larger scale : and their losses must have been more considerable. With reference to the proceedings of the mixed force in its integrity, it was estimated that at least five hundred Baluchis, Kákars, and Afghans, had fallen before our soldiers since leaving Shikarpúr and Larkhána ; the casualty roll on our side showing thirty or forty killed in open combat, besides some hundreds of followers murdered. The loss in baggage animals, owing to death, desertion of drivers, abandonment, robbery, and the many causes presenting themselves in a country where forage was scarce, water not always procurable, and travelling dangerous and difficult, must be set down at a very high figure. Sir Willoughby Cotton's regiments and detachments had so suffered from defective commissariat arrangements that, on arrival at Kwatta, the men composing them were placed on half-rations, and the camp-followers on an allowance barely sufficient to support nature. If, in such case, human beings died of starvation, the lot of beasts of burden could hardly have been less cruel.

APPENDIX E.

HONOURS AWARDED TO OUTRAM, page 209.

BUT for the General's unexplained silence regarding his varied services as extra aide-de-camp, Outram's brevet for Kalát would have been a lieutenant-colonelcy, probably accompanied by a C.B.-ship. Indeed, he was actually on the list for promotion to that rank, but at the eleventh hour some occult influence in London prevailed to cancel it. As it was, he remained a major till 1843, much to the prejudice of after-advancement, for his regimental promotion was exceptionally slow, and always lagged far behind his brevet rank.

It is pleasant to remark that among the most active of those admirers whose kind exertions, twenty years later, secured the success of the 'Outram Testimonials,' was one whose warm friendship for him dated from the time when they served together on the Commander-in-Chief's staff in Afghanistan, viz. the second Lord Keane of Ghazni. And although both Sir William Macnaghten and Lord Auckland had been fully aware of the Bombay captain's outspoken condemnation of their Afghan policy, it in no way affected their generous recognition of his merits. They not only showed their confidence by selecting him for responsible duties, but they omitted no opportunity of expressing their unreserved approbation of his manner of fulfilling them. A friendly correspondence with the high-minded Envoy continued till his tragic death. His last official letter is that noticed in the text, intimating the grant of the Order of the Duráni Empire.

The Governor-General's approbation did not evaporate in public and private expressions of commendation. It marked out, for the young Bombay 'political,' a wider and more responsible field of action than any available within his own Presidency.

MR. ROSS BELL, page 224.

MR. ROSS BELL, of the Bengal Civil Service, was designated by Lord Auckland as 'an officer of tried energy and intelligence.' Much has been said and written of this gentleman's love of display and of the pomp and parade attendant on his movements from place to place, in the fulfilment of his official duties. Contrasted with the simpler ways of Colonel Pottinger and his assistants, it is quite intelligible that the style of living and moving of the Upper Sind magnate was considered by many to be unnecessarily costly and luxurious. But we believe the difference to have been as much one of Englishmen's habits generally in the two Presidencies of Bengal and Bombay, as of idiosyncrasy. In other respects, Lord Auckland was well satisfied with his nominee; and from first to last, throughout the late Mr. Ross Bell's short career in Sind and Baluchistan, did not hesitate to express himself in the strongest terms of the importance and value of his services. Unfortunately, a weak state of health, brought on by an ungenial climate, greatly aggravated the difficulties of his position. Regulation and precedent, which commonly guide and render smooth the routine of Indian *kachahris*, were almost wholly wanting within the limits of a Baluchistan political agency. Their place would here be supplied by common sense, knowledge of native character, moral and physical courage, tact, energy, and sound discrimination: and no amount of high principle and zeal could atone for the absence of qualities such as these.

It may be well here to say a few words on our relations with Upper Sind at the time of Mr. Ross Bell's agency. If Lower Sind was important as the seat of the higher class local government, the Amirs of Khairpur, or the Upper Sind districts, were far from insignificant members of the Talpur clan, and could boast a family history quite as interesting as that of their cousins lower down the river. One 'Kaka,' or 'Bijan,' was the common ancestor, from whose son, Hotak, sprang the respective founders of the two houses of Haidarabad and Khairpur, and whose other son, Manik, numbered among his immediate descendants the first ruler of Mirpur. His grandson Shahdad, eminent among the Baluch settlers in the country during the rule of the Kalhoras (who preceded the Talpurs), was perhaps more than an ordinary

landholder, and exercised a sort of feudal sway in the land of his sojourn. First of the family to quit his native hills and take service in Sind, he had brought many Baluch followers to the newly adopted standard. These had not the patience to remain long in obscurity ; and stirring times were near to test their prowess and nationality. On the death of Shahdad, his sons Chákar and Bahram became the recognised heads of the Sind Talpurs. The murder of the latter, and other acts of violence and oppression committed by the chiefs in power, brought about a revolution ; the government was subverted ; and eventually Sohrab the son of Chákar, in Upper Sind, and Fath Ali, Ghulam Ali, Karm Ali, and Murad Ali, sons of Bahram in Lower Sind, together with Tára in Mirpur, became the *de facto* sovereigns of the country.

It is of Sohrab and his children we have now to speak. He had aided in the expulsion of the Kalhoras from Haidarabad, and might therefore reasonably claim a share of the spoil in the general partition of the province ; but the tract which fell to his lot was insufficient to satisfy his ambition, and he was not long in extending its limits. To this end, both Bhawalpur and the Afghans were destined more or less to contribute a quota ; the first, on clear compulsion, the second, with comparative indifference to the transfer of ownership.

One hundred and forty years ago, the Persian conquerors of Delhi, under the leadership of Nadir Shah, possessed themselves of extensive lands west of the Indus. The helpless Sindians were driven to Umarkot and the Eastern deserts. On the death of Nadir in 1747, Ahmad Shah Abdalli raised up a new kingdom between Northern India and Persia, which, while it saved the former country from the aggressions of the latter, made little change in it otherwise, for it merely replaced there one plunderer by another. The Afghan monarch was an awkward neighbour ; invaded on his own account, and scattering his followers over Sind and the Punjab, demanded a certain amount of black mail from the inhabitants in return for holding his hand. In Sind this tribute became hereditary, both to givers and receivers. Throughout Ahmad Shah's reign every art and evasion was called into play to get rid of the incubus ; but the Afghan was needy and could never dispense with the money. When taking the province from the Kalhoras, the Talpurs had also taken the debt, but, more fortunate than their

predecessors, they found means of staving off the liability. The relief, however, was not permanent, nor was the claim suffered to become obsolete. Taimur Shah, the less formidable successor of Ahmad, had been quieted by pretexts; the next king, Zamán, had accepted a shabby settlement in lieu of arrears; and Shuja-ul-Mulk, brother to Zamán, had followed the latter's example. Nay more, the Amirs of Sind had so far turned the tables on their old oppressors, as to abstract Shikarpur from the hands of its local governors, and make that important possession their own. Suddenly, new interests arose; the question of Sind tribute was revived with a purpose hitherto unknown; a new power had interfered to exhume the buried accounts; and the debtors were consigned to so-called justice. We have already shown the nature of the tribunal before which the Amirs were arraigned, and the sentence passed upon them. British mediation is a serious affair in circumstances such as these.

But Sohrab himself had retired from public life in 1811, and made over the dignity and cares of government to his eldest son Rustam, with whom, twenty years later, Alexander Burnes opened treaty relations. This popular and kindly chief not only suffered from his hospitable attention to strangers, but was doomed, through the intrigues and ambition of a near relative, to experience hard treatment in his own home. Even prior to the negotiations of 1831, he had begun to be involved in domestic and dynastic perplexity. His father had but recently died at a very advanced age—probably in his ninetieth year—and, before dying, had contrived, by wills and codicils, to throw disorder into his succession. Abdication of the *riyásat*, or office of *Ráis*, had been followed by marriage with a young wife, and this wife had presented old Sohrab with a son, when the son of a former wife, Rustam, was a quinquagenarian, and busily engaged in directing the affairs of State. In process of time the child became a man, and a covetous and very aspiring man, who rested not until he had brought his venerable half-brother to ruin. Indian history knows the youngest son of Sohrab as Mir Ali Murad of Khairpur. His career affords a remarkable illustration of Sindi-Baluch character, and may be studied with advantage by our own political officers in India, as well as by native candidates for Government service. To the first it should supply an incentive to understand our subjects as closely

as these strive to understand their rulers, and with better results. To the second it should be a caution to deal heedfully and, as much as in them lies, honestly, with individual representatives of the British Government, who are not all cast in the same mould nor professors of one and the same political creed.

ESTABLISHMENTS IN SIND AND BALUCHISTAN, page 229.

With reference to Outram's scheme, submitted to Mr. Colvin in August 1840—of the first-class assistants in Sind and Baluchistan, Captain Edmunds was already in the Kalát State, Lieutenant Leckie was at Haidarabad, and Lieutenant Postans at Shikarpur. It was proposed to complete the number by nominating Captain French to Upper Sind. Of second-class assistants, as there were six (i.e. Captains Kennedy, Gordon, and Kynvett, with Lieutenants Eastwick, Hammersley, and Whitelock) at the time, on the roll of officers employed in the agency, one was in excess of the proposed number. But the supernumerary officer would be available to fill one of the vacancies in the third class, in which four new names were submitted for approval, viz. Captains Hart and Christal, Lieutenant Pelly and Lieutenant Agar. Under the old system of separate agencies for Upper and Lower Sind, Captain Bean was the political agent at Kwatta (for Shál), but as he might not elect to remain under the arrangement which placed his office among the limited agencies, his tenure was not treated as a permanent one. Three officers, Messrs. Brown, Varden, and Wallace, then employed in Sind and Baluchistan, were not included in the programme, because it was understood that the first had resigned, and the two last would be compelled, by ill-health, to leave the country. Lieutenant Eastwick, a second-class assistant, had, moreover, gone on sick leave to Karachi.

EVENTS IN AFGHANISTAN, page 241.

The busy Political Agent's voluminous correspondence abounds in suggestive comments upon Afghan events generally, but space

forbids lengthened quotation. In a letter to Colonel Sutherland, dated December 26, 1841, for submission to the Governor-General if deemed advisable, he reviews the existing situation :—

‘ I had long contemplated the possibility of the Afghan explosion, and revolved in my mind the most creditable, and least disadvantageous, way of shaking off the Cabool connection, if it should become necessary ; and in that case, what arrangement would best secure our influence in Afghanistan. . . . To allow ourselves to be *driven* out, or to *withdraw*, under *present circumstances*, would, I really think be tantamount to throwing up our hold on India, for such a declaration of weakness would be a death-stroke to power principally based on opinion. *That*, therefore, is not to be thought of, I trust: neither will the necessity occur, I confidently hope, for humiliating capitulation by any of our garrisons throughout the country, every one of which is capable of holding its position on the defensive until spring, if provided with ammunition, of which, I trust, every post has a sufficiency, at least for mere defence, behind walls which need not call for much expenditure; and I have every expectation that among so mercenary a people, provisions will be obtained without difficulty, after the first enthusiasm of the revolt abates, and the vigilance of the besiegers begins to relax and dissension to arise, as inevitably must result from delays in attaining their objects. I rely upon it, that by the time for our troops to advance on Cabool, from Jellalabad and Candahar, the league will be greatly weakened, if not entirely broken; and that little or no opposition will be offered, or if so, nothing that will not be overcome by fresh and eager troops, at infinitely less cost than the weak and worn-out brigade under Sale suffered on retirement from that capital. . . . I would, after the *resubmission* of the chiefs, admit their right to choose a king for themselves, since the national voice has declared against Shah Soojah, . . . on the condition of a British representative being retained at that court, and pledges for due deference to British counsels. A Barukzye would most likely be nominated; and if Dost Mahomed, it would be to our advantage.’

How accurately these anticipations were in accordance with actual facts, the events of 1842, the journals of Eyre, of Mohun Lall, and of Lady Sale fully testify. But the ‘military crime’ (as he expressed it) witnessed at Kabul, and the non-provisioning of Ghazni, were beyond the ken of those who, like himself, had based

their predictions of the safety of the large and well-provided force upon knowledge of place and people, and upon ordinary military considerations. He writes to Sir J. Carnac on February 10, 1842 :

‘I have proved a false prophet, alas ! as regards the issue of affairs at Cabool ;. but who could conceive that five thousand British troops would deliberately commit *suicide*, which literally has been the fate of the Cabool garrison ? From first to last such a tissue of political and military mismanagement the history of the world has never shown.’

After commenting in detail upon the errors committed, he concludes: ‘Within my own charge, I confidently trust to all going on well, in spite of the volcano around us. . . . you will see that I then (in 1839) predicted everything that has come to pass so far as the *Affghans* are concerned, though certainly I never could have believed that *our troops* in that country could be humbled to such a depth of degradation.’

APPENDIX F.

TREATMENT OF MAJOR OUTRAM, page 291.

IN reference to the peculiar treatment of Major Outram described in the text it would be unfair to his memory to pass by altogether the spontaneous expressions, however eulogistic, of two such competent observers as Henry Lawrence and Mountstuart Elphinstone. The former remarks in his already quoted article in the 'Calcutta Review' of September 1845 :

'In the year 1838, Outram carried to Affghanistan a character such as could not be paralleled by any officer of his standing in India. His services during the first Affghan war were second to those of no officer then and there employed. And had he remained in the Ghilzee country, or at Khelat, many of our disasters might have been averted. But it is by his civil management, first of Lower Sind, and then of both the Upper and Lower Provinces, and of all Beloochistan, that Outram has won our highest admiration.

'When the European inhabitants of Calcutta trembled for our Indian Empire—when, in the highest places, men grew pale at the evil tidings from Affghanistan—Outram held his frontier post with a firm hand, a brave heart, and cheerful tone that *ought* to have been contagious. Vigilant, conciliatory, courageous, he managed, with his handful of troops, not only to prevent the Ameers from taking advantage of our disasters, but to induce them to aid in furnishing supplies and carriage for the *relieving*, then considered the *retreating*, army. The merits of his exertions on that occasion are little understood. He obeyed as was his duty ; but he did not the less clearly perceive the ruinous tendency of the Government orders. He had the moral courage to sacrifice his own immediate interests by stemming the then prevalent tide of cowardly counsel.'

Regarding Hammersley's fate, Sir Henry remarked : 'Outram's

chivalrous defence of his assistant, Lieutenant Hammersley, is one of the many instances in which he advocated the right, at the peril of his own interests. Hammersley was as brave, as honest-hearted a young soldier as ever fell a victim to his duty. We knew him well; and no man who did so need be ashamed to shed a tear over his fate. He was literally sacrificed for telling the truth—a truth, too, that was of vital importance to the beleaguered Candahar army—nay, to the interests of British India! Peace be to the memory of this noble fellow!’

Mr. Elphinstone thus writes to one of the Directors of the East India Company in 1843: ‘ Besides his ample share in the planning and conduct of various military enterprises, his political services for several years have been such as it would be difficult to parallel in the whole course of Indian diplomacy. We forced a subsidiary grant and tribute on Sind; we made open war on the Brahoes of Khelat, killed their chief, and took their capital; and on these two powers, all our communications with Candahar depended. To keep them quiet, and prevent them thwarting our measures, would have been difficult even in times of peace and prosperity; yet such was Colonel Outram’s management as to obtain their cordial co-operation during the whole of our dangers and disasters in Affghanistan. Our movements in every direction from Candahar depending on the country supplies we received from them, all of which they might have withheld, without any show of hostility or ground of quarrel with us, had they been disposed for more open enmity—General England’s detachment could neither have retired or advanced, as it did; and it is doubtful whether Nott himself could have made his way to the Indus, through the opposition and privations he must have suffered in such a case. In an advance towards Cabul, he certainly could not, without the assistance he received through the Sind and Khelat country.’

APPENDIX G.

CONDITION OF THE AMIRS IN UPPER SIND, p. 313.

THE letter from which extracts are given in the text was written from Kháirpur on January 26. One of two days' earlier date from the same place, had put the General in possession of certain facts and figures, illustrating the reduced circumstances of the Upper Sind Amirs—brought about by our interference—which Sir Charles frankly acknowledged to have 'grieved him exceedingly.' The following extract will convey some notion of the money value of the territory and revenues lost to the chiefs :—

'The balance which now remains to the Ameers of Upper Sinda is rupees 14,29,000, and you are bound, I understand, to make good to Ali Moorad his share of the ceded country, which he claims to the value of 1,50,000 and which, in addition to his original territory of 2,95,000, gives him rs. 4,45,000. Added to this you are, I believe, pledged to give him one-fourth of the remaining property of Upper Sinda (or, of rupees 14,29,000)=rupees 3,57,250—Total rupees 8,02,250. Consequently, all that will remain for the support of the other Ameers and their families and feudal chiefs and dependents, as well as most of the Belooch chieftains who have hitherto enjoyed Jaghires in the portion of the territory to be made over to Meer Ali Moorad (who will undoubtedly eject them all sooner or later to make room for foreign mercenaries, relatives, and countrymen of his minister Ali Hoosein, and Afghans whom Ali Moorad particularly patronises)—will be rupees 6,26,750, who formerly enjoyed rupees 17,44,000, the revenue shared among them previous to our entering the country (exclusive of Ali Moorad's portion).

APPENDIX H.

EXTRACTS FROM A DESPATCH OF THE HONOURABLE THE COURT OF
DIRECTORS OF THE EAST INDIA COMPANY TO THE GOVERNMENT
OF BOMBAY : DATED SEPTEMBER 25, 1845, NO. 25, page 379.

3. On the death of the late Rajah at Kolapoor in November 1838, it became the duty of the British Government to make arrangements for the government of that country during the minority of the present Rajah. The treaty of 1829 had given us the right of appointing a minister, but your predecessors preferred to give their support to the administration which might be acceptable to the persons of greatest influence in the State itself. The Sirdars of Kolapoor had mostly attached themselves either to the Rajah's mother (Tara Bâee) or to the Diwan Sahiba, widow of a previous Rajah. After a short and successful attempt to combine these parties in a joint administration, the Diwan Sahiba was made Regent, and the two principal Sirdars of her party, Rowjee Wukuns and a Dinkur Row Guicowar, were appointed to assist her, as Karbarrees (or minister), with the aid of another Chief named Moro Punt.

4. The arrangement proved a failure, the corruption, profusion, and incapacity of the Administration led you in the beginning of 1843 to set it aside and to banish the two Karbarrees, Rowjee Wukuns and Dinkur Row Guicowar, from the seat of government. In our letter dated February 28, No. 3, 1844, paragraphs 3 and 7, we approved this course.'

5. The attempt was now made to form an administration from the other of the two rival parties, that of Tara Bâee, the Mâee Sahib. A Regency was formed consisting of the Raj Adnya (the principal Sirdar of that party) and Hindoo Row Guicowar, a Mahratta Chief, of whom Mr. Townsend, at that time Political Agent, entertained a high opinion. It was intended still to

retain Moro Punt, as a member of the Regency, but he declined to act.

6. The new administration proved itself equally incompetent with the former. In a letter dated September 12, 1843, Mr. Townsend, after representing various instances of its 'inertness and folly' declared that 'no actual revenue settlement had been made for the last two years,' that 'for that period no exact accounts of income can be given,' that the 'corruption and mismanagement at Colapore are on a gigantic scale,' that every reform was utterly hopeless 'under a management so devoid of energy as that of the Raj Adnya'—'whether imbecility or knavery be the cause, whether fear of those around him, or a hope that the Agent will be changed and a change of measures adopted, I cannot say for certain, but the result is the same, nothing is done towards a reform, things continue at the worst.' On January 15, Mr. Townsend reiterated his conviction of the 'indolence, inefficiency, and deceit' of the 'Raj Adnya,' and said that to effect any improvement while he is Karbarree is out of the question.' He reported that it had been impossible by any amount of importunity to obtain from the Karbarree the accounts of receipts and disbursements since the Rajah's death, and that 'his yads to the Durbar were mere waste papers.' He expressed, as he had previously done, his conviction that it was necessary to appoint as chief manager a person wholly independent of the Durbar of Kolapoor.

7. The two Kolapoor parties having thus successively proved their unfitness to be entrusted with office, you abandoned the attempt to form an exclusively native administration; and, on the recommendation of Mr. Townsend, Dajee Kristna Pundit, a servant of the British Government and Dufterdar of Dharwar, was placed at the head of the Regency. With him were at first associated Hindoo Row Guicowar, a member of the preceding ministry, and Kassinath Punt, the government Akhbār-navis. These individuals, however, were shortly suspended by Mr. Reeves, who had succeeded Mr. Townsend as Political Agent. The grounds of their suspension were, in the case of Hindoo Row, that the administration of which he had formed a part was found to have left a great deficiency in the treasury, and to have, immediately before giving up office, unauthorisedly, and (it was suspected) corruptly, released a number of Enams which had been attached. The suspension of

Kassinath Punt was caused by his having withheld from Mr. Reeves a knowledge of the release of the Enams and by various complaints of his having abused the influence which he derived from his office of Akhbār-navis; and we must here remind you that the inquiry into the conduct of this individual has never been completed, Mr. Reeves (in consequence, no doubt, of the subsequent press of more urgent duties) having never furnished the additional information called for in your Secretary's letter of October 2, 1844.

8. On April 5, 1844, Dajee Kristna Pundit commenced his functions as chief minister of Kolapoor. On July 22 the first manifestation took place of armed opposition to his administration. The Ghudkurees or hereditary garrison of the fort of Boodurghur shut the gates against the Mamlutdar, and were immediately joined in their insubordination by those of Samunghur. Attempts were made by Mr. Reeves to open a communication with the Ghudkurees for the purpose of conciliation, but without success. The only grievance which they alleged was that the number of Mamlutdars of the Kolapoor State having (for reasons of economy) been reduced, the forts had no longer, as before, Mamlutdars to themselves, but were included in larger districts. It was from the first the opinion of Mr. Reeves and of Dajee Kristna that the Ghudkurees acted at the instigation of some persons of influence at Kolapoor.

9. A force under Lieutenant-Colonel Wallace marched from Belgaum on September 16, to reduce the refractory forts and reached Samunghur on the 19th. The Ghudkurees persevered in their resistance. From a variety of causes, among which imperfect information respecting the strength of the fort (for which imperfection it is very difficult to account) appears to have been the principal, the defence was unexpectedly and most unfortunately protracted, and Samunghur did not fall into the hands of our troops until October 13, when it was taken by storm. During the interval the insurrection had become general. The town of Chickodee in the British territory was surprised, and its treasury plundered. The Ghudkurees of Munshur, a fort in the Kolapoor country, but overlooking that of Sawunt Warree, commenced aggressions upon the last-mentioned territory. The strong forts of Punalla, and Pownghur in the northern part of Kolapoor were placed in a state of defence. The troops at Kolapoor itself, under a leader named Babajee Ahirakur, seized upon the minister Dajee

Kristna, and upon the young Rajah's tutor, threw them into confinement at Punalla, and recalled the former Karbarrees, Rowjee Wukuns and Dinkur Row Guicowar, whom, together with the Dewan Sahib, they reinstated in the administration.

10. After the capture of Samunghur and the defeat of a party of the Kolapoor insurgents who were on their way to relieve that place, the primary object was to suppress the insurrection at Kolapoor itself. For this purpose Lieutenant-Colonel Outram (who, having volunteered to proceed to the scene of disturbance, had been placed by your Government under the orders of Mr. Reeves) moved forward with a light detachment towards Kolapoor, and in a few days succeeded in obtaining peaceable possession of the town and fort and of the Rajah's person. A large portion, however, of the Sebundy, headed by Babajee Ahirakur left the place and continued in arms. Before Lieutenant-Colonel Outram was admitted into the town he had promised (on condition of immediate submission) what was called an amnesty, and this measure, being in the first instance imperfectly reported to you, appeared to you extremely objectionable. On further explanation, however, it appeared that (besides the exception made of all who were concerned in the affair at Chickodee, or who had committed any other act of aggression against British territory) the chiefs themselves had received no promise of pardon, in case they should afterwards prove to have instigated the rebellion, and the amnesty altogether was conditional upon establishing the existence of grievances. Lieutenant-Colonel Outram gave every facility and even encouragement to the troops and people to make their grievances known. Very few complaints, however, were made, and these were not only trifling, but appeared on examination to be unfounded. The Karbarree Dajee Kristna came out with unblemished character from the investigation, and the amnesty was nullified by the failure of an essential condition.

11. The movement of Major-General Delamotte's force against Boodurghur, which had been suspended while Kolapoor itself was in insurrection, was now resumed, and on November 10 the Major-General obtained possession of the fort, having first granted terms to the Ghudkurees considerably more favourable than was consistent with the intention or even the orders of your Government, and this too although Babajee Ahirakur and his followers

had been admitted into the fort and were hurried out at one gate while Major-General Delamotte entered by another.

12. Boodurghur is at no great distance from Munohur, and the force under Major-General Delamotte was about to proceed against the latter place when it was summoned to the northward in consequence of the intelligence that Lieutenant-Colonel Ovans (who was on his way to Kolapoor by order of Government to assume the temporary management of that State) had been waylaid and carried off by the Ghudkurees of Punalla. The necessity of this northward movement was the more unfortunate as at the same time a formidable insurrection broke out in the Sawunt Warree. The Phond Sawunt family (who since their pardon by Government appeared to have resumed their former turbulent habits) rose in arms, and persuaded Anna Sahib, the son of the Surdessye, to go off with them to Munohur. In a short time no part of Sawunt Warree could be said to be in the possession of the Government, except the town itself, and the posts actually held by detachments of troops. Plundering incursions were also frequently made into British territory towards Baitsee and Parghur on the one side, Rairee, Vingorla, and Malwa on the other.

Paragraph 13, referring to the imprisonment of Colonel Ovans, states: 'We must express our satisfaction . . . that Mr. Reeves and Lieutenant-Colonel Outram refused to listen to any propositions from the insurgents previously to his release. That release, when it took place, not having been accompanied by any offer of submission, except upon conditions which could not be granted to armed insurgents, it unhappily became necessary to storm the fort; and the chief insurgent leader, Babajee Ahirakur, fell in the assault.'

The origin of the insurrection is thus sketched and commented on :—

16. The territory of Kolapoor contains thirteen forts, twelve of them hill-forts, and in point of situation among the strongest in the world. Of these thirteen, eleven have on this occasion been in arms against our Government, the exceptions being the two forts of Gunjundurgur and Sewghur, belonging to the dependent Chief of Bowra. The resistance has in general been obstinate; no less than six of the forts were either taken by storm or evacuated after a first unsuccessful assault. Besides this, all, or nearly all

its troops were concerned in the establishment of the unauthorised Government at Kolapoor.

17. According to your statement, 'there are strong reasons for believing that there is not a single person of any note connected with the Kolapoor State who will not be found more or less implicated in the late unlawful proceedings in that territory.'

18. Such a display of hostility cannot in our opinion be explained by the intrigues of a few persons, or by any partial or local dissatisfaction. The feeling must have been national. What has taken place is not an insurrection of disaffected subjects against the Kolapoor Government, but a general rising of the Kolapoor State against the British power.

19. The British Government had given no just cause for any such manifestation of animosity. Its interference in the affairs of Kolapoor had been entirely disinterested, having no other aim than the benefit of the Rajah and of the State. Nor had it attempted any fundamental alteration of existing institutions. Its object had been to correct gross abuses and to secure the better working of the existing machinery of government.

20. The motives of the Kolapoor Sirdars and those of Ghudkurees require to be distinguished.

21. Mr. Reeves and Lieutenant-Colonel Outram have made a careful investigation in relation to both.

22. From the evidence forwarded with Mr. Reeves' letter dated December 30, 1844, it appears that before the commencement of operations against Samunghur (but not before the Ghudkurees began their resistance) Babajee Ahirakur and other leaders of the Sebundeas had a secret interview with Dinkur Row Guicowar; that the prolonged resistance of Samunghur determined their subsequent conduct; that several of the Mankurries or dignitaries of the State, came into their views at an early period; that after the seizure of Dajee Kristna 'all the Mankurries, and Huzzrias of the Putucks assembled, and in the presence of Dinkur Row, Rowjee Wukuns, Humunt Bahadoor and both Princes, all touched the Maharajah's idol, and bound themselves by an oath to be faithful to one another, and to obey the two Karbarrees, Rowjee Wukuns and Dinkur Row; and that they immediately despatched agents to seek assistance from Goa and Sawunt Warree.' The motive assigned is dissatisfaction at the appointment of a foreign Kar-

barree. On the part of those connected with the two previous administrations, resentment at the loss of power and of legitimate or corrupt emolument was the obvious inducement. On the part of the military leaders the motive was said to be 'that they were now under a Karbarree sent by the British Government with whom nobody's intercession had any weight, who did not send for any of them, and to whom they could not apply for any presents, which they used to do when they were under their own Karbarrees.

23. There is evidence to show that even after the Chiefs at Kolapoor had ostensibly submitted to Lieutenant-Colonel Outram, some of them were in communication by emissaries (Lallgeree Gossavee, Sukharam Ghutkey, and others) with the Ghudkurees of Punalla; it seems even probable that the seizure of Lieutenant-Colonel Ovans was brought about by information received from Kolapoor, and it was the arrival of Sukharam Ghutkey and Lallgeree Gossavee of Punalla which, after the Ghudkurees had almost resolved to submit, decided them to hold out. It is asserted the Ghudkurees and Babajee Ahirakur expected that the Dewan Sahib and the Rajah's brother would come out and openly countenance their resistance, and there is considerable reason to believe that such was really the intention of those persons, though frustrated by Lieutenant-Colonel Outram's vigilance. On the several points, however, which relate to Punalla, Mr. Reeves (as appears from his letter of March 19) is much less decided in his opinion than Lieutenant-Colonel Outram.

24. The motives of the Dewan Sahib and the Kolapoor Sirdars for the course they adopted are obvious, and those of the leaders of the Kolapoor troops are also sufficiently intelligible. But the Ghudkurees were differently situated. They do not appear to have been deprived of any illicit gains by reforms in the administration.

25. There is, however, no sufficient reason to believe that any instigation from Kolapoor preceded the first acts of insubordination by Samunghur and Boodurghur Ghudkurees. The evidence points rather to the conclusion that the discontented at Kolapoor were encouraged to what they did by the previous resistance of the Ghudkurees, and especially by the prolongation of the siege of Samunghur.

26. We feel little doubt that the Ghudkurees of the two forts

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were originally acted upon by fear of encroachment upon their rights and privileges, though they may have been encouraged to prolong their resistance by inducements held out from Kolapoor.

27. It has been proved that the rights of the Ghudkurees had not in fact been encroached upon. Their only actual grievance was that their forts and the villages from which they derived their revenues were merged in larger revenue districts; and even this arrangement had been adopted (though not carried into effect) under the Karbarrees who preceded Dajee Kristna Pundit in the administration. But under the former system the Mamlutdar was under the orders of the Chief of the Ghudkurees who communicated directly with the Durbar. Under the new system the Chief of the Ghudkurees was under the orders of the Mamlutdar, a change naturally offensive to their pride, and which in minds probably distrustful of the general tendency of our system might easily appear to be a preparation for placing the districts altogether under Khálsa management. They might also very reasonably presume that the revenue officer of a large district would be less acquainted with, and less careful of, their rights than an officer who resided in the midst of them; who was, ostensibly at least, under their orders; and who, having the charge of their district and of no other, was in a manner identified with themselves.

28. The evidence of the Boodurghur prisoners transmitted by Mr. Reeves in his letter of December 3, 1844, gives strong confirmation of these opinions. Although the dues of the Ghudkurees had not been interfered with by the new Mamlutdar, it appeared that alarm had been given by counting their houses and fruit-trees, and the privilege of sealing with their own seal all the orders and letters issued from the fort had been discontinued. It is also asserted that they had been threatened with the discontinuance of some minor privileges.

29. Mr. Reeves says 'they had ample opportunity afforded them for making known all circumstances in their condition which they felt irksome and grievous.' But men who were accustomed, as these doubtless were, to look upon their military prowess, and the strength of their forts, as the only security for their prescriptive rights against the usurpations of even their own Government, naturally shut the gates of their fort on the first serious indication of what they deemed a purpose of encroachment.

Paragraph 34 is illustrative of the enlightened spirit and sound judgment of the Court. It states :

That portion of the Kolapoor troops who did not quit the place with Babajee Ahirakur, nor commit any subsequent acts of insubordination, have been pardoned unconditionally, and you have directed 'that their former situations and privileges be continued to them as long as they conduct themselves properly.' At a later period an amnesty was tendered to the Sawunt Warree insurgents, except the leaders and those personally implicated in any outrage, provided they laid down their arms within a certain time. We should have been glad if, on the termination of military operations in the Kolapoor country, a similar amnesty could have been granted to the misguided subjects of that State. You have determined that such of the Kolapoor offenders as it might be necessary to bring to justice (including the Sirdars Rowjee Wukuns and Dinkur Row Guicowar), should be tried by Mr. Lumsden aided by native assessors. By a subsequent arrangement, those taken in our own territory of the Coulon are to be tried by Mr. Brown, an acting judge of the Sudder Adawlut on circuit.

We conclude our extracts with the nine following paragraphs :—

38. The forts of every description are to be dismantled (except that, with respect to Munsontosh and Munohur, you were waiting for a report from Lieutenant-Colonel Outram), the functions of the Ghudkurees, an hereditary garrison, being thus superseded; the Ghudkuree system is to be abolished, but the hereditary privileges of the Ghudkurees are to be retained by them (except when lawfully forfeited) on conditions to be clearly stated and understood by them, that their services are to be made available for other useful State purposes, such as a local police force for every district, &c.

39. The military force of the State, already limited by treaty to 400 horse and 800 infantry, is to be disbanded, saving (we trust) the faithful execution of any promises which have been given to the portion of the Sebundy who, as already noticed, had received a full pardon from Government.

40. A local corps, similar to that of Sawunt Warree, is to be formed, and employment given in it to as many as possible of the able-bodied Ghudkurees; to such of them as cannot be employed

either in this manner or on police duties you intend to hold out encouragement for engaging in cultivation.

41. An addition of three companies and a second in command is to be made to the Sawunt Warree local corps, and some portions of the forfeited possessions of the chiefs of the insurrection in that territory are to be bestowed as rewards on those who have adhered to our interests.

42. The little territory of Vishulghud, subordinate to Kolapoor, has been taken, for the present, under British management.

43. Finally, Lieutenant-Colonel Ovans having resigned the offices of Resident at Sattara and the command of the troops at that station, you have conferred those appointments upon Lieutenant-Colonel Outram, in consideration of the gallant and energetic spirit in which his operations in Sawunt Warree have been undertaken, and the ability with which they have been carried into execution.

44. To all these measures we have the satisfaction of giving our entire approbation.

45. In consideration of the zealous and valuable aid which Chintamun Row, the Chief of Sanglee, has afforded to your Government, both in troops and by advances of money during the disturbances, you recommended that, as one of the most gratifying marks of honour which could be conferred upon that respectable Chief, a sword, with a suitable inscription, should be presented to him by the Court. We shall take immediate steps for carrying this suggestion into effect.

46. In conclusion, we feel it a duty to express our sense of the vigour and promptitude with which the powers and resources of your Government have been placed at the disposal of the officers entrusted with the immediate conduct of the late operations. We must also applaud the sincere desire which you have manifested to ascertain and redress all real grounds of complaint, and we trust we shall find that you have been equally disposed to make due allowance for even groundless apprehensions and to be satisfied with the fewest and least severe examples, consistent with making the needful impression on the minds of the disaffected.

EXTRACTS FROM SIR JAMES OUTRAM'S MINUTE
OF JANUARY 2, 1860.¹

ON THE AMALGAMATION OF HER MAJESTY'S INDIAN FORCES WITH
THE BRITISH ARMY. (75 Paragraphs.)

The so-called mutiny.—Bear in mind how unspeakably great had been our recent obligations to the European troops of the East India Company, as well as to their glorious comrades of the Royal Army, who had cheerfully laid down their lives to save an empire that then appeared tottering to its fall. Think of the marvellous deeds of valour they had just performed, of the privations and hardships they had endured, and of the (to them) heavy losses which many of them had sustained beyond the destruction of that *kit* for which alone they could hope to obtain compensation. Remember that the Press had long teemed with denunciations of the Government on the ground that we were cruelly negligent of the claims of our own countrymen, while, as was alleged, we were needlessly caressing and enriching natives who had but scanty claims on our consideration. Recollect that for years past a painful conviction had pervaded the Army that the Government had not behaved fairly to it in the matter of prize—a conviction which led to the destruction, in Lucknow alone, of property to the extent of many tens of thousands of pounds—to the destruction, indeed, of all frangible property which could not be appropriated by the captors, who (and the men were *not* Company's soldiers) declared that 'Government should make nothing by it.' Keeping all these facts in view, let us place ourselves in the position of the Company's European soldiers, when informed that, owing to financial difficulties arising out of that mutiny which they had so zealously and successfully aided in subduing, they were—on what they regarded as a lawyer's quibble—to be deprived of that re-enlistment (with

¹ These Minutes are referred to in Book III. Ch. VI., near the close of the Second Volume.

the bounty which that re-enlistment implied) to which the Prime Minister of England had declared them fully entitled. And doing this we must admit that some allowance should be made for their conduct.

Injustice to India of amalgamation.—But granting, as I readily do, that for all the purposes of *real soldiership*—for marching, for bivouacking, roughing it in the field, and fighting, Indian regiments are superior to those that have not had the like experience of the real and distinctive elements of military life; I cannot admit either the policy or the equity of upsetting the military system under which India was gained and has been maintained—dealing a grievous blow at our Eastern Empire, imposing vast burdens on our Eastern native fellow-subjects, and inflicting cruel wrongs on six thousand English gentleman who have well acquitted themselves of their duties, though unfortunately they have but little aristocratic interest, and no Parliamentary or Press influence, simply that an increased number of the regiments of Her Majesty's Line may acquire a greater practical knowledge of their profession. If the real objects of the proposed amalgamation be merely to give Indian experience to a greater number of Royal regiments, let the twenty-four corps of the line and four regiments of cavalry, which before the mutinies were found sufficient to supplement the local force, be relieved every ten, every seven, or if need be every five years, the Imperial Treasury bearing the additional cost.

Comparative cost.—It is a fact that the local European corps of India actually cost less than the line regiments supplied from England. The pay of officers and men is alike—their rations, clothing, &c., the same. But, partly owing to the costliness of the separate depôt system, two companies of each regiment being kept up in England—partly owing to the greater sickness to which, as a rule, they are subject for the first few years of their service—the fact is as I have stated it. The average number of line regiments coming out to India before the mutinies was $1\frac{3}{4}$ per annum: under the amalgamation system it would, even with reliefs only after fifteen or twenty years' service, be five or six per annum, involving a proportionably increased cost to the State.

The cadets of the old régime.—They have come out to India as boys—healthy, ingenuous, manly boys, ignorant of the enjoyments and dissipations of 'life' in England, and full of eager expectations

in respect of the country which is to be their *home* for the next twenty or thirty years. On their arrival they have been thrown into close contact with men who had resided long in India and acquired a knowledge of its people, its languages, its religions, and its civil and military history. From these they have taken their tone—acquiring from them a vast fund of information not to be obtained in books, and practical maxims, the result of the experience of many generations. Associating with such men, they have early become ‘ambitious to emancipate themselves from griffinhood’—in other words, to acquire a thorough familiarity with the country, its customs, and its concerns. Taking readily to field sports, they have necessarily been thrown into intimate intercourse with the natives under circumstances which begot in them kindly feelings towards the latter. They have thus early learned to penetrate below the surface of the native character, to admire its good features, and to understand and guard against its less amiable peculiarities; and thus did they acquire that knowledge of the workings of the native mind which enabled them in after-life to discharge with efficiency, and in kindness, the various military, political, departmental, and administrative duties assigned to them. Such were the men, and such was the training of the men, who have hitherto commanded the regular and irregular corps of the local army; who have been the private friends and official counselors of the chiefs and nobles and gentry of India; who have managed and controlled those enormous commissariat and other military establishments, through the working of which the native masses are brought into contact with Europeans; who have wandered amongst the rural population, and been brought into intimate relations with it in the pursuit of sport, and when officially engaged in conducting surveys, adjudicating disputes, constructing bridges, roads, and tanks, suppressing violence, redressing wrongs, and performing those numberless miscellaneous duties that so constantly devolve on military officers in this country. Deeply interested in the native masses, such men were to be found sitting for hours under the shade of a village tree in earnest colloquy with the people—listening to their tales, answering their questions, clearing their minds of misapprehensions, giving them advice, and rendering them practical aid in many ways. . . . It may be said that when amalgamation takes place, India will be supplied as before with young men

who, inspired by the prizes which the staff and departmental offices hold out, will exert themselves as earnestly and as successfully in the acquisition of local knowledge and experience as their predecessors of the local army. I reply :—‘ the thing is impossible ; the lads may bring the same earnestness, but it is impossible they can achieve equal success. They will not be placed under those conditions of early association and local training to which, much more than to formal study, the success of their predecessors was due. . . . ’

[The Appendices A and B to Sir James Outram’s ‘ Amalgamation ’ Minute of January 2, 1860, must be read as a whole in order to obtain any idea of the elaborate scheme for the instruction of both private and officer, and of the equally elaborate scheme of organisation of the army staff in all grades, military and medical, which their one hundred and fifty paragraphs or clauses set forth. The following are selected from those which, in Appendix A, relate to the professional prizes to be held out for attainment by privates of the Indian Local European Army.]

Commissions.—I desire to replenish the local force with a higher class of men than those who form the present average of our British armies—to entice into our ranks the steady, sober, and moral peasants and artificers of Britain, and steady, sober, moral, and intelligent men of a still higher parentage and education, but of humble means and uninfluential connections. Such men I would seek—in the interests of the State, and for the honour and moral influence of our nation in this country—to attract to our colours by opening to every private of high moral character and superior zeal and ability, the opportunity of working his way up to the highest of our staff appointments and the highest of our military ranks and commands. I propose to make such a feat difficult of accomplishment—too difficult to awaken any reasonable jealousy of those who enter the army as commissioned officers, but still sufficiently practicable to the worthy, the able, the resolute, the industrious, to offer a strong inducement to such to enter the service.

Unattached commissions.—And I propose to allow steady, sober, intelligent, and industrious privates to attain the dignity of a commission on still lower terms. I propose to allow *any* private who by professional excellence and good conduct has raised himself to the position of a non-commissioned officer, and who having for a

certain length of time served with honour in that position, has possessed himself of the accomplishments (general and professional) required of an ensign aspiring to a lieutenant's commission, to earn for himself, as of right, by honourable service as a non-commissioned officer, an ensign's commission, with subsequent promotion according to certain defined rules. Without contending against the conversion of deserving non-commissioned officers into *regimental* commissioned officers, I abstain from recommending it as part of my scheme. I only ask that they should be furnished with *unattached* commissions; and I propose to employ them (with the position and all the social considerations attaching to commissioned officers) in the various departments and administrative posts now held by 'clerks,' 'deputy' and 'assistant commissaries,' 'conductors,' &c., whose monthly salary is equal to and above that of regimental ensigns, lieutenants, and captains. . . .

Results of proposed scheme.—And what would not be the advantage to India of the presence of such a body of men as our European local corps would become under the moral influence of the class of men I speak of, and under the influence of that fine spirit of emulation in steadiness, and mutual accomplishment, which the adoption of my scheme would induce? In what respects is that scheme impracticable? As to its expense, even if it did to a small extent increase the annual military outlay of the country, it would still be cheapness itself as compared with the cost of the amalgamation scheme; and I am convinced that if fair play be given to my scheme in its integrity—which involves superior sanitary arrangements, the encouragement of industry, &c.—the health and longevity of the troops would be so improved that a very considerable saving would be annually effected in hospital expenses (a terribly large item), invaliding charges, &c. The retiring pensions I propose conferring on unattached officers would probably be less, certainly not greater, than the average amount of retiring pensions enjoyed by uncovenanted civilians.

[From 'Supplementary Minute' by Sir James Outram, of February 11, 1860, intended as an additional appendix to his 'Amalgamation' Minute of January 2, 1860. (114 paragraphs.) On Sanitary and General Improvements for the well-being of the European soldier in India.]

'Board ship' arrangements—*Officers.*—Considerable care should

be taken in the selection of the officers placed in command even of the smallest detachments. I solemnly declare that I would rather a detachment were put under the control of the captain of the ship, than subjected to the command of a military officer inexperienced in, or unsuited for the management of European soldiers—of a tyrannical, hard, unsympathising, foul-mouthed man—of a puppy who, considering duty a bore, cares not to disguise his feelings; or even of a good-natured, well-meaning man of indolent and slovenly habits, given to the perfunctory performance of his work. Still more do I deprecate recruits being placed under an officer who cannot command himself, whether his inability to do so arise from want of temper or from intemperance in the use of wine. Yet, painful as it is, I am constrained to confess that I have known of many cases, in which such exceptionable men have been placed in charge of recruits; in fact I know that I accurately describe the present state of matters when I say that, in the nomination of officers to the charge of troops, these special qualifications for the officer are little considered. It is assumed that any man who has served a certain number of years in the army, and obtained a certain rank, is fit for the post. But this is a grievous mistake. Thrown together as officers and men necessarily are on board ship, no evasion of duty on the part of the former, no disingenuous fudging of work, no vicious habits, no deficiency in the qualifications for command, no indifference to the feelings or comfort of the men, can possibly escape the observation of the latter, who, poor fellows, have not much else to observe. And little idea can be formed, by those who have not investigated and pondered over the matter, of the demoralisation and permanent contempt for authority—nay, of the positive vindictiveness towards all exercising it—which may thus be acquired by soldiers in the course of a four months' voyage; to say nothing of the evil habits into which they fall, under the *ennui* of a long confinement on board ship, when deprived of that of which they never ought to be deprived—the ever-vigilant control and paternal guardianship of a firm, but benevolent, conscientious, and intelligent officer. . . .

Non-commissioned officers on board.—But, besides subalterns, the commanding officer should have a staff of experienced and efficient non-commissioned officers, in a proportion of not less than one to every fifty men. And, as well to secure an adequate supply of

these for every batch of recruits, as in acknowledgement of the great merits of that most estimable body of men, I would recommend that four non-commissioned officers per regiment should annually receive an eighteen months' modified furlough to Europe. . . .

Instruction on board.—In my former Minute I recommended that, so far as might be practicable, the systematic course of instruction in which the men had been engaged in *dépôt* should be continued on board ship. . . . But in addition to the ordinary school tuition thus recommended, it is, I think, desirable that the troops should be instructed in matters specially relating to the country whither they are proceeding: what to look for, and 'how to observe' that which will be presented to their eyes—the general geographical and ethnographical features of India—its climatic peculiarities, the influence of these on health, and the mode in which their morbid tendencies may best be neutralised. These are topics on which the medical and other officers would generally be competent to enlighten the men. But to avoid all risk of this species of instruction being neglected, I would recommend that a course of lectures (prepared under authority by some competent person) should be printed and supplied to the commanding officer of each detachment, together with an adequate supply of maps, pictures, models, and diagrams for their due illustration. . . .

Two or three hours per week, devoted by each of the officers to the instruction of those solicitous for it, in drawing, mathematics, fortification, or such other branches as they might be qualified to teach, would be but a slender tax on them, and might hereafter prove a boon of exceeding value to some of their humbler fellow-voyagers. A single hour *per diem*, devoted by each officer to friendly conversation with the men on the library books they were perusing, would not be missed by him, and could hardly fail to be appreciated by them.

And no one who has seen much of the European soldier on his first arrival in India can doubt that the lessons thus given (in Hindustani colloquial phrases, &c.) would prove to him very useful, smoothing away many of his early difficulties, and saving him from many an imposition, and many a fracas with natives. Were the medical officer to devote three hours per week, on a four months' voyage, to the instruction of such men as chose to avail themselves of his offer, in bandaging, in the use and application of tourniquets,

in the art of extemporising these by sticks and handkerchiefs—and in other such-like minor items of surgical procedure, I feel assured he would find an abundance of apt pupils.

Punishment of the 'brute' on board.—Adequately aided by the non-commissioned officers who, I have recommended, should be sent with each detachment, I believe it to be perfectly possible for a firm and judicious commanding officer entirely to put a stop to the use of that coarse and prurient language, intended for the women's ears, which, too generally, I believe, is made use of in the lower deck at night. I am as averse as any man can be to corporal punishment; but I do not hesitate to say that, were I in command of troops on a sea voyage, I would for the third offence of this nature, scourge the filthy scoundrel's back till he howled in very agony. The first offender I would put on bread and water for forty-eight hours, keeping him a prisoner near the wheel the whole time, if the weather permitted: the second I would additionally subject for a week to fatigue work of the hardest and most menial character: the third, as I have said, I would appeal to in the only way in which such a degraded animal could be successfully appealed to on board ship—by the torture of his unmanly carcase. The offence is a brutal and a cowardly one—its possible results very dreadful; and the punishment should be that suited to a brute and a coward, and one calculated by its severity to prevent a repetition of the offence by the same man, or by others.

Effect of careful attention to 'board ship' life.—And I maintain that, under a judicious system of training during a four months' voyage, very much may be done to invigorate the constitutions of our men, and to repair the evil effects of previous enervating habits—very much to enhance their efficiency as soldiers—very much to beget in them a taste for reading and simple and innocent recreations—very much to fortify them against the temptations, and moral and constitutional dangers, to which they will be exposed on landing—and very much indeed to awaken and foster in them kindly, grateful, and reverential feelings towards their commissioned superiors, by practically demonstrating to them that their present comfort and future welfare are objects of affectionate solicitude to the latter.

Refinement in barracks.—But I confess myself one of those who believe that external circumstances very powerfully influence the

inner man—that there is a very intimate connection between material and moral refinement. Every argument in favour of substituting neatness for squalor in the dwellings of the humbler classes in civil life, appears to me as logically establishing the propriety of elevating mere neatness into elegance. And every argument in behalf of uncostly and modest elegance, which is valid in respect of the civil population, I conceive to be *a fortiori* applicable to their military brethren. . . .

I ask not for the dandyism, but for the decencies of the mess-house, for extreme cleanliness, and for such little elegancies as matting for the floor, chicks for the doors and windows, uncostly but artistically commendable prints for the walls, chairs and benches a little above the roughest products of bazaar manufacture, trays (be they of the coarsest tin) to preserve the tables from the stains of porter mugs and coffee cups, metal plates for receiving pipe-ashes, and decent spittoons. . . .

Canteens.—Whatever decision be arrived at as regards the appearance and furniture of our military canteens, let us, at all events, do our utmost to induce our soldiers to seek such refreshments as they require (or fancy they require) where wholesome beverages are supplied to them, rather than go in quest of them to the vile dens which are, and ever will be, accessible to them, be our cantonment regulations ever so stringent. Give them, in our own canteens, shade and coolness (by punkahs and tatties when necessary) in the day-time—abundant illumination in the evenings—light, unadulterated beer to any extent they choose to pay for—wholesome spirits (that is spirits as little prejudicial as absolute purity can render them), when only spirits will satisfy their morbid cravings—and though they may at times exceed, their excesses will injure them less than if practised in the hot dirty bazaars, where the veriest poison is sold under the name of liquor—and where the drinking den and the brothel, when not identical, are conterminous. In the canteens they will, at least, be under surveillance and control, and when tipsy they can be at once removed to their barracks, thus avoiding the scandal and injury which the public display of their debauchery inflicts on the British name and the Christian faith. And just in proportion as we carry out the recommendations I have made in this and my previous Minute, and supplement these recommended measures by compelling our canteen-keepers to furnish

rich, strong, delicious coffee, genuine and well-made tea, and good and cheap ginger-beer, lemonade, and soda-water—by bestowing on our canteens the comforts, in the *English-looking* elegancies for which I plead—by supplying them with the means of innocent and sedentary recreation—and by covering their tables with the lightest of light and amusing, but wholesome, periodical literature—just in the same proportion shall we win our soldiers from the love of alcohol, and gradually give them a distaste for those coarser excitements in which only at present can the rougher of them realise what they call ‘life and fun,’ but from which not a hundred-brigadier-power, however energetically exerted, could *drive* them until substitutes are provided such as I have suggested.

Mental culture.—I would endeavour to supply stimuli to mental culture, and to furnish its means, to those whom the regimental school, and the prizes it holds out, fail to attract thither. And I look, in the event of the arrangement above recommended being adopted, to the officers of our military stations supplementing the efforts of Government by the delivery of lectures to the men on many interesting subjects.

Effects of such a system.—That, by providing him with amusements and offering him remunerative employment, you will convert a drunkard into a sober man, or a bad soldier into a good one—inspire a grumbler or a ‘lawyer’ with contentedness and the spirit of prompt and willing obedience—drive out invincible indolence from a lazy fellow, or confer smartness on the man of slovenly tastes and habits—I do not for a moment suppose. But I do believe that you may reclaim those who are only negatively bad, and confirm those who have good and healthy principles, and keep in the right path an overwhelming majority of those who hereafter join the army; elevating them in their own and the world’s estimation, preserving their health, vastly enhancing their efficiency, and bestowing upon our own military service a prestige which shall make it popular amongst classes higher in the social scale than those from which its ranks are now mainly recruited.

FROM A MINUTE BY SIR JAMES OUTRAM,
OF FEBRUARY 21, 1860.

ON 'MISCELLANEOUS QUESTIONS AFFECTING THE ORGANISATION AND
EFFICIENCY OF THE INDIAN ARMY.' (30 Paragraphs).

The 'individuality' of the soldier.—I believe that the tendency of our military system has been mischievously to repress his *individualism*, to weaken his sense of personality, and thus to check the development of that intelligent consciousness of personal capacities, and of that desire to multiply his resources of independent action, the want of which is apt to prove most lamentable in many of the contingencies of active service. . . . I believe that much more could (and ought to) be done, to augment the *individual* efficiency and practical knowledge of our men. . . . I would not leave the matter one altogether of choice. I would *compel* our men to acquire a practical knowledge of everything that could influence their individual comfort, safety, and efficiency, in every conceivable contingency of active service. I would take care that each soldier was thoroughly indoctrinated in all such practical expedients and their philosophy, as are, for example, laid down in Mr. Galton's useful little book, 'The Art of Travel.' . . . He should, moreover, be made thoroughly to understand the *rationale* of all the movements, formations, and evolutions, to the mechanical performance of which he is drilled. He should be habituated to contemplate, and to frame for himself rules of action in trying emergencies, which may at any time occur on field service—such, for instance, as those in which detached posts lose their commissioned and non-commissioned officers, or pickets are cut off from their supports (as has happened sometimes in jungly districts during the recent campaigns and in the immediate neighbourhood of the enemy, for hours, and even

days together). He should be not only theoretically, but practically trained to the procedure and precautions indispensable in that street, suburb, and jungle fighting to which no judicious leader will ever unnecessarily expose him, but which it is impossible always to avoid in the conduct of military operations. Very much more attention should be paid to his perfection in marksmanship than I fear, is, or at all events used to be, the case. . . . I conceive moreover that *every* infantry soldier (and not merely a percentage of each corps) should be taught artillery drill, and often exercised in it, so as to keep him qualified to act as a gunner on any sudden emergency. . . . Four or six hours per week, in the hot season, devoted to (what for want of a better term I shall call) 'the theoretical instruction of their men,' would not be an excessive demand on the captain of a company and his subalterns. . . .

Practical drills.—I believe that they might be advantageously substituted for some of the regular 'horse in the mill' battalion parades, in which zealous commanding officers luxuriate morning and evening in the cold season, and which, in some regiments, are carried to an extent that not only wearies, but positively *stupifies* both officers and men. It is amidst ruined buildings, and the débris of old villages, hedges, cornfields, topes of trees, broken ground, the unequal banks of nullahs, &c. &c., that the 'light infantry drill' of the smooth parade-ground can alone be perfected into that which will often be demanded of the soldier in the field. . . .

Military topography.—I hold it to be a primary duty with each officer above the rank of lieutenant, on the arrival of his regiment at any station, to familiarize himself most thoroughly with its military topography. I would that I could lay my hands on Sir Henry Lawrence's remarks on this subject . . . Like all his words, they were words of wisdom; and as the voice of that great and good and sagacious man, speaking from his grave, they would have an influence far beyond that which I can hope will be accorded to my own feeble utterances.

Independent commands.—Most earnestly do I advocate—and for the reasons so ably and forcibly adduced by Sir Bartle Frere—the maintenance of the present arrangement by which each of the three older Presidencies is provided with a separate army. And with him I most sincerely believe, that the less we trammel our commanders—whether regimental, brigade, divisional, or chief—with

'regulations,' and the more we allow them full scope for the play of their individual energies—*so long as we scrupulously exclude from commands of every kind any save those most fit to hold them,* the more efficient will be our armies.

Red-tape and suspicion.—When we catch a rogue let us punish him with exemplary severity ; but let us not perpetuate a system which seems to assume that every officer would be a rogue if he could, and, by its infinity of invidious checks, almost exonerates our functionaries from any regard for the pecuniary interests of the public not prescribed by the strict letter of the regulations.

Most of the details I have given involve *principles*—all of them I deem of practical importance—and when I have seemed to urge for adoption that which has been already adopted, I have merely meant to express my conviction that it has not been carried out as it *might* and *ought* to be carried out.

As regards Sir James Outram's forebodings of the evil results of amalgamation of the Royal and Indian armies, we recall attention to the following extract from a letter which appeared in the 'Times' of September 15, 1864, from its Calcutta correspondent, writing after a three years' experience of the dreaded measure :

'Everyone acquainted with military affairs can perceive that the "amalgamation" of the Indian and English armies has not worked well. Indian officers used to take a sincere interest in their labours: they knew their men well, they tried to turn them into efficient soldiers, they were content to spend their days here in the discharge of duties of which they were proud. Be the cause what it may, it is certain that this is all changed. Queen's officers hate the country with a bitter hatred, and the army has been weakened by illiberality and injustice. The disadvantages of destroying the Indian army,—disadvantages which such men as Lord Stanley, Sir John Lawrence, Sir James Outram, Sir R. H. Vivian, and Colonel Durand foresaw when they opposed the amalgamation,—are working their full measure of evil. The army now shares the feeling which is so prevalent in English society here of hating the country, and the ever-present desire to get home. Is it desirable to strengthen these views in the army?'

A despatch from Lord Cornwallis, written in 1795 to the Court of Directors, contains the following important paragraph, which, if forgotten in the letter, is not obsolete in spirit :

‘The conditions on which the European non-commissioned officers and soldiers at present in the Company’s service have enlisted cannot be altered, and therefore those men who do not choose on receiving a new bounty to re-enlist voluntarily on the usual terms in the King’s service can only be required to perform the engagements in India which they have contracted to the Company, subject during those periods to the Articles of War (which in no essential point differ from those of His Majesty) under which they enlisted, and after the expiration of those engagements they are to be furnished with passages to Europe in the Company’s ships.’

The above extract, found among Sir James Outram’s papers, was on a proposal, in 1795, to transfer the Company’s army to the Crown.

END OF THE FIRST VOLUME.

